EXECUTORS AND ADMINIS-
TRATORS.

1. Where testatrix lived in and
owned real estate in G. county
at time of her death, and her
will was duly filed for probate
there, suit to remove executor,
brought in C. county, should
have been removed to G. county,
under Code Civ. Proc. 1912, secs.
40, 48. Smith v. Heyward (93
S. E. 195), 107 S. C. 543.

EXECUTORY DEVISE.

1. An estate is never an execu-
tory devise, if it can take effect
as a remainder. Pearson v.
Easterling (92 S. E. 619), 107 S.
C. 265.

FAILURE OF CONSIDERA-
TION.

See Contracts. Wait v. Williams
(91 S. E. 969), 107 S. C. 32.

FILING PAPERS.

See Courts. Palmer v. Simons (92
S. E. 23), 107 S. C. 93.

FIRES.

See Railroads. Williams v. N. W.
R. R. Co. (93 S. E. 183), 107 S. C.
524.

FLIGHT.

See Criminal Law. State v. Turn-
age (93 S. E. 182), 107 S. C. 479.

FORFEITURES.

See Intoxicating Liquors. Seig-
nious v. Limehouse (93 S. E. 193),
107 S. C. 546. (Also see Cir-
cuit Decree in Appendix.)

FORECLOSURES.

See Mortgages. Farmers & Mer-
chants Bank v. Rivers (92 S. E.
753), 107 S. C. 204; Christensen
v. Griffin (93 S. E. 143), 107 S.
C. 456.

FORGERY.

1. Cotton ticket, reciting sale and
giving weights of cotton, held
subject to forgery. State v.
Walton (93 S. E. 5), 107 S. C.
353.

2. In prosecution for forging cot-
ton ticket, evidence held not to
show that cotton weigher, and

not defendant, altered figures of
weights thereon. State v. Wal-
ton (93 S. E. 5), 107 S. C. 353.
3. In prosecution for forging cot-
ton ticket, evidence held to war-
rant finding that defendant made
alterations thereon. Ib.

FRAUD.

1. In action for fraud and deceit
in procuring contract for labor
to be performed by defendant,
whether there was evil intent on
defendant's part, or whether it
acted in good faith, held for jury.
Gobbel v. Columbia Ry., Gas &
Electric Co. (93 S. E. 137), 107
S. C. 367.

2. A fraud action cannot be main-
tained, where plaintiff had
abundant opportunity to ascer-
tain the truth. Whitman v. Sea-
board Air Line Ry. (92 S. E.
861), 107 S. C. 198.

3. Where there was no proof that
the prediction of defendant rail-
road's physicians that plaintif
would entirely recover was not
carefully made, the evidence is
insufficient to sustain a finding
of fraud, where plaintiff had
nearly two years to ascertain
facts before his cause of action
was outlawed. Whitman v. Sea-
board Air Line Ry. (92 S. E.
861), 107 S. C. 198.

See Torts. National Bank etc.
v. So. Ry. Co.-Ca. Div. (91 S.
E. 972), 107 S. C. 28.

See Creditor's Suit. McClary-
Broadway Co. v. Dingle (92 S. E.
1051), 107 S. C. 384.

FRAUDS, STATUTE OF.
1. An oral agreement by the
daughter of deceased to pay for
certain funeral equipment and
services performed in connection
with the funeral is not within
the provision of the statute of
frauds as to actions on a special
promise to answer for the debt
of another, where there is no con-
tract whereby any other person
became obligated to pay for such
equipment and services. Fox v.
Weeks v. Laney (92 S. E. 1044),
107 S. C. 318.

FRAUDULENT CONVEY-
ANCES.

1. In creditors' bill against hus-
band and wife to set aside deeds
to wife for fraud on theory that
lands were purchased with hus-
band's money, evidence held not
to show that husband's money
bought lands or any fraud in pur-
chases. Southern States Phos-
phate & Fertilizer Co. v. Weekley
(93 S. E. 190), 107 S. C. 511.
2. The burden is on plaintiff suing
to foreclose a mortgage executed
by one to whom property had
been conveyed in fraud of the
grantor's creditors to prove, as
against the creditors, that she
was a bona fide mortgagee with-
out notice of the fraud. Smith v.
Faust (92 S. E. 24), 107 S. C.

37.

3. As to voluntary conveyances.
See DeWitt v. Dowling (91 S. E.
1040), 107 S. C. 51.

FRAUDULENT MISREPRE-

SENTATIONS.

