A suit brought in a court of the United States by a foreign sovereign [Napoleon III.], where the nation he represents is the party substantially aggrieved, as in the case of an injury to a public ship, is not defeated, not does it abate, by a change in the person of the sovereign or by his deposition. Such change may, if necessary, be suggested on the record. The Sapphire, 11 Wall. 164. In this case the court observed that if a special case should arise in which it could be shown that injustice to the other party would ensue from a continuation of proceedings after the death or deposition of a sovereign, the court, in the exercise of its discretionary power, would take such order as the exigency might require to prevent such a result. A bill was filed by "The Government of the State of Colombia and his Excellency Don Manuel José Hurtado, a citizen of the said State, and minister plenipotentiary from the same to the court of His Britannic Majesty, now residing at No. 33, Baker street, Portman square, in the county of Middlesex." The vice-chancellor : "A foreign state is as well entitled, as any individual, to the aid of this court in the assertion of its rights: but it must sue in a form which makes it possible for this court to do justice to the defendants. It must sue in the names of some public officers who are entitled to represent the interests of the state, and upon whom process can be served on the part of the defendants; and who can be called upon to answer the cross bill of the defendants. This general description of The Colombian Government' precludes the defendants from these just rights; and no instance can be stated in which this court has entertained the suit of a foreign state by such a description. "Demurrer allowed." The Colombian Government r. Rothschild (1826), 1 Simons, 94, 104. A foreign sovereign prince, though entitled to sue in the court of chancery in his political capacity, stands in such case on the same footing as ordinary suitors with respect to the rules and practice of the court, and is bound, like them, to answer a cross bill personally and on oath, and can not claim the privilege of putting in an answer by his agent, or without oath or signature. The King of Spain v. Hullet (1833), 1 Cl. & Fin. 333. The same principle was enforced in Rothschild v. Queen of Portugal, 3 Younge & Collyer, 594, (June 24, 1839,) in which Alderson, B., overruled a demurrer of the Queen to a bill brought by Rothschild for the discovery of certain correspondence relating to the transaction in respect of which she had sued him. The matter was of a public nature. See, also, the United States r. Prioleau, and other cases, supra, § 26. of Mexico (1899), 29 Misc. (N. Y.) 511.) (2) REGULATION OF PROCEDURE. § 187. When a suitor applies to foreign tribunals for justice, he must submit to the rules by which those tribunals are governed. General principles. Bradford, At.-Gen., 1794, 1 Op. 53. Citizens of the United States whilst residing in Peru are subject to its laws and the treaties existing between the parties, and are amenable to its courts of justice for any crimes or offenses which they may commit. It is the province of the judiciary to construe and administer the laws; and if this be done promptly and impartially towards American citizens, and with a just regard to their rights, they have no cause of complaint. In such cases they have no right to appeal for redress to the diplomatic representative of their country, nor ought he to regard their complaints. It is only where justice has been denied or unreasonably delayed by the courts of justice of foreign countries, where these are used as instruments to oppress American citizens or deprive them of their just rights, that they are warranted in appealing to their Government to interpose. No such circumstances exist, so far as I understand the question, in the case of Dr. Norris, which was the subject of Mr. Jewett's protest.” Mr. Buchanan, Sec. of State, to Mr. Osma, Peruvian min., Feb. 1. 1848, "Complaints of unfounded seizures of property by Mexican authorities on the Rio Grande frontier have recently been addressed to this Department by citizens of the United States. They inveigh against arbitrary acts of the military and corrupt proceedings of the judicial officers of Mexico in that quarter. This Government is not disposed to connive at any infractions of the laws of Mexico by our citizens, but it has a right to expect that if they are charged with a violation of those laws the cases will be fairly and impartially tried and decided. If a contrary course should be adopted it may be difficult to restrain the aggrieved parties from seeking reparation by acts of violence against the property of Mexicans on the southern bank of the Rio Grande." Mr. Webster, Sec. of State, to Mr. Smith, May 5, 1851, MS. Inst. Mexico, XVI. 258. "Our citizens who resort to countries where the trial by jury is not known, and who may there be charged with crime, frequently imagine, when the laws of those countries are administered in the forms customary therein, that they are deprived of rights to which they are entitled, and therefore may expect the interference of their own Government. But it must be remembered, in all such cases, that they have of their own free will elected a residence out of their native land, and preferred to live elsewhere, and under another government, and in a country in which different laws prevail. "They have chosen to settle themselves in a country where jury trials are not known; where representative government does not exist; where the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is unheard of, and where judicial proceedings in criminal cases are brief and summary. Having made this election, they must necessarily abide its consequences. No man can carry the ægis of his national American liberty into a foreign country, and expect to hold it up for his exemption from the dominion and authority of the laws and the sovereign power of that country, unless he be authorized to do so by virtue of treaty stipulations." Report of Mr. Webster, Sec. of State, to the President, Dec. 23, 1851, on See, also, as to Thrasher's case, Moore, Int. Arbitrations, III. 2701. "Every nation, whenever its laws are violated by anyone owing obedience to them, whether he be a citizen or a stranger, has a right to inflict the penalties incurred upon the transgressor if found within its jurisdiction. The case is not altered by the character of the laws, unless they are in derogation