otherwise escape notice, especially when involved in a multiplicity of terms. To represent such an instrument as destitute of all utility, or to speak of it as merely the science of logomachy, betrays an utter ignorance of its nature and object. It is reported of Lord Mansfield, that on one occasion, when pleading at the bar, he was confounded and perplexed with an argument which he was convinced was false, but of which he could not detect the sophistry; and that, upon going home, and throwing the various propositions of which it consisted into the syllogistic form, he thereby discovered the fallacy. The Aristotelian Logic is, therefore, by no means so worthless, or so injurious, as has been represented. Had it not been greatly abused, both by its friends and its foes, a system formed on so just an analysis of the reasoning process, and calculated, when kept within its own limits, and employed on its own proper duties, to be of such use, had never been stigmatised and neglected as has unhappily and unjustly been the case.

CHAPTER II.

OF THE NATURE AND FUNCTIONS OF THE SYLLOGISM.

WE have already laid down, in detail, all that is usually deemed necessary respecting the nature and functions of the syllogism. Of late, however, new and rather extraordinary views have been propounded on this subject-supported by superior talent, and very high authority. It may be proper for us, therefore, now that we are somewhat prepared for the investigation, to give these views a calm and careful consideration.

The work in which these novel statements are brought forward and defended, at greatest length, and with the greatest ability, is unquestionably Mr Mill's "System of Logic," to which we have had already occasion repeatedly to refer, with high but just commendation. Many of the important discussions with which that able work abounds, may be viewed by the Logician as but remotely connected with his science, however necessary they may be to the author's professed object, which was, he

informs us, " to embody and systematise the best ideas which have been either promulgated on its subject by speculative writers, or conformed to by accurate thinkers in their scientific inquiries," (Pref. p. 1.) In treating of Logic proper, he appears particularly anxious to reconcile the friends and the foes of the Syllogism. "In the contempt entertained by many modern philosophers for the syllogistic art," he observes, "it will be seen that he by no means participates; although the scientific theory on which its defence is usually rested, appears to him erroneous: and the view which he has suggested of the nature and functions of the syllogism may, perhaps, afford the means of conciliating the principles of the Art with as much as is well-grounded in the doctrines and objections of its assailants," (Pref. p. 4.) Perhaps it is this laudable anxiety to unite these contending parties, that makes him seem rather at a loss where to fix the boundaries of this science. He admits that Logic "comprises the science of reasoning, as well as an art, founded on that science," (Vol. i. p. 3.) But he is unwilling to receive this as an adequate definition. He pleads for an extension of the province of Logic, so as to "include several operations of the intellect not usually considered to fall within the meaning of the terms Reasoning and Argumentation," (p. 5.) He seems wishful "to define Logic as the science which treats of the operations of the human understanding in the pursuit of truth," (p. 5.) Admitting candidly, however, that if the former definition includes too little, this "now suggested has the opposite fault of including too much;" he then restricts the province of Logic "to that portion of our knowledge which consists of inferences from truths previously known; whether those antecedent data be general propositions, or particular observations and perceptions," (p. 9.) As if aware that a science restricted to "inferences from truths previously known" -from "antecedent data"-would scarcely suit his purpose, he enlarges its boundaries, once more, in his final definition ;— "Logic, then, is the science of the operations of the understanding which are subservient to the estimation of evidence; both the process itself of proceeding from known truths to unknown, and all intellectual operations auxiliary to this," (p. 13.)

Now, we must demur against any definition of Logic which represents it as "the process itself of proceeding from known

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truths to unknown." This author admits that reasoning or inference is the business of Logic. He distinctly states this in laying down the chief object of his elaborate work; ject," he says, "will be to attempt a correct analysis of the intellectual process called Reasoning or Inference, and of such other mental operations as are intended to facilitate this: as well as, on the foundation of this analysis, and pari passu with it, to bring together or frame a set of rules or canons for testing the sufficiency of any given evidence to prove any given proposition," (pp. 13, 14.) But, strictly speaking, Reasoning, or Inference alone, can never lead us to unknown truths. Truths absolutely unknown, not implied in anything we previously knew, which cannot be inferred from anything already in our possession, can only be obtained by information, whether received from the testimony of our senses, from the report of credible narrators, from observation, experience, or any of the numerous methods by which we acquire knowledge. An able man, if allowed sufficient time and opportunity, might, by pure patient Reasoning, attain to any amount of mathematical knowledge, because all the truths of mathematics are implied and involved in the definitions and axioms of that science. But no amount of ability or toil could give him the knowledge, by Reasoning alone, of what took place in his absence; of matters of fact not previously known; of truths to him absolutely new. He could never tell, by any effort of mere reasoning, how many satellites Jupiter has; whether Saturn has a ring; or in what portion of the heavens the constellations Aries, Gemini, or Leo, are to be found. Unless he had either seen or been informed of the experiments, he could never discover, by Reasoning alone, what effect would be produced on his eye by mixing the colours yellow and blue; or what would be the appearance of a ray of light when passed through a prism. New truths are not generally ascertained without Reasoning; but this is not the whole, nor the chief part, of the process which is necessary to their acquisition. To represent Logic, -which treats not of every exercise of Reason, but of Reasoning "the inferring from certain granted propositions another proposition as the consequence of them," as an instrument of discovery, is to mistake or misstate the nature of the science. There are, it is true, what are called Logical Discoveries, truths

