“In point of fact, the court-martial of Tamatave is, as it styles itself, a ‘permanent court-martial,' as provided by the code of maritime justice for a state of peace, and in a normal condition of things. It existed prior to the armed conflict of France with the Hova Government; it was a normal court, the jurisdiction of which is prescribed by articles 76 to 83 of the code of maritime justice (title 1, jurisdiction of maritime courts sitting upon land; chap. 1, sec. 1, jurisdiction of permanent courts-martial in maritime districts). These courts have jurisdiction only over individuals belonging to the naval forces of those assimilated thereto. John Waller did not belong to that category. "In support of this jurisdiction the court-martial of Tamatave relies solely upon article 104 of the code of maritime justice. "This article does not apply to the case. It is taken from Title III of Book II, entitled 'Jurisdiction in case of complicity,' and it provides that all prisoners, without distinction, shall be brought before the court-martial when the crime has been committed in part by persons who are ordinarily subject to its jurisdiction, and in part by others who are not personally subject thereto. In the present case, Waller was not prosecuted as accessory or as joint author of the crime, but as sole author thereof. Article 104, which is peculiar to cases of complicity, does not cover his case. Waller does not fall into the category of individuals dealt with in article 104 of the code of maritime justice. "One circumstance alone would have given jurisdiction to the permanent court-martial' of Tamatave in regard to even civilian delinquents-that is to say, the lawful proclamation, prior to the proceedings, of a state of siege. "The declaration of a state of siege and its effects are regulated by the law of August 3, 1849, by the law of April 3, 1878, and for places in a state of war by a decree of October 4, 1891, rendered in consequence of the two preceding laws. 66 Tamatave in March, 1895, might have been considered as a place in a state of war. "By virtue of article 189 of the decree of October 4, 1891, the military commander may declare a state of siege in case of investment of the place, of attack, of internal sedition, and of armed gatherings within a radius of 10 kilometers. "In proclaiming a state of siege the military commander makes known that all offenses, which he does not consider it his duty to submit to the ordinary tribunals, shall be tried by the military tribunals, whatever be the status of the delinquents. "What did the military authorities do at Tamatave? Did they proclaim a state of siege? At what period did they proclaim it? Was such declaration made in the circumstances provided by the law and in the prescribed forms? "It may be doubted whether such was the case in view of the laconic tenor of the judgment of March 18, 1895. "This judgment, in fact, only mentions upon page 2, and in quite an incidental manner, that Tamatave is in a state of siege.' 6 "Now, from the point of view of the jurisdiction of the permanent courtmartial' in respect of a civilian, this was a circumstance of capital importance, as it alone could give jurisdiction over him. Nevertheless, the judgment does not mention either the law of 1849, nor the law of 1878, nor the decree of 1891, while, in order to fulfill article 170 of the code of maritime justice, it reproduces all the articles of law upon which it rests its jurisdiction and justifies the sentence. “Even if no court of common law or an exceptional jurisdiction existed or was competent at Tamatave to take cognizance of the crime charged against John Waller or any other civilian, it does not follow that they would remain unpunished. Accused of a criminal offense perpetrated within the territory where French sovereignty was de facto exercised, and finding no judges there to judge them, the delinquents should have been removed to the nearest portion of French territory (to the island of Réunion, for example), where all the organs of French justice were performing their regular functions, and should have been brought before a court of common law, having jurisdiction over them, in accordance with the rules of the code of criminal procedure. The crime charged against Waller (article 78 of the Penal Code) belonged to the jurisdiction of the criminal jury (court of assizes). "In order to understand the actual facts, it must be remembered that at Tamatave at that period the French army was in a condition of open war with the Hovas, and that in particular at Tamatave it was in presence of the enemy, for at a short distance the Malagasy troops occupied the Fort of Farafata. "In such a situation a military post, established even before hostilities were begun, easily assumes the characteristics of an army of occupation. Now, armies at such a junction are authorized by the law of nations and the practice of nations to secure their own protection by exceptional methods. "We may consult upon this point an authoritative article on the jurisdiction of armies of occupation in regard to offenses committed by aliens, etc. (Clunet's Journal, 