: tions now adduced, the following conclusions seem to be established-All reasoning is from particulars to particulars: General propositions are merely registers of such inferences. already made, and short formulæ for making more: The major premise of a syllogism, consequently, is a formula of this description and the conclusion is not an inference drawn from the formula, but an inference drawn according to the formula; the real logical antecedent, or premises, being the particular facts from which the general proposition was collected by induction. Those facts, and the individual instances which supplied them, may have been forgotten; but a record remains, not, indeed, descriptive of the facts themselves, but shewing how these cases may be distinguished respecting which the facts, when known, were considered to warrant a given inference. According to the indications of this record, we draw our conclusion; which is to all intents and purposes, a conclusion from the forgotten facts. For this it is essential that we should read the record correctly, and the rules of the syllogism are a set of precautions to insure our doing so," (p. 259.) "In the above observations it has, I think, been clearly shewn, that, although there is always a process of reasoning or inference where a syllogism is used, the syllogism is not a correct analysis of that process of reasoning or inference; which is, on the contrary, (when not a mere inference from testimony,) an inference from particulars to particulars; authorised by a previous inference from particulars to generals, and substantially the same with it; of the nature, therefore, of Induction. But, while these conclusions appear to me undeniable, I must yet enter a protest, as strong as that of Archbishop Whately himself, against the doctrine that the syllogistic art is useless for the purpose of reasoning. The reasoning lies in the act of generalisation, not in interpreting the record of that act; but the syllogistic form is an indispensable collateral security for the correctness of the generalisation itself," (pp. 263, 264.) 66 This theory, although thought out with so much originality and tact, must, we fear, be pronounced more specious than satisfactory;—at least, in so far as the nature and functions of the syllogism are concerned. It contains, certainly, an able inquiry into "the origin of our knowledge;" it points out how we attain to "general truths;" it shews how, by abstraction and generalisation, we can form, for our convenience and use, common terms, and "general propositions ;" and were the inquiry, How are our premises obtained? there might not be much stated in this theory that is objectionable. But, with regard to the reasoning process, it is far otherwise. The speculations are ingenious; but, we apprehend they will not work any great deliverance,* either for the friends or the foes of the syllogism. In these extracts, we find the same mistiness and misconception respecting the most common logical terms, on which we have had occasion already to animadvert. The statements are far too fanciful, to be philosophical. What, for example, are we to understand by inference, in the following sentences?" that the Duke of Wellington is mortal, is evidently an inference; "—" it is not in the latter half of the process, the descent from all men to the Duke of Wellington, that the inference resides;"-" the inference is finished when we have asserted that all men are mortal." How can the assertion that all men are mortal, conclude anything respecting the duke, in distinction from all the rest of mankind,—it being his case only that is under consideration,-unless there be a special inference drawn in his case, a "descent from all men" to him in particular? In concluding that the duke is mortal, like the rest of mankind, he admits, "we may pass through the generalisation, All men are mortal, as an intermediate stage;" —but we must do it, or no logical inference can be legitimately drawn. He says, "the individual cases are all the evidence وو * In a very favourable review of Mr Mill's elaborate work, the writer, referring to the above-mentioned view of the syllogism, says, "By this explanation we are released from the dilemma into which the syllogistic and non-syllogistic party had together thrown us;" and, therefore, he adds, we are grateful for the deliverance it works for us." Yet, this writer's logical studies have either been so defective, or he is so oblivious of them, that he seems not to know, or remember, what is meant by a minor proposition! He speaks of it constantly as being the conclusion. "Who has not learnt-what is a major, what a middle term, and what the minor or conclusion?"-"We have, or may have, it is true, a major in all our ratiocination, implied, if not expressed, and are so far syllogistic; but then the real premise from which we reason is the amount of experience on which that major was founded, to which amount of experience we, in fact, made an addition in our minor, or conclusion."Is this writer a judge competent to pronounce a verdict in this case? we can possess ;"-but, till the induction be complete-till every individual instance, without exception, is included—till, in short, we arrive at the general proposition, "All men are mortal," nothing can, with certainty, be concluded respecting the duke's mortality. If one exception only be possible, he may be that exception; and, therefore, the inference drawn cannot stand. To assume the mortality of any number of individual cases less than the whole, would never suffice for the argument; and how can the whole class be thought of, or spoken of, without a general proposition? It is not the "arbitrary fiat of logicians," but the necessity of the case, that renders a general proposition indispensable. He says, "the real logical antecedent, or premises, are the particular facts from which