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dents. The United States also referred to the decision of the Hon. William R. Day, as arbitrator in the case of Metzger, to the same effect.

Mr. Adee, Act. Sec. of State, to Mr. Powell, min. to Hayti, No. 579, Oct.

5, 1903, For Rel. 1904, 377; Mr. Hay, Sec. of State, to Mr. Powell, No. 582, Nov. 6, 1903, id. 378; Mr. Hay to Mr. Powell, No. 603, May

9, 1904, id. 388. In February, 1904, the Haytian Government stated that American citi

zens should continue to be placed on the same footing as Haytian citizens, but intimated that a proposal would be made to modify the treaty of 1864. Such a proposal was made on May 7, 1904, together with notice of termination of the treaty at the expiration of a year. (For. Rel. 1904, 370, 381.)

(6) MONOPOLIES.

§ 185.

“ With regard to the other topic of Mr. Brown's letter, it may be observed that although the grant of the monopoly of importation of ice into Rio to an Italian may not be contrary to the strict letter of the treaty, yet as the manifest tendency of such grants would be to defeat the object of the treaty, which was to establish a perfect reciprocity in trade and navigation between the two countries, you will intimate that the grant is considered incompatible with that object. You will also represent that no similar restriction exists in the United States with respect to any production of Brazil, and that, if no such obstacles to the perfect freedom of commerce between the two countries were in future to be interposed, this Government would deem it an additional proof of the disposition of the Brazilian Government to reciprocate our wish to cultivate the best understanding with that country.”

Mr. Forsyth, Sec. of State, to Mr. Hunter, chargé d'affairs to Brazil, Dec.

17, 1834, MS. Inst. Brazil, XV. 15. As to the case of the Boston Ice
Co., in Colombia, see For. Rel. 1888, I. 411, 420, 429. The report of
the Colombia minister of foreign affairs, justifying the monopoly in
the sale and production of ice in the Department of Panama, accom-
panies the dispatch of Mr. Abbott, min. to Colombia, to Mr. Blaine,

Sec. of State, Aug. 14, 1890. For. Rel. 1890, 258.
The Colombian Government also maintained for a time a monopoly in

matches. This monopoly ceased in April, 1900. (Mr. Hill, Assist. Sec.
State, to Mr. Moore, April 6, 1900, 244 MS. Dom. Let. 202.)

March 12, 1881, the Government of Guatemala entered into a contract with certain citizens of the United States for the completion of a railroad from Champerico, on the Pacific coast, to a place in the interior. A supplementary contract was made May 30; 1882. By these contracts, which were afterwards duly assigned to a California corporation, the Guatemalan Government agreed that for twenty-five years from the date of the opening of the line for traffic no other railroad should be operated between the specified terminal points, and that no competing line should be constructed within 15 leagues on either side. The railroad was built in accordance with the contract, and was accepted by the Guatemalan Government September 24, 1884. It was alleged, however, that in 1887 the Guatemalan Government entered into a contract with another company for the construction of a new railway within the prohibited distance throughout the entire length of the existing line. With reference to the exclusive privilege thus put in jeopardy, the Department of State said: “ The transaction, as above stated, can not be treated as open to the objections which could be made to a grant of a perpetual monopoly. ... The petitioners aver that this guaranty against competition is of vital importance to them, and that without it they should not have undertaken the construction of this important work.

It is not questioned that a government, when a monopoly becomes oppressive, may give public relief by the grant of privileges to an adverse interest. If, however, it should do so in such a way as to destroy private rights granted by its own express agreement, it would seem but just that compensation should be made to the parties thereby injured. And it may be observed that in the case now in question the exclusive privileges granted to the petitioners' assignors are not only conferred for a limited period, but are so guarded by provisions for prompt and effective service, at rates fixed in the contract itself, as to prevent the possibility of any oppression to the public.”

