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cannot, how can he reasonably expect that any man in the world fhould believe it?

2. That it is not neceffary to the true nature of faith, that we thould be infallibly fecured of the means where. by the Christian doctrine is conveyed to us; particular ly of the antiquity and authority of the books of fcripture, and that the expreffions in it cannot poffibly bear any other fenfe. And these are the very things I inftance in, in the paffage fo often mentioned. And to thefe Mr S. ought to have spoken, if he intended to have confuted that paffage. But he was refolved not to speak diftinctly, knowing his beft play to be in the dark, and that all his fafety lay in the confufion and obfcurity of his talk.

Now, that to have an infallible fecurity in thefe particulars, is not neceffary to the true nature of faith, is evident upon thefe two accounts; becaufe faith may be without this infallible fecurity, and becaufe, in the particulars mentioned, it is impoffible to be had.

1. Because faith may be without this infallible fecurity. He that is fo affured of the antiquity and authority of the books of scripture, and of the fenfe of those texts wherein the doctrines of Chriftianity are plainly delivered, as to fee no just cause to doubt thereof, may really affent to thofe doctrines, though he have no infallible fecurity. And an affent fo grounded I affirm to have the true nature of faith. For what degree of affent, and what fecurity of the means which convey to us the knowledge of Chriftianity, or neceffary to the true nature of faith, is to be eftimated from the end of faith, which is, the falvation of mens fouls. And whoever is fo affured of the authority and sense of scripture, as to believe the doctrine of it, and to live accordingly, fhall be faved. And furely fuch a belief as will fave a man, hath the true nature of faith, though it be not infallible. And if God have fufficiently provided for the falvation of men of all capacities, it is no fuch reflection upon the goodness and wisdom of providence as Mr S. imagines, that he hath not taken care that every man's faith fhould arrive to the degree of infallibility; nor does our bleffed Saviour, for not having made this provifion, deferve "to be esteemed by all "the world, not a wife lawgiver, but a mere ignora

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mus and impoftor," as one of his fellow-controver tifts (Labyrinthus Cantuarienfis, p. 77.) fpeaks with re

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Befides, this affertion, That infallibility is neceffary to the true nature of that affent which we call faith, is plainly falfe upon another account alfo; becaufe faith admits of degrees, but infallibility has none. The fcrip ture speaks of a weak and a strong faith, and of the increase of faith; but I never heard of a weak and strong infallibility. Infallibility is the highest perfection of the knowing faculty, and confequently the firmeft degree of affent, upon the firmeft grounds, and which are known to be fo. But will Mr S. fay, that the highest degree of affent admits of degrees, and is capable of increase? Infallibility is an abfolute impoffibility of being deceived. Now, I defire Mr S. to fhew me the degrees of abfolute impoffibility; and if he could do that, and confequently there might be degrees of infallibility, yet I cannot believe that Mr S. would think fit to call any degree of infallibility a weak faith or affent.

2. Because an infallible fecurity in the particulars mentioned, is impoffible to be had; I mean in an ordinary way, and without miracle and particular revela tion; because the nature of the thing is incapable of it. The utmost fecurity we have of the antiquity of any book, is human teftimony; and all human teftimony is fallible, for this plain reason, because all men are fallible. And though Mr S. in defence of his beloved tradition, is pleafed to fay, that human teftimony in fome cafes is infallible; yet I think no man before him was ever fo hardy, as to maintain, that the teftimony of fallible men is infallible. I grant it to be in many cafes certain, that is, fuch as a confiderate man may prudently rely and proceed upon, and hath no just cause to doubt of; and fuch as none but an obftinate man or a fool can deny. And that thus the learned men of his own church define certainty, Mr S. (if he would but vouchfafe to read fuch books) might have learned from Melchior Canus; who, fpeaking of the firmnefs of human teftimony in fome cafes, (which yet he did not believe to be infallible), defines it thus: Thofe things

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De loc. theol. lib. 11. c. 4. Certa apud homines ca funt, que negare fine pervicacia et ftultitia non possunt.

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"are certain among men, which cannot be denied without obftinacy and folly." I know Mr S. is pleased to fay, that certainty and infallibility are all one; and he is the first man that I know of, that ever faid it. And yet perhaps fome body may have been before him in it; for I remember Tully fays, That "there is nothing fo "foolish, but fome philofopher or other has faid it.' F am fure Mr S.'s own philofopher, Mr White, contradicts him in this moft clearly, in his preface to Rufhworth's dialogues; where, explicating the term moral certainty, he tells us, That "fome understood it by fuch a certainty as makes the caufe always work the fame "effect, though it take not away the abfolute poffibility "of working otherwife:" and this, prefently after, he tells us, "ought abfolutely to be reckoned in the degrees of true certainty, and the authors confidered as mistaken in undervaluing it." So that, according to Mr White, true certainty may confift with a poffibility of the contrary; and confequently Mr S. is miftaken, in thinking certainty and infallibility to be all one. Nay, I do not find any two of them agreeing among. themselves about the notions of infallibility and certainty. Mr White fays, That what fome call moral certainty, is true certainty, though it do not take away a poffibility of the contrary. Mr S. afferts the direct contrary, that moral certainty is only probability, because it does not take away the poffibility of the contrary. The Guide in controverfies, p. 135. differs from them both, and makes moral, certain, and infallible, all one. I defire that they would agree thefe matters among themfelves, before they quarrel with us about them.

