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again at the poles as at the equatorial line; consequently, the line without inclination is also that of the least intensity.

2. The magnetic intensity of the earth decreases as we rise in the atmosphere, and this decrease is probably according to the law that the force is inversely as the square of the distance.

3. The magnetic intensity of the earth varies with the hour of the day, being least between 10 and 11 in the morning, and greatest between 4 and 5 in the afternoon.

4. The magnetic intensity exhibits irregular variations, and, like the inclination and declination, is subject to perturbations from the influence of the aurora borealis.

not be a moral act. Here we have a second circumstance or characteristic essential to moral agency, namely, that the action be voluntary. No involuntary action can be of a moral nature.

Some distinguish the liberty of the agent from voluntari. ness, but to us they appear to be the same, or to involve one another. If an act is voluntary, it is free; and if free, it must be voluntary. The highest conceivable degree of liberty in a dependent being is the power of doing as he wills or pleases. But as this subject has by metaphysical controversy been involved in perplexity, something may be said hereafter respecting what is called the freedom of the will.

When it is said that the actions of moral agents are the only proper objects of moral approbation or disapprobation, two qualifications of the assertion must be taken into view. The first is, that the omission to act when duty calls is as much an object of disapprobation as a wicked action. Should we see a number of persons sailing on a river in a boat, and while we surveyed them, should a child near them fall into the river, and no hand be stretched out to rescue it from drowning, we could not help feeling a strong disapprobation of the conduct of the persons who were near enough to render the necessary help. If, however, it should be ascertained that one or more of the persons were fast bound and pinioned, so that they could not possibly stretch out their hands to rescue the child, we should exempt them from all blame. for no man is bound to do what is physically impossible. The second qualification of the statement is, that when we disapprove an external act, we always refer the blame to the motive or intention. But if we have evidence that the agent possesses a nature or disposition which will lead him often or uniformly to perpetrate the same act when the occasion shall occur, we not only censure the motive, but extend our moral disapprobation to the disposition or evil nature lying behind. If we suppose the case of an agent acted on by a superior upon the agent himself, but upon the power by which he is governed, we shall consider the immediate agent as not free, and the acts brought forth as not properly his acts, but those of the governing power. A demoniac or person possessed by an evil spirit who had power to direct his thoughts and govern his actions, would not be an accountable agent.

LESSONS IN MORAL SCIENCE.-No. IV. MORAL AGENCY, AND WHAT IS NECESSARY TO IT. As actions of moral agents are the proper and only objects of moral approbation or disapprobation, it becomes necessary to institute an inquiry into the nature of moral agency or into what are the constituents of a moral agent. The decision of this question must depend entirely on experience, and can never be determined by reasoning on abstract principles. The process is simply this: we contemplate a great variety of acts, which by the moral faculty we judge to possess a moral character. We next examine the circumstances in which those acts were performed, and we conclude those things which are found in all of them to be necessary to moral agency. Or, to render the examination more simple, we may suppose some one condition of the action to be absent, and then another, and then viewing the action as thus changed in its circumstances, we may bring it before the mind, and if the moral quality of the act appear unchanged, we conclude that that which has been removed from it is no essential circum-power, so that the nature and direction of the act depend not stance in moral agency. But if the change in the circumstances of the action leads all men to take an entirely different view of its nature, then we conclude that this circumstance is essential to moral agency. To illustrate this principle, let us suppose the following case: If we see a man suddenly, without any apparent provocation, raise his hand and strike another, believing that it was freely done, by a man compos mentis, we feel a strong disapprobation of the act, as immoral and deserving punishment. But if on inquiry it is ascertained that the person who committed the assault was utterly destitute of reason, we may blame his keepers or friends who left him at liberty, but we no longer feel any moral disapprobation of the act. For it is the intuitive judgment of all persons, that a man destitute of reason is not a moral agent, nor accountable for his actions, whatever evil may be produced. We consider such a man as exactly in the same predicament as a wild beast which does an injury. This is the common judgment of men; for in all courts of justice, when a man is arraigned for an assault, if it can be proved that he was a maniac at the time, he is acquitted, and all men approve the judicial decision which exempts him from punishment. Hence it is apparent that the exercise of reason is essential to moral agency. We may bring before our minds a thousand acts, under different circumstances, but all performed by agents without reason, and no man can believe that such actions are of a moral nature, or of good or evil desert.

It may seem to be an objection to this broad assertion that there are some who entertain the opinion that infants are moral agents from their birth, and commit actual sin. But these persons do not suppose that an irrational being can be a moral agent, but they think that infants have an obscure exercise of reason. Their mistake is not in the general principle which has been laid down, but in the fact that infants have reason in exercise.

