Opinion of the Court. of the power of Congress over the public domain; and as its provisions embraced the present case, it must be adjudged that, at the date of the definite location of the line of the railroad referred to, there was a "lawful claim" upon the lands in controversy, based on the act of 1866; in other words, that act confirmed to the State, for the benefit of those who had purchased from it in good faith, all lands embraced by its provi sions, and not expressly excepted therefrom. The subsequent definite location of the line of the railroad did not withdraw from its operation any lands confirmed to the State. This doubtless was the view taken by the Land Department, which, after due notice to all parties interested, confirmed these lands to the State. The circumstance that the railroad company had, before that action of the Land Department, obtained a patent covering these with other lands, is not material, for the reason that they had been segregated from the public domain by the act of 1866, and were thereby excluded from the grant of 1862, notwithstanding they were within the exterior lines of the general route of the railroad. Besides, Menotti's proceedings under the act of 1866 were instituted in that department before the railroad company obtained its patent. Without considering other aspects of the case, we are of opinion that the defendant was entitled, upon the findings of fact, to a judgment in his favor. A judgment in favor of the plaintiffs was a denial of rights secured to the defendant by the laws of the United States. As the views we have expressed determine the case for the plaintiff in error, it is unnecessary to consider whether, as held by the Supreme Court of the State, the words in the fourth section of the printed act of July 2, 1864, 13 Stat. 356, c. 216, "the improvements of any bona fide settler, or any lands returned and denominated as mineral lands," should read "the improvements of any bona fide settler on any lands returned and denominated as mineral lands." The judgment is reversed, and the case remanded to the Supreme Court of California for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. Syllabus. DOMINGUEZ DE GUYER v. BANNING. ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA. The Board of Commissioners appointed under the act of Congress of March 3, 1851, 9 Stat. 631, c. 41, confirmed to Manuel Dominguez and others, claimants under a Mexican grant, a certain tract of land known as the Rancho San Pedro. Upon appeal to the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of California, the action of the Board was approved, and it was adjudged, February 10, 1857, that the claimants had a valid title to that ranche, the decree giving the boundaries to the lands so confirmed. In execution of the decree, the lands were surveyed under the direction of the United States surveyor general of California. The survey upon its face excepted, reserved and excluded from the claim surveyed the inner bay of San Pedro. Within the exterior lines of that bay is Mormon Island, containing at mean low tide 18.88 acres, and at mean high tide, about one acre. The survey having been filed in the Land Department, a patent was issued February 19, 1858, to the claimants under the decree of confirmation, conveying lands that were outside the exterior lines of the inner bay of San Pedro, and containing eight square leagues more or less. The patent followed the survey, and did not include that bay or any lands within its exterior lines. The present action was brought by various parties, asserting title under the decree of confirmation, to recover possession of the above 18.88 acres. The defendant claimed under a patent issued to him by the United States in 1881. No application was ever made to the District Court of the United States to correct any error in the decree of 1857, nor was any step taken to have a new survey or to obtain a patent conveying all the lands apparently embraced by that decree: Held, (1) If the surveyor general misinterpreted the decree of confirmation, and made a survey which excluded from the surveyed claim any of the lands within the lines given by that decree, it was within the power of the District Court to have its decree properly executed, and to that end to order a new survey; (2) While it may be true, in some cases, that an action to recover possession of lands confirmed to a claimant under the act of 1851 can be maintained before a patent is issued, a patent issued avowedly in execution of a decree passed under that act, was conclusive between the United States and the claimants, and until cancelled, such patent alone determines, in an action to recover possession, the location of the lands that were confirmed by the decree; (3) The patent in question having been accepted by the patentees, and Opinion of the Court. being uncancelled, the plaintiffs in this action, claiming under the patentees, cannot recover lands not embraced by it, even if such lands are embraced by the lines established by the decree of confirmation the conclusive presumption being that the patent, being uncancelled, correctly locates the lands covered by the confirmed grant. The court further said it was unnecessary to decide whether the defendant was entitled to a judgment on his cross-complaint, or whether the lands under the navigable waters of the inner bay of San Pedro, and those here in controversy or any part thereof, passed to the State of California upon its admission into the Union, or after the issuing of the patent of 1858. THE case is stated in the opinion. Mr. Jefferson Chandler for plaintiffs in error. Mr. Stephen