2. Municipal corporations 581-Purchaser of general tax certificate of purchase who paid special tax bills after expiration of lien not entitled to amount paid on redemption from tax sale. have to deduct the difference between the, execution on a benefit assessment judgment, in center of gravity, calculated from the sur- view of section 23, providing for a special tax face of the floor and the top of the truck. record to show special tax bills and benefit This difference I am unable to figure out, be- assessments, and such right of redemption is cause I am not a civil engineer. We must not affected by article 6, relating to condemnation proceedings. also consider the evidence which shows that the sheets of metal were about 9 inches in width, and that they were stacked on top of and along the side of, the truck next to the plaintiff, at the time he was injured, and that the center of the weight was thereby moved from the center of the truck about 6 inches closer to that side thereof, which would change the center of gravity in that proportion, but just how many degrees that would be, I am unable to state. I did submit the question to a well-known and competent civil and highway engineer and he said it could not shift it more than one-third to one-half, or from 15 to 221⁄2 degrees, at most, which would still leave the center of gravity several inches removed from a perpendicular line drawn from the floor on which the truck stood, to the top of the metal sheets on top of the truck, to the side thereof next to the plaintiff, at the time he was injured, which under no circumstances would cause the truck to tip over. Whether or not the engineer was correct or incorrect in his estimates of this wellknown physical law, we still have our own common observations and knowledge, which teach us that the truck in question, loaded as it was, and standing upon a floor with a slant of only three-eighths of an inch to the foot, would not tip over. This is the only theory upon which the plaintiff attempted to go to the jury and that theory is so at variance with the known physical laws of nature, neither the jury nor court was required to give any probative force to such evidence; and we are therefore of the opinion that the trial court should have taken the case from the jury, and, that being true, the errors of the instruction, if any there were, became immaterial, and we therefore affirm the judgment. All concur; JAMES T. BLAIR, J., in result. SPILLMAN LAND & SECURITIES CO. v. 1. Municipal corporations 581 Charter held to provide for redemption from sale under execution issued upon a benefit assessment judgment. Kansas City Charter, art. 8, § 24, making "every special tax bill" a lien upon the land described therein, and providing for redemption within one year from the sale under the lien, held to allow redemption from a sale under providing for redemption by payment to tax Under Kansas City Charter, art. 5, § 34, sale purchaser of the amount for which the property was sold, together with taxes, assessments, or benefits "subsequently paid" by the purchaser, owner of special tax bills, who pur. chased general tax certificate of purchase after the expiration of the lien of the special tax bills, was not entitled, on redemption from the general tax sale, to amount of special tax bills paid by it to the city and received from city as required to pay the special tax bills, in view holder of the special tax bills, not having been of expiration of lien. 3. Internal revenue 34-Unstamped deed, though invalid, held admissible to show grantee the owner in action to redeem under statute providing for redemption by "owner." In suit to redeem land from tax sale under Kansas City Charter, art. 5, § 34, providing for redemption by "the owner or his agent or attorney," deed to plaintiff, though not stamped as required by Act Cong. Oct. 3, 1917, schedule A, par. 7, making unstamped deed invalid, was admissible to show that plaintiff paid the purchase price for the property, and was therefore the "owner." [Ed. Note.-For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Owner.] 4. Municipal corporations 581-Purchaser who has paid purchase price held the owner within charter providing for redemption from tax sale by owner, notwithstanding invalidity of deed. Purchaser who has paid vendor the purchase price held the owner, under Kansas City Charter, art. 5, § 34, providing for redemption from tax sale by the owner, though the deed was invalid because not stamped as required by Act Cong. Oct. 3, 1917, Schedule A, par. 7, the holder of an equitable title being the owner in the general acceptation of the term. Appeal from Circuit Court, Jackson County; Allen C. Southern, Judge. Suit by the Spillman Land & Securities Company against the Standard Investment Company and another. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendants appeal. Affirmed. Hunter M. Meriwether and Ball & Ryland, all of Kansas City, for appellant Standard Investment Co. Ilus M. Lee, Asst. City Counselor, of Kansas City, for appellant Kansas City. Gage, Ladd & Small, Clarence I. Spellman, and Caleb S. Monroe, all of Kansas City, for respondent. For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes (238 S.W.) WHITE, C. The plaintiff brought this suit, 1914. Eleven days later, July 17, 1917, the to determine title to certain lands in Kansas | Standard Investment Company, after it had City, and to redeem said lands from a sale paid the general taxes mentioned above, dis for city taxes. The defendant claimed to be absolute owner, and that the plaintiff had no right to redeem; that if plaintiff had a right to redeem it should be required to pay certain special tax bills which the defendant had acquired against said property. One William A. Evans had owned the lots. On July 9, 1914, Evans conveyed them to the Utility Investment Company, and the Utility Investment Company, May 31, 1918, conveyed the same to the plaintiff. This was the plaintiff's title: The defendants' claims against the lots were as follows: missed its suit against Evans. Thus the Standard Investment Company, on July 17, owned the certificates of purchase for general taxes and the special tax bills for grading, the lien of which had expired some five days before, and which amounted to $1,877.74. On that day the Standard Investment Company paid to the city treasurer that amount in settlement of the tax bills owned by itself, and two days later, as owner of the tax bills, received from the city auditor the same amount. That is, the defendant, claiming to own the land, paid to the city In July, 1915, while the lots were owned $1,877.74, the amount of the tax bills, and, by the Utility Investment Company, special as owner of the tax bills, received from the tax bills for grading Charlotte street, adja-city immediately the same amount. cent said property, were issued and immedi- When this suit was brought, October 17, ately transferred by their owner to the defendant Standard Investment Company. These grading tax bills amounted in July, 1917, to $1,877.74. The property had been sold for general taxes for the year 1916, bid in by the city, and certificates of purchase had been issued to the city. On July 13, 1917, defendant paid to the city treasurer the general taxes mentioned, with penalties and costs, which amounted to $93.06, and took an assignment of the certificate of purchase. In a condemnation proceeding in the circuit court of Jackson county judgment had been rendered assessing benefits against the lots, of which benefit assessment it appears defendant became the owner by assignment in July, 1917. Special execution was issued upon the judgment, and the lots sold October 20, 1917, to the defendant, Standard Investment Com pany, at the price of $287.77, which it paid to the sheriff. The sheriff did not deliver a 1918, the plaintiff held the record title as stated, which it had acquired through mesne conveyances from William A. Evans, and it also held certificates of redemption which had been issued when it paid the amount of the judgment for benefits assessed in the condemnation proceeding. At that time the defendant held the certificates of purchase, aggregating $93.06, which it acquired under sale for general taxes in July, 1918, and also held the tax bills for grading aggregating at that time more than $2,000, including interest. On July 15, 1918, before bringing the suit, the plaintiff tendered to the city treasurer $93.06 for general taxes for the purpose of redeeming the land. This was refused because the plaintiff did not also tender the amount of the special tax bills for grading, the lien of which had expired July 12, 1917. court recited the facts, and decreed that the After hearing this evidence the circuit plaintiff was owner in fee of the lots dedeed to the defendant, but delivered certificates of purchase reciting that the lots might scribed in the petition, and that the same be redeemed within a year from the date of were chargeable with only $93.06, the amount sale. In July, 1918, within the year, the of the general taxes and penalties for the plaintiff-respondent here-paid to the sher-year 1916, which amount had been tendered iff the amount received by him from the de- by the plaintiff and deposited with the clerk fendant, and the sheriff issued to the plain- of the court. Whereupon the defendant aptiff certificates of redemption. Afterwards, pealed. in August, 1918, the sheriff paid to the defendant the total amount which it claimed as holder of the certificates of purchase just mentioned. The defendant accepted and retained this money. [1] I. The appellant asserts that the plaintiff had no right to redeem the land from a sale under the execution; that, while the charter of Kansas City expressly permits redemption from sale under execution to enforce a judgment upon special tax bills, it does not allow redemption from a sale under execution issued upon a benefit assessment judgment. In the meantime the defendant, as holder of special tax bills for grading Charlotte street mentioned above, brought suit July 6, 1917, six days before the lien provided by the charter should expire, to enforce its lien of Article 8 of the charter of Kansas City those special taxes against the lots. This covers the general subject of public improvesuit, however, was brought against William ments. It provides for assessments, tax bills, A. Evans, the former owner, after he had con- etc., for improvements. Section 23 of the veyed the lots to the Utility Investment Com- article requires the treasurer of the city to pany, which was the record owner at the keep a "special tax record," which should time the suit was brought, and since July, be "complete and full and show all special tax, was the