Mr. Bayard, Sec. of State, to Mr. Hall, min. to Central America, March

27, 1888, For. Rel. 1888, I. 134, 136, 137. A correspondence having arisen as to an exclusive ferry privilege granted

at Port Sarnia, in Canada, it was agreed that cooperative action was desirable as to ferries between the United States and the Dominion

of Canada. (For. Rel. 1884, 243, 245, 250, 255, 256.) For references to various discussions of exclusive privileges, see Martin's

Index to Foreign Relations, 555-556.

Though the grant of a monopoly “is inconsistent with American ideas and probably would be prejudicial to American interests, any official protest against it, unless based upon treaty obligations, would necessarily have the appearance of attempting to interfere with the sovereign right of a country to regulate its own export and import trade."

Mr. Foster, Sec. of State, to Messrs. McKesson & Robbins, Nov. 12, 1892,

189 MS. Dom. Let. 151. By Arts. XIV. and XXVII. of the French treaty with China of 1860 the

augmenting of the number of articles reputed contraband or subjects of monopoly was prohibited. (For. Rel. 1887, 181; For Rel, 1888, I. 252, relating to a camphor monopoly in Formosa.)

As to a monopoly of cotton manufacture in China, see For. Rel. 1883, 129.
Mr. Abbott, min. to Colombia, to Mr. Blaine, Sec. of State, No. 15, July 31,

1889, S. Ex. Doc. 264, 57 Cong. 1 sess. 235, says it is probable that
diplomatic demands for justice to the Boston Ice Company, whose
business in Colombia had been destroyed by the creation of a monop-
oly, will continue to be refused, unless the United States should take

unusual measures to obtain a favorable response.

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“ The mere fact that the Western Union Telegraph Company is enjoying, under a grant of exclusive right, what amounts to a monopoly is no reason of itself why it should be deprived of its concession. It is easy to say that monopolies are odious, but there are concessions which amount to monopolies which are lawful, and cannot be disturbed except by a violation of public faith. The laying and operation of cables, especially a quarter of a century ago, were attended with great expense and risk, and it was a very common thing for different nations, including the United States, to grant exclusive concessions for a term of years to companies that would undertake to invest the necessary capital and carry on such enterprises. With the chances of success the concessionaries took also the hazard of failure and loss. If loss ensued, they bore it; if success and profit, it was deemed proper to secure for a limited period to those who had risked the venture the enjoyment of the fruits of their enterprise, and not to allow other competitors who had not shared the risk to come in and take a share of the benefits. With the wisdom of such arrangements for exclusive franchises the Executive Departments are not concerned. The grants are made in this country by Congress, and in other countries by the constituted sovereign authority. It is the duty of those who administer the Government to deal with the conditions as they find them, and to see that legal rights of every nature are respected.”

Griggs, At.-Gen., June 15, 1899, 22 Op. 514, 516.
The opinion contains a list of concessions by various sovereignties of ex-

clusive cable rights, including such grants by the United States,
England, France, Spain, Portugal, Brazil, Peru, Ecuador, Colombia,

Mexico, and Japan.
See also Griggs, At.-Gen., March 18, 1901, 23 Op. 425, 427.

4. LEGAL REMEDIES.

(1) COMPETENCE OF TRIBUNALS.

S 186.

The courts of the United States have jurisdiction in cases of claims for salvage even where all the parties are aliens.

Mason v. Blaireau (1804), 2 Cranch, 240, 264

In an action brought on certain promissory notes made in St. Domingo it was held that the courts of the United States have no jurisdiction of cases between aliens.

Montalet v. Murray (1807), 4 Cranch, 46. “ Torts originating within the waters of a foreign power may be the subject of a suit in a domestic court. . . . Had both parties to the libel been foreigners, it might have been within the discretion of the court to decline jurisdiction of the case, though the better opinion is that, even under those circumstances, the court will take cognizance

; at least in the absence of a protest from a foreign consul.”. Panama Railroad Co. 4. Napier Shipping Co., 166 U. S. 280, 285; citing

The Avon, Brown's Adm. 170; Smith 1. Condry, 1 How. 28; The Maggie Hammond, 9 Wall. 435; The Belgenland, 114 U. S. 355; and other

cases. See, further, as to the jurisdiction of the courts in civil matters, Dicey,

Conflict of Laws, 222–237, 361-396 ; and (the American Notes) 229, 230-232, 268, 283, 330, 397.

