Moran v. The Commissioners of Miami County. bonds and interest warrants, brings the case, by the declaration in the bond as to the object and purpose for which they were issued, so entirely within what we have shown to be the law in such cases as to the inference which may be made from the face of the bond, of its having been regularly executed by the party having authority to do it, that we are relieved from the task of considering much of the argument made to us by counsel; and from examining the special pleas which were put in by the defendant, or the reasoning of the court upon the third and fourth pleas upon which it rested its judgment for the dismissal of the plaintiff's case. If the contract and bonds are considered in connection with the authority of the board of commissioners of Miami county to issue them, it must be obvious that several of the points presented to us by the counsel of the defendant do not arise in the case. For instance, whether the board of commissioners of Miami county had power to issue them at the time and for the purpose for which it was done, or that the bonds and interest warrants, by having been endorsed to the plaintiff by the railroad company, were subjected to the revised statutes of Indiana, making certain promissory notes, &c., negotiable by endorsement thereon, so as to vest the interest in the contract to the assignee, and permitting the obligor to set up any defense to the obligation against the assignee that he could have done against the original obligee, or that it was necessary to them *that the bonds were issued by virtue of a special statute, [*731] and if that did not exist, that the bonds may be held to be void. It is true that all of these points were as well argued by the counsel of the defendants as the circumstances of the case permitted, but in every instance, either of argument or of pleading, the point of estoppel, as made by the plaintiff's counsel in the court below, and renewed here by him with vigor by the citation of many cases, was not directly met by the counsel of the defendant. The first point of the plaintiff's counsel was, that even if the bonds had been issued irregularly, and not in strict conformity with the power of the county to borrow money, the defendant is, nevertheless, estopped by the bonds themselves, which, on their face, express that they were issued for a loan of the amount to the county, as authorized by the act of the general assembly to borrow money, and that such bonds being habitually received and passed as commercial securities, and being bona fide in the hands of the plaintiff, they were entitled to recover the amount of interest sued for, notwithstanding there might be equities between the original parties to the transaction. It is not necessary for us to follow out the plaintiff's Moran v. The Commissioners of Miami County. argument in this particular, thinking it, as we do, conclusive. We think that the bonds in this case, with interest warrants annexed, are commercial securities, though they are not in the accustomed forms of promissory notes or bills of exchange; that the parties intended them to be passed from hand to hand to raise money upon them, so that a full title was intended to be conferred on any person who became the legal holder of them, and that the original maker, under such circumstances, has no equity to prevent the recovery of the interest. But the real point in this case, as made by the counsel of the plaintiff in error, and sustained in argument by numerous adjudicated cases, was, that as it is declared in the bonds that they were issued by the board of commissioners of Miami county by order or resolution, pursuant to the statute authorizing the county to borrow money, passed at a regular meeting of the board, to be used by the Peru and Indianapolis railroad, payable to the company, [*732] or bearer, for a loan to the county that the bona fide holders of the bonds, whether so by endorsement or delivery, had a right to infer that the bonds had been lawfully issued, by which the county of Miami is estopped in a suit for the recovery of the interest from denying by pleas that its bonds had been issued to the Peru and Indianapolis railroad for a loan of money to the county of Miami. We think and adjudge that the recitals in the bonds are conclusive, constituting an estoppel in pais upon the defendants in this suit. In support of this conclusion, we cite the following cases: Girard v. Bradley, (7 Ind. § 600;) Reeves v. Andrews, (Ibid. 207;) Frances v. Porter, (213;) May v. Johnson, (3 Ind. 448;) Trimble v. State, (4 Black, 435;) 8 Blackford, 258; Ryan v. Vanladingham, (7 Ind. 416;) 24 How. 375; 23 How. 381; 29 Connecticut Rep.; Society of Saving v. City of New London, (103;) 1 Vesey, senior, 123; 8 Blackf. 47. It is the opinion of this court that the defendant is estopped from setting up the defenses taken as set forth in the transcript of the record of this case, and that the judgment of the court below sustaining the demurrer should be, and is hereby reversed and annulled, and that the case should be remanded to that court, with directions to award a venire facias de novo. INDEX. ADMIRALTY. COLLISION. 