And these are the topics we must proceed upon, to justify our exclufion of the young pretender in France; that of his suspected birth being merely popular, and therefore not made use of, as I remember, since the revolution, in any speech, vote, or proclamation, where there was occafion to mention him.

As to the abdication of King James, which the advocates on that fide look upon to have been forcible and unjust, and confequently void in itfelf, I think a man may observe every article of the English church, without being in much pain about it. It is not unlikely, that all doors were laid open for his departure, and, perhaps, not without the privity of the prince of Orange; as reasonably concluding, that the kingdom might better be fettled in his abfence. But, to affirm he had any cause to apprehend the fame treatment with his father, is an improbable scandal, flung upon the nation by a few bigotted French scribblers, or the invidious affertion of a ruined party at home, in the bitterness of their fouls; not one material circumstance agreeing with those in 1648; and the greatest part of the nation having preserved the utmost horror for that ignominious murder. But whether his removal were caused by his own fears, or other mens artifices, it is manifeft to me, that, supposing the throne to be vacant, which was the foot the nation went apon, the body of the people was thereupon left at liberty to chuse what form of government they pleased, by themselves, or their representatives.

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The only difficulty of any weight against the proceedings at the revolution, is an obvious objection, to which the writers upon that fubject have not yet given a direct or fufficient answer; as if they were in pain at fome consequences, which they apprehend those of the contrary opinion might draw from it. I will repeat this objection, as it was offered me fome time ago, with all its advantages, by a very pious, learned, and worthy gentleman of the nonjuring party. *

The force of his argument turned upon this, That the laws made by the supreme power, cannot, otherwise than by the fupreme power, be annulled: That this confifted, in England, of a King, Lords, and Commons, whereof each have a negative voice; no two of them can repeal or enact a law, without confent of the third; much less may any one of them be entirely excluded from its part of the legislature, by a vote of the other two: That all these maxims were openly violated at the revolution; where an assembly of the nobles and people, not fummoned by the King's writ, (which was an effential part of the conftitution,) and consequently no lawful meeting, did, merely upon their own authority, declare the King to have abdicated, the throne vacant; and gave the crown by a vote to a nephew, when there were three children to inherit; though, by the fundamental laws of the realm, the next heir

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is immediately to fucceed. Neither doth it appear, how a prince's abdication can make any other fort of vacancy in the throne, than would be caused by his death; fince he cannot abdicate for his children, (who claim their right of succession by act of parliament,) otherwise than by his own confent, in form, to a bill from the two houses.

And this is the difficulty that seen's chiefly to stick with the most reasonable of those, who, from a mere fcruple of confcience, refuse to join with us upon the revolution-principle; but the rest are, I believe, as far from loving arbitrary government as any others can be, who are born under a free constitution, and are allowed to have the leaft share of common good sense.

In this objection, there are two questions included. First, Whether, upon the foot of our constitution, as it stood in the reign of the late King James, a king of England may be deposed? The second is, Whether the people of England, convened by their own authority, after the king had withdrawn himself in the manner he did, had power to alter the fucceffion ?

As for the first, it is a point I shall not presume to determine; and shall, therefore, only say, that, to any man who holds the negative, I would demand the liberty of putting the cafe as strongly as I please. I will suppose a prince limited by laws like ours, yet running into a thousand caprices of cruelty, like Nero or Caligula; I will suppose him to murder his mother and his wife; VOL. II.

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to commit incest, to ravish matrons, to blow up the fenate, and burn his metropolis; openly to renounce God and Christ, and worship the devil: these, and the like exorbitancies, are in the power of a fingle person to commit, without the advice of a ministry, or assistance of an army. And, if such a king as I have described, cannot be depofed but by his own consent in parliament, I do not well fee how he can be refifted; or what can be meant by a limited monarchy; or what fignifies the people's consent, in making and repealing laws, if the person who administers, hath no tie but confcience, and is answerable to none but God. I defire no stronger proof, that an opinion must be false, than to find very great absurdities annexed to it; and there cannot be greater than in the present cafe: for it is not a bare fpeculation, that kings may run into such enormities as are above mentioned; the practice may be proved by examples, not only drawn from the first Cæfars, or later Emperors, but many modern princes of Europe; such as, Peter the Cruel, Philip II. of Spain, John Bafilovits of Muscovy; and, in our own nation, king John, Richard III. and Henry VIII. But there cannot be equal abfurdities supposed in maintaining the contrary opinion; because it is certain, that princes have it in their power to keep a majority on their fide by any tolerable administration, till provoked by continual oppreffions: no man, indeed, can then anfwer where the madness of the people will stop.

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As to the second part of the objection, Whether the people of England, convened by their own authority, upon king James's precipitate departure, had power to alter the succession ?

In answer to this, I think it is manifest from the practice of the wisest nations, and who seem to have had the trueft notions of freedom, that when a prince was laid afide for maleadministration, the nobles and people, if they thought it neceffary for the public weal, did refume the administration of the supreme power, (the power itfelf having been always in them,) and did not only alter the succession, but often the very form of government too; because they believed there was no natural right in one man to govern another, but that all was by institution, force, or confent. Thus, the cities of Greece, when they drove out their tyrannical kings, either chose others from a new family, or abolished the kingly government, and became free states. Thus the Romans, upon the expulfion of Tarquin, found it inconvenient for them to be fubject any longer to the pride, the lust, the cruelty and arbitrary will of fingle persons; and, therefore, by general consent, entirely altered the whole frame of their government. Nor do I find the proceedings of either, in this point, to have been condemned by 'any historian of the succeeding ages.

But a great deal hath been already faid by other writers upon this invidious and beaten fubject; therefore I shall let it fall; though the point

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