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the discharge of their duty, for the purpose of obtaining from the captain thereof the compensation due by him to these persons for several days' labor performed in his service, appears from the testimony furnished to have been of a most reprehensible character, the undersigned does not perceive that there is the slightest ground upon which this Government can be called upon to punish him. The offence in question was committed in New Granadian territory upon citizens of that Republic, and in violation of its peace and laws. The perpetrators of the outrage therefore are amenable, not to the laws of this country, but to those of New Granada. There is no law of the United States which authorizes this Government to enforce the respect due to the local and municipal authorities of other States."

Mr. Marcy, Sec. of State, to Señor Don V. de Paredes, Sept. 27, 1853, MS.

Notes to Colombia, VI. 40. In March, 1882, the American schooner Daylight, being on a voyage from Key West, Fla., to Tampico, in Mexico, was, while lying at anchor during a storm outside the bar, near the harbor of Tampico, waiting to enter that port, run into by the Mexican gunboat Independencia, the schooner and cargo becoming a total loss. A claim for compensation having been presented diplomatically, the Mexican Government, though observing that it might be sued under the Mexican law before the proper tribunals, and that this course should be pursued by the claimant, stated that the case might be settled between the two Governments, but that, as the diplomatic channel was available only in the event of a denial of justice, the claimant must himself appear before the Mexican department of war and marine, to which the matter particularly pertained. The United States, on the other hand, contended that as the wrong complained of was suffered at the hands of a high officer of the Mexican navy, and as the Mexican Government was therefore conceived to be justly responsible for it, the claimants, who were not residents of Mexico, should not be required to go to that country to seek redress, but that the case should be dealt with by the two Governments; and that if, by the laws or administrative regulations of Mexico, it was essential that the facts should be first investigated by the ministry of war and marine, the subject should be referred to that department by the minister of foreign affairs. Such a course, it was said, would be pursued by the United States were a similar demand to be made on it by Mexico.

Mr. Frelinghuysen, Sec. of State, to Mr. Morgan, min. to Mexico, Nov. 15,

1883, and May 17, 1884, For. Rel. 1884, 343, 358; Mr. Morgan, min. to Mexico, to Mr. Frelinghuysen, Sec. of State, Sept. 21, 1883, Jan. 2, 1884, March 25, 1884, and June 26, 1884, For. Rel. 1884, 340, 345,

362, 370. See also Mr. Bayard, Sec. of State, to Mr. Jackson, min. to Mexico, July

2, 1885, MS. Inst. Mexico, XXI, 317, where the subject is discussed as H. Doc. 551—vol 2-6

that of the entry of a vessel into foreign waters under stress of weather. It seems, however, that, although a storm was prevailing when the schooner was run into she had entered Mexican waters off Tampico because that port was her destination, and was only waiting for an opportunity to cross the bar. The idea of stress may have been derived from a remark by Mr. Frelinghuysen, in bis instruction of May 17, 1884, that “ at the time of the occurrence which gave rise to the claim the vessel could scarcely be said, with strict propriety, to have been in Mexican waters. She was anchored outside the bar, near the harbor of Tampico, in an exceptionally rough sea, at the close of a severe storm, which rendered it unsafe for her to attempt to cross the bar or enter the harbor." He had previously stated that the schooner, when so lying at anchor, was on her voyage from Key West, Fla., with a cargo of lumber for Tampico."

(For. Rel. 1884, 358, 359.) The remark that the vessel could “scarcely be said, with strict propriety,

to have been in Mexican waters," referred to the contention that the case properly belonged to the jurisdiction of the Mexican courts. Mr. Frelinghuysen took the ground that “the municipal civil laws can only be held applicable to and operative on the rights, property, and persons of the citizens of the country and foreigners who may be either permanently or temporarily residing in the country," and in this relation he said: “ The owners of the Daylight were never residents of Mexico, either permanent or temporary. They are not known to have ever been in that country. The master of the vessel was not a resident of Mexico, and .. the vessel could scarcely be said, with strict propriety, to have been in Mexican waters. ... To insist that those claimants shall go from Maine to Tampico to seek redress in the Mexican tribunals for a grievous wrong suffered at the hands of a high officer of the navy of that Republic, and in such proceedings to be met by the evidence which the commander of the Independencia would readily be able to elicit from the ship's crew, would, in the estimation of this Government, be a practical denial of justice." (For. Rel. 1884, 359-360.)