There are some who maintain that all human actions proceed from God, as their first cause, and that man can act only as he is acted upon. Upon this theory, it does not appear how man can be an accountable moral agent; for though his actions may be voluntary and performed in the exercise of reason, yet, as he does not originate them, they can scarcely be considered his own.

We will now suppose the case of a man possessing reason, freedom, and will, and originating his cwn actions, but desti tute of a moral faculty, or unable to perceive a difference between right and wrong. Can such a person be considered a moral agent? We think not. That being-how much soever of reason he may possess-who has no perception of moral relations, and no feeling of moral obligation, would be incapable of a moral law, or of performing moral acts. But the case is an imaginary one, There are, I believe, none who possess reason, and yet are destitute of all moral sense; but though we conceive of the intellect of a dog or an elephant increased to any degree, yet, as being destitute of a moral faculty, we do not regard them as moral agents.

MAN A MORAL AGENT.

Very few have entertained the opinion that man is a mere machine, governed by physical influences. It will not be necessary, therefore, to occupy time in refuting an opinion contrary to reason and universal experience.

But there are many who entertain the opinion that man is Again, let the case supposed be varied. Let it be that the the creature of necessity; that in the circumstances in which person committing the assault had the full exercise of reason, each man is placed, he could not be different from what he is. but that the stroke was not voluntary, but the effect of a This theory of fatalism is plausible, because a slight observaspasmodic, diseased, action of the muscles; or that the hand tion of the history of man shows that the moral characters of was moved by another. Every one, at once, judges that the most men are formed by the education which they receive, and person giving the stroke, whatever he might be in other by the sentiments and conduct of those with whom they assomatters, was no moral agent in this assault. It was a mereciate. It has, therefore, been maintained-and the opinion physical operation, and not proceeding from the will, could has in our day been industriously propagated—that

man is no

a free and accountable agent; that he is what he is, by the operation of causes over which he has no control; that no man should be censured or punished for his conduct, since those who censure him, if placed in the same circumstances, would act in the same manner. In short, that no man is responsible for his conduct; because his actions-whether good or badare the effect of necessary causes. It is held by the same persons that the only possible method of ameliorating the condition of the human race, is to educate them in such a manner as to avoid those prejudices which have hitherto proved inimical to the happiness of men; and to remodel society, rejecting those institutions which are supposed to cause most of the misery which is found in the world. This theory has not only been embraced with confidence, but attempts have been made to carry it out in practice. Societies, founded on the principles above stated, have been formed both in Great Britain and America. But thus far the experiment has been attended with small success. Still the advocates of the Social system, as it is called, have not been discouraged. They are instituting new societies upon an improved plan, and the most sanguine hopes are entertained by those concerned in these new associations, that a far better and happier state of society than any hitherto enjoyed is practicable and will be realised. In answer to all arguments brought to prove that man is not a free moral agent, we appeal to the consciousness of every rational being. No arguments, however plausible, are of any force against intuitive first principles. Whether we can or cannot answer arguments against liberty, we know that we are free. In regard to some actions, we feel that we are under a moral obligation to perform them, and in regard to others, that we ought not to perform them, and if we are induced to violate this obligation, we feel that we are to be blamed, and are deserving of punishment.

Some philosophers have been persuaded by their reasonings that man is not free, but under necessity in all his actions. But as they could not deny that every man is intimately conscious of being free, they have adopted the opinion that man's feeling of liberty is a deceptive feeling, and contrary to fact. A far more reasonable conclusion is, that there must be some error in the reasoning from which the conclusion that man is not a free agent is deduced. When a chain of reasoning brings us to conclusions repugnant to our intuitive convictions, it is certain that there is a flaw in some link of it, whether we can discover it or not. We are as certain that we are free, as we can be; a revelation from heaven could not render us more so. As in other instances where speculative men have been led to adopt conclusions at variance with selfevident principles, so here, men act, in common life, in conformity with the common notions of mankind. They can by no effort divest themselves of this assent to certain fundamental truths.

MAN NOT UNDER A FATAL NECESSITY.

Although our consciousness of freedom ought to satisfy us, whatever reasonings to the contrary may be adduced; yet it may be useful to inquire whether, indeed, there are any arguments of force against the free agency of man. It is certain that one truth cannot be in opposition to any other truth. If, therefore, the deductions of reason and the evident principles of common sense and experience seem to stand in opposition to one another, it must arise from some misapprehension, or abuse of terms. As our understanding is given us to enable us to apprehend truth, no proposition clearly perceived to be true, whether intuitively or by ratiocination, can possibly be opposed to any other truth.

