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and with moral certainty to the conclusion that the defendant did
commit the offense of which he is accused, and exclude any reason-
able hypothesis except the guilt of the defendant. (Hocker v. State,
716.)

3. EVIDENCE-JUDICIAL NOTICE-PLACE OF DANGER.-A
grade crossing, on a railroad, is judicially recognized as a place of
danger. (Chicago etc. R. R. Co. v. State, 557.)

4. EVIDENCE TO PROVE DELIVERY OF TELEGRAM.-From
the testimony of a witness that he wrote and sent a telegram it
will be presumed that he sent it in the ordinary manner, to wit,
by delivering it to a telegraph company for transmission. (Eppinger
v. Scott, 220.)

5. EVIDENCE.-A TELEGRAM IS PRESUMED TO HAVE
BEEN DELIVERED in the regular course of business to the per-
son to whom it was directed. The fact that the telegram was sent
is therefore admissible in evidence, and tends to prove that it was
received. (Eppinger v. Scott, 220.)

6. EVIDENCE-CONFESSIONS

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ADMISSIBILITY CORPUS
DELICTI.-Confessions are not admissible in evidence, in a criminal
case, until the corpus delicti has been proved. (Bradford v. State,
24.)

7. EVIDENCE-CONFESSIONS-WAIVER OF PROOF AS TO
THEIR BEING VOLUNTARY.-In criminal cases, where confessions
are offered in evidence, and the defendant objects that such evidence
is "incompetent and illegal," the court ought to require satisfactory
proof that the confessions were voluntarily made before admitting
them. Such objection is not so general as to waive the required
preliminary proof. (Bradford v. State, 24.)

8. EVIDENCE- CONFESSIONS-ADMISSIBILITY.-In crim-
inal cases, confessions are prima facie inadmissible, and will not be
received in evidence until it is shown to the court that they were vol-
untarily made, unless the objection is waived. (Bradford v. State,
24.)

9. EVIDENCE-FRAUDULENT TRANSFER-RES GESTAE.—
Statements made by a vendor before the sale had become complete
by delivery and while delivery was in process are admissible for
the purpose of throwing light upon the character of the sale by
enabling the jury to determine whether it was bona fide or with
intent to defraud creditors. (Eppinger v. Scott, 220.)

10. EVIDENCE, PAROL TO CONTROL AGREEMENT FOR
SUPPORT.-Testimony as to what was said prior to the execution of
a mortgage conditioned for the support of the mortgagees as to
where they were to live after such execution is not admissible to
vary the effect of the mortgage, so as to obligate the mortgagor to
furnish such support only at his own residence. (Tuttle v. Burgett,
649.)

11. ELECTION, BALLOTS, LATENT AMBIGUITY—Where there
are two men in the same town with the same name, one of whom is
a candidate for office at an election and the other is not, and there
are ballots which do not designate which of these persons are voted
for thereon, parol evidence may be received to show for which the
votes were intended. (State v. Steinborn, 938.)

12. ELECTIONS-BALLOTS, CONTRADICTING.-Where there
are two persons in the same town, one commonly known as "C. H.
C., Sr.," and the other as "C. H. C., Jr.," both being eligible to an of-
fice for which the former only is a candidate, parol evidence is not
admissible to pove that ballots on which the name "C. H. C., Jr.," ap-
peared were intended for "C. H. C., Sr." (State v. Steinborn, 938.)

13. ELECTIONS, EVIDENCE OF INTENTION OF THE VOT-
ERS.-Parol evidence is not receivable to explain what is placed
upon a ballot, nor to contradict or vary it, nor can the intention of
the voter as expressed upon his ballot be explained by parol evi-
dence, except for the same general purpose that such evidence might
be received to explain any other written instrument. (State v.
Steinborn, 938.)

14. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS – GUARANTY—INSTRUC-
TIONS. AS parol evidence is inadmissible to contradict a contract of
indorsement, or to prove a contract of guaranty, instructions author-
izing the jury to find from such evidence whether or not the payee
of a note put his signature upon the back of it for the purpose of
guaranteeing its payment are improperly given. (Hately v. Pike,
304.)

15. EVIDENCE - INDORSEMENT-GUARANTY-PAROL EX-
PLANATION OF INTENTION.-If a note of a corporation, payable
to the order of its president, is indorsed by him twice, the first sig-
nature having the word "president" attached to it, and the second
one not having it, parol evidence is inadmissible to vary the contract
of indorsement, as shown by the first signature, or to prove that the
indorser, by his second signature, intended and agreed to guarantee
the payment of the note. (Hately v. Pike, 304.)

16.

CORPORATIONS-TWO

INDORSEMENTS OF NOTE BY
PRESIDENT-PAROL EVIDENCE.—If a note of a corporation, pay-
able to the order of its president, is to be regarded as payable to its
own order, the president's name in blank, upon the back of the note,
under a preceding signature of his, to which is attached the word
"president," renders him liable as second indorser, and parol evi-
dence is inadmissible to show the contract to be one of guaranty.
(Hately v. Pike, 304.)

