The testimony was very conflicting. The plaintiff and Mr. Stratton, one of the members of the firm of Stratton & Oleson, both testified that the plaintiff was hired by Mr. Oleson to work for Stratton & Oleson. Mr. Oleson denied this, and insisted he was at work for the B-O-S-S Company. Other testimony was given, tending to support each of the contentions. This raised a question of fact which was left to the jury in a carefully considered charge.

2. The same reasons that would justify the court in refusing to direct a verdict would justify a refusal to grant a new trial.

3. The record shows the court had practically completed his charge, when the following occurred:

"These are the issues in the case, and it will be for you, as judges of the facts and judges of the credibility of the witnesses, to determine the truth of the issue. The form of your verdict will be either, that you find-"

Mr. Springer submits a paper (special questions) to the court:

"The Court: I cannot submit this at this time. It is too late. It will be for you to determine whether there was employment by the firm, whether the employment ceased at once, or ceased at any time during the time that employment was claimed to have continued, and therefore the form of your verdict will be that you find for the plaintiff, at the rate that has been mentioned here-I think it is $21 a week or $3.50 a day-from the time that you, from a study of the evidence, are convinced that employment lasted should you find it was employment by this firm. Now, of course, if the plaintiff comes in and seeks to recover under the claim he urges, the burden of establishing his claim falls upon him, and he must establish his case by a fair preponderance of the evidence. That means that he must produce that class of testimony that convinces you of its truth. If he has done so, he is entitled to a verdict, but if he has failed to do so, or the defendant has convinced you of the truth of

their claims, the defendant is entitled to a verdict of no cause of action.

"The Court: It seems to me that after I have finished the charge to the jury it is too late to submit these special questions.

"Mr. Springer: I do not understand it so, and I think I want to insist upon an answer to these questions.

"The Court: Let it appear of record that counsel for plaintiff was here during the early part of my charge, when counsel for both sides handed up requests, and counsel for plaintiff is engaged in the trial of a case in another division of the court and was obliged to leave and has not examined these proffered questions, which are five in number; that these questions are submitted in typewriting, and evidently have been prepared prior to coming into court this morning, and were not submitted to the court or the counsel on the other side until after the court had charged the jury generally. Follow an officer.

"Mr. Springer: I take an exception to the refusal of the court to submit the special questions to the jury offered by counsel for defendant."

The practice indulged here is not to be commended. Counsel may not, as a matter of right, have questions submitted when presented after the charge is begun.

In Cousins v. Railway Co., 96 Mich. 386 (56 N. W. 14), Justice MONTGOMERY, speaking for the court, said:

"We think the court was right in refusing to submit these questions. Whatever the finding of the jury might have been thereon, such finding would not have been inconsistent with the general verdict for the plaintiff. It is not the duty of the trial judge to submit mere questions of evidence to the jury. The questions must be so framed as to call for an answer which may be controlling of the main issue."

See Crane v. Reeder, 25 Mich. 303, 316; Fowler v. Hoffman, 31 Mich. 215, 219; Harbaugh v. Cicott, 33 Mich. 241, 250; Toulman v. Swain, 47 Mich. 82 (10 N. W. 117); Ward v. Campau, 161 Mich. 85, 88 (125

N. W. 734); Zucker v. Karpeles, 88 Mich. 413 (50 N. W. 373).

The questions offered come within these cases. The other assignments of error have been examined. We think them without merit.

Judgment is affirmed.

BROOKE, C. J., and MCALVAY, KUHN, STONE, OSTRANDER, BIRD, and STEERE, JJ., concurred.

LACHELT v. MCINERNEY.

1. EQUITY-BILL TO QUIET TITLE-REMEDY AT LAW-POSSESSIONEJECTMENT.

As against parties in possession of real property under a claim of title, a bill to quiet title will not lie: the remedy is at law.

2. EXECUTION - SALE-PREVIOUS DEED RECORD AND RECORDING LAWS-DEEDS-NOTICE OF LEVY.

3 Comp. Laws, § 9224 (4 How. Stat. [2d Ed.] § 11386), providing that no levy of execution shall take effect until the notice of levy is filed and that such levy shall be a lien from the date of filing and have priority over prior mortgagees and grantees, of which the execution creditor did not have actual or constructive notice, confers a prior right upon the execution creditor who has filed his notice of levy before the registration of a previous deed, which was unrecorded at the time of the levy and sale, unless the complainant had actual or constructive knowledge of the existence of the deed or the rights of the grantee.

tor, as claimed by the latter, in which he informed the creditor that he had transferred his property to others, but which the evidence tended to show occurred after the levy, was not such actual notice as to subject complainant's rights to the claim of the debtor's wife under an unrecorded transfer or conveyance.

Appeal from Wayne; Mandell, J. Submitted April 27, 1914. (Docket No. 148.) Decided April 6, 1915.

Bill by William Lachelt against John F. McInerney and others to quiet title to certain real property. From a decree for defendants, complainant appeals. Reversed in part.

Jay Fuller, for complainant.

Cornelius & Ring, for defendants Pinson.

John Boughton, for defendants McInerney.

BIRD, J. Complainant recovered a judgment in justice's court against one George Carnaski. On appeal he was again successful, being awarded a judgment for $41.50 damages, and costs taxed at $43.20. Judgment was rendered against both Carnaski and his surety, John F. McInerney, one of the defendants herein. On May 9, 1910, an execution issued against them, which was returned unsatisfied. On November 21, 1910, an alias execution was issued and levied upon certain lots, numbered 122, 123, 124, and 125, in Callaghan's subdivision of part of lot 2 of the shipyard tract in the city of Detroit. The record title of these lots stood in John F. McInerney. They were later sold on execution and were purchased by the complainant, the sheriff's deed therefor being recorded on April 25, 1912. On June 29, 1911, defendant McInerney placed of record a quitclaim deed of lots 124 and 125 to his wife, Florence McInerney, and on March 25, 1913, a warranty deed conveying lots 122 and 123 to defendants Pinson was duly recorded.

In April, 1913, defendants Pinson started to erect a dwelling thereon. While the work was progressing, this suit was commenced by complainant to enjoin the erection of the same, and for the further purpose of quieting the title to the lots in complainant. It was the claim of defendants that the conveyances to the Pinsons and McInerney's wife were made in June, 1906, and that, while not placed of record until after notice of levy had been filed, the complainant had notice brought home to him before the said levy was made that McInerney was not the owner of them. The chancellor was impressed with this view of the proofs, and accordingly denied the relief prayed for and dismissed the bill.

On behalf of the defendants Pinson, the point is made that this bill to quiet title could not be maintained because they were in actual possession of and claiming title to the premises. This point appears to be well taken. They had erected a dwelling thereon, and it was nearly completed when these proceedings were instituted.

Lots 124 and 125 quitclaimed by defendant to his wife upon an expressed consideration of one dollar were vacant and unoccupied property. As to these lots it is made certain by the records that notice of complainant's execution and levy preceded the recording of the deed. This being so, the rights acquired by the purchaser under the execution levy and sale were superior to the rights of the grantees mentioned in the unrecorded deed, even if the deed was actually executed and delivered in 1906 as claimed by them, if it can be said that the complainant had no actual notice of such transfer. Section 9224, 3 Comp. Laws (4 How. Stat. [2d Ed.] § 11386). This section provides:

"That no levy by execution on real estate, made after this act shall take effect, shall be valid against bona fide conveyances made subsequent to such levy,