9. The present civil war has assumed a territorial character, dividing the country into
two parts by a line of bayonets. All persons residing south of this line arc, by
virtue of their domicile, enemies in this war to the government. Ib.
10. As the principle on which the right of belligerent capture on the high seas is, that
property, unless captured, may, by reason of the residence of its owner, come to be
used in aid of the public enemy, the other side has the right to capture it as a
means of crippling that enemy's resources. Ib.
11. This principle applies to citizens of the United States domiciled within the rebel
lines, without regard to the part they may have taken in the war or their senti-
ments on the subject. Ib.
12. Nor is the government forbidden to exercise this right of war by the fact that it is
sovereign and can punish criminals, nor by any of the provisions of the constitu-
tion. The government is at liberty to exercise its right of sovereignty, or the rights
which a state of war gives it, without consulting its enemies. Ib.
13. As to the Amy Warwick, the owners of the vessel and the cargo were all residents
of Richmond, Virginia, and, without reference to the blockade, the vessel and cargo
were both rightfully condemned as enemy property. 1b.
14. As to the Hiawatha, we are of opinion that the British minister had a right, from
his correspondence with the state and navy departments, to believe that fifteen days
after notice of blockade would be allowed for foreign vessels to leave the ports. Ib.
15. But in order to obtain an enemy cargo she remained until after the expiration of
the fifteen days, and thus voluntarily subjected herself to the danger of capture. Ib.
16. There is no provision in the proclamation of blockade for warning vessels. If
there was any such warning necessary, it could only apply to vessels coming into
port, and in no event could it be necessary as to a vessel which had full knowledge
of the blockade and was in correspondence with the government about it. The
cargo must share the fate of the vessel, and both were properly condemned for
violation of the blockade. Ib.
17. The Brilliante: the evidence in this case shows that the owner of the vessel, who
was aboard, violated the blockade of New Orleans, after warning, in entering that
port, and was captured in attempting to violate the blockade by escaping with a
cargo. Both vessel and cargo were properly condemned. Ib.
18. In regard to the Crenshaw, the only question is of enemy property. The vessel
and a large part of her cargo were owned by residents of Richmond, Virginia, and
were properly condemned. The claim of the firm of Ludlam & Watson, for part of
the cargo, must be governed by the fact of the residence of Watson, the active
member of the firm in Richmond. Ib.
19. Irvin & Co., of New York, had tobacco on board, purchased in Richmond before
the commencement of hostilities. Whether they had the right to withdraw this
generally after the war or not, they should have the benefit of the fifteen days' grace
allowed to others, and thus protect their property.
1. The cases of Boston v. Lecraw, 17 How. 426, (21 Curtis, 590,) and Richardson v. City
of Boston, 19 How. 263, (1 Miller, 675,) considered and explained. Richardson v.
The City of Boston, 24 H. 188..... 65.
2. Proceedings on an indictment may be introduced as evidence in a civil suit, but
they are not conclusive, and if the judgment of the court was founded on erroneous
instructions to the jury, they are of little value. Ib.
3. A decree in chancery in a foreclosure suit, in which want of consideration and fraud
in the original contract is set up, and the decree is against the defense, is a good
answer to the same defense in a suit at law on the notes secured by the mortgage
between the parties to the chancery suit. Thompson v. Roberts, 24 H. 233......94.
4. It is no objection to the decree as evidence that there were other parties to the chan-
cery suit who are not parties to the present suit, provided the fact was decided as
between the present parties. Ib.
5. That the court submitted to the jury the question whether the same defense was set
up in the chancery suit, instead of instructing them that it was the same defense, is
no error to the prejudice of the defendants, the plaintiffs here, and can be no ground
for reversing the judgment. Ib.
6. In a suit upon a special contract, the record of a former suit and judgment between
the same parties, in which plaintiffs counted on this special contract, and also on
common counts, is admissible as evidence in behalf of plaintiffs, who recovered in
the former suit. The Steam Packet Co. v. Sickles, 24 H. 333......157.