See Torts. National Bank v. So.
Ry.-Ca. Div. (91 S. E. 972),
107 S. C. 28.

FUTURES.

See Gaming. Gwathmey v. Bur-
gess (93 S. E. 1), 107 S. C. 332.

GAME.

1. Under Cr. Code 1912, sec. 747,
subd. 2, and by its specific pro-
visions, the term of the State
game warden is four years only,
and it cannot be extended.
Gibbes v. Richardson (92 S. E.
333), 107 S. C. 191.

2. Term of State game warden
held not extended by Const., art.
XVII, sec. 11, subd. 6, as to
officers holding over until ap-
pointment of their successors.
Ib.

3. Assuming office of State game
warden to be public trust, so that
the Court should not permit it to
remain vacant, it may be de-
clared vacant in view of Civ.
Code 1912, sec. 695, providing for
filling a vacancy therein by the
Governor on nomination of the
Audubon Society. Ib.

4. In view of Cr. Code 1912, sec.
747, subd. 2, as to appointment
of the game warden, a nominee
who fails to show that his name
was sent to the Governor by the
Audubon Society can have no
title to the office. Ib.

GAMING.

1. In action to recover balance
due on transaction relating to
futures in cotton, instruction on
intent of parties as affecting
validity, held erroneous under
statute. Gwathmey & Co. V.
Burgess (93 S. E. 1), 107 S. C.

332.

See Searches and Seizures. State
v. Harley (92 S. E. 1034), 107
S. C. 304.

GIFTS.

1. If the donor of cetrificates of
deposit merely intended that the
donee should have the money at
his death, there was no gift to
her in his lifetime. Sawyer v.
Mabus (92 S. E. 1029), 107 S. C.
369.

HIGHWAYS.

1. In order for a road established
by user to be a public road for
the obstruction of which an indict-
ment will lie, it must be shown
that it terminated on both ends
in a public road or public place.
State v. Allen (92 S. E. 193), 107
S. C. 132.

2. In a prosecution for the ob-
struction of a road which the
State claimed had been estab-
lished as a public road by user,
where there was evidence that
the road led through the land
of another who had built a fence
and house across it, an instruc-
tion that the obstruction of the
road by the other did not ex-
cuse defendant was misleading,
since, if the obstruction was
placed across the road by the
other before the road had become
a public road, it prevented it
from thereafter becoming a pub-
lic road. Ib.

3. Liability of municipal corpo-
ration for defects in streets.
Caston v. City of Rock Hill (92
S. E. 191), 107 S. C. 126; Sexton

v. City of Rock Hill (93 S. E.
180), 107 S. C. 506.

HOMESTEAD.

1. Under Const., art. III, sec. 28,
a homestead is not exempt from
execution for purchase price of
improvements made thereon.
Christensen v. Griffin (93 S. E.
143), 107 S. C. 456.

2. A tenant in common is entitled
to a homestead to the amount of
$1,000, although it cannot be al-
lotted to land set off by metes
and bounds, which is not subject
to execution and cannot be in-
vaded by legal process; as the
homestead right is in the title.
Ex parte Beaty (92 S. E. 1052),
107 S. C. 364.

HOMICIDE.

1. The general reputation of vic-
tim of homicide for violence may
be shown, but not particular acts
of violence. State v. Hiers (93
S. E. 124), 107 S. C. 411.

2. In a murder trial, where it ap-
pears that after deceased was
shot he was in a semiconscious
condition from which he reacted
somewhat, subsequent dying
declaration is inadmissible until
it is proven that declarant's con-
dition, causing disability, had
been removed. State v. Quick
(93 S. E. 127), 107 S. C. 435.

4. Evidence held sufficient to au-
thorize a reasonable influence
that defendant aided and abetted
in a killing. State v. Graham
(92 S. E. 188), 107 S. C. 139.

HUSBAND AND WIFE.
1. There is no presumption of law
that when married woman pur-
chases property from third per-
son husband furnished money.
Southern States Phosphate & Fer-
tilizer Co. v. Weekley (93 S. E.
190), 107 S. C. 511.

2. Where wife allowed husband to
mortgage her personal property,
only ones who can complain are

mortgagees. Southern States
Phosphate & Fertilizer Co. v.
Weekley (93 S. E. 190), 107 S. C.

511.

See Marriage of Slaves. Mims v.
Jones (91 S. E. 987), 107 S. C.
81.

INDICTMENTS.

