Opinion of the Court. time for filing a bill of review had long ago elapsed. The Circuit Court could do nothing to affect the decree, except in obedience to the mandate of this court." After the mandamus was granted the Circuit Court entered the decree as ordered; and appointed another special master, directing him "to proceed to state an account between said parties according to the terms of this decree, and to that end he shall take testimony in writing of all witnesses produced, and shall report the same with all his proceedings and findings herein to this court." The statement of the account was in itself as the case stood a mere matter of computation, and the record does not show that there had been any surrender of possession or any other act after the decree of November 10, 1887, which would affect the final result. The master, however, instead of restating the account, corrected in the particulars indicated by us, proceeded to take new proofs as to rental value and the value of the improvements; and thereupon found the value of the improvements to be $2625, and cut down the rents to six dollars per front foot. The report was excepted to, the exceptions overruled, and a decree rendered January 23, 1894, that plaintiffs pay defendants the sum of $2316.23. From this decree. plaintiffs prosecuted an appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals. for the Eighth Circuit, the decree was affirmed, and the case was then brought to this court. 32 U. S. App. 342. In these proceedings in the Circuit Court there was error and its decree must be reversed. It is true that in Goode v. Gaines we said that defendants "should be charged with rental value from the date of the filing of the bills to the rendition of the decrees with interest," but we did not intend to be understood as holding that the rental value after that date had not been satisfactorily determined, and had in mind in that regard only the exclusion from the decree of November 10, 1887, of the amount found due plaintiffs for rent prior to that date, together with interest thereon. Nor did we intend that the finding by that decree of the then value of the improvements should be disturbed. The reversal of that decree amounted to nothing more than Opinion of the Court. a vacating of the accounting so as to permit of a modification thereof in particulars pointed out with sufficient precision in the opinion, and it might well be held that the Circuit Court had no power, under our mandate, to again go into the questions of rental rate and value of improvements, for they had been determined, and an accounting was only required to bring the amounts, including subsequent taxes, if any, paid by defendant, and interest down to date. But, apart from that, the rent prescribed by the lease was at the rate of ten dollars per front foot, and this did not appear from the extrinsic evidence to be unreasonable or excessive. Nor does the additional evidence, when carefully analyzed, all the evidence being taken together, compel to any other conclusion. So that, without being absolutely controlled by the terms of the lease, and without attributing conclusive effect to the first report and the decree thereon, we remain of opinion that the rental value per annum of ten dollars per front foot, and the sum of eighteen hundred dollars as the value of the improvements, should be decreed. As to this last item, the lapse of time would not increase the value, and there is no evidence in the record of additional improvements since the filing of the bill, if subsequent improvements could in any aspect be allowed for. And it should be observed that it is clear that, under the circumstances, this is not a case for the application of the principle of the acceptance by an appellate court of the conclusions of a master, concurred in by the trial court, when depending on conflicting testimony. We cannot permit our views to be overcome by presumptions in favor of this second report and decree. The decree will be reversed at appellees' costs and the cause remanded to the Circuit Court with directions to enter a decree to the effect that all the right, title, claim and interest of defendant in and to lot sixteen, block sixty-eight, in the city of Hot Springs, Arkansas, be and the same is divested out of her and vested in said plaintiffs, and that defendant convey said lot to plaintiffs, or that a master do it for her; that plain Opinion of the Court. tiffs have and recover of defendant the possession of said lot sixteen in block sixty-eight; and that a writ of possession issue, or that a copy of said decree be served upon her, which shall operate as such writ; that an account between plaintiffs and defendant be stated, and in doing so that defendant be charged with the rental value of the lot at ten dollars per front foot per annum from May 23, 1884, down to date of decree, with interest on the same from the end of each year at the rate of six per cent per annum; that plaintiffs be charged with all taxes paid by defendant on the lot since. May 23, 1884, with interest on the same from time of payment until date of decree, at the rate of six per cent per annum; also with $1800, adjudged to be the value of improvements placed by defendant on said lot; also with the sum paid by defendant to the United States for the lot and interest thereon at the rate of six per cent per annum from the date of payment to date of decree; and that judgment be entered for the balance; and that plaintiffs recover their costs in the court below. Decree of the Circuit Court of Appeals reversed; decree of Circuit Court reversed, and cause remanded to that court with directions to enter a decree in conformity with this opinion. LATTA V. NEUBERT, No. 304; LATTA v. COHN, No. 326; LATTA . RUGG, No. 327; LATTA v. GARNETT, No. 328; LATTA v. SUMPTER, No. 329. Appeals from the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. THE CHIEF JUSTICE: The parties having stipulated that these cases shall abide the event of Latta v. Granger, just decided, the decrees of the Circuit Court of Appeals therein are severally reversed, and the decrees of the Circuit Court are also severally reversed, and the causes remanded to that court with directions to enter decrees in conformity with the opinion in Latta v. Granger, ante, 81. Ordered accordingly. Statement of the Case. WABASH RAILROAD COMPANY v. DEFIANCE. ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OHIO. No. 239. Argued March 25, 26, 1897. Decided May 10, 1897. In 1887, the municipal authorities of Defiance authorized the erection of bridges over the Wabash Railroad, and about eighteen feet above its track, by the railroad company, to take the place of two existing bridges. In 1893, the common council of Defiance changed the grade of the streets crossing on said bridges to the level of the railroad, and changed the approaches to it by causing them to descend to the level of the railroad. Held, that the common council acted within its powers in changing the grade of the streets in question, and that the railroad company had no legal right to complain of its action. The legislative power of a city may control and improve its streets, and a power to that effect, when duly exercised by ordinances, will override any license previously given, by which the control of a certain street has been surrendered. In this case, it was purely within the discretion of the common council to determine whether the public exigencies required that the grade of the street be so changed as to cross the railroad at a level THIS was a petition, in the nature of a bill in equity, originally filed in the Court of Common Pleas for Defiance County, Ohio, to enjoin the city of Defiance from proceeding with a contemplated improvement of North Clinton street and Ralston avenue, by which those streets would be so graded as to necessitate the removal of certain bridges erected by the plaintiff over its roadway, where it crosses those streets, and also the approaches constructed by the plaintiff to those bridges. The material facts were that, in the year 1887, the Wabash, St. Louis and Pacific Railway Company, then operated by one McNulta as receiver, crossed two public streets or highways in that city, known as the Holgate pike and the Brunersburg road, respectively, at a grade about eighteen feet below the grade of said streets, where the same crossed the railway, and that there were two overhead wooden bridges at about that distance above the track of the railway. On December 20, 1887, the city council of Defiance passed Statement of the Case. an ordinance permitting this railway to erect new bridges over and across its track, where the same crossed these two highways, provided said bridges should be of good and substantial construction, placed in the centre of the street, with eighteen feet wide roadway, good and substantial sidewalks, eight feet on each side of said bridges, and with proper railings on each side of said walks, which bridges and walks were to be kept in good repair by the company. The railway was further required to allow a distance of twenty-one feet in the clear between the tops of its rails and the bottom of the floor beams of the bridges, and also to construct approaches at not exceeding one and one quarter inches to the foot grade, and to make the same solid by either stone or gravel, etc.; all to be done to the approval of the city and to be kept in repair by the company. This ordinance is printed at length in the margin.1 1 An ordinance permitting Wabash, St. Louis and Pacific Railway to construct bridges at Holgate pike and Brunersburg road. Be it ordained, by the council of the city of Defiance, Ohio: SEC. 1. That the Wabash, St. Louis and Pacific Railway Company is hereby authorized to erect new bridges over and across the track of the railway of said company where the same crosses the public streets in the Third ward of said city, known as the Brunersburg road and Holgate pike, provided said bridges shall be of good and substantial construction, placed in the centre of said street, be eighteen feet wide roadway, with good and substantial sidewalk eight feet wide on each side of said bridges, with proper railings on each side of said walks, said bridges and sidewalks to be at all times kept in good order and repair by said company. And said railway company is hereby further authorized to construct each of said bridges of sufficient height to give a distance of twenty-one feet in the clear between the tops of the rail of said railway at its present grade and the bottom of the floor beams of said bridges, provided always that said company shall provide and construct good and sufficient approaches and grade to each of said bridges, and extend the same to sufficient distance to give a grade of not to exceed one and one fourth inches to the foot, and to conform to the width of the present street, said grade to be made firm and solid, by either stone or gravel, at the option of said company, provided that if gravel be used, said city will permit it to be taken from their gravel bed without charge, and to construct and keep in constant repair good and proper approaches to said sidewalks, and brought to the proper level of the pres ent walk by broad, safe steps where the grade would be too great for a safe incline; and all to be done to the approval of the city, and all to be kept in |