In July, 1885, three seamen of the American schooner Maggie E. Abbott were arrested at Port au Prince, on a charge of murdering a Haytian policeman in a drinking house. Two of them were soon discharged, but the third, a Swede named Robinson, was held. As he had gone ashore without leave, he might, said the Department of State, “be reclaimed as a deserter, but this right is subordinated to any claim which the justice of Hayti may have upon him for violation of the laws of Hayti. If so accused, he has no exceptional right as an American seaman, and this would hold true, whether he went ashore with or without leave. If charged with the commission of crime in Haytian jurisdiction, he is amenable to Haytian law therefor."

M:. Bayard, Sec. of State, to Mr. Thompson, min. to Hayti, July 31, 1885,

MS. Inst. Hayti, II. 511. For affirmation of prior decisions in the
Goerdeler case, see Mr. Gresham, Sec. of State, to Mrs. Goerdeler,
April 26, 1893, 191 MS. Dom. Let. 425,

February 27, 1897, the United States legation at St. Petersburg reported that the Russian Government had refused to pardon the five Americans who were sentenced for illegal sealing on Robben Island, but that, under the operation of the Imperial manifest of May 14 (26), 1896, their sentences expired January 25 (February 6), 1897.

For. Rel. 1897, 446, referring to correspondence printed in For. Rel. 1896,

495-507. June 19, 1895, the embassy of the United States at London, cabled that

the home secretary would release John Curtin Kent on ticket of leave as soon as his friends should arrange to care for him. (For. Rel. 1895, I. 728.)

It being stated that certain Tyrolese subjects were detained against their will on a steamer at San Francisco, after having been induced to embark for Hawaii, under a contract to labor, by representations as to pay which they had found to be fraudulent, reply was made: “ Neither the police authorities of San Francisco, nor the [United States] Commissioner of Immigration, had any legal right or power to release the said Tyrolese from the restraint alleged to have been put upon their liberty. This could only be done by the institution of legal proceedings for a writ. of habeas corpus, . . . either by the injured parties themselves or by their friends in their behalf,” it not being the legal duty of any Federal or State official to institute proceedings in such cases.

Mr. Hay, Sec. of State, to Mr. Hengelmuller, Aust. amb., July 27, 1900,

MS. Notes to Aust. Leg. IX. 450, referring to previous notes of July 6

and 13, and the ambassador's notes of June 19 and July 21. The matter was referred to the governors of California and Hawaii, on

general groupds, for the purpose of acquainting them with the case and enabling them to give it consideration.

Article XII. of the convention between the United States and

France of 1788 provided that “all differences and Convention with

suits” between French subjects in the United States France, 1788.

and United States citizens in France, and particularly all disputes and differences between the officers and crews of vessels, should be “ determined by the respective consuls and viceconsuls, either by a reference to arbitrators, or by a summary judgment, and without costs; ” that no officer of the country should “ interfere therein, or take any part whatever in the matter; ” and that “ the appeals from the said consular sentences shall be carried before the tribunals of France or of the United States, to whom it may appertain to take cognizance thereof."

This convention, after giving rise to many differences, was, together with the other treaties with France, declared by the United States in 1798 to be abrogated.

Did the consular convention with France of 1788 give the French consul cognizance of all differences and suits between Frenchmen, or confine it to the description of cases therein enumerated or other cases not arising from transactions in the United States? The court held that the consular jurisdiction did “not extend generally to all differences and suits between Frenchmen."