7. But such verdict and judgment are not conclusive on defendants as to the special
contract, because the jury may have found their verdict on the common counts of
that declaration. Ib.
S. The action of the court in rendering a judgment on that verdict on the special count
does not make that judgment and verdict conclusive in the second suit. Ib.
9. Therefore defendants should have been permitted to give evidence, as they offered to
do, of what was in issue before the jury, and tried by them in the former suit. Ib.
10. Where the subject-matter of a suit has been litigated in the courts of the District of
Columbia, and the fund remitted to the bankrupt court in New Hampshire for distri-
bution, and the appellant and complainant resumed the litigation there, on the ground
that the decree in the first case was obtained by fraud: Held, that the bill was right-
fully dismissed, by reason of a total failure to prove its allegations. Clark v. Hack-
ett, 1 Black, 77......371.
11. A decree of a court of chancery determining and deciding the title, as between the
parties to real estate, rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusive on
both parties to that suit in any other court. Parrish v. Ferris and others, 2 Black,
606......860.
12. This applies to the relations of the State and the federal courts, as well as to other
courts, and to a subsequent action of ejectment brought by one of the parties. Ib.
13 The decree of the court in a suit to quiet title, brought under the statute of Ohio
by one in possession against one out of possession, where the question of title is ad-
judicated by the decree, is as conclusive upon both parties to that suit as any other
decree settling the rights of the parties. 1b.
EQUITY, GENERAL PRINCIPLES, 2; MRS. GAINES' CASE, 6, 7.
1. Bridge piers and landing places, as well as wharves and permanent piers, are often
constructed by the riparian proprietor on the shore of navigable rivers, bays, and
arms of the sea, as well as on the lakes: and where they conform to the regulations of
the State, and do not extend below low-water mark, they are not nuisances, unless
they are an obstruction to the paramount right of navigation. Dutton v. Strong, 1
Black, 22......339.
2. The lakes are not navigable in any proper sense in certain places for a considerable
distance from the shore; and when this is the case, the adjacent owner can make his
pier; but this right terminates at the point of navigation. Ib.
3. Piers and wharves, though the property of an individual, may be either for public
or private use, though generally for the public. Ib.
4. But a riparian owner may build one of these structures for his own exclusive use
and benefit; and if confined to the shore of the sea or the unnavigable waters of the
lake, no implication arises that it was constructed for public use. Ib.
5. When those in charge of a vessel had attached her, during a violent storm, to such a
bridge pier by ropes and chains, and it became apparent that there was great danger
of the destruction of the bridge pier by the vessel, the owners of the former had a
right, after due warning, to cut the vessel loose, and are not responsible for her loss
by her coming in contact immediately with another pier. Ib.
6. The survey and plat by which the United States sold the land under which plaintiff
claims showed the east boundary to be the lake and the south boundary the Chicago
river. The plat represents the Chicago river as running about due east with the
lake. In point of fact, when this survey was made this was an artificial channel.
The main channel diverged southwardly and entered the lake at a different point,
making a sand bar, which is the subject of the present contest: Held, that the
grantee is bound by the survey and map as to the quantities specified in his patent,
and acquired no claim to the sand bar in question. Bates v. The Illinois Central R.
R. Co., 1 Black, 204......437.
7. The government of the United States has the right, through its officers, to determine
the boundaries by which it sells or grants its lands, and a purchaser is bound by
descriptive calls, surveys, and plats designating what he buys. Ib.
8. It was properly left to the jury to say whether, at the date of the acts under which
plaintiff claims, the land in controversy was within the boundaries by which he
purchased. Ib.
9. This sand bar did not exist at the date of this suit, but had been washed away, and
was land under water permanently, over which defendant's railroad was carried;
and the question of plaintiff's loss by this washing away of the sand bar, though
much discussed, had no application, since the jury decided that he never owned
it. Ib.
10. In deciding whether the lot purchased by plaintiff of Johnston had a water front,
the fact must be determined by the condition of the lot when the deed was made, and
not by a reference to the condition of things when Kinzie made his title bond to
another person, on which his deed to Johnston was founded. Johnston v. Jones, 1
Black, 210......440.