intent of the Legislature in framing bills if any issue under this charter and all the Kansas City charter. The court uses benefit assessments arising out of condemna- this language (127 Mo. loc. cit. 430, 30 S. tion and grading cases, etc. * Any and W. 109): all special assessments therein, contained, whether arising out of the issuance of special tax bills as in this article provided, or by virtue of the verdict or report of juries or commissioners in such condemnation or grading proceedings, respectively, shall be considered for the purpose of collecting and receiving payment thereof, as special taxes against any lot or parcel of land against which the same may be a lien." "The vitality of a statute is its intent, and where the latter is plain the court should give it effect. What is within the clear meaning and implication of an enactment is as much a part of it as its very letter." That language has been quoted and the principle approved in the later case of State ex rel. v. Trustees of William Jewell College, 234 Mo. 299, loc. cit. 313, 136 S. W. 397. Section 24 of the same article provides The omission to mention execution on benethat fit assessments as well as tax bills does not prevent that conclusion as to the intent, because such benefit assessments are provided for in the same special record, and are to be treated as special taxes. "Every special tax bill issued under the provisions of this article shall be a lien upon the land described therein upon the date of the certification thereof to the city treasurer, as in this article provided, and such lien shall continue for two years thereafter but not long-visions of article 6 of the charter of 1908, er," etc. Continuing, section 24 provides for the is suance of special tax bills, for suit to enforce same, and for judgment thereon, and contains this provision: "Upon sale made by the sheriff upon any such special execution he shall issue to the purchaser a certificate of purchase setting forth the circumstances of such special execution, the date of sale, the purchase, the property sold and the amount bid. If the property so sold be redeemed within one year from the date of such sale by the payment of the amount of such judgment including interest and costs up to the date of redemption by the owner or party interested in said property, no deed shall be given by the sheriff. Upon such redemption as herein provided of any tract of land sold under special execution the judgment against the same and the lien thereof shall be satisfied on the record of such judgment," etc. Appellant further contends that the pro relating to the condemnation of property for public purposes, will control the provisions of article 8, which is a general act, and points out some of the provisions of article 6 in relation to the condemnation. Among other things that article provides that, after a verdict fixing the assessment in condemnation proceedings, and judgment, on a sale the sheriff shall make the purchaser a deed and vest in the purchaser all the right, title, interest, and estate of the parties owning and interested in the land sold. Then it provides that under the control of the court as in ordinary "Executions and proceedings thereon shall be civil cases." There are other provisions in article 6 relating to proceedings for condemnation, a trial, verdict of the jury, method of conducting trial, appeals, etc. However, all these The appellant points out that "every spe-provisions relate to the method of procedure cial tax bill" as provided in that article, shall in the conduct of a condemnation proceeding be a lien upon the land, and asserts that the until the final judgment and execution. provisions for executions upon them applies There is nothing in any of them to show an only to special tax bills, and not to benefit intention to deprive a landowner of any of assessments in condemnation proceedings, the benefits and privileges provided by the and that the provision quoted refers only to general article on public improvements (arexecutions issued upon the judgment to en-ticle 8). The article relating to the special force special tax bills, and does not include subject contains no provision that is in conspecial executions upon judgments for a flict with the provisions of the general arbenefit assessment. ticle. It will be noticed that section 23 provides for a special tax record, which is to include special tax bills as well as benefit assessments, and both are to be considered for the purpose of collection as special taxes. II. The appellant claims that, if the plaintiff has a right to redeem, it is only by payment of the special tax bills which the defendant held for grading. It will be recalled that those special tax bills which the defendIn Bryant v. Russell, 127 Mo. 422, 30 S. ant held were issued July 12, 1915, and cerW. 107, this court quoted from the then char-tified to the city treasurer on that day. Secter of Kansas City a provision exactly the tion 24, art. 8, of the charter of Kansas City, the same in respect to the above as the pres- provides that every tax bill issued under the ent charter, and held that the right of re- provision of the article relating to public demption applied to sales under judgment improvements shall be a lien upon the land for benefit assessments as well as under described therein from the date of the cerjudgment for