Villeneuve v. Barron, U. S. circuit court, Dist. of Mass., May term, 1792,

2 Dallas, 235, note.

Mr. Harrison, United States district attorney at New York, March 6, 1794, stated that, having considered the provisions of the treaty and the act of Congress concerning consuls and vice-consuls, he was of opinion that the United States marshals were“ bound by law to execute any sentence of a French consul arising under the said [twelfth] article."

Mr. Bradford, Attorney-General of the United States, March 14, 1794, stated that he perfectly coincided in this opinion.

On the same day these opinions were communicated to the French minister.

Mr. Randolph, Sec. of State, to M. Fauchet, French min. March 14, 1794,

6 MS. Dom. Let. 121.

The subject of the French consulate in the United States has again been considered, in reference to the claim of execution of the judicial decrees of the French consuls by the officers of the United States, and the result is the same as formerly. The present Attorney General (the law officer whose constitutional duty it is to investigate all legal questions on which the Executive is to decide) concurs in the opinions of his predecessor and of the Attorney of the District of New York, that neither the consular convention between the United States and France, nor the law enacted by Congress for carrying the convention into effect, render it the duty of any officer of the United States or give him the power to execute such consular decrees. Of the opinion of the Executive of the United States on this point, with some reasons on which it was founded, you are already possessed in my letter of the 16th January last to General Pinckney. You say that the number of American commercial citizens in France vastly surpasses the number of French commercial citizens in the United States, and thence you infer that a mutual acknowledgment or cession of the consular powers you contend for would be proportionally more beneficial to us than to France. But, Sir, the United States desire no extension of the advantages secured to their citizens by the consular convention, and of course readily relinquish all claim to the powers which you say are accorded to the American consuls in France, relative to the authoritative execution of their judicial decrees. If any material inconvenience follows to the citizens of the United States, Congress must provide by law a penalty to be inflicted on such of them as refuse to obey the regular decisions of their consuls in France; in like manner as you informed me the laws of France impose a penalty of 1,400 livres, on any of her citizens, in such case offending."

Mr. Pickering, Sec. of State, to Mr. Letombe, French consul-general,

May 29, 1797, 10 MS. Dom. Let. 51.

The commander of a French privateer, having captured on the high seas the sloop Betsey, sent the vessel into Baltimore, where the owners of the vessel and cargo filed a libel in the United States district court for restitution on the ground the property was neutral. The captor pleaded to the jurisdiction of the court. The plea was allowed, and the decree was affirmed by the circuit court, from which an appeal was taken to the Supreme Court of the United States. The general question was raised whether an American court of admiralty had jurisdiction to entertain the libel and decree restitution. The Supreme Court, besides holding that the district court should proceed to determine whether, agreeably to laws and treaties, restitution should be made, declared that, since no foreign power could of right institute or erect any court of judicature in the United States but in pursuance of treaties, the admiralty jurisdiction which had been exercised in the United States by French consuls, not being so warranted, was not of right.

Glass v. The sloop Betsey (1794), 3 Dallas, 6.
“The United States and France have, by their consular convention,

given mutually to their consuls jurisdiction in certain cases spe-
cially enumerated. But that convention gives to neither the power of
establishing complete courts of admiralty within the territory of the
other, nor even of deciding the particular question of prize or not
prize." (Mr. Jefferson, Sec. of State, to Mr. Morris, min. to France,

Aug. 16, 1793, Am. State Papers, For. Rel. I. 169.)
The action of the French consul at Charleston in condemning as prize a

British vessel, not being warranted by the law of the land, " is conse-
quently a mere nullity.” (Mr. Jefferson, Sec. of State, to the British

min., May 17, 1793, 5 MS. Dom. Let. 105.) See, also, Moore, Int. Arbitrations, I. 311 et seq.

The Constitution of the United States gives jurisdiction to the

courts of the United States in cases where foreign Suits by foreign states are parties, and the judiciary act gives to the sovereigns.

circuit courts jurisdiction in all cases between aliens and citizens; but the court refused to inquire, upon a motion, whether Ferdinand VII., King of Spain, could institute this suit, the Government of the United States not having acknowledged him King.

King of Spain v. Oliver, 2 Wash. C. C. 429.

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