1. In a collision in the harbor of New York between a lighter managed by oars and a ship towed by a steam tug, the tug was held to be in fault, because it had no lookout, and changed its course so as to bring on the collision at a time when those in charge of the lighter could not prevent it. The Hector and The Wisconsin, 24 H. 110......23. 2. As between the tug and the ship which she was towing the tug is responsible, because it sufficiently appears that those in charge of the tow were in full control of both vessels, the ship having no crew and no control, or means of control, of the course and speed of the two vessels, or of either of them. Ib. 3. A steamboat ascending and a loaded flat-boat descending collide in the day time in the middle of the Ohio river, having been in full view of each other for a mile and a half: Held, that it was the duty of the steamboat to have kept out of the way, and the flat-boat cannot be held in fault for floating with the current without using her oars to avoid collision, unless it was shown very clearly that she could safely and successfully have done so after the danger of collision became apparent. Those in control of her had a right to suppose that the steamboat would take measures to avoid a collision. The Steamboat Doctor Robertson, 24 H. 228......90. 4. It is a fault for which a steamship must be held responsible, when a collision is produced by the mistake of the pilot in putting the helm to the starboard, because he supposed his vessel was backing, when in fact she was moving forward at the rate of six miles an hour. The Steamship Pennsylvania, 24 H. 307......141. 5. Inevitable accident is not to be presumed solely from the circumstances attending the imminence of the collision, but is to be determined by all the circumstances affecting the skill and care with which the vessel is navigated, as she comes within the distance of possible collision. Ib. 6. A tug having a barge with many others in tow, held, on a minute examination of much testimony, to be in fault for bringing the barge, while landing her, into collision with a sloop, whereby the barge was so injured that it afterwards sunk. The Steamer New Philadelphia, 1 Black, 62......361. 7. The schooner had a right to use a fender to keep off the barge; and though this may have contributed to the injury to the barge, it does not follow she should pay part of the loss. Ib. 8. If, in a suit against the schooner, she might be held liable, that is no defense, as this suit is founded on her carelessness in executing her contract to tow the barge safely and skillfully. Ib. 9. In this case we are of opinion, that the weight of testimony is in favor of the charges of the libel and of the decree rendered by both the district and circuit courts. The Ship Marcellus, 1 Black, 414......525. 10. We reassert the proposition, that when the controversy turns on the weight of evi (925) dence, and the district and circuit courts both have found the same way, the pre- See JURISDICTION, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12. DECREE A LIEN ON REAL PROPERTY. 1. Whenever, by the laws of the State, the judgments or decrees of the State courts are 2. A decree of the district court of the United States sitting in admiralty operating 3. Where an execution has been levied upon real estate, which issued from the district DELIVERY OF CARGO TO AND BY THE VESSEL. 1. The bar at the mouth of the harbor of Mobile, some fifteen miles from the city, pre- 2. That where the goods are lost by an explosion of the lighter before being received 3. The English cases examined on the subject. Ib. JURISDICTION. COMMON CARRIER, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. 1. The twelfth rule of admiralty practice, presented by the supreme court in 1844, 2. These rules refer exclusively to the character of the process to be used in certain cases, 5. The acts of congress and the decisions of this court examined, and the power of this 6. The reasons for the change of the rule given and considered, to wit: the embar- 7. In this case, as the State law gave a lien, and the rule of the court which authorized 8. It is not essential to the jurisdiction of the district courts as courts of admiralty, in 9. Nor is the jurisdiction defeated because the place of collision was within the body 10. The suit in such cases may be prosecuted either in personam or in rem in any dis- 11. The owner of the vessel injured can recover not only for the injury to his vessel, 12. This court reaffirms the doctrine of the steamer St. Lawrence. 1 Black, 525; (4 LIABILITY OF OWNERS. 1. The act of congress of March 3d, 1851, (9 U. S. Statutes, 635,) which exempts ship 2. The words "barges," "canal boats," and "lighters," and vessels used in navigating 3. One purpose of the act was to place our ship owners on equal condition with foreign MARITIME LIEN. 1. The maritime lien on goods carried for the freight is, like the lien of the common Sears v. 2. So long as he has this possession he may enforce the lien by a proceeding in rem in 4. But where, as in the present case, the consignee was party to the charter party by 5 The lien once acquired was not waived by the acceptance of the owner's notes by |