special tax bills, and that such tification to the city treasurer, and shall con (238 S.W.) tinue for two years thereafter. Then the and neither the purchaser nor the owner was Jien of such tax bills expired July 12, 1917. under obligation to pay them in order to proThe defendant acquired them before the lien tect the property. Appellant, however, calls expired, and brought suit on them July 6, attention to the language of section 34, art. 1917, against the wrong party, which suit 5, quoted, which requires the purchaser, in was afterwards dismissed. The appellant order to redeem, to pay "any other taxes, asclaims the right to include those in the sessments, or benefits subsequently paid," amount which plaintiff should be compelled to and argues that this provision of the charter pay in order to redeem, as provided by the is not limited to such taxes, assessments, and city charter, and quotes section 34, art. 5, benefits as are a lien upon the land, but apof the city charter, relating to the subject, as plies to all assessments of benefit, whether a follows: lien or not. In thus invoking a technical and literal construction of this section, appellant assumes that the payment to itself of the amount of special tax bills was a payment subsequent to its purchase. Aside from that, appellant asserts that, inasmuch as the property has been benefited by the improvement, deem without paying for such improvements. as a matter of right plaintiff ought not to reAppellant does not use the expression "in equity and in good conscience," but that is the purport of the argument. * * "Section 34. Real property sold under the provisions of this article, including any real property bid off by the city, or any interest in such real property, may be redeemed by the owner, or his agent or attorney, at any time within five years from the first day of which the annual tax sale began ment to the city treasurer of the amount for by the paywhich such real property was sold, together with interest thereon at the rate per cent. bid per annum from the date of purchase together with any other taxes, assessments, or benefits subsequently paid by the purchaser, his heirs or assigns, as authorized by this charter, whether state, county, park, municipal, general or special together with interest thereon at the same rate from date of payment." It is true, section 34 does not say anything about taxes and assessments which are a lien against the property. tions follow relating to "redemption," and But several secit is plain that the term means redemption [2] It will be noticed that this section pro- could be no such thing as redemption from from some charge against the land. There vides that a purchaser at any tax sale, as some invalid claim or some nonexistent to pay back to him what he paid as a mere provided in article 5, in order to redeem must pay any other taxes, assessment, or ben-charge. It will be noticed that section 39, efits "subsequently paid" by the purchaser. not redeemed within the time provided, a art. 5, provides that, in case the property is If these special tax bills, while still alive, deed shall be delivered by the city treasurer had been taken up by the defendant after it had acquired the general tax certificate of to the purchaser, "free from all incumbrances purchase, then the right to redeem them of any kind or nature, subject however to all would come technically within the provisions unpaid state, county, and city taxes, general of that section, although the lien may have and special taxes, or assessments which are expired prior to the time of redemption. a lien thereon." The purchaser at a tax sale, However, the purchase by the defendant un- then, is free from any obligation to pay speder the general tax sale was on July 13, cial taxes which are not a lien. The land 1917, and it had acquired grading tax bills which he purchases could not in any event immediately after their date July 12, 1915. be subject to a lien which had expired, and, Thus the claim of title by the defendant was being under no obligation to discharge a lien acquired not only after it had acquired the which had expired, how can it be said that special tax bills, but after the lien of those he could require the owner, .in redeeming, tax bills had expired. Evidently the appellant purchased the cer- gratuity. A technical construction of the tificate of redemption and also the benefit assessment judgment, not as independent investments, but for the very purpose of protecting its tax bills upon which the lien had expired. The appellant, then, in order to It is admitted by appellant that one who come within the technical requirement of voluntarily pays taxes for another is withthe section quoted, paid into the city treas-out remedy against the property; but the apury $1,877.74, the amount of the special tax pellant argues that the city charter provides bills which it held. It occupied the dual po- certain conditions upon which redemption sition of purchaser at the tax sale and hold- may be had, and invokes section 34 as proer of the special tax bills; as purchaser it viding those conditions. In framing article paid into the City Treasury the city tax bills, 5 of the charter of Kansas City it was not and as holder of the tax bills it two days the Legislative intent to give the purchaser later collected the same money from the city at a tax sale a