other. So, in the proposition, the house decays; the house denotes one object, decays another; but the proposition denotes one as the predicate of the other; that is, it denotes the house as the subject of decays.

§ 347. The relation of terms in associations as subjects and predicates corresponds to the relations of the objects of ideas as contemplated by the human mind. In thinking of objects we regard them as subjects and predicates, and we do this universally. No object of thought is perceptible or possible which does not admit of being viewed by the mind in connection with any one of its other objects of thought, and made the joint object of a common thought in which either of the two may sustain the relation of subject or predicate to the other. This fact is the foundation of propositions consisting of subjects and predicates. It is a fundamental law of thought and is distinctly recognized in the structure of all languages and all possible modes of expressing ideas. Terms express thoughts and the objects of thought, in their elements; propositions in associations of two and two. Terms express thoughts and the objects of thought absolutely; propositions express them in their primary and fundamental relations to each other in associations of two and two. Terms express thoughts and objects of thought as unities; propositions as dualities beginning in one unity and terminating in another. The idea expressed by a proposition embraces two distinct conceptions comprehended in one; it commences with an idea of one object as a subject and unites with this in one more extended conception, the idea of another object as its predicate. The subjective relation is one of the first objects and elements of human knowledge, and one that enters fundamentally into all associations of ideas in aggregates of two and two. Our conceptions of things as subjects and predicates, arises necessarily from our conceptions of them as things, and from contemplating them together in associations of two and two Suppose, for example, we are contemplating an apple, and we think of its form. We contemplate the apple as one thing, and its form as another; and get the idea of the apple as the subject, and the form as the predicate; which we ex press in the sentence, an apple has form; or we contemplate an apple and abstract the idea of size, and then, by contemplating the two together, we get the idea expressed by the proposition, an apple has size, and so on. But it makes

no difference how the second idea is suggested, or from what source it is derived, if we bring the two together and make them the simultaneous objects of thought, and compare them deliberately together we shall predicate one of the other in some of the categories of judgment. The leading idea, which ever it may be, will be made the subject, and the final idea the predicate of a complex thought capable of being expressed by a proposition.

Division of Propositions into Premises and Conclusions.

$248. On a comparison of propositions we find them capable of being divided into premises and conclusions. Premises are those propositions from which others are derived; conclusions are propositions derived from others.. Conclusions are capable of serving as premises for other propositions, and are either premises or conclusions, in different instances in which they occur, according to their position and relations, as derivative or a source of derivation for other propositions. In many cases, the same proposition sustains the double character of a conclusion and a premise, being derived by inference from previous propositions, and serving as a ground of inference for subsequent ones.

The origin and derivation of ideas is one of the most profound and difficult subjects of human inquiry; and is involved in all those investigations in which we inquire concerning the correctness or incorrectness of particular ideas. To prove that an idea is correct, we must show valid grounds from which it may be derived. These grounds must be found in the original conditions of sensations and consciousness, or else in previous ideas derived directly or remotely from these conditions. The correctness of every questionable idea mist, therefore, be proved in one of two ways. We must go back to sensations and consciousness, and come down by a regular succession of judgments, till we arrive at the idea in question; or we must begin from some unquestionable idea, and come down from that by a continued series of inferences, till we obtain the idea in question; or else we must begin with the idea, and reason from it to some conclusions which will prove its incorrectness by their absurdity; in which case we may know that it is false, without passing any judgment on its derivation. When we have deduced a conclusion from a proposition

which we know to be true, we may be as certain of the truth of our conclusion as of the proposition from which it is deduced. Truth is not diluted by the length of the series of successive judgments through which it is derived. The first conclusion by which we infer sensible objects from sensations, is not more certain than the fiftieth or five hundreth, in a series of consecutive judgments deduced from our primitive ones.

Nature and Object of Syllogisms.