of the well-established international code. No nation has a right to supervise the municipal code of another nation or claim that its citizens or subjects shall be exempted from the operation of such code, if they have voluntarily placed themselves under it. The character of the municipal laws of one country does not furnish a just ground for other states to interfere with the execution of these laws even upon their own citizens when they have gone into that country and subjected themselves to its jurisdiction. If this country can rightfully claim no such exemption for its native-born or naturalized citizens, it can not claim it for those who have at most but inchoate rights of citizens. "The above principle, that persons, being citizens or subjects of one state and having violated the laws of another state, may be punished while they remain under or are fairly brought within the jurisdiction of the latter state, is too well established to be made a matter of serious controversy. It is clearly affirmed in, and, indeed, is the basis of, every extradition treaty. Each contracting party agrees to deliver up to the other fugitive offenders, generally in cluding its own citizens as well as strangers,-for specified offenses, to be dealt with according to the laws of the country demanding the surrender of them. It is true that there are some kinds of offenses which are not, and ought not to be, included in extradition treaties;such, for instance, as are called political offenses;-yet because one nation will not enter into a compact to deliver such offenders to another, that does not justify the inference that if such offenders go voluntarily within the jurisdiction of the country whose laws they have offended they may not be rightfully punished, or that they can claim exemption from punishment if they were citizens of another country when the offense was committed, or had, after committing it, acquired another nationality. "The country whose 'protection' is invoked can not, it is conceived, properly interpose in such a case unless the municipal law, the violation of which is charged, contravenes some right of such country acquired by treaty stipulations or otherwise. The principle does not at all interfere with the right of any state to protect its citizens or those entitled to its protection when abroad from wrongs and injuries, from arbitrary acts of oppression or deprivation of property, as contradistinguished from penalties and punishments, incurred by the infraction of the laws of the country within whose jurisdiction the sufferers have placed themselves." Mr. Marcy, Sec. of State, to Mr. Jackson, chargé d'affaires, Jan. 10, 1854, "The system of proceedings in criminal cases in the Austrian Government has, undoubtedly, as is the case in most other absolute countries, many harsh features, and is deficient in many safeguards which our laws provide for the security of the accused; but it is not within the competence of one independent power to reform the jurisprudence of others, nor has it the right to regard as an injury the application of the judicial system and established modes of proceedings in foreign countries to its citizens when fairly brought under their operation. All we can ask of Austria, and this we can demand as a right, is, that in her proceedings against American citizens prosecuted for offenses committed within her jurisdiction, she should give them the full and fair benefit of her system, such as it is, and deal with them as she does with her own subjects or those of other foreign powers. She can not be asked to modify her mode of proceedings to suit our views, or to extend to our citizens all the advantages which her subjects would have under our better and more humane system of criminal jurisprudence." Mr. Marcy, Sec. of State, to Mr. Jackson, chargé d'affaires, Apr. 6, 1855, "It cannot be expected that any government would go so far as to yield to a pretension of a foreign power to revise and review the proceedings of its courts under the claim of an international right to correct errors therein, either in respect to the application of principles of law, or the application of facts as evidence in cases where the citizens of such foreign power have been convicted. It certainly could not be expected that such a claim would be allowed before the party making it had first presented a clear case prima facie of wilful denial of justice or a deliberate perversion of judicial forms for the purpose of oppression." Mr. Marcy, Sec. of State, to Mr. Jackson, chargé at Vienna, Apr. 6, 1855, See, also, McDonald v. State, 80 Wis. 407; 50 N. W. Rep. 185. "In France and on the continent of Europe generally, the police authorities have the right and are in the habit of setting on foot proceedings against individuals upon suspicion merely, and not upon probable cause alleged under oath. The power referred to is, no doubt, sometimes abused. Citizens of the United States, however, whether native or naturalized, who, of their own accord, visit countries where it exists, must expect to incur that hazard, unless by treaty stipulation they should be placed upon a more favorable footing than the subjects of the government whose agents may commit the abuse." Mr. Marcy, Sec. of State, to Mr. Richter, Feb. 21, 1854, 42 MS. Dom. Let. 231. Complaint was made as to the action of the police of Valparaiso in searching the house of and arresting a citizen of the United States on suspicion of being concerned in a robbery. On the facts in the case the Department of State thought that the conduct of the police "was certainly censurable," but that the case was "scarcely one the circumstances of which would warrant its being made an international grievance. The Chilean Government, like ours," continued the Department of State," is sovereign within its own territory, and can not without derogation from its sovereignty allow a foreign government to dictate the form in which judicial proceedings are to be carried on. There may have been some irregularity in the manner in which the search was made of the house of Priest. If, however, his rights were thereby invaded, and there are no means of making the authorities judicially accountable, this is a defect which may work injury to Mr. Priest, but it does not appear to be an intentional and aggravated denial of justice, for the redress of which the peaceful relations between the United States and Chile ought to be disturbed. You are aware that we have no treaty with the Government of that Re |