The plaintiff gave evidence tending to dispute the notice to the agent of dissolution. Justice CAMPBELL speaks of the notice in the following language:

"On the 13th of February the firm was dissolved, and on the same day the agent was informed of the dissolution. * * * The shipment of the goods was not made in accordance with the terms of the order, and was not made until the order had been rescinded by notice of the dissolution."

This indicates that the notice of dissolution to the agent was held to be notice to the plaintiff.

It cannot be consistent with any just conception of fair dealing to subject a retired partner to the payment of debts contracted after the notice of dissolution has been given to the creditor extending credit. Such a creditor cannot assume the status of partnership to be unchanged, when he has actual notice of a change imputed to him from the knowledge of his agent, where the agent was such an agent that notice to him was notice to the principal. See, also, D. June & Co. v. Doke, 35 Tex. Civ. App. 240 (80 S. W. 402); Hier v. Odell, 18 Hun (N. Y.), 314. See, also, collection of authorities in note at foot of Bush v. W. A. McCarty Co., 127 Ga. 308 (56 S. E. 430), reported in 9 Am. & Eng. Ann. Cas. at page 244.

The most of the remainder of the alleged errors discussed in plaintiff's brief are disposed of under the authorities cited, that notice to the agent was notice to the plaintiff, and the trial court left the question of notice to Beattys as one of fact to the jury; for, if given, as said in the case of Cox v. Pearce, above cited, "such notice was in law a notice to the principal, although it was never communicated to him."

It is true that the trial court submitted to the jury the question whether such notice had been actually communicated to the plaintiff. This part of the charge was more favorable to the appellant than the law of the case would warrant under the authorities above

referred to, and we do not think the plaintiff can complain because of such submission.

It is further contended by counsel under this subdivision of his brief that there is no question that the plaintiff actually extended credit to the Celery City Electric Company upon the strength of Congdon's connection. We think that this was an immaterial matter, provided the jury found that notice had been given to Beattys, the agent; for, if this traveling agent of plaintiff had actual knowledge of the withdrawal, as the jury must have found, it is not important whether plaintiff sold the goods relying upon Congdon's connection with the defendant firm or not.

Counsel also complains of the charge because the court stated that the undisputed evidence showed that Congdon had retired from the partnership previous to the time when the credit was extended by the plaintiff. A reading of the record satisfies us that the court was clearly correct in this statement. The testimony of Mr. Congdon and Mr. Kressler was not disputed in any way as to the time when he withdrew. Both of them fixed the time as previous to that when any credit was extended, and particularly with reference to the sale of the motor, which was the first item for which credit was extended.

Error is also assigned upon that portion of the charge with reference to the subsequent dealings of the plaintiff with the Celery City Electric Company after it was conceded the plaintiff had notice of the withdrawal of the defendant Congdon. We do not think, in view of the course which the trial took, that there was any error in submitting this question to the jury.

In our opinion there was no reversible error on the trial of which the appellant can complain, and the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.

STEERE, C. J., and MOORE, MCALVAY, BROOKE, KUHN, OSTRANDER, and BIRD, JJ., concurred.

KOVACS v. MAYORAS.

1. EVIDENCE-HEARSAY-CROSS-EXAMINATION.

On cross-examination of plaintiff, in an action for libel, the trial court erred in permitting the witness to testify that a third party, had approached him, claiming to act in defendant's behalf, to propose a compromise.

2. SAME-LIBEL-RETRACTION.

Nor was a letter admissible in evidence, to plaintiff from the editor of a newspaper which published the alleged libel, containing criticisms of defendant who was shown to have caused the objectionable article to be published.

3. SAME

REPUTATION-LIBEL AND SLANDER.

Specific facts shown by testimony and admitted by plaintiff in a libel suit on cross-examination must stand against him as qualified or explained by him, although the evidence tends to impeach his good reputation, and it is not permissible to introduce evidence in rebuttal showing his good reputation in the community. The rule that defendant may show bad reputation does not authorize plaintiff in the first instance to open the door by general evidence of his good reputation.