1882, p. 511, and following). Among the quotations may be remarked that of the American Instructions of 1863, and prepared for the armies in the field by the eminent Professor Lieber, revised by a commission of officers, and ratified by President Lincoln: "'ART. 7. Martial law extends to property and persons, without distinction between the subjects of the enemy and other foreigners. “‘ART. 16. The consuls of the American and European nations are not considered as diplomatic agents. Nevertheless, their chanceries and their persons shall not be subjected to martial law except in cases of necessity. Any offense which they shall commit against the military government shall be punished as if it had been committed by an ordinary citizen, and such offense can not give rise to any international claim.' "Conclusion. The first permanent court-martial sitting at Tamatave had jurisdiction over John Waller, who was neither a military man nor a person assimilated thereto, if Tamatave had been, prior to the proceedings, declared in a state of siege, under the conditions laid down by the laws of August 3, 1849, April 3, 1878, and the decree of October 4, 1891. "In any case, there is a serious omission in the judgment of March 18, 1895, consisting in its not having stated the grounds of the exceptional jurisdiction, in its not having cited the laws and decrees which justify such jurisdiction, and in its not having reproduced in fine the text of the declaration of the state of siege, the basis of its exceptional common-law jurisdiction in regard to a civilian, as it reproduces the text (without date, however) of the warrant of the delegate of the chief of the naval division relating to the transmission of correspondence.” The second part of the opinion relates to the regularity of the judgment of the court. This subject is discussed fully and minutely, with the result that various irregularities were disclosed; but it appeared that the periods of appeal having elapsed, they could no longer be made the subject of judicial appeal. The irregularities related to (1) dates in the judgment, (2) the constitution of the court, (3) the formal description of the advocate, (4) the absence from the record of the evidence taken in the preparatory investigation and certain informalities and defects in the evidence taken at the trial, and (5) defects in procedure and sentence. (H. Doc. 225, 54 Cong. 1 sess.; For. Rel. 1895, I. 304–306 306-309.) II. TERRITORIAL OPERATION OF LAWS. 1. MUNICIPAL LEGISLATION. $197. The municipal laws of one nation do not extend, in their operation, beyond its own territory, except as regards its own citizens or subjects. The Apollon, 9 Wheat. 362. See Report on Extraterritorial Crime (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1887). As a general proposition the laws of one country have in themselves no extraterritorial force, and whatever force they are permitted to have in foreign countries depends upon the comity of nations, regulated by a sense of their own interests and public convenience. Le Roy v. Crowninshield, 2 Mason, 151. The existence of a foreign law being a question of fact, the Attorney-General can not give an opinion upon the law of a foreign nation. Harmon, Atty.-Gen., July 2, 1896, 21 Op. 377. Municipal laws "have no controlling operation beyond the territorial limits of the countries enacting them." Hence, in questions. between two independent nations, "neither has the right to appeal to its own municipal laws for the rules to settle the matter in dispute, which occurred within the jurisdiction of a third independent power." Mr. Marcy, Sec. of State, to Mr. Hülsemann, Austrian chargé d'affaires, A law providing for the succession of nonresident aliens to real estate confers a right to be enjoyed within the state, and is not a law having an extraterritorial operation. State v. Smith, 70 Cal. 153, 12 Pac. Rep. 121; Blythe v. Hinckley, 127 The provisions in the Constitution of the United States relating to writs of habeas corpus, bills of attainder, ex post facto laws, trial by jury, and generally to the fundamental guarantees of life, liberty, and property, have no relation to crimes committed outside the jurisdiction of the United States and against the laws of a foreign country; and an act of Congress therefore is not unconstitutional because it fails to secure to persons whose extradition it authorizes to a for eign country such rights, privileges, and immunities as are secured to persons charged with crime in the United States. Neely v. Henkel (1901), 180 U. S. 109, 122–123. See, also, In re Ross, 140 U. S. 453; Ex parte Ortiz, 100 Fed. Rep. 955. Where an attempt was made to hold a British subject personally liable for the conversion of a vessel which he had captured under a commission from the Queen of Portugal, on the ground that in accepting the commission he violated the British foreign enlistment act, judgment was rendered for the defendant, the court saying that no one could dispute "the right of the Queen of Portugal, to appoint. in her own dominions, the defendant or any other person she may think proper to select, as her officer or