1. If the allegations of an indict-
ment were sufficient to constitute
any offense whatever, demurrer
thereto was properly overruled.
State v. Cole (92 S. E. 624), 107
S. C. 285.

INJUNCTION.

1. On demurrer to complaint for
temporary injunction, Court had
no right at chambers on sustain-
ing demurrer to make order dis-
missing complaint. Dallas v. In-
man (93 S. E. 8), 107 S. C. 402.
2. A Circuit Judge at chambers
on application for a temporary
injunction cannot try the case
on its merits and make a final
order. Kinder v. Atlantic Coast
Lumber Corp. (93 S. E. 7), 107
S. C. 404.

3. Order on application for tem-
porary injunction is not conclu-
sive of merits of case. Kinder v.
Atlantic Coast Lumber Corp.
(93 S. E. 7), 107 S. C. 404.

4. Subscribers to a school build-
ing fund are entitled to injunc-
tion to restrain the proposed re-
moval of the building, though
the trustees and the school dis-
trict are solvent, since it would
be impossible to prove or esti-
mate the damages caused by the
loss of plaintiff's right to have
a school maintained at that place,
and, therefore, the remedy at law
is inadequate. McCormac v.
Evans (92 S. E. 19), 107 S. C. 39.
5. Wrongful acts resulting in the
destruction of plaintiff's prop-
erty or any interference with his
use of it may be prevented by
injunction. Ib.

6. The right of subscribers to a
school building fund to prevent
the demolition and removal of
the building cannot be denied
because they have adjoining
lands on which they can build
a schoolhouse. Ib.

INSURANCE.

1. In action on life policy, held
that there was no payment of
first premium. Wood v. South-
eastern Life Ins. Co. (93 S. E.
197), 107 S. C. 537.

2. Where local council of frater-
nal society remitted full amount
of assessments due which was
received and accepted, held that
national council could not com-
plain after member's death that
he had not paid local council.
Outlaw
National
v.
Council,
Junior Order United American
Mechanics (92 S. E. 469), 107 S.
C. 225.

3. Tender back of premiums paid,
made after commencement of ac-
tion on fire policy, could not by
operation of law rebut inference
of waiver of conditions from
failure to give notice of concella-
tion; but the question whether
there was waiver should have
been submitted to jury. Porter
v. Dixie Fire Ins. Co. (93 S. E.
141), 107 S. C. 393.

4. In view of Civ. Code 1912, sec.
2755, the custom of a local lodge
not to declare forfeiture of a
mutual benefit policy upon de-
linquency did not constitute
waiver, especially where the con-
stitution prohibited such waiver
and was agreed to by the in-
sured. Sternheimer v. Order of
United Commercial Travelers of
America (93 S. E. 8), 107 S. C.
291.

5. In view of Code Civ. Proc.
1912, sec. 137, subd. 7, providing
that an action on a life policy
may be brought within six years,
a constitutional provision of a
mutual benefit order that no ac-
tion shall be brought after six
months from disallowance of
claim does not bar an action un-
til after six years. Sternheimer
v. Order of United Commercial
Travelers of America (93 S. E.
8), 107 S. C. 291.

6. In action on mutual benefit cer-
tificate, allegation that insured
was in good standing being un-
necessary, it need not be proved
by plaintiff. Sternheimer v.
Order of United Commercial

Travelers of America (93 S. E.
8), 107 S. C. 291.

7. The insurer under a mutual
benefit policy is bound to allege
and prove delinquency of insur-
ed to establish forfeiture of the
policy. Ib.

8. Where defendant pleaded de-
linquency, the burden of prov-
ing waiver of condition as to
payment was on plaintiff. Stern-
heimer v. Order of United Com-
mercial Travelers of America (93
S. E. 8), 107 S. C. 291.

9. Evidence held to warrant re-
fusal to submit to jury question
of waiver by insurer under mu-
tual benefit policy of condition as
to payment of premium. Stern-
heimer v. Order of United Com-
mercial Travelers of America
(93 S. E. 8), 107 S. C. 291.
10. Evidence as to violation of
policy conditions. Conner v.
Grand Lodge (92 S. E. 1032),
107 S. C. 308; Fowler v. N. Y.
Life Ins. Co. (91 S. E. 1043), 107
S. C. 21.

11. Defense that insured was ad-
dicted to excessive use of liquor.
Fowler v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co. (91
S. E. 1043), 107 S. C. 21.