§ 249. In the acquisition of knowledge, the natural direction of the human mind is from particular objects to general and universal ones, and all that is known is contemplated in universal or generic and particular relations. In forming ideas of known objects, we do not always start from the primitive conditions of the formation of those ideas, but deduce them from the nearest general object to which they belong; thus, if the question is whether the pope is fallible or not, we do not decide this question by any deductions from the primitive conditions of judgment; but having generalized the whole subject of human liability to error, we infer from this general idea, the particular one, that the pope is liable to error. Our reasoning in this case stands thus:

1. All men are liable to error;

2. The pope is a man;

3. Therefore, the pope is liable to error;

So, if the question is whether piety or learning will be an advantage to an individual, on the whole, we may decide it from a general conclusion on the subject, as follows:

1. All rational beings are benefited by piety and learning; 2. The person in question is a rational being;

3. Therefore he will be benefited by piety and learning; These are specimens of analytical reasoning, in which a general conclusion serves as a premise from which to deduce less general or particular ones. It is a kind of reasoning for which we have great use, and to which we are indebted for almost the entire mass of our practical judgments.

$250. Arguments of the above description are denominated syllogisms. The first proposition states a general truth, by predicating a certain thing of a universal term, and is called the major premise. The second proposition asserts

that the subject of the conclusion is a subordinate genus or individual, comprehended in the subject of the major premise, and is called the minor premise. The third proposition is called the conclusion. Whenever the first two of these propositions are true, the third is true. If either of the first two are false, the third will be liable to be erroneous. The following may serve as examples of fallacies depending on erroneous premises:

1. All actions which are the objects of foreknowledge,

are necessary;

2. The moral actions of men are foreknown:

3. Therefore, the moral actions of men are neceesary. 1. Transgressing the laws of God is wrong;

2. Forcible resistance of injuries is a transgression of the laws of God;

3. Therefore, a forcible resistance of injuries is wrong. In the first of these syllogisms the major premise is not true. It is not true that all actions which are the objects of foreknowledge are necessary. We may know before hand, that men will commit particular crimes, and yet they may commit them with perfect freedom. There is no repugnance between foreknowledge and freedom, any more than there is between after knowledge and freedom. The conclusion in this argument, therefore, is false through a defect in the major premise.

In the second syllogism the minor premise is not true. Properly interpreted the law of God does not forbid all forcible resistance of injuries, but actually requires such resistance to be made. The conclusion in this argument is false, therefore, through a defect in the minor premise. In both these cases the conclusion is correctly inferred from the premises, but is incorrect through a defect in one of the premises. If both premises are incorrect, the conclusion. will, of course still farther fail of being established by them.

§ 251. Syllogisms may be defective by not having a universal term for the subject of the major premise, in which case the argument will stand thus:

1. Some modes of action in which persons pursue happi

ness are wrong;

2. Serving God for the sake of the eternal happiness both of ourselves and others, is a mode of pursuing happiness; 3. Therefore, serving God for the sake of the eternal happiness both of ourselves and others, is wrong

The defect of this argument is, that the subject of the major premise is not a universal term, and does not comprehend that of the minor premise and conclusion, as a species or individual under it. Both the premises, therefore, may be true, and the conclusion false.

§ 252. The form of the syllogism which has been given in the above examples, admits of variation; but it involves all the principles of syllogistic reasoning, and all other forms which establish legitimate conclusions may, by a slight change, be reduced substantially to this. In analytical reasonings, either of the premises may be suppressed, and the conclusion inferred from the other, the suppressed premise being understood; as,

1. All moral beings ought to be good;

2. Therefore, men ought to be good; or,

1. Men are moral beings;

2. Therefore, men ought to be good

In the first of the above arguments the minor premise is omitted, and in the second the major premise. The argu ments, however, are valid, and the conclusion true, because the omitted premises can be easily supplied, and are com prehended in the real grounds of the conclusion.

§253. Another mode of error in analytical reasoning, consists in drawing conclusions not in argeement with the premises The following is an example of this:

1. Whatever is productive of pain is a natural evil;

2. Disgrace is productive of pain;

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3. Therefore, we ought not willingly to expose ourselves to disgrace.

In this case the premises are both correct, but the conclusion is not in argument with them. The only proper conclusion from these premises is; therefore disgrace is a natural evil. Substituting that for the erroneous conclusion, the argument stands thus:

1. Whatever produces pain is a natural evil;

2. Disgrace is productive of pain;

3. Therefore disgrace is a natural evil.

If the premises are correct, and bear the proper relation to each other, and the conclusion is drawn in agreement with them, it must be true. If either, or both, the premises are incorrect, or if they do not sustain the proper relation to each other, they do not prove the conclusion.