"This court held in Sherrill v. Railway Co., 161 Mich. 495 [126 N. W. 830], where a similar question was raised, that it would refuse, in such a proceeding, to try disputed questions of fact upon affidavits, and that the proper practice was to frame an issue by a proper plea. As it appears, however, by an examination of the affidavits filed in this case, that there are no disputed questions of fact raised, we shall proceed to dispose of the question here presented." If the judgment is void for want of jurisdiction of the defendant, we think the question is properly here. It will be noted that there was no general appearance of the defendant in the case. It was provided by Act No. 266, Pub. Acts 1911, which was an amendment of Act No. 206, Pub. Acts 1901, under which this defendant qualified to do business in Michigan, as follows: "The secretary of State shall in the certificate which he issues state under what act such corporation is to carry on business in this State, and such corporation shall have all the powers, rights and privileges and be subject to all the restrictions, requirements and duties granted to or imposed upon corporations organized under such act." It is the claim of the defendant that it appearing that it had a factory in Michigan, in charge of a resident manager, and was there conducting a local business which was entirely separate and distinct from the business in Wisconsin, and that it had complied with the laws of this State in obtaining from the secretary of State a certificate authorizing it to carry on business in this State, with all the rights and privileges of a corporation organized under the provisions of Act No. 232, Pub. Acts 1903 (4 How. Stat. [2d Ed.] § 9460), it was for the purposes of suit and service of process a domestic corporation, with its business in the city of Grand Rapids, and amenable to the provisions of the statute relating to service upon domestic corporations; that, in the case of a domestic corporation, the plaintiff could bring his action in the county wherein he resides, if process could be served there, otherwise he must bring his action where service could be obtained; and that section 10442, 3 Comp. Laws (5 How. Stat. [2d Ed.] § 13521), and the amendment thereto (Act No. 3, Pub. Acts 1909), were designed to afford a resident plaintiff greater advantage in an action against a foreign corporation transacting interstate commerce business in the State. As we understand the argument, it is that the defendant has become in effect a domestic corporation, with a local factory and business at Grand Rapids, and is entitled to the same rights and privileges as a domestic corporation, as it is also subject to all the restrictions, requirements, and liabilities of such corporation. In Showen v. J. L. Owens Co., 158 Mich. 321 (122 N. W. 640, 133 Am. St. Rep. 376), this court said: "The effect of the statutes regulating the transaction of local business in this State by foreign corporations is to make such corporations, as to such business, domestic corporations organized under the act specified in the certificate of the secretary of State entitled to and subject to the same remedies as such corporations in the courts of this State. We are of the opinion, therefore, that section 10442, 3 Comp. Laws, should be limited in its application to foreign corporations transacting interstate commerce business in this State"-citing Barrow Steamship Co. v. Kane, 170 U. S. 100, 18 Sup. Ct. 526. In the Kane Case Justice Gray said: "The constant tendency of judicial decisions in modern times has been in the direction of putting corporations upon the same footing as natural persons in regard to the jurisdiction of suits by or against them." We are aware that the decision in the Showen Case was before the amendment of section 10442, in 1909; but we are of the opinion that since, as well as before, the amendment, its application should be limited to foreign corporations transacting interstate commence business in the State. Such was the holding and application of the statute in Daniels v. Railway Co., supra. See Sherrill v. Railway Co., supra; Matthews v. Mining Co., 183 Mich. 541 (150 N. W. 127); International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U. S. 579, 34 Sup. Ct. 944. We are of opinion that the circuit court erred in refusing to grant the motion to quash the service of declaration, and in entering judgment in favor of the plaintiff. It did not obtain jurisdiction of the defendant. For these errors the judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the service of process is set aside. BROOKE, C. J., and MCALVAY, KUHN, OSTRANDER, BIRD, MOORE, and STEERE, JJ., concurred. EDGERLY v. LADIES OF THE MODERN MACCABEES. 1. INSURANCE-FRATERNAL BENEFICIAL ASSOCIATIONS. In an action on a benefit certificate issued by defendant fraternal organization, testimony of the finance keeper tending to show the purpose of insured in permitting her policy to lapse and in withdrawing from the order, was inadmissible under the statute excluding testimony in relation to matters equally within the knowledge of the decedent; but where the record showed that the insured voluntarily permitted her certificate to lapse and made no attempt to become reinstated until a short time before her decease, the error in permitting the testimony to be offered was harmless and did not require the reversal of the judgment for the defendant insurer. 2. SAME-LAPSE OF POLICY · TION. REINSTATEMENT SPECIAL DISPENSA A dispensation of the head of a fraternal organization duly authorized, permitting suspended members to be reinstated without furnishing a certificate of good health during the period from June 1st to January 1st was only available to such members as took advantage of it while it was in force: suspended members who failed to take advantage of the dispensation were not in position to claim that they were deprived of any right by a rescission of the dispensation before the day limited therein. 3. NOTICE-FORFEITURE OF A CERTIFICATE. No personal notice to a member of an order who voluntarily permitted her policy to lapse was required as a condition precedent to rescind such special dispensation; having forfeited her certificate she lost all vested right under the rules of the order, in the absence of any provision of law authorizing or requiring notice of such subsequent action. A member who has been suspended may only be reinstated in strict conformity with the by-laws and has no rights until actual reinstatement has taken place. 4. SAME. Where the by-laws of a fraternal order required the insured to apply to a regular meeting of the local organization for reinstatement, such dispensation abolishing the requirement of a health certificate did not do away with the requirement of the application to the local branch. 5. SAME. Held, also, that under the by-laws of the order when a member became suspended voluntarily she had only such right of reinstatement as existed at the time of her application therefor, and could not complain of what may have happened during the period of her suspension: nor was the beneficiary under the certificate of insurance in any better position than the insured. Error to Ingham; Collingwood, J. Submitted Jan uary 15, 1915. 18, 1915. (Docket No. 103.) Decided March Assumpsit by Harry Edgerly against the Ladies of the Modern Maccabees upon a certificate of insurance. Judgment for defendant on a directed verdict. Plaintiff brings error. Affirmed. Warner, Raudabaugh & Person, for appellant. STONE, J. This case was before this court in 1913, and will be found reported in 175 Mich., at page 28 (140 N. W. 960). An examination of that opinion will render a full statement of the facts here unnecessary. It is conceded that, if the certificate of Julia E. Edgerly was in force at the time of her death, the plaintiff, her son, would be entitled to recover. To expedite the trial certain facts were stipulated, among which are the following: "That assessments Nos. 123, 124, 125, and 126 for the months of August, September, October, and November, 1910, respectively, were duly levied and due notice given thereof, according to the laws of the crder. "That Julia E. Edgerly did not pay or offer to pay assessments 123, 124, 125, and 126 until December 6, 1910. "That Julia E. Edgerly was not in good health on December 6, 1910, and could not have furnished a certificate of good health on that date." Mrs. Luella Hodges, the finance keeper of the Lansing Hive, whose duty it was to collect assessments and forward them to headquarters, was called as a witness by the plaintiff. On her cross-examination she testified as follows: "I was a regular attendant of the lodge meetings, |