privilege and advantage auditor. Even if this transaction could be which the owner of the land purchased did called a payment of the tax bills, it was not possess. The purchaser at a tax sale made after the lien on the same had expired, may ignore tax bills which have ceased to charter which appellant invokes would thus relieve the owner, in redeeming, from having to pay the purchaser what the purchaser was under no obligation to pay. become a lien. They do not affect his right ty cannot help him. Appellant does not ask or title in the least; then why, under all the affirmative relief, and doubtless would dis-. sections relating to redemption, should the claim any intention to invoke the aid of the owner be under obligation to meet claims of equity branch of the court in seeking the rewhich the purchaser is relieved? The case lief demanded; yet, unless it be in equity, it of Burke v. Brown, 148 Mo. 309, 49 S. W. is impossible to say on what theory the ap1023, is in point upon this proposition. The pellant asks the court to enforce his claim court there held that taxes unlawfully as- on the special tax bills. If the charter fails sessed against property could not be demand- it there is no other recourse. The charter ed by the purchaser at a tax sale as a con- specifically provides that the lien should exdition upon which the owner could redeem. pire in two years. The tax bills were not It is true in that case the taxes were never paid "subsequent" to the defendant's purlawful, and appellant distinguishes them chase, and therefore do not come within the from assessment in this case, because orig- terms of the statute; the liens had expired, inally they were lawful for benefits accruing and were not enforceable, and, from the plain to the land, but the lien had expired. It intendment of section 8, art. 5, relating to looks as if the broad rule laid down there redemption, there is no requirement that the should apply, as the court uses this expres- owner in redeeming should pay anything exsion (148 Mo. loc. cit. 317, 49 S. W. 1025): cept what was a legal charge against the land. "If the circumstances were such that the owner never was under obligation to pay the sum charged to him, so that no enforceable lien attached in favor of the state, it seems too plain for argument that no statute can place the purchaser in the position of holding a val id lien on the land." [3] III. When the plaintiff offered in evidence its deed from the Utilities Investment Company dated May 31, 1918, the defendant objected to it because it was not stamped as required by the federal statute. Act Oct. 3, 1917, c. 63, 40 Stat. 323, par. 7. The plaintiff At the time the appellant claims to have thereupon offered evidence to show that the paid those tax bils to the city treasurer failure to affix the revenue stamp to the deed there was no enforceable lien in favor of the was inadvertent; the court allowed the plaincity nor in favor of the holder of the tax tiff to affix the stamp, and overruled the debills. The fact that there had been a lien fendant's objection. which had expired would not affect the situation. [4] The federal statute (Act June 13, 1898, c. 448, § 13, 30 Stat. 454, as amended by Act The appellant, while not using the words March 2, 1901, c. 866, § 7, 31 Stat. 941, U. S. "in equity and good conscience," in effect Comp. St. 1918, § 63181, and the act of 1917, argues that the plaintiff cannot escape the supra, cited by appellant) declares that an charge for the special tax bills. This court unstamped document shall be deemed invalid, held in the case of Kansas City v. Field that but it does not say that it shall not be adequity would not enforce the lien of a tax missible in evidence. If it be conceded that bill. 285 Mo. 253, 271, 226 S. W. 27, loc. cit. the deed without a stamp had no effect to 32. The court said: convey the legal title to the plaintiff, yet it "The courts are practically unanimous in was admissible in evidence for the purpose holding that, if a statutory method of collec- of showing that the plaintiff had paid the tion is provided, especially if it is adequate purchase price for the property-a fact which and complete, equity is without jurisdiction." was shown by other evidence. Section 34, art. 5, of the charter does not say it must be Also, 285 Mo. 275, 226 S. W. loc. cit. 33: the holder of the legal title who may redeem, "While at first thought it may appear right but "the owner or his agent or attorney." for chancery to enforce tax liens, the notion It cannot for a moment be complained that vanishes when we remember that the subject is not within the original cognizance of equity, but pertains to the political branch of the government, and therefore, according to all analogies, cannot fall within the equity jurisdiction, at least unless the tax is made a lien and no sufficient remedy is provided to make the lien efficacious." Now it cannot be contended here that ample provision for the enforcement of the tax lien is not provided. The legal remedy is adequate and complete. Naturally a twoyear statute of limitations requires diligence in pursuing the remedy. It is salutary because it is important that such claims be settled and titles cleared. If the defendant failed to avail itself of the legal remedy equi any one else was the owner; the holder of Besides, plaintiff had a certificate of re- |