servant, to seize a vessel which is afterwards condemned as a prize." Dobree v. Napier (1836), 2 Bingham's New Cases, 781, 796. In 1858, William Lesley, master of a British ship, entered into a contract with the Chilean Government to convey to Liverpool certain citizens of Chile who had been ordered to be banished. The persons in question were brought by force, guarded by soldiers, on board the ship at Valparaiso. After her arrival in England, Lesley was indicted on a charge of assaulting, falsely imprisoning, and detaining the Chileans on the high seas, and was convicted. One of the Chileans testified that, after the ship had reached the high seas, they requested Lesley to take them to Peru, offering him as much money as the Chilean Government was paying, but that he replied that his contract required him to take them to England. The same witness also stated that the ship called at the Azores, and that he there saw the carpenter making holes in the boats, in order to prevent their escape. It was not alleged, however, that they made any request to be allowed to land at the Azores. On the contrary, the witness stated that, when the master refused to take them to Peru, " we then resolved to submit to our fate, hoping that our wrongs would be satisfied in England." The same witness stated that no protest was made to the master when they were received on board at Valparaiso, nor was he sure that he would have desired to be handed back to the officers who brought him on board. Lesley was convicted; and on a case reserved the conviction was sustained. The court, however, expressly declared that the conviction could not be sustained for what was done in Chilean waters. "We assume," said the court," that in Chile the act of the Govern ment towards its subjects was lawful; and, although an English ship in some respects carries with her the laws of her country in the territorial waters of a foreign state, yet in other respects she is subject to the laws of that state as to acts done to the subjects thereof. We assume that the Government could justify all that it did within its own territory, and we think it follows that the defendant can justify all that he did there as agent for the Government, and under its authority." But the court held that the defendant was indictable for what was done outside of Chilean waters, on the ground "that an English ship on the high sea, out of any foreign territory, is subject to the laws of England; and persons, whether foreign or English, on board such ship, are as much amenable to English law as they would be on English soil." On this ground the court decided that, although the master was justified in first receiving the prosecutors in Chile, yet that justification ceased when he passed the line of Chilean jurisdiction, after which "it was a wrong . . intentionally planned and executed in pursuance of the contract, amounting in law to a false imprisonment. It may be that transportation to England is lawful by the law of Chile, and that a Chilean ship might so lawfully transport Chilean subjects; but for an English ship the laws of Chile, out of the state, are powerless, and the lawfulness of the acts must be tried by English law." Regina . Lesley (1860), Bell's C. C. 220, 8 Cox C. C. 269. It is not improper to suggest a doubt as to whether the principle on which this case was decided is sufficient for the purposes of such a transaction or of analogous transactions. It may be suggested that, as the transportation of the prosecutors within Chilean jurisdiction was admitted to have been lawful, their subsequent detention, after the vessel reached the high sea, was properly to be regarded as the natural and legitimate consequence of that lawful act. Had the prosecutors sought to go ashore at the Azores, another question would have been presented; but they neither desired nor asked to be allowed to do so. It seems to follow from the decision of the court that even a fugitive from justice may not be transported from one national jurisdiction to another in a vessel flying the flag of a third country. Such transportation is a matter of common occurrence, the prisoner usually being in the custody of an officer of the demanding government; but we are not acquainted with any case in which an action for false imprisonment has subsequently been brought, or in which the government of the country to which the vessel belonged has demanded his release on the ground of a violation of its national jurisdiction. If the doctrine of the court be correct and sufficient, it would seem that either or both of these courses might be taken, certainly by, or within the jurisdiction of, governments such as Great Britain and the United States, which hold that the extradition of criminals is not obligatory in the absence of a law or a treaty. By the act of March 3, 1885, 23 Stat. 362, 376, an appropriation was made for the investigation of certain Indian depredation claims. The act evidently referred to claims for property destroyed within the limits of the United States. Under it the Secretary of the Interior made an investigation and reported its results to Congress. By an |