which have been overlooked by the person who has in his possession the premises from which they may be elicited by Reasoning, and which truths may be as much hid from him, for all practical purposes, till thus developed, as if they had been absolutely unknown. But these are not the unknown truths to which our author refers when he defines Logic, "the process itself of proceeding from known truths to unknown." He maintains that "cases of inference, in the proper acceptation of the term," are 66 those in which we set out from known truths, to arrive at others really distinct from them,” (pp. 222, 223) and "that the conclusion may, to the person to whom the syllogism is presented, be actually and bonâ fide a new truth," (p. 246.) This may be necessary if we are to include within the province of Logic, as this author has done, the process of Induction, and "the methods of scientific Investigation;" but these we have seen belong not to our science. The author himself seems to have anticipated that his definition would be unsatisfactory: he observes, (p. 2,) "the definition which I am about to offer of the science of Logic, pretends to nothing more than to be a statement of the question which I have put to myself, and which this book is an attempt to resolve. The reader is at liberty to object to it as a definition of Logic; but it is at all events a correct definition of the subject of these volumes." We have dwelt, the more particularly, on his definition, and his remarks respecting the province of Logic, as, of course, these give a direction and a colouring to all his discussions—more especially to those respecting the nature and functions of the Syllogism.

On this branch of Logic our author professes to cast new light, and to extricate us from difficulties in which we are otherwise necessarily involved. He says: "Reasoning, in the extended sense in which I use the term, and in which it is synonymous with Inference, is popularly said to be of two kinds reasoning from particulars to generals, and reasoning from generals to particulars; the former being called Induction, the latter Ratiocination or Syllogism," (p. 223.) Again; speaking of Reasoning, he says; "in one of its acceptations, it means syllogising; or the mode of inference which may be called (with sufficient accuracy for the present purpose) concluding from generals to particulars. In another of its senses,

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to reason, is simply to infer any assertion, from assertions already admitted; and in this sense, Induction is as much entitled to be called Reasoning as the demonstrations of geometry," (p. 3.) Now, we would ask, in these two contrasted kinds of reasoning, where lies the difference? Does it lie in the premises? Or in the inference drawn from these premises? Or in the mode of drawing that inference? If in the premises, we would remark, that with their nature or number, the manner in which they are obtained, or the claims which they have to our belief, Logic has nothing to do. In every argument, whether the premises be generals or particulars, they must be antecedent data; and the only business of Logic is to see that the inferences from them be legitimately drawn. In syllogistic reasoning, the inference is that which is proved by the premises; if then, in the above-mentioned instance, simply to infer any assertion, from assertions already admitted," does not mean to prove that assertion, then it is not, properly speaking, reasoning at all. Our author observes: "Not only may we reason from particulars to particulars, without passing through generals, but we perpetually do so reason. All our earliest inferences are of this nature. From the first dawn of intelligence we draw inferences; but years elapse before we learn the use of general language. The child who, having burnt his fingers, avoids to thrust them again into the fire, has reasoned or inferred, though he has never thought of the general maxim, Fire burns. He knows from memory that he was burnt, and on this evidence believes when he sees a candle, that if he puts his finger into the flame of it, he will be burnt again. He believes this in every case which happens to arise; but without looking, in each instance, beyond the present case. He is not generalising; he is inferring a particular from particulars. In the same way, also, brutes reason. There is little or no ground for attributing to any of the lower animals the use of conventional signs, without which, general propositions are impossible. But these animals profit by experience, and avoid what they have found to cause them pain, in the same manner, though not always with the same skill, as a human creature. Not only the burnt child, but the burnt dog, dreads the fire," (p. 251.) Now, we submit, is this a fair, an admissible specimen of Reasoning in the sense in which that term