The courts of admiralty have jurisdiction of collisions on the high seas between vessels of different nationalities;a and of torts committed on the high seas, without reference to the nationality of the vessels or of the parties;) but, in the absence of a statute, not of suits in rem for damages for the death of a human being. Jurisdiction of libels for seamen's wages is discretionary. The United States admiralty courts have jurisdiction of a libel in personam against an American corporation for injuries received at its dock by a foreign vessel in a foreign ccountry.e

In exercising jurisdiction in admiralty upon libel for wages against a foreign vessel, the court will, through comity, administer the law of the country whose flag the vessel carries, to which law the seamen, by shipping for service on such vessel, subject themselves.

The Belvidere, 90 Fed. Rep. 106. The general maritime law, and not the local law, governs the question of the liability of a municipal corporation for an injury negligently done to a vessel by a city fire boat while hastening to put out a fire.

Workman 1. New York City, 179 U. S. 552, 21 S. Ct. 212, reversing City of

New York 1'. Workman, 67 Fed. Rep. 347, 14 C. C. A. 530.

a The Belgenland, 114 U. S. 355.

• The Noddleburn, 28 Fed. Rep. 85). See The Carolina, 14 Fed. Rep. 424; The Montapedia, 14 Fed. Rep. 427; Bolden 1. Jensen, 70 Fed. Rep. 505.

c The Harrisburg, 119 U. S. 199.

& The Karoo, 49 Fed. Rep. 651, and cases there cited; The Belgenland, 114 U. S. 355.

• Panama R. R. Co. v. Napier Shipping Co., 166 U. S. 280, 17 S. Ct. 572.

A private in the United States Army was held at Havana, in April, 1900, awaiting trial by the civil courts of Cuba on a charge of murder committed in that island, the victim being a teamster in the military service. By art. 58 of the Articles of War it is provided that “in time of war, insurrection, or rebellion ... murder," when cominitted by persons in the military service of the United States, shall be punished by sentence of a general court-martial. By art. 59, when an officer or soldier is accused of a capital crime his commanding officer is required, except in time of war, on application by or on behalf of the party injured, to endeavor to deliver him over to a civil magistrate in order that he may be tried. It was advised that in the condition of affairs then existing in Cuba, the island being occupied by the United States in pursuance of the treaty of peace with Spain, the private in question should not be tried either by a court-martial or by a military commission, and that while art. 59 did not require him to be delivered to the Cuban courts it was nevertheless proper to permit such courts to try him.

Griggs, At.-Gen., May 9, 1900, 23 Op. 120.
The opinion proceeded upon the theory that the President might, as the

commander of the American forces then occupying Cuba in time of
peace, exempt them from “the laws of the sovereignty of Spain,
which he himself ha adopted as the laws of the sovereignty of Cuba,"
but that this power should not be exercised to defeat the chief end
and aim of all government, as would result from exempting Ameri-
can soldiers from trial for crime.

In suppressing an irregular establishment formed by persons who had no legal authority from any government, on a spot in the immediate neighborhood of the United States, and for purposes incompatible with their laws and with public tranquillity, the Government of the United States were bound by no obligation to assume a jurisdiction over those persons for acts previously committed by them on the high seas or within the jurisdiction of a neighboring state. They were required to depart from the island, with their property, which has accordingly been effected.”

Mr. Adams, Sec. of State, to Mr. Hyde de Neuville, French min., March 19,

1818, MS. Notes to For. Legations, II. 316, replying to notes of Mr. de Neuville of February 12 and March 11, 1818, requesting the assistance of the United States for the restoration to their original owners, who were subjects of France, of certain French vessels and cargoes alleged to have been taken and carried into Amelia Island by persons who had lately occupied that place.

“ While admitting that the conduct of the captain of the Camillus," an American vessel, “in causing several New Granadian citizens, among whom were two commissaries of police, to be cruelly whipped on board the aforesaid vessel, to which they had resorted in

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