Opinion of the Court. not such a joint tariff established, that the grain shipped from Nebraska was not shipped on such tariff, or that the tariff was itself a pretence. He does say that the naming of the points Turner and Rochelle, as termini of the shipment, was a mere device to evade the law, but what evasion, or how it operated to make the evasion, is not indicated. It is true he says that the grain was intended to be, and was in fact, transported by the defendant to Chicago. But it must have been so transported if it was shipped to the termini named in the joint tariff. It is true also that he alleges that when transported to Chicago the grain was sold on the market or delivered to connecting roads for eastern seaboard points. But which, he does not advise us. If the former, that might happen by the shipper's intercepting at Chicago a shipment made under the joint tariff through to one of the four eastern points; if the latter, it would necessarily occur if the shipment was under such tariff. So the former is consistent with and the latter implies the joint tariff. Neither makes certain any violation of the long and short haul clause. On the contrary, the plain implication of the averments of these counts is that there was such a joint tariff (indeed, it is alleged that it was never printed in type, was not circulated or published at any of the stations on defendant's road in Iowa, and no copy thereof filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission, as required by law; and also that it remained in force up to February 1, 1888, and that the corn shipped from Nebraska was shipped on that tariff); and further, that the ground of complaint is not that it did not exist, but that it was not published in Iowa; that plaintiff was not informed and did not know of its existence, and therefore did not get the benefit of it, but shipped his corn at local rates to Chicago instead. of at through rates to the eastern points. That the portion of a through rate received by one of the companies party thereto may be less than its local rate, is not questioned. The Interstate Commerce Commission, which has filed a brief in this case, and which has criticised some of the views expressed in the opinion of the Court of Appeals in the Osborne case, concedes this, and also that the judgment in that case was Opinion of the Court. right. All that it contends for is that the total through rate shall be greater than the local rate, so as not to violate in this respect the long and short haul clause. We pass, therefore, to consider the allegations as to the non-publication of this tariff. It is alleged that it was never printed in type, was never circulated or published at any of these stations on defendant's road in Iowa, that no copy thereof was ever filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission, and that the existence of the same was concealed from the knowledge of the plaintiff and other shippers in Iowa, and the benefits and advantages of the rates therein specified were denied to plaintiff and such other shippers. The burden of this is the ignorance of the plaintiff, through failure to publish this tariff at Iowa stations. The interstate commerce act, in section 6, requires the railroad company to post in every station along the line of its road its local tariffs. It also requires such carrier to file with the commission copies of all contracts, agreements or arrangements with other common carriers, and also copies of any joint tariffs made with such common carriers, and adds that "such joint rates, fares and charges on such continuous lines so filed as aforesaid shall be made public by such common carriers when directed by said commission, in so far as may, in the judgment of the commission, be deemed practicable; and said commission shall from time to time prescribe the measure of publicity which shall be given to such rates, fares and charges, or to such part of them as it may deem it practicable for such common carriers to publish, and the places in which they shall be published.” In the former cases it was shown that the commission had made a general order requiring the publication of joint tariffs "at every depot or station upon the line of the carriers uniting in such joint tariff, where any business is transacted in competition with the business of a carrier whose schedules are required by law to be made public as aforesaid," and it was there held that the places of shipment in Iowa were not competing points within the scope of this order, and that, therefore, no publication of this tariff at the points named was necessary. Counsel contends that this fact only appeared in Opinion of the Court. the evidence on the part of the defendant and is not disclosed or suggested in the petition in this case, and that the Court of Appeals improperly based its decision upon the supposed existence of this order. We do not so understand the scope of its opinion. No reference is made to any such order, and the case is discussed upon simply the averments in the petition. The allegation is that this joint tariff was not filed with the commission, and not published at the Iowa stations from which plaintiff made his shipment, and that in consequence thereof he was ignorant of its rates. His argument practically is that if the tariff had been filed with the commission it might have made an order, either general or special, requiring that it be posted at the Iowa stations; that if it had been so posted he might have examined the rates and might have determined to ship his corn, not to Chicago, but to one of the four eastern points named in such tariff. But these "might be's" interfere very materially