the general proposition was collected by induction." The "record" of these facts is indeed the general proposition. But, if the general proposition be a correct record of all these facts, the two must be equivalent; and, if taken in their proper extension, it comes to the same thing, whether the one or the other be considered the premises-whether we reason from the facts themselves, or merely "decipher our own notes." The grand reason why our author is so anxious to get rid of general propositions in reasoning is, that he may divest the major premise of the petitio principii. This is the real difficulty; and with much ingenuity does he labour to remove it. "The true reason why we believe that the Duke of Wellington will die," he maintains, "is that his fathers, and our fathers, and all other persons who were contemporary with them, have died. Those facts are the real premises of the reasoning. But we are not led to infer the conclusion from these premises, by the necessity of avoiding any verbal inconsistency. There is no contradiction in supposing that all those persons have died, and that the Duke of Wellington may, notwithstanding, live for ever. But there would be a contradiction if we first, on the ground of these same premises, made a general assertion inculding and covering the case of the Duke of Wellington, and then refused to stand to it in the individual case," (pp. 262, 263.) But, we ask, if the duke's case is not "included and covered" in the premises, how can we thence conclude anything respecting him? If the duke "may live for ever," for anything the premises say to the contrary, how can we thus prove that he is mortal? This does get rid of the petitio principii, it is true; but it sweeps away the argument likewise. Again, he says, "In the argument which proves that Socrates is mortal, one indispensable part of the premises will be as follows:-'My father, and my father's father, A, B, C, and an indefinite number of other persons, were mortal;' which is only an expression in different words of the observed fact that they have died. This is the major premise divested of the petitio principii, and cut down to as much as is really known by direct evidence," (p. 272.) We reply: This major premise, "cut down and divested of the petitio principii," must either be a universal or a particular proposition. If universal, then, "My father, and my father's father, A, B, C, and an indefinite number of persons," mean all mankind; and, as Socrates is one of that number, what is predicated of the whole may be of him. But, alas! in this case, the petitio principii meets us If the above proposition be particular-if the "indefinite number" do not include all mankind, then the argument is inconclusive. It merely amounts to this :— Some men are mortal : Socrates is a man; therefore, In this case the middle term is undistributed; nothing is proved. To get rid of the petitio principii in this way, is surely to emulate Alexander the Great with the Nodus Gordianus. The novel views propounded in Mr Mill's work, and the high authority with which this author's well-earned reputation has invested his speculations, have detained us thus long in giving them, as our space and ability would allow, a candid examination. While we have—we trust with becoming deference-recorded our dissent from some things laid down in this work respecting Logic proper, we cheerfully acknowledge there is much more in these highly interesting volumes with which we cordially agree. It is by no means an elementary work; yet, after the student has made himself familiar with the elements of Logic, and has made some progress in the study of mental, moral, and natural philosophy, few exercises will be more invigorating to the mind than to give this able production a thorough and oft-repeated perusal. CHAPTER III. OF THE POPULAR FORMS OF ARGUMENT. MUCH misapprehension relative to the practical utility of Logic has sprung from the mistake into which many justly celebrated writers have fallen, that Aristotle meant the syllogistic form of reasoning, expressed in regular figure and mood, to supersede the various forms of reasoning in common use. This error lies at the foundation of all Locke's objections to the Syllogism. It is implied in what Campbell, in his "Philosophy of Rhetoric," brings forward, when he affirms "that this form of reasoning is a very incommodious one, and has many disadvantages, but not one advantage of that commonly practised, will be manifest to every one who makes the experiment. It is at once more indirect, more tedious, and more obscure." And Lord Kames charges Aristotle with inconsistency, because "in his Treatise of Ethics, Politics, &c., he argues like a rational creature, and never attempts to bring his own system into practice." A mistake so palpable we should scarcely have thought worthy to be mentioned, had it not been advanced by these distinguished authors, who have thus given it a prevalence and importance which it could not otherwise have obtained. It never was intended that this mode of unfolding arguments should be introduced into general practice, or that all the popular abbreviated forms of stating an argument should be abandoned, in order that the Syllogism, stated at full length, might be universally employed. This would be as absurd as for a Grammarian to parse every sentence he reads. Who ever dreamt that this was the object which Grammar was intended to accomplish? And why should a supposition as absurd have been entertained respecting the Science now under consideration? On this subject it has been well remarked, that "Logic, which is, as it were, the Grammar of Reasoning, does not bring forward the regular syllogism as a distinct mode of argumentation, designed to be substituted for any other mode; but as the form to which all correct reasoning may be ultimately reduced; and which, consequently, |