CHAPTER VI. OF THE CONNEXION WHICH LOGIC HAS WITH GRAMMAR AND RHETORIC. To every department of literature and science Logic bears a very intimate relation; but to none more so than to Grammar and Rhetoric. The former of these branches of study treats of the principles and structure of Language, and points out the purity, precision, and propriety that should obtain in words and sentences. Rhetoric advances a step further, and shews how we may best gain the object which discourse proposes to accomplish, whether that be to please or instruct, to convince or persuade. These two branches of study when united enable us to communicate our thoughts to others, either in speech or writing, with purity and precision, with force and elegance. It is evident, then, that they are intimately connected with Logic, which helps us to think, judge, and reason, with readiness and accuracy. If the terms which we employ are not clear and distinct; if we cannot easily discern wherein objects agree and disagree, and pronounce accordingly; and if the inferences deduced from these decisions are not drawn promptly and conclusively, it will matter little that grammatical purity and rhetorical elegance have been preserved. With these important studies, then, Logic should be associated, if we wish to reap, with the greatest advantage, the benefits which they are each intended to communicate. Grammar may be looked upon as the introduction to logical pursuits; and though its office be not dignified, it is nevertheless of indispensable necessity. Without a knowledge of the rules and principles developed by the Grammarian, it is impossible to advance a step in the prosecution of logical inquiries with any hope of success. The various definitions, distinctions, and classifications, which lie at the very threshold of this Science, in many instances, belong almost as properly to the one study as to the other. Logic has for its object the laws of thought, in so far as the reasoning process is concerned; but as language is the medium of thought, and as these two exert a mutual influence on each other, it is necessary that language, in some degree, come under the consideration of the logician. Here, then, it is that Grammar and Logic meet; the one takes up, and prosecutes, and applies to its own use, what the other had previously prepared. A knowledge of the principles and rules which have led to the formation of artificial signs for the communication of thought, and an acquaintance with the different classes of such signs, with their various functions, combinations, and accidents, must be valuable both in a speculative and practical point of view. It was by considering speech and language in this light that the science of Grammar was produced, which consists of two kinds, the one popular, the other philosophical. The former is intended to aid us in the speedy and perfect acquirement of languages, so that we may intelligibly communicate and understand the ideas which are conveyed from one to another in the common intercourse of society, whether by speech or by writing. This branch of Grammar, therefore, treats of the order, connexion, and dependence of words, as laid down in rules of syntax and construction; and whoever enters on the study of Logic without having previously made himself intimately acquainted with the principles and rules there developed, undertakes a difficult, if not an impracticable task. But that part of Grammar which has been styled philosophical, moves in a higher sphere. It is employed in examining the nature and powers of words; and its office is to enter into the philosophy of language. It is when taken in this latter sense that Grammar is seen to be most intimately connected with Logic. The first part of Logic, which treats of terms, enters deeply into the philosophy of language. Much depends, in every process of argumentation, on the mere verbal part of the argument; and, in so far as this is concerned, the labours of the Grammarian and the Logician very nearly coincide. But, properly speaking, the former prepares the way for the latter, introduces him to the right path, and removes many obstacles that would materially impede him in prosecuting his journey. As Grammar may be considered the introduction, so Rhetoric is merely an extension of this Science. The object which Logic and Rhetoric propose to accomplish is in some : respects the same, since they are both intended to produce conviction by a process of reasoning. But the manner in which they accomplish this end is different. The Logician has his premises laid before him, and his office is to draw a conclusion from them on the other hand, the Rhetorician has the conclusion given, and his object is to seek for arguments by which it may be established. The one is the Advocate, who has to exert his talent and ingenuity to find arguments to support the cause he has espoused; the other is the Judge, who has to determine whether these arguments are valid or not. The subject-matter of both may be the same; and, in so far as the bare process of reasoning extends, that is, of course, also the same in both. But Rhetoric proceeds further than the mere process of reasoning. It has to invent arguments; to find out those that are most suitable for the matter in hand; to arrange them in their proper order; and so to state and enforce them, as shall be most likely either to illuminate the understanding, please the imagination, influence the will, or move the passions. It is evident, then, although these two branches of study are intimately connected, that the one advances much further than the other. As an acquaintance with Grammar is necessary before we can properly enter on the study of Logic, so a knowledge of Rhetoric is essential to the successful application of Logic to practical purposes. These three branches of study, therefore, naturally follow each other in the order we have specified, and tend mutually to aid and perfect each other. It appears, then, from what has now been advanced, that Method, although generally brought forward as a distinct part of Logic, and dignified with the name of a logical instrument, belongs more properly to Rhetoric than to Logic. By method, as it is explained, we are to understand the arrangement of our thoughts in such a manner as shall best aid the mind in the acquisition or communication of knowledge. It includes more than mere order. It is such a disposition of our mental stores as may lead to their increase, or to their most efficient application; it is such an arrangement of our thoughts, on any particular subject, as may lead us most easily, and speedily, and safely, from one branch of it to another, till we ultimately obtain a clear and adequate acquaintance with the whole. It The utility of such an instrument no one will deny. will preserve the mind from confusion and mistake, and greatly facilitate our attempts both to acquire and impart information. We are far, then, from depreciating the rules that have been laid down on this subject, and which are generally given in works on Logic, as a fourth part of the system. But as method is perfectly distinct from the reasoning process, and is subservient more especially to the art of communication, we prefer assigning it to Rhetoric, to which branch of study it seems properly to belong. This will more evidently appear if we glance, for a moment, at the two principal divisions of method, the Analytic and the Synthetic. By the Analytic Method we arrive at the knowledge of a subject by taking it as a whole, and resolving it into its compotent parts. The procedure in this case is from generals to particulars, from a whole to its parts, from effects to their causes. This method is employed, not so much in the arrangement and classification of known truths, as in the search after those that are not yet clearly ascertained. It has, therefore, been called the method of invention, because it observes the order in which our minds are employed in the invention or discovery of truth. The Synthetic Method is just the reverse of this. We here begin with the elementary parts of a subject, and, by putting them together, we trace them up till we ascertain what it is as a whole. In this case the process is from the simple to the compound, from the parts to the whole, from causes to effects. This has been called the method of instruction, because it is most commonly employed in explaining and communicating knowledge to others. These two methods, then, have evidently a special reference to the business of the Rhetorician. By the one he invents his arguments; by the other he arranges them so that he may most effectually instruct, persuade, or excite those whom he addresses. The rules that have been laid down respecting Method, and those relating to the writing of themes, and the conducting of disputations, which are generally given in connexion with it, we therefore hand over to the Rhetorician, since they belong more properly to his Art, than to our Science. |