The New York Supplement

enterprise, except, perhaps, the provision that certain religious workers and missionaries were given preference over the public at large. Having regard to the evidence disclosed by the record in these cases we are of the opinion that the relator cannot claim exemption from taxation, although it is a corporation clearly entitled to exemption under the provisions of the Tax Law.

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[2, 3] To entitle it to exemption, however, the burden is upon the relator to prove that its property is exclusively used for religious purposes, and that it has brought itself within the provisions of the statThis burden, we conclude, the relator has not sustained, for we think it clearly appears that its property was used for business, rather than for religious purposes. The provisions of the Tax Law of the state of New York exempting property from taxation are to be strictly construed against the claimant. See People ex rel. Delta Kappa Epsilon Society of Hamilton College v. Lawler, 74 App. Div. 553, 557, 77 N. Y. Supp. 840, affirmed 179 N. Y. 535, 71 N. E. 1136; People ex rel. Young Men's Association for Mutual Improvement in City of Albany v. Sayles, 32 App. Div. 197, 53 N. Y. Supp. 67, affirmed 157 N. Y. 677, 51 N. E. 1093; People ex rel. Adelphi College v. Well's, 97 App. Div. 312, 89 N. Y. Supp. 957, affirmed 180 N. Y. 534, 72 N. E. 1147; People ex rel. Catholic Union of City of Albany v. Sayles, 32 App. Div. 203, 53 N. Y. Supp. 65, affirmed 157 N. Y. 679, 51 N. E. 1092. See, also, Matter of Young Women's Christian Ass'n (Sup.) 141 N. Y. Supp. 260, affirmed sub nom. Young Women's Christian Ass'n v. Carr, 158 App. Div. 908, 142 N. Y. Supp. 1151; Matter of Young Women's Christian Association of Brooklyn, 156 App. Div. 295, 141 N. Y. Supp. 138, affirmed 209 N. Y. 534, 102 N. E. 1118.

The learned trial justice, in rendering his opinion, referred to Matter of Silver Bay Association for Christian Conferences & Training (Sup.) 186 N. Y. Supp. 956, affirmed 196 App. Div. 913, 186 N. Y. Supp. 956. That case, however, is easily distinguishable from the present case. In the Silver Bay Case it appeared that the association had procured a tract of land in the town of Hague, Warren county, New York, and upon it erected a hotel, a Forest Inn, and a number of cottages. There was a farm upon this tract, upon which were kept cows, chickens, and pigs. The property was located on the shores of Lake George, several miles distant from any village, transportation station, or place of supply. Upon the property and in its buildings were conducted a series of schools for instruction and training. Judge Van Kirk, in deciding that case, concluded as a matter of law that any use of the property outside of the declared lawful purposes could only be occasional, incidental, and resulting from natural or unexpected conditions, or as an accommodation, the refusal of which would amount to unnecessary meanness, else the right of exemption would be lost, and that the use outside of lawful purposes must not be continuous and must not become a practice. Of course, the cases are not parallel, and the Silver Bay Case is really no authority here.

[4] A point is raised in the respondent's brief that the referee erred in refusing to exempt a part of the property, which the respondent claims was not shown to have been used for purposes other than religious purposes. The statute does provide that, if a portion only of

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any lot or building of any such corporation is "used exclusively for carrying out thereupon one or more of such purposes, * * * then such lot or building shall be so exempt only to the extent of the value of the portion so used." Tax Law, § 4, subd. 7, as amended by Laws 1918, c. 288. In other words, the respondent claims that, if a part of a single lot of their property was used exclusively for corporate purposes, then it would be entitled to exemption on that part of the particular lot, and that, if a part of a single house was used exclusively for corporate purposes, then the relator would be entitled to exemption upon that part of the house. This point is disposed of by the referee's finding, which we think is amply supported by the evidence, which is to the effect that the relator's property, while consisting of six separate parcels, is, in fact, one parcel of property, devoted to the purposes of the association and used as one, but that the property was used in such a manner by the missionary board that it cannot claim exemption under the statute.

It follows that the judgment in each case, which vacates and sets aside the assessment levied upon the relator's property for the year 1920 for the taxes of the year 1921, should be reversed upon the law and the facts, and the several writs of certiorari quashed and dismissed, with costs.

Judgment reversed on the law and the facts, and writ of certiorari quashed and dismissed, with costs. All findings of fact inconsistent herewith are reversed. Appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law in conformity with this decision will be signed by the court.

Settle findings and order upon notice before Mr. Justice MANNING. All concur.