dictment. But after going on to trial, when the jury could not be safely discharged, the power to amend comes in aid of justice, to prevent a failure. Then the last provision of the 13th section is, that every verdict and judgment which shall be given, after making such amendment, shall be of the same force and effect, in all respects, as if the indictments had originally been in the same form in which it was after such an amendment was made.' Rough v. Commonwealth, 78 Pa. 495.

In Myers v. Commonwealth, 79 Pa. 308, the defendant below was convicted of murder of the first degree on an indictment which charged at the time the jury were empaneled that the crime had been committed on October 11, 1874. After the jury had been sworn the indictment was amended, under the prisoner's objection, by changing the date to November 11, 1874. In holding that this amendment was properly allowed, we said: "The amendment of the indictment from October 1874 to November 1874, is justified by the 13th sect. of the Act of 31st of March 1860, relating to the criminal procedure, especially when read in connection with the powers of amendment set forth in the 11th and 12th sects. A clause in the 13th sect. reads thus: Or in the name or description of any matter or thing whatsoever therein named or described.' The month of October was named in the indictment, and the precise day described by the number eleven. The amendment fell clearly within this power, which is strengthened by the large powers of amendment intended to be conferred by the sections stated."

The court below, in the case at bar, having had power to allow the amendment before verdict, had the same power after verdict: Brown v. Commonwealth, 78 Pa. 122. So after all the question is as to the power of the court below to have allowed the amendment at any stage of the proceedings. No statute of limitation runs in favor of a murderer and time is therefore not of the essence of his crime when he is called for trial upon the indictment charging him with it. A misstatement in an indictment of the date of the commission of a crime is a mere ¦

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formal defect if it be shown on the trial that the offense charged had been committed; Commonwealth v. Major, 198 Pa. 290; Commonwealth v. Powell, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep., 370. The wrong date disclosed in the indictment returned by the grand jury in this case having been a mere formal defect, it was cured by the amendment clearly allowable under the Act of March 31, 1860, and there is, therefore, no merit in the main contention of learned counsel for the prisoner, which we dismiss with the following from the opinion of the learned court below denying the motion in arrest of judgment: The defendant testified that he was with Collata on October 31, and that, while they were in the wagon together, Collata was shot. He denied that he shot him, but said that he was shot by a man by the name of Santo, who jumped in from the back of the wagon, stayed about two minutes on the wagon, and then ran away. That testimony could only have applied to a past and not to a future time. It seems, therefore, to us to be almost trifling with justice if, in the face of all the testimony presented, and after a fair and impartial trial, the Court should set aside the conviction, which was most righteous under the testimony, because some official inadvertently blundered concerning a fact which on the trial was not in dispute and the correction of which was in no wise prejudicial to the defendant."

The Act of June 19, 1913, P. L. 528, directing that the death penalty shall be inflicted by means of electricity, is not an amendatory enactment. It is complete in itself and does not require the reenforcement of any other statute to give it effect. It is, therefore, not violative of Article III, Sect. 6, of the Constitution. Clarion County v. Clarion Township, 222 Pa. 350.

Nothing more remains to be said except that the judgment is affirmed, with direction that the record be remitted to the court below for execution of the sentence according to law.

Company.

Fire insurance-Statement.

The plaintiff in a suit on an insurance policy should not be permitted to guess at the amount of goods in his store at the time of the fire, though his books are burned and the proof difficult to secure and where his statement lumps the items of his loss, he will be compelled to itemize his claim although the claim is less itemize his claim although the items complained of amount to less than the difference between his total loss and his insurance.

Petition for more specific statement. C. P. of Lancaster Co., March Term, 1914, No. 48.

IV. U. Hensel, for petition.

B. F. Davis, contra.

of the fire, and, even though the proof is difficult to secure, the rule of law that the burden is imposed on each litigant to prove his claim before he can recover is not changed on that account. If he does not know what he lost, how can he approximate a value on the same?

