ledge of God, and of Chrift, and of our duty, is of the greatest usefulness and neceflity to us in order to our happiness. It is of abfolute neceffity that we fhould know God and Chrift, in order to our being happy : This is life eternal, (that is, the only way to it), to know thee, the only true God, and him whom thou haft fent, Jefus Chrift, John xvii. 3. It is neceffary also, in order to our happiness, to know our duty; because it is neceffary for us to do it, and it is impoffible to do it. except we know it.

So that whatfoever other knowledge a man may be endued' withal, he is but an ignorant perfon who doth not know God, the author of his being, the preferver and protector of his life, his fovereign and his judge, the giver of every good and perfect gift, his fureft refuge in trouble, his best friend or worst enemy, the prefent fupport of his life, his hopes in death, his future happinefs, and his portion for ever; who does not know his relation to God, the duty that he owes him, and the way to please him who can make him happy or miferable for ever; who doth not know the Lord Jefus Chrift, who is the way, the truth, and the life.

If a man, by a vaft and imperious mind, and a heart large as the fand upon the fea-fhore, (as it is faid of Solomon), could command all the knowledge of nature and art, of words and things; could attain to a myftery in all languages, and found the depths of all arts and fciences; meafure the earth and the heavens, and tell the ftars, and declare their order and motions; could difcourfe of the interefts of all ftates, the intrigues of all courts, the reason of all civil laws and constitutions, and give an account of the hiftory of all ages; could fpeak of trees, from the cedar-tree that is in Lebanon, even unto the hyffop that springs out of the wall; and of beafts alfo, and of fowls, and of creeping things, and of fishes; and yet fhould, in the mean time, be destitute of the knowledge of God and Chrift, and his duty; all this would be but an impertinent vanity, and a more glittering kind of ignorance; and fuch a man (like the philofopher, who, whilft he was gazing upon the stars, fell into the ditch) would but fapienter defcendere in infernum, be undone with all this knowledge, and with a great deal of wisdom go down to hell.

H. That

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II. That to be religious is the truft wisdom; and that likewife upon two accounts,

1. Because it is to be wife for ourselves.

2. It is to be wife as to our main intereft and concernment.

ift, It is to be wife for ourselves. There is an expreffion, Job xxii. 2. He that is wife, is profitable to himfelf; and, Prov. ix. 12. If thou be wife, thou shalt be wife for thyfelf: intimating, that wildom regards a man's own intereft and advantage; and that he is not a wife man that doth not take care of himself and his own concernments; according to that of old Ennius, Nequicquam fapere fapientem, qui fibi ipfi prodeffe non quiret. That man hath but an empty title of wif "dom, and is not really wife, who is not wife for him"felf." As felf-prefervation is the first principle of nature, fo care of ourselves and our own intereft is the first part of wisdom. He that is wife in the affairs and concernments of other men, but careless and negligent of his own, that man may be faid to be bufy, but he is not wife he is employed indeed, but not fo as a wife man should be. Now, this is the wisdom of religion, that it directs a man to a care of his own proper inte reft and concernment.

2dly, It is to be wife as to our main intereft. Our chief end and highest interest is happiness and this is happinefs, to be freed from all, if it may be, however from the greateft, evils, and to enjoy, if it may be, all good, however the chiefeft. To be happy, is not only to be freed from the pains and difeafes of the body, but from anxiety and vexation of fpirit; not only to enjoy the pleasures of fenfe, but peace of confcience, and tranquillity of mind. To be happy, is not only to be fo for a little while, but as long as may be, and, if it be poffible, for ever. Now, religion defigns our greateft and longest happiness; it aims at a freedom from the greatest evils, and to bring us to the poffeffion and enjoyment of the greateft good: for religion wifely confiders, that men have immortal fpirits; which, as they are fpirits, are capable of a pleasure and happiness di ftinct from that of our bodies and our fenfes; and, becaufe they are immortal, are capable of an everlasting happiness. Now, our fouls being the best part of ourfelves,

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felves, and eternity being infinitely the moft confider able duration, the greatest wisdom is, to fecure the intereft of our fouls and of eternity, though it be with lofs, and to the prejudice of our temporal and inferior interefts. Therefore religion directs us rather to fecure inward peace than outward eafe; to be more careful to avoid everlasting and intolerable torment, than fhort and light afflictions which are but for a moment; to court the favour of God more than the friendship of the world; and not so much to fear them that can kill the body, and after that have no more that they can do, as him who, after he hath killed, can destroy both body and foul in hell. In a word, our main intereft is, to be as happy as we can, and as long as is poffible; and if we be caft into fuch circumstances, that we must be either in part, and for a time, or else wholly and always miferable, the best wisdom is, to chufe the greatest and most lafting happinefs, but the leaft and fhortest mifery. Upon this account religion prefers thofe pleafures which flow from the prefence of God for evermore, infinitely before the tranfitory pleasures of this world; and is much more careful to avoid eternal mifery than present fufferings. This is the wifdom of religion, that, upon confideration of the whole, and cafting up all things together, it does advise and lead us to our beft interest.