11. As the lot of plaintiff had no water front when he received his deed, any instructions
of the court to the jury as to the mode of dividing accretions between water lots
which have a claim to them, can work no injury to plaintiff in error. But this court
adheres to and reiterates the rule laid down in this case when formerly before it, as
reported in 18 How. 150, (1 Miller, 138.) See also Deerfield v. Arms, 17 Pickering. 45,
the language of which is here adopted. Ib.
12. A deed from Robert A. Kinzie, the patentee, to John H. Kinzie described this lot by
reference to the original plat, which did show a water front; but the deed of John
H. Kinzie to plaintiff referred to the plat as recorded, which did not show a water
front. Ib.
13. A deed made by John H. Kinzie to plaintiff long since this suit was commenced,
purporting to correct a mistake by making the deed conform to the original plat,
was rightfully excluded from the jury. Ib.
14. The evidence offered to show the nature of accretions by Allen's map was inadmissi-
ble, because the evidence shows that Allen's map was not the map, and was not reli-
able evidence. Ib.
15. All grants of land bounded by fresh water rivers, where the expressions designating
the water line are general, confer proprietorship to the middle thread of the stream.
Jones v. Soulard, 24 H. 41......8.
16. The owner of such a grant becomes entitled to accretions as they are formed. Ib.
17. This rule applies to the great navigable rivers, such as the Mississippi, as well as
others. Ib.
See MISSOURI LAND TITLES, 1; EQUITY, GENERAL PRINCIPLES, 1.
By a contract between plaintiffs and defendants, the goods which plaintiffs had agreed
with shippers to carry from Baltimore to Petersburg were received by the latter
at City Point, and delivered at Petersburg. It had been the custom to store these
goods in defendants' warehouse on Sundays, when the boat arrived at City Point on
that day, and keep them over until Monday: Held, that whether the work of
placing these goods in the warehouse on Sunday, which was done by plaintiffs, was
a violation of the Sunday law of Virginia or not, it did not affect the obligation of
defendants, as carriers, to keep them safely, and deliver at Petersburg, and that
plaintiffs having been sued, and compelled to pay for their loss by fire in defend-
ants' warehouse on that day, could recover against the defendants. Powhatan
Steamboat Co. v. Appomattox R. R. Co. 24 H. 247......101.
Where a bond for the release of property taken in replevin was given to the marshal
who held it under the writ of replevin, and he permitted one of the principals in the
bond, with his consent, to erase his name from it, this discharged the sureties in the
bond from all liability on it. Martin v. Thomas, 24 H. 315......147.
1. The legislature of the State of Wisconsin authorized the town of Sheboygan to sub-
scribe to a railroad or railroads, and provided that the taxes necessary to pay the
bonds issued for such subscription should be levied exclusively on the real estate of
said city Held, that a prior act, by which no such distinction was made as to tax-
ation, constituted no coract with the bondholder against exempting personal prop-
erty from taxation for that purpose. Gilman v. Sheboygan, 2 Black, 510......788.
2. Nor are these acts liable to the objection that a tax for that purpose is taking
private property for public use without due compensation. Ib.
3. This court follows the court of Wisconsin in holding that the act requiring this tax
to be levied exclusively on real estate is a violation of Article VIII, Sec. 1, of the
constitution of that State, which declares that "the rule of taxation shall be uniform,
and taxes shall be levied upon such property as the legislature shall prescribe." Ib.
4. The statute of New York, under which the tax is levied which is here in dispute, is
a tax upon the capital of the stock at its assessed value in whatever it may be in-
vested, and is not a tax upon its nominal capital stock, without regard to its value.
Bank of Commerce v. The Commissioners, 2 Black, 620......870.
5. The latter tax might be sustained as a tax upon the franchise of banking, without
regard to the kind of property in which the capital was invested. The former is no
such tax, but is a tax upon property according to its value. Ib.
6. Where it is made to appear that the capital on which the tax is thus assessed as a
whole is largely invested in stock, bonds, or other securities of the United States, it
is a tax to that extent upon those securities. Ib.