4. LIBEL AND SLANDER-PLEADINGS-DAMAGES.

For damage to plaintiff's feelings because of libelous statements relating to himself and wife, proper averments in the pleading are required in order to authorize a recovery and it is error to permit the jury to assess damages by reason of what was published concerning his wife, if complaint is only made in the declaration in so far as it related to him.

5. SAME.

A married woman may bring a sole action for slander; and her action is not barred by the recovery of damages by the husband for slanderous statements concerning himself and wife.

6. SAME-JUSTIFICATION-TRUTH AS DEFENSE.

It is sufficient for the defendant to justify so much of the defamatory matter as constitutes the sting of the charge: it is unnecessary to justify every word thereof

so long as the substance be justified. But when the article is indivisible and the facts asserted are dependent on each other to impute the defamatory charge then each material allegation must be justified or plaintiff may recover for the part not justified. Where a full and complete justification cannot be made of each item constituting the libel, the facts as they exist may be shown in mitigation of damages, and if such facts are substantially the same, or not materially variant from those alleged, they will reduce the damages to a minimum.1

7. SAME.

Held, that the court erred in charging the jury that there was no evidence of justification.

Error to Muskegon; Sullivan, J. Submitted April 25, 1913. (Docket No. 84.) Decided May 28, 1913.

Case by Steve Kovacs against Peter Mayoras for libel. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant brings error. Reversed.

R. J. Macdonald and William H. Simpson, for appellant.

Turner & Turner, for appellee.

STONE, J. This is an action on the case for libel. The libel claimed was the publication of a newspaper article in the Hungarian language, in a paper published at Cleveland, Ohio, in that language. The article is set out, both in the Hungarian and English languages, in the declaration. The inducement, or introductory part of the declaration, is in the common form in such action, as to the proper conduct and behavior of the plaintiff in the community, and that he had not ever before been suspected to have been guilty of the offenses and misconduct therein charged, etc. The declaration proceeds in this language:

'The authorities on the question of truth as a defense to a civil action for libel or slander are collated in a note in 31 L. R. A. (N. S.) 132.

"Yet the said defendant, well knowing the premises, but greatly envying the happy state and condition of the said plaintiff, and contriving, and wickedly and maliciously intending to injure the said plaintiff, in his good name, fame and credit and to bring him into public scandal, infamy, disrepute and disgrace with and among all his neighbors and other good and worthy citizens of this State, and to cause it to be suspected and believed by those neighbors and citizens that he, the said plaintiff, was a bad man, was in the habit of getting drunk, and when drunk threatened to shoot people, and that he had been arrested for the same, etc., to vex, harass, oppress, impoverish and wholly ruin him, the said plaintiff, heretofore, to wit, at the city of Muskegon Heights, said county, did on or about, to wit, the 28th day of April, 1911, compose and write a certain article in the Hungarian language of and concerning said plaintiff and sent the same to the Hungarian paper published at Cleveland, Ohio, called the 'Szabadsag,' the English of which is 'Liberty,' which Hungarian paper has a large circulation among the Hungarians at Muskegon Heights and elsewhere where plaintiff resides, and caused the same to be printed in said paper and so circulated as aforesaid, and did falsely, wickedly and maliciously compose and publish, and cause and procure to be published of and concerning the said plaintiff in said paper aforesaid the following: Stephen Kovacs Pogany of Szalona (Borsod county) got tipsy, together with his wife Susanna Vecsei to the great disgrace of the Hungarians who live soberly, in peace, the alcohol made them to lose their reason, and after they had had enough of their amusement Kovacs Pogany rushed out to the street with a loaded revolver and threatened to shoot everybody. Luckily, the pistol did not go off, and thus could not do any damage in human life. His example was followed by his wife whose revolver did not refuse to go off, but the intervention of the police prevented any greater mishap.' (Meaning thereby that said plaintiff and his wife had got drunk to the great disgrace of all their race and rushed out into the street and tried to shoot everybody.) In another part of which said libel there is contained also the following, to wit: "The couple that so forgot themselves were taken to the city jail