It becomes necessary, therefore, in the first place, to have distinct ideas of what is meant by liberty, and what by necessity. Here the reference must be, not to metaphysical reasoning, but to the common judgment and clear conviction of all impartial men. It has already been stated that that liberty which is necessary to moral agency, can be nothing else than the liberty of doing what we will, to the extent of our power. It is freedom of action in conformity with our desire and will. When a man is compelled by force to strike another (we mean not by the force of strong motives, but by actual physical force), we say he is not accountable, because

not free to do as he willed. When we think of that liberty which is necessary to free agency, and to the performance of a moral act, this is the kind of liberty which we have in our minds. In judging of the moral quality of an act, we never attempt to go further back than the spontaneous inclination of the mind, and never think it necessary to know in what way this disposition was acquired. If the action proceed from will, so far as liberty is concerned it is a moral act. We cannot conceive of any greater or more desirable liberty than this. Dependent creatures, indeed, cannot possess that independent liberty which is the prerogative of the Deity. The creature, notwithstanding his liberty, is still under the government of divine Providence.

It is also important that we entertain distinct and accurate ideas of that necessity which is inconsistent with free agency. There is what has been termed moral or philosophical necessity, which is not incompatible with human liberty. This is no other than the certain operation of moral causes, producing moral effects, according to the power which they possess. Such necessity, it has been shown, must belong to God, because he cannot act in opposition to truth, wisdom, and justice. But this does not hinder him from acting freely. So the angels in heaven and glorified saints are so confirmed in holiness that they cannot sin; but still in loving and serving God they act most freely.

But as in the common use of terms, and according to the common apprehension of men, liberty and necessity are diametrically opposite; when the name necessity is applied to any exercise, the prejudice immediately arises that it cannot be free; especially if there be some points in which it coincides with real necessity. Here, it is probable, we have the true source of the difficulty and perplexity in which this subject has been involved. The word necessary should never have been applied to any exercises which are spontaneous or voluntary, because all such are free in their very nature. When we apply this term to them, although we may qualify it by calling it a moral or philosophical necessity, still the idea naturally and insensibly arises, that if necessary they cannot be free. It is highly important not to use a term out of its proper signification; especially when such consequences may arise from an ambiguous use. An event may be absolutely certain without being necessary. It was absolutely certain that God, in creating the world, would act most wisely. It is a matter of absolute certainty that the holy angels will continue to love and serve God incessantly; but this certainty is not inconsistent with liberty. If a man possess good principles, and all temptation to do wrong be removed, it is morally certain that, in any given case, he will do right; and if a man be of corrupt principles, and all virtuous considerations be foreign from his thoughts, and strong temptations be presented to his ruling passion, it is certain that he will yield to temptation and commit sin. But in all these cases there is no necessity, because there is no coercion or compulsion. If the mere certainty of an event were inconsistent with freedom, then there could be no such thing as liberty in God or the creatures. As God knows all things most certainly, every thing, in his view, whatever may be its cause, is equally certain; the divine prescience cannot be mistaken. There is no good reason why uncertainty should be considered essential All to that liberty which is necessary to moral actions. causes operate according to their nature and force. The reason why one effect is necessary and another free is, not that the one takes place without an adequate cause, or that the same cause may produce different effects; for both these are contrary to common sense. The true reason is, that the one is produced against will, or without will, whereas the other is a voluntary act.

Let the distinction between what is certain and what is necessary be fully comprehended and attended to, and a great part of the darkness which, in the view of many, has obscured this subject will be dissipated. Although, then, it should be demonstrated that the will is as certainly governed by motives as the scale of the balance is by weights, yet there can be no legitimate inference from the one to the other, as if that would prove that the will is not free but under a necessity. The difference lies, not in the difference of certainty in the two cases, but in the difference in the nature of the causes of that certainty.

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30. D J.

This letter, generally, has the sound of the letter D in the English word DEED. It is usually silent when final, except in Proper Names.

The principal exception to the above Rule is, when D is final just before a noun which commences with a vowel or an Hmute. In such a case, the D has the sound of the letter T in the English word TOP; and in pronunciation is joined with the following word, as if it were its first letter, as will be seen in the two examples which follow, viz. :UN GRAND ACTEUR, as if printed UN GRANT Acteur, UN GRAND HOMME, UN GRANT HOMME,

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At the end of Proper Names, B is always sounded.
In these two words, viz.: A-PLOMB, and PLOMB, the B is
silent, and the next two preceding letters in each word, viz. :
OM, take the Nasal sound of ON.