M. White for defendant in error. Mr. Solicitor General filed a brief for the United States. MR. JUSTICE HARLAN delivered the opinion of the court. This action is in form ejectment. It was brought May 17, 1886, in the Superior Court of the county of Los Angeles, California, by Ana J. Dominguez De Guyer and others to recover the possession of a certain island known as Mormon Island in the inner bay of San Pedro, California. At mean high tide the island has an area of less than one acre; at mean low tide, about 18.88 acres. The area of the bay, including the island, is 1100.59 acres. The defendant Banning filed an answer, in which he denied the allegations of the complaint; also, a cross-complaint asserting title in himself, and asking a judgment declaring him to be the owner and of right in possession of the premises in controversy. A jury having been waived, and the cause having been tried by the court, judgment was rendered that the plaintiffs take nothing by their action, and that the defendant was the owner, seized in fee and entitled to the possession of the lands described in the pleadings. That judgment was reversed by the Supreme Court of California. Three of the members of that court as then constituted-Justices Fox, Sharpstein and Opinion of the Court. Paterson were of opinion that the island, as well as the whole of the inner bay within the exterior lines of a grant alleged to have been made by the Mexican government to Christobal Dominguez, belonged to the claimants under that grant, and that the title was vested in the plaintiffs. Mr. Justice Thornton was of opinion that the plaintiffs were entitled to recover the island and such other portion of the land sued for as contained 18.88 acres, and was not covered by the navigable waters of the inner bay. Chief Justice Beatty and Justice McFarland dissented. Upon a rehearing the court, then constituted of Chief Justice Beatty and Justices De Haven, McFarland, Harrison, Garoutte and Sharpstein, unanimously affirmed the judgment of the inferior court. 91 California, 400. The present appeal was prosecuted by the Los Angeles Terminal Land Company and George Carson, trustee, they having, after the final decision in the state court, become vested with all the right, title and interest of the original plaintiffs. The case has been twice orally argued in this court, and we have, in addition, the benefit of a brief filed by leave of court, on behalf of the United States in support of the judg ment below, the Solicitor General having stated that the Government has a deep interest in the result of the litigation by reason of the fact that it has heretofore expended vast sums of money in improving the navigation of the inner bay of San Pedro, and the entrance thereto; and that this bay is regarded as one of the most important points on the Pacific Coast as a harbor of refuge. The history of the title to the lands in controversy, as shown by acts of Congress, public documents and records is substantially as follows: By the act of Congress of March 3, 1851, 9 Stat. 631, c. 41, provision was made for the appointment of a Board of Commissioners to ascertain and settle private land claims in California. That act declared that every person claiming lands in that State by virtue of any right or title derived from the Spanish Opinion of the Court. or Mexican government should present the same to that Board, together with such documentary evidence and testimony of witnesses as the claimant relied upon in support of his claim -the decision when rendered to be certified, with the reasons on which it was founded, to the District Attorney of the United States for the District in which it was rendered. § 8. In case of the rejection or confirmation of a claim, provision was made for a review of the decision by the District Court of the District in which the land was situated; and an appeal was allowed from the judgment of that court to the Supreme Court of the United States. §§ 9, 10. When deciding on the validity of any claim the Board, as well as the courts, were to be governed by the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, the law of nations, the laws, usages and customs of the government from which the claim was derived, the principles of equity and the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States as far as they were applicable. § 11. By the thirteenth section of the act it was provided "that all lands, the claims to which have been finally rejected by the Commissioners in manner herein provided, or which shall be finally decided to be invalid by the District or Supreme Court, and all lands the claims to which shall not have been presented to the said Commissioners within two years after the date of this act, shall be deemed, held, and considered as part of the public domain of the United States; and for all claims finally confirmed by the said Commissioners, or by the said District or Supreme Court, a patent shall issue to the claimant upon his presenting to the General Land Office an authentic certificate of such confirmation, and a plat or survey of the said land, duly certified and approved by the surveyor general of California, whose duty it shall be to cause all private claims which shall be finally confirmed to be accurately surveyed, and to furnish plats of the same; and in the location of the said claims, the said surveyor general shall have the same power and authority as are conferred on the register of the land office and receiver of the public money's of Louisiana, by the sixth section of the act to create the office of surveyor of the public lands for the State of Louisiana,' |