An illustration of the looseness with which the statement has been prepared is shown in the first item complained of. This item is: "Miscellaneous Books, such as Road Laws, &c., $15." A number of other books, amounting in value, as alleged. to $103.50, are specifically named. Why, then, is not the smaller lot set forth in like manner? The jury upon the trial cannot help but be confused by this manner of statement, and the defendant may be prejudiced there

On February 24, 1914, the plaintiff brought suit against the defendant to recover the amount of a policy of insurance, which covered the contents of a store property owned by the plaintiff. In the statement filed by him are set forth a large number of lumped items, and the defendant now complains that they should be made more specific. To this, the plaintiff has replied that his books were burned in the fire, and he cannot render a more particular statement than he has already furnished, and he also says that, as his insurance is for $2,700.00, whereas his total loss is $3,764.25, and the items complained of only amount to $900.00, it makes no difference to the defendant if these particular items are not specific.

I do not see the force of this latter contention, and I think the defendant is entitled to know just how the claim is made up. If the plaintiff does not rest upon these items, he should withdraw them; but, if he does, he should set forth,

with particularity, what goods he lost. He certainly cannot recover the value of any items except those supported by specific proof, and if he is bound to

a cursory view given, subsequently explained; but most of them are open to this objection.

It is, therefore, ordered that the plaintiff shall, within thirty days, file a more specific statement as to the items contained in the defendant's petition, except where that has already been done.

Ryder v. Sondheimer.

Magistrates—Jurisdiction—Trespass.

A magistrate has no jurisdiction in a suit to recover for a cane which the defendant obplaintiff and broke over his head. tained possession of in an altercation with the

It seems, that the magistrate would have had jurisdiction if the claim had been for injury to the head.

Where a defendant is summoned in as

sumpsit, the magistrate can not hear testimony in trespass. Where however the defendant participated in the hearing this error is condoned.

Certiorari. C. P. of Lancaster Co.,

June Term, 1914, No. 36.

C. Reese Eaby, for certiorari.
H. M. Houser, contra.

The record in this case shows a wilful breaking and damage of the personal property of the plaintiff. The Justice clearly had jurisdiction.

Auchey v. Emig, 23 York, 113.

"A Justice has jurisdiction in an action for damages for injuries caused by the defendant striking the plaintiff's horse and wagon with his automobile."

Morrison v. Lefever, 29 LANC. Law REVIEW, page 370.

"A Justice-of-the-Peace has jurisdiction in an action for damages where the injury is immediate and not consequential, and such as would be recoverable at common law in an action vi et armis. Becker v. Palm, 27 LANC. LAW REVIEW, page 175.

A Justice has jurisdiction in actions in Trespass brought for the recovery of damages for injury done or committed on real or personal estate.

Gingrich v. Schaeffer, 16 Sup. C., page 304, 27 LANC. LAW REVIEW, page 175, 23 York, page 187.

September 26, 1914. Opinion by LANDIS, P. J

The summons issued in this case is de

nominated by the Alderman as a plea of "Assumpsit in Trespass,"-whatever that may be. The suit was brought to recover for a cane, valued at five dollars. It appears in the transcript that the plaintiff was the owner of a silver-mounted cane. During an altercation with defendant, the latter, he says, willfully and maliciously broke it, while striking the plaintiff. Judgment was entered by the Alderman in favor of the plaintiff for five dollars and costs, and the defendant, alleging want of jurisdiction on the part of the Alderman, sued out this writ of certiorari.

The record, as returned by the Alderman, shows that the action was in assumpsit. The Alderman had, therefore, no right to hear testimony showing a trespass. Morrison v. Lefever, 29 LANC. LAW REVIEW, 370. As, however, the defendant appeared and participated in the hearing, the error in this regard was no doubt condoned.

The next question is, whether an action lay within the jurisdiction of the Alder

man for the value of the broken cane. We think that it did not. A Justice of the Peace has jurisdiction of actions of trespass for the recovery of damage done. or committed on real and personal estate. The damages for which a plaintiff may sue before a Justice in this form of action are such as arise where the injury is immediate and would be recoverable in a common law action of trespass vi et armis, and not such as are consequential and would be recoverable, if at all, only in an action of trespass on the case. Now, what are the facts as set forth in the record? The parties, it seems, got into a fight. The defendant, in some way obtaining possession of the plaintiff's cane, struck the plaintiff over the head with it, and it broke. If the cause of acately break the cane. tion had been the injury to the plaintiff's head, and the sum of five dollars had would have been such an immediate inbeen claimed on that account, it no doubt jury as to fall within the jurisdiction of would have been such an immediate inthe Justice. But, under the circumstances, we think it was consequential, and that, therefore, the Alderman had no jurisdiction of the case.

He did not deliber

proceedings of the Alderman are set The exception is sustained and the

aside.