49. C c.

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REPOND-ON AINSI?

51. F f.

In the commencement and body of words, this letter is usually pronounced as the letter F in the English word FOR. It is sometimes sounded also in the end of words. There are several exceptions, however, which are best found in the French the F is silent when it precedes a word commencing with a dictionary. In the French word NEUF, which means Nine, Consonant, viz.: NEUF LIS-nine lilies, is pronounced as if printed-NEU lis.

But the striking peculiarity of this letter consists in the fact, that it receives the sound of the letter V in the English word VOW, before another word commencing with a Vowel or H mute; and is joined with this word in pronunciation, as if it were its first letter, viz. :

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When FINAL, and not preceded by the letter N, C is generally sounded like the letter K in the English word BOOK, viz.:

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In a few words, however, C final is not sounded; and these exceptions are best found out by consulting a French diction

ary. In a few words, C has the sound of the letter G in the English word GO, viz. :-SECOND: SECONDAIRE: SECONDAIREMENT: SECONDE: SECONDEMENT: SECONDER: SECONDINE.

In these words, the C, which commences the second syllable, has the sound of G, viz.: SECOND-as if printed SEGOND: pronounced S'-gonh! etc. We do not illustrate all the sounds of these French words here, because of the Nasal sounds contained in them

Aigu
Magdebourg
Globe
Augment
Grappe

G, final of the word BOURG, a market-place, takes the sound of the English K. This word is pronounced BOORK. Names of Towns ending in BOURG drop the final G ; i. e. the G is silent, viz. :—

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This letter is used in the French language in two ways, usually styled MUTE and ASPIRATE-a definition perfectly intelligible to natives of France, but not equally so to others, that is, to foreigners. Let us explain. When we say His MUTE, every one knows what is meant. But when we say His ASPIRATE in the French language, we do not mean that it ever has the same sound as H in the English words HAVE, HIGH, HOLD and HULL, that is, a forcible breathing, or emission of the voice at the commencement of a word. There seems to be a misapprehension of this matter with many writers and teachers, not natives of France. It is believed that the true theory is this, viz., the French NEVER SOUND THE H. It is with them, virtually, ALWAYS MUTE. But besides being mute it has a particular duty to do-so to speak. But when we say His Aspirate, we only mean, that the vowel immediately following partakes so much of the property of a Consonant, as to prevent elision with the preceding vowel. The following examples will illustrate our meaning very clearly,

viz. :

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not Hay-ro, as an Englishman would pronounce it, with a strong guttural articulation. But to add to the force and office of the Aspirate H, in the word HE'ROS, let the article LE, be placed before it, thus: LE HE'ROS. Now, if the H were Mute, these two words would become one in pronunciation, viz. :Léros. The H not being Mute in this word Héros, but dspirate, what is its office? It enables the following letter E to prevent elision with the E of the word preceding it; and consequently, the two words must be pronounced as if printed Le-é-ros.

Thus it will be seen, that one particular use of the aspirated H, is to prevent elision of the two Vowels between which it may chance to be placed, in being the initial of a word. H aspirate is best determined by consulting a French dictionary, because

NEVER

no particular and definite Rule can be given for distinguishing it from H mute. It must be granted, that this whole matter is now considered debateable ground among Orthoepists. One side affirms, that the H aspirate IS SOUNDED, any more than H mute is, but only serves the sole purpose of preventing elision. The other side affirms, that the aspiration is very slight, which, in common conversation, amounts to nothing, but is barely observable only in serious reading, and the use of devotional language. One thing, however, is quite certain that a native Frenchman never aspirates the H of his own language, as we do in pronouncing the words HAVE, HIGH, HOLD and HULL.

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un and yn in old French; which sounds will be illustrated in the proper place. After M and N in the end of words, final consonants are usually silent, viz. :—

Prends as if printed

Romps

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Temps

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When N is final before another word beginning with a Vowel or H mute, it requires, besides being pronounced with a Nasal sound, that another N should be added in pronunciation to the beginning of the next word, viz. :—

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THE POPULAR EDUCATOR.

LESSONS IN ARITHMETIC.-No. XXX.

DECIMAL FRACTIONS.

Fractions which decrease in a tenfold ratio, or which express simply decimal parts, as tenths, hundredths, thousandths, etc., are called DECIMAL FRACTIONS.