Secondly, The fecond way of confirmation fhall be by endeavouring to fhew the ignorance and folly of irreli gion. Now, all that are irreligious are fo upon one of thefe two accounts: either, firft, Because they do not believe the foundations and principles of religion, as the existence of God, the immortality of the foul, and future rewards : or elfe, fecondly, Becaufe, though they do in fome fort believe thefe things, yet they live contrary to this their belief; and of this kind are the far greatest part of wicked men. The firft fort are guilty of that which we call fpeculative; the other, of practical Atheism. I fhall endeavour to fhew the igno rance and folly of both thefe.

Firft, Speculative Atheism is unreafonable; and that upon thefe five accounts. 1. Because it gives no tolerable account of the existence of the world. 2. Nor does it give any reasonable account of the univerfal confent of mankind in this apprehenfion, that there is a

God.

God. 3. It requires more evidence for things than they are capable of. 4. The Atheist pretends to know that which no man can know. 5. Atheism contradicts itself.

I. Because it gives no tolerable account of the existence of the world. One of the greatest difficulties that lies in the Atheist's way is, upon his own fuppofition, that there is no God, to give a likely account of the existence of the world. We fee this vaft frame of the world, and an innumerable multitude of creatures in it; all which we who believe a God, attribute to him as the author of them. For a being fuppofed of infinite goodness, and wisdom, and power, is a very likely cause of these things. What more likely to make this vaft world, to ftretch forth the heavens, and lay the foundations of the earth, and to form these, and all things in them, of nothing, than infinite power? what more likely to communicate being, and fo many de grees of happiness, to so many feveral forts of creatures, than infinite goodness? what more likely to contrive this admirable frame of the universe, and all the crea tures in it, each of them fo perfect in their kind, and all of them fo fitted to each other, and to the whole, than infinite counsel and wifdom? This feems to be no un⚫ reasonable account.

But let us fee now what account the Atheist gives of these things. If there be no God, there are but thefe two ways imaginable for the world to be. Either it must be faid, that not only the matter, but also the frame, of this world, is eternal; and that, as to the main, things always were as they are, without any first caufe of their being; which is the way of the Ariftotelian Atheist, (thofe I mean who proceed upon Aristotle's fuppofition of the eternity of the world, but yet deny it to be from God, which he exprefsly afferts): or else, the matter of the world being fuppofed to be eternal, and of itself, the original of this vaft and beautiful frame must be ascribed merely to chance, and the casual concourse of the parts of matter; which is the way of the Epicurean Atheift. But neither of thefe ways gives a tolerable account of the exiftence of the world.

I fhall firft confider the hypothefis of those whom, for diftinction's fake, I call the Ariftotelian Atheists; which

is

is this, That not only the matter, but also the frame of the world, is eternal; and that, as to the main, it was always, as it is, of itself; and that there hath been from all eternity a fucceffion of men and other creatures, without any first cause of their being.

It seems to be very hard, and, if that would do any good, might be juft matter of complaint, that we are fallen into fo profane and fceptical an age, which takes a pleasure and a pride in unravelling almost all the received principles both of religion and reafon : fo that we are put many times to prove thofe things which can hardly be made plainer than they are of themselves. And fuch almoft are these principles, That God is, and, That all things were made by him; which, by reason of the bold cavils of perverfe and unreasonable men, we are now-a-days put to defend.

That fomething is of itfelf, is evident, because we fee things are. And the things that we fee, must either have had fome firft caufe of their being, or have been always, and of themselves. One of these two is unavoidable.

So that the controverfy between us and this fort of Atheists comes to this: Which is the more credible opinion, That the world was never made, nor had a beginning, but always was as it is; and that there hath been from all eternity a fucceffion of men and other creatures, without any first cause of their being or, That there was from all eternity fuch a being as we conceive God to be, infinite in power, goodness, and wisdom, which made us and all other things? The firft of thefe opinions I fhall fhew to be altogether incredible; and the latter to have all the credibility and evidence of which a thing of that nature is capable, and fuch evidence as is fufficient to convince any impartial and confiderate man.

Now, in comparing the probabilities of things, that we may know on which fide the advantage lies, these two confiderations are of great moment; What the arguments are on each fide? and, What the difficulties? For if there be fair proofs on the one fide, and none at all on the other; and if the most preffing difficulties be on that fide on which there are no proofs, this is fuffi