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17. EVIDENCE CONTRACT OF INDORSEMENT.- PAROL
EVIDENCE is not admissible to alter or vary the liability created by
a contract of indorsement, by showing that it was a contract of guar-
anty, or any other kind of a contract than one of indorsement, and
this is true, whether the indorsement consists merely of the indor-
ser's signature, or whether the agreement imported by the signature
is written over it in full. (Hately v. Pike, 304.)

18. EVIDENCE OF GOOD CHARACTER is always admissible in
a criminal case, and should be considered in connection with all the
other evidence, but never independent of it, to generate a doubt of
the guilt of the accused. (Scott v. State, 100.)

See Appeal, 8-12; Boundaries; Homicide, 3-8; Larceny, 6-9; Motions;
New Trial, 2; Trial, 2-5.

EXCEPTIONS.

See Appeal, 5.

EXCESSIVE VERDICT.

See Damages, 10; New Trial, &

EXCURSIONS.

See Railroads, 14.

EXECUTION.

1. EXECUTION SALES.-EVERY PRESUMPTION is indulged
in favor of the regularity and validity of execution sales. (Neal v.
Nelson, 590.)

2. EXEMPTION LAWS-CONFLICT OF.-If property of a debt-
or is seized under attachment or execution, its exemption from the
writ must be determined by the laws of the state where the seizure
is made, and its release cannot be procured by establishing its exemp-
tion in the state where the debt was contracted and the debtor and
creditor both reside, but this will not prevent the debtor from main-
taining an action in the state of his residence against his creditor for
resorting to the courts of the other state for the purpose of evading
the exemption laws of the state of their residence. (Stewart v.
Thomson, 431.)

3. EXEMPTION LAWS, SUITS FOR, BRINGING PROCEED-
ING IN ANOTHER STATE FOR PURPOSE OF AVOIDING.-If a
debtor, having property exempt from execution by the laws of the
state in which he and his creditor reside, goes temporarily into an-
other state for a business purpose, to which such property is neces-
sary, and therefore takes it with him, and his creditor resorts to the
courts of that state for the purpose of subjecting such property to
execution, it not being there exempt, and afterward sells it under
execution in defiance of an injunction issued in the state of their
domicile, he is liable to an action by the debtor to recover the value
of the property. (Stewart v. Thomson, 431.)

See Adverse Possession, 2; Attachment, 4; Chattel Mortgages, 2;
Sheriff, 2; Statutes, 24.

EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS.

1. EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS-GRANT OF AD-
MINISTRATION—ATTACK UPON.-If an administrator appointed
by the probate court of the wrong county accepts the appointment,
and, acting thereunder, obtains possession of the assets of an estate
and converts thein, neither he nor his sureties can question the valid-
ity of his appointment. The fact that the administration bond was
signed several years before the grant of administration is immate-
rial, if the obligors signed it with reference to the administration
of all estates that might be committed to the hands of the adminis-
trator by the order of the court of that county. (Kling v. Connell,
144.)

2. EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS-GRANT OF AD-
MINISTRATION-COLLATERAL ATTACK.-It is presumed that
the probate court before making an appointment of an administrator
of the estate of a deceased person has ascertained the existence of
the jurisdictional facts, without which the power of appointment
could not be legally exercised. Such grant of administration, when
made, cannot be collaterally assailed otherwise than in a direct pro-
ceeding. (Kling v. Connell, 144.)

3. EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS—COLLATERAL AT-
TACK.-A GRANT of letters of administration by the probate court
of one county on the estate of a decedent who resided in another
county at the time of his death, is not void, but merely voidable, and
cannot be collaterally attacked nor questioned otherwise than in a di-
rect proceeding brought for that purpose. A motion by sureties on
the bond for such administration to quash executions issued against
them as sureties, on the ground that the grant of administration was
made in the wrong county, is a collateral attack. (Kling v. Connell,
144.)

4. PROBATE SALES-COLLATERAL ATTACK UPON.-In the
absence of fraud or collusion, the judicial determination by a pro-
bate court, that there are debts against an estate over which it has
Jurisdiction, and that a sale of the land is necessary, is conclusive
against all who are parties to that proceeding and upon a chancery
or other court in any collateral proceeding or suit, so far as the rights

of bona fide purchasers are concerned. Parties to such decree can-
not impeach the sale collaterally on the ground that they were 1g-
norant of their rights, that such debts were barred by the statute of
limitations, and for fraud, the facts of which are not stated. (Cobb
v. Garner, 136.)

5. EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS-ESTATE OF DE-
CEDENT IS NOT LIABLE FOR ADMINISTRATOR'S MISREPRE-
SENTATIONS, TORT, OR BREACH OF CONTRACT.-—Neither an
action of tort nor of contract can be maintained against the estate
of a deceased person for damages growing out of alleged representa-
tions, warranties, or statements made to a purchaser of the trust
property, by an administrator, or other representative of the dece-
dent, at an administrator's sale. Hence, if the purchaser at such sale
buys two cows represented to be with calf from a thoroughbred bull,
and it turns out that one is barren and the other not with calf, thus
decreasing their value, the estate is not liable for the damage. (Huff-
man v. Hendry, 351.)

6. EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS-MUTUAL MIS-
TAKE-EQUITABLE RELIEF.-If a purchaser at an administra-
tor's sale and the administrator, acting in good faith, make a mutual
mistake, either of fact or of law, the result of which is to benefit
the estate under the control of the court, the court, having jurisdiction
of the trust, may, in a proper case, in the exercise of a sound dis-
cretion, grant the injured party equitable relief, but he must first
restore, or offer to return to the estate, what he has received, or
show a good reason for his failure to do so. (Huffman v. Hendry,
351.)
See Fraudulent Conveyances, 7-9.

EXEMPTION.

See Attachment, 10; Execution, 2, 3; Homestead, 1.

EXPERIMENTS.
See Evidence, 1.

EXPERTS.

See Witnesses, 10.

FELLOW-SERVANTS.

See Master and Servant, 2-5; Witnesses, 2.

FENCES.

See Railroads, 2.

FIRES.

See Railroads, 4; Carriers, 9.

FIXTURES.

1. FIXTURES.-WHERE MACHINERY IS PERMANENT in
its character and essential to the purposes for which a building is
occupied, it must be regarded as realty and as passing with the build-
ing; and whatever is essential to the purposes for which the build-
ing is used will be considered a fixture, although the connection be-
tween them is such that it can be severed without physical or last-
Ing injury. (Morotock Ins. Co. v. Rodefer, 846.)

2. FIXTURES.-A "steam-feed" machine, attached by bolts to the
sills of a sawmill resting on piling driven in the ground, is a fixture

as between the mortgagor and mortgagee of the land on which the
mill is located. (Clark v. Hill, 574.)

FORFEITURES.

1. FORFEITURES ARE NOT FAVORED either in law or in
equity. (Webster v. Dwelling House Ins. Co., 658.)

2. FORFEITURES ARE TO RECEIVE A STRICT CONSTRUC-
TION, when the intent is doubtful, against those for whose benefit
they are introduced. (Webster v. Dwelling House Ins. Co., 658.)

3. A FORFEITURE IS a deprivation or destruction of a right in
consequence of the nonperformance of some obligation or condition.
(Webster v. Dwelling House Ins. Co., 658.)

See Insurance, 4, 5; Landlord and Tenant, 9, 10.

FORGERY.

1. FORGERY-FICTITIOUS PERSON.-The signing of a ficti-
tious name to a written instrument with fraudulent intent constitutes
forgery. (Hocker v. State, 716.)

2. FORGERY-VENIRE.-Under a statute providing that "the of-
fense of forgery may be prosecuted in any county where the written
instrument was forged, or where the same was used or passed, or
attempted to be used or passed," the forger may be prosecuted in
the county where the forged instrument was passed, although it pur-
ported to be executed in another county. In such case, although the
indictment alleges that the instrument was made in the county
where it was passed, it is not necessary for the prosecution to prove
such allegation as a prerequisite to conviction. (Hocker v. State,
716.)

3. INDICTMENT-VARIANCE.-An indictment for forgery alleg-
ing that the instrument uttered by the accused purported to be the
act of another, "a fictitious person," which instrument was to the
tenor of the following, then setting out the instrument signed by such
other, does not contain a variance. The purport clause of the indict-
ment simply describes such other party as a fictitious person, and
does not allege that the act was that of a fictitious person. (Hocker
v. State, 716.)

FRAUD.

1. FRAUD IN PROCURING CONTRACT-BURDEN OF
PROOF.-The burden of proof is on the party who undertakes to im-
peach a written instrument for fraud to establish the fraud by clear
and satisfactory evidence. (Beck etc. Lithographing Co. v. Houp-
pert, 77.)

2. FRAUD IN PROCURING CONTRACT-EFFECT OF.-If a
party is induced by fraud and misrepresentation to sign a written
instrument, which he did not know he was signing, and which he
did not intend to sign, such instrument is void, although he did not
read it, or have it read. (Beck etc. Lithographing Co. v. Houppert,
77.)

3. FRAUD IN PROCURING CONTRACT-SUFFICIENCY OF
PLEA.-In an action to recover the price of goods sold under a writ-
ten contract, a plea that the contract was procured by fraud is suf-
ficient, and not demurrable, where it avers that the plaintiff's agent
drew up the contract sued on, read it over to the defendant in the
terms agreed upon, and, believing that the instrument was written
as read, the defendant executed it, and where the plea then sets out
the difference between the instrument the defendant signed and the
one he meant to sign. (Beck etc. Lithographing Co. v. Houppert, 77.)
4. FRAUD-PLEADING.-When it becomes necessary to plead

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