They arise from dividing a unit into ten equal parts, then dividing each of these parts into ten other equal parts, and so on. Thus, if a unit is divided into 10 equal parts, 1 of those parts is called a tenth. If a tenth is divided into 10 equal parts, 1 of those parts will be a hundredth; for 10=ido. If a hundredth is divided into 10 equal parts, 1 of the parts will be a thousandth; for Too 10 Tobo, etc.

Each order of whole numbers, we have seen, increases in value from units towards the left in a tenfold ratio; and, conversely, each order must decrease from left to right in the same ratio, until we come to units' place again. By extending this scale of notation below units towards the right hand, it is manifest that the first place on the right of units will be ten times less in value than units' place; that the second will be ten times less than the first; the third ten times less than the second, etc. Thus we have a series of orders below units, which decrease in a tenfold ratio, and exactly correspond in value with tenths, hundredths, thousandths, etc.

Decimal Fractions are commonly expressed by writing the numerator with a point () before it.

The point placed before decimals is called the Decimal Point, or Separatrix. Its object is to distinguish the fractional parts from whole numbers.

If the numerator does not contain so many figures as there are ciphers in the denominator, the deficiency must be supplied by prefixing ciphers to it. For example, is written thus, 1; thus 2; thus, 3; etc. 18 is written thus, 01, putting the one in hundredths' place; 785 thus, 05; etc. That is, tenths are written in the first place on the right of units; hundredths in the second place; thousandths in the third place, etc.

The denominator of a decimal fraction is always 1 with as many ciphers annexed to it, as there are figures, or figures and ciphers, in the given numerator, when properly pointed. The names of the different orders of decimals, or places below units, may be easily learnt from the following DECIMAL TABLE.

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In reading decimals, as well as whole numbers, the units' place should always be made the starting point. It is advisable for the learner to apply to every figure the name of its order, them. Beginning at the units' place, he should proceed or the place which it occupies, before attempting to read towards the right, thus,-units, tenths, hundredths, thousandths, etc., pointing to each figure as he pronounces the name of its order. In this way he will be able to read decimals with as much ease as he can whole numbers.

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Sometimes we pronounce the word decimal when we come to the separatrix, and then read the figures as if they were whole numbers; or, simply repeat them one after another. Thus, 125-427 is read, one hundred and twenty-five, decimal four hundred and twenty-seven; or, one hundred and twenty-five, decimal four, two, seven.

Write the fractional part of the following mixed numbers in decimals:

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81000000

6 7

It will be seen from this table that the value of each figure in decimals, as well as in whole numbers, depends upon the place it occupies, reckoning from units. Thus, if a figure stands in the first place on the right of units, it expresses tenths; if in the second, hundredths, etc.; each successive place or order towards the right, decreasing in value in a tenfold ratio. Hence each removal of a decimal figure one place from units towards the right, diminishes its value ten times. Prefixing a cipher, therefore, to a decimal diminishes its value ten times; for, it removes the decimal one place farther from units' place. Thus, 4; but 04186; and 004 Tooo, etc.; for the denominator to a decimal fraction is 1, with as many ciphers annexed to it as there are figures in the numerator.

Annexing ciphers to decimals does not alter their value; for, each significant figure continues to occupy the same place from Thus, 5=1%; so 50 = 10%, or, by dividing the numerator and denominator by 10; and 500

units as before.

100%, or 1%, etc.

It should be remembered that the units' place is always the right hand place of a whole number. The effect of annexing and prefixing ciphers to decimals, it will be perceived, is the reverse

60

71880

9, 2

10000000

9. Write 9 tenths; 25 hundredths; 45 thousandths.
10. Write 6 hundredths; 7 thousandths; 132 ten thou-
sandths.

11. Write 462 thousandths; 2891 ten thousandths.
12. Write 25 hundred thousandths; 25 millionths.
13. Write 1637246 ten millionths; 65 hundred millionths.
14. Write 71 thousandths; 7 millionths.

15. Write 23 hundredths; 19 ten thousandths.
16. Write 261 hundred thousandths; 65 hundredths; 121
millionths; 751 trillionths.

Fractions both in their origin and in the manner of expressing
Decimal Fractions, it will be perceived, differ from Common
them.
number of equal parts; consequently, the denominator may be
Common Fractions arise from dividing a unit into any
any number whatever. Decimals arise from dividing a unit into
ten equal parts, then subdividing each of those parts into ten
other equal parts, and so on; consequently, the denominator is
always 10, 100, 1000, etc.
pressed by writing the numerator over the denominator. Deci
Again, Common Fractions are ex-
before it, while the denominator is understood.
mals are expressed by writing the numerator only, with a point

Decimals are added, subtracted, multiplied, and divided, in the

same manner as whole numbers.

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