INTOXICATING LIQUORS.

1. Under dispensary law, defend-
ant, who purchased liquor at dis-
pensary, had right to carry it to
his home in dry county, provid-
ing it was intended for personal
State v. Burns (93 S. E.
194), 107 S. C. 542.

use.

2. Where mortgagee did not have
knowledge of, or consent to, use
of automobile by mortgagor for
illegal transportation of liquor,
his interest could not be con-
fiscated. Seignious v. Limehouse
(93 S. E. 193), 107 S. C. 546.
3. Under Acts 1915, p. 140, secs.
1, 7, Cr. Code, 1912, sec. 825 (the
dispensary act of 1894), Const.
1895, art. V, secs. 18, 21, and
Const. 1868, sec. 19, Court of
General Sessions held to have
jurisdiction to try defendant
charged with violating acts 1915,
p. 140, sec. 1, relating to trans-
portation of liquor. State v.

Morelli (92 S. E. 475), 107 S. C.
262.

4. The gallon a month law did not
change existing rights to bring
whiskey into State, except that
it limited amount to gallon per
month for personal use, and re-
quired liquor to be delivered to
consignee. State v. Allston (92
S. E. 177), 107 S. C. 486.

5. Private carrier for hire had
same right to bring liquor into
State under the gallon a month
law as common carrier, such as
railways and express companies,
subject to same law and re-
strictions. Ib.

Ib.

6. Person ordering liquor, not ex-
ceeding gallon a month, to be
brought into State for personal
consumption, had choice of
bringing it in by private carrier
for hire or common carrier.
7. A private carrier could, for
hire or as a favor, bring into the
State not more than one gallon
of liquor for another person's
personal use during one calendar
month wtihout intent to violate
the law. State v. Gens (93 S. E.
139), 107 S. C. 448.

8. Chief element in offense of stor-
ing alcoholic liquors is unlawful-
ness of storing, intent of him
who has liquor. State v. Tooley
(93 S. E. 132), 107 S. C. 408.
9. If defendant's act in storing
liquors be unlawful, Court will
not measure with nicety quan-
tity defendant had in his safe.
Ib.

10. In prosecution for storing alco-
holic liquors, Supreme Court
may not infer as matter of law
that discovery of very small
quantity in defendant's safe on
three separate occasions within
six months did not amount to
storing. State v. Tooley (93 S.
E. 132), 107 S. C. 408.

11. Act Feb. 19, 1916 (29 St. at
Large, p. 704), limiting punish-
ment of Court to imprisonment
for all persons who violate any
of provisions of any law relat-
ing to or regulating sale of in-
toxicating liquors, does not ap-
ply to sales only, but to unlawful

storing as well. State v. Tooley
(93 S. E. 132), 107 S. C. 408.
12. By Cr. Code 1912, sec. 839,
Court is empowered in its dis-
cretion either to fine or imprison
person convicted of unlawful
storing of intoxicants, denounced
by act Feb. 19, 1916 (29 St. at
Large, p. 704). Ib.

13. Offense of storing and keeping
in possession contraband liquors
held not committed by receiving
such liquors, and having them in
possession but a moment before
they were seized. State v. Free-
man (93 S. E. 13), 107 S. C. 431.
14. In view of Cr. Code 1912, sec.
825, providing that all liquors
except those purchased from a
county dispensary for a lawful
use and those passing through
the State consigned to points be-
yond the State shall be deemed
contraband and may be seized
in transit without warrant,
where a defendant purchased
liquor for lawful use from a coun-
ty dispensary which had the legal
right to sell it to him and trans-
ported it with his personal bag-
gage to another county not hav-
ing a dispensary, he was not
guilty of the offense of transport-
ing contraband liquor. State v.
Aiken (92 S. E. 1043), 107 S. C.
359.

15. Acts 1915, p. 140, making it un-
lawful for any person, firm, cor-
poration, or company to ship
liquors in larger quantities than
one gallon per month, held not
to provide for any punishment
for a corporation violating the
act, since section 7 provides the
punishment for "any person"
violating the act. State v. So.
Express Co. (92 S. E. 1054), 107
S. C. 349.

16. Where, in a prosecution for
unlawfully storing contraband
liquor, there was sufficient evi-
dence for the jury to determine
whether the liquor was legally
obtained by defendant for an
illegal purpose, or whether it
was illegally obtained for a legal
purpose, the Court properly re-
fused to direct a verdict of "not
guilty," on the ground that the