with the line of sequence. He does not show that he had not already contracts with some consignee in Chicago, New Orleans or some place other than the four eastern points named in the tariff, for shipment to him of all grain at his command. He does not allege that he had or would have made any arrangement with any consignee in any of those points for the receipt and sale of his corn, or even that the extra commissions there would not more than make the difference in rates. In short, he does not allege, either directly or indirectly, that if he had known of these rates he would have shipped his corn, under this tariff, to either of those points, but rests his contention upon the suggestion that the mere difference in the prices would naturally have caused him to ship to one or the other of them, and thus to take advantage of the joint tariff. Every fact which he alleges might be absolutely and fully true, and yet he, with knowledge of the joint tariff, with the privilege of shipping under it, have never offered or sought to forward a single pound of corn to any other place than Chicago. Surely it needs but the statement of this to show that he comes far short of that rule of strict proof which enables one to enforce a penalty for wrong; for, if he would not under any circumstances have shipped to New York, was Opinion of the Court. compelled by his contracts or any other consideration to ship to Chicago, he cannot say that he was injured by his ignorance of the rate to New York. The only right of recovery given by the interstate commerce act to the individual is to the "person or persons injured thereby for the full amount of damages sustained in consequence of any of the violations of the provisions of this act." So, before any party can recover under the act he must show not merely the wrong of the carrier, but that that wrong has in fact operated to his injury. If he had shipped to New York and been charged local rates he might have recovered any excess thereon over through rates. He did not ship to New York and yet seeks to recover the extra sum he might have been charged if he had shipped. Penalties are not recoverable on mere possibilities. We think, therefore, without attempting to take judicial knowledge of the general order made by the Interstate Commerce Commission in reference to the publication of joint tariffs, the plaintiff has failed in that full and clear showing of injury which is necessary in order to justify a recovery under the interstate commerce act. With reference to the fifth count, little need be said. In that it is disclosed that the through rates to the four eastern points were largely in excess of the local rate charged by the defendant for shipment to Chicago. Of course, therefore, within any view of the scope of the fourth section - the one containing the long and short haul clause-there was no violation of its provisions. With reference to the matter of publication, nothing more need be said than has been in reference to such allegations in the prior counts, and as to the complaint of an unlawful preference and discrimination forbidden by the third section of the act, it is sufficient to refer to the fact heretofore noticed of the failure of the plaintiff to show a certain injury to him. These are all the matters that call for consideration. We see no error in the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and it is Affirmed. MR. JUSTICE BROWN took no part in the decision of this case. Statement of the Case. MERCHANTS' AND MANUFACTURERS' BANK v. PENNSYLVANIA. ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA. The decision of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania that the act of June 8, 1891, in respect of the taxation of national banks does not conflict with the constitution of that State is conclusive in this court. There is no lack of uniformity of taxation under that act which renders it obnoxious to that part of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution which forbids a State to "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws," as the right of election which, if not availed of by all, may produce an inequality, is offered to all. That act treats state banks and national banks alike; gives to each the same privileges; and there is no discrimination against national banks as such. The making the national bank the agent of the State to collect such taxes is a mere matter of procedure, and there is no discrimination against the national banks in the fact that the state banks are not so compelled, but the auditor general looks to the stockholders directly. The statute, by fixing the time when the bank shall make its report, and directing the auditor general to hear any stockholder who may desire to be heard, provides "due process of law" in these respects. THIS case comes on a writ of error to the Supreme Court of the State of Pennsylvania, and involves the validity of the statute of that State of date June 8, 1891, Laws Penn. 1891, p. 240, in respect to the taxation of national banks. The decision of that court was in favor of its validity, 168 Penn. St. 309. Sections 6 and 7 of the statute contain these provisions: "SEC. 6. In case any bank or savings institution incorporated by the state or the United States shall elect to collect annually from the shareholders thereof a tax of eight mills on the dollar upon the par value of all shares of said bank or savings institution that have been subscribed for or issued, and pay the same into the state treasury on or before the first day of March in each year, the shares and so much of the capital and profits of such bank as shall not be invested in real estate shall be ex |