7. Such a tax, if permitted, would enable the States to tax the loans, bonds, and other
securities out of the markets of the States, and would in effect place the power of
the general government to borrow money at the mercy or discretion of the States. Ib.
8. Such a power in the States is therefore inconsistent with the power conferred on the
United States by its constitution to borrow money, and any State law which author-
izes such a tax is void. Ib.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 12, 13; CONTRACTS, 1, 2; LAND TITLES, 11, 12.
1. Any defect in the power of Steele to act as commissioner in the colony of Nashville
or Robertson has been cured by the statute of 1841 of the republic of Texas. Davila
v. Mumford, 24 H. 214......83.
2. The phrase," want of intrinsic fairness and honesty," in the 15th section of the act
of limitations of the State of Texas, has relation to defects in the chain of title of
defendant set up as color of title, and not to a knowledge on the part of defendant
of the existence of a superior title. Ib.
3. The statute of 13th Elizabeth, concerning fraudulent conveyances, is in force in
Texas; and it was error in the court to refuse to admit evidence that the deed under
which defendant held was made in fraud of creditors, plaintiffs themselves being
creditors. Chandler v. Von Roeder, 24 H. 224......87.
4. Under the colonization laws of Mexico, the consent of the federal executive of Mex-
ico was essential to the grant of lands within the border and coast leagues; and the
courts of the State of Texas have uniformly held that the permission of the federal
government to colonize within these lines did not dispense with the necessity of pro-
curing the assent of the federal executive to the grants of the State within the lit-
toral leagues. League v. Egery, 24 H. 264......111.
5. Without inquiring whether this was the sound interpretation of the Mexican law
as applicable to those grants, this court adopts the rule now well settled by repeated
decisions as the rule of property in Texas on that point. Ib.
1. A municipal corporation is liable for injuries received by an individual by reason
of the unsafe condition of the streets of which it has control. Chicago v. Robbins, 2
Black, 418......732.
2. It has a remedy also against the individual whose fault it was that the street was
left in that condition. Ib.
3. Such a person so liable is bound by the verdict of the jury and judgment of the
court against the city, if he had an opportunity to defend the suit, and failed to do
so. Express notice of the suit and request to defend it are not necessary to bind
him. Ib.
4. But this does not estop him from showing that it was not through his fault the injury
occurred, but does bind him as to the amount, if on trial he is found liable at all. Ib.
5. The owner of the lot on which the injury occurred cannot relieve himself from
liability for its dangerous condition by any agreement with the contractor who puts
up a building for him. His obligation to keep his property in safe condition for the
use of the streets cannot be thus evaded. Ib.
6. Notwithstanding the adoption of a different rule by the State courts where the trial
took place, as it is a question to be determined by the common law, in a matter
which has not become a rule of property, this court is not bound by the decisions of
the State court. Ib.
7. The law is well settled that municipal corporations, upon which the duty is imposed
to construct and keep in repair streets, bridges, &c., and upon which are conferred
the means of accomplishing this duty, are liable for any special damages growing
out of a neglect of this duty. 1 Black, 39, (4 Miller, 349.) Nebraska City v. Camp-
bell, 2 Black, 590......848.
See CORPORATIONS, 7, 8; COURT AND JURY, 1; EQUITY PRACTICE, 11, 12.
1. To constitute usury, there must either be a loan and a taking of usurious interest, or
the taking of more than legal interest, for the forbearance of a debt or sum of money
due. Hogg v. Ruffner, 1 Black, 115......390.
2. The sale of land or other property on long credit, at a price increased by reason of
the credit much more than the lawful rate of interest, is not a usurious transac-
tion. Ib.
3. Nor does it make it usury because the land was sold and bought as a means of set-
tling existing indebtedness between the parties, about which there was difficulty, at
a price much larger than that at which the vendor agreed to sell it for cash. Ib.
1. The unpaid purchase money for real estate is treated in equity as a lien upon the
land sold, because when a person has got the estate of another he ought not in con-
science to be allowed to keep it without he gives the consideration. Chilton v.
Lyons, 2 Black, 458......763.
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