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In brief, then, though moral certainty be fometimes taken for a high degree of probability, which can only produce a doubtful affent, yet it is alfo frequently used: for a firm and undoubted affent to a thing upon fuch grounds as are fit fully to fatisfy a prudent man; and in this fenfe I have always used this term. But now infallibility is an abfolute fecurity of the understanding. from all poffibility of mistake in what it believes. And there are but two ways for the understanding to be thus fecured; either by the perfection of its own nature, or by fupernatural affiftance. But no human understand

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ing being abfolutely fecured from poffibility of mistake, by the perfection of its own nature, (which I think all mankind, except Mr S. have hitherto granted), it follows, that no man can be infallible in any thing, but by fupernatural affiftance. Nor did ever the church of Rome pretend to infallibility upon any other account, as every one knows that hath been converfant in the writings of their learned men. And Mr Creffy, in his anfwer to Dr Pierce, p. 88. 89. hath not the face to contend for any other infallibility but this, That" the im"mutable God can actually preferve a mutable creature from actual mutation." But I can by no means agree with him in what immediately follows, concerning the omniscience of a creature, "That God, who is abfolutely omniscient, can teach a rational creature "all truths neceffary or expedient to be known; so that

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though a man may have much ignorance, yet he may "be in a fort omnifcient within a determinate fphere." Omnifcient within a determinate Sphere, is an infinite within a finite fphere; and is not that a very pretty fort of knowing all things, which may confift with an ignorance of many things? Of all the controvertists I have met with, except Mr S. Mr Creffy is the happiest at thefe fmart and ingenious kind of reafonings.

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As to the other particular, of the fenfe of books, it is likewife plainly impoffible that any thing fhould be delivered in fuch clear and certain words as are abfolutely incapable of any other fenfe; and yet, notwithtanding this, the meaning of them may be fo plain, as that any unprejudiced and reasonable man may certainly understand them. How many definitions and axioms, &c. are there in Euclid, in the fenfe of which men are univerfally agreed, and think themselves undoubtedly: certain of it? and yet the words in which they are ex-^ preffed, may poffibly bear another fenfe. The fame: may be faid concerning the doctrines and precepts of the holy fcriptures; and one great reafon why men do not fo generally agree in the fenfe of thefe as of the other, is, because the interefts, and lufts, and paffions of men are more concerned in the one than the other. But whatever uncertainty there may be in the sense of any text of fcripture, oral tradition is fo far from affording

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us any help in this cafe, that it is a thousand times more uncertain, and lefs to be trufted to; efpecially if we may take that to be the traditionary fenfe of texts of fcripture, which we meet with in the decretals of their Popes, and the acts of fome of their councils; than which never was any thing in the whole world more abfurd and ridiculous; and whence may we expect to have the infallible traditional fenfe of feripture, if not from the heads and reprefentatives of their church?

This may abundantly fuffice for the vindication of that paffage which Mr S. makes fuch a rude clamour about, as if I had therein denied the truth and certainty of all religion; but durft never truft the reader with a view of thofe words of mine upon which he pretended to ground this calumny. But the world understands well enough, that all this was but a fhift of Mr S.'s, for the fatisfaction of his own party, and a pitiful art to avoid the vindication of Sure footing, a task he had no mind to undertake.

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And yet the main defign of this book, which he calls Faith vindicated, &c. is to prove that which I do not believe any man living ever denied, viz. That what is true is not poffible to be falfe: which, though it be one of the plainest truths in the world, yet he proves it fo foolishly, as would make any man (if it were not evident of itself) to doubt of it. He proves it from logic, and nature, and metaphyfics, and ethics, &c. I wonder he did not do it likewife from arithmetic and geometry, the principles whereof, he tells us, (Sure footing, p. 93.) are concerned in demonftrating the cer tainty of oral tradition." He might alfo have proceeded to aftrology, and palmistry, and chymistry, and have fhewn how each of thofe lend their affiftance to the evidencing of this truth. For that could not have been more ridiculous, than his argument (Faith vindic. p. 6. 7.) from the nature of fubject, and predicate, and copula in faith-propofitions; because, forfooth, whoever affirms any propofition of faith to be true, affirms it impoffible to be falfe. Very true. But would any man argue, that what is true is impoffible to be falfe, from the nature of fubject, predicate, and copula? for be the propofition

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