out being indebted to its aid. We doubt not, however, but that this study, when better known, and cultivated on right principles, will gradually rise in reputation. To understand the theory of Reasoning, the principles on which it is founded, and the rules to which it has been reduced, is an object worthy the attention of every human being. The advantages to be derived from a study embracing these particulars, ought to recommend it as an essential part of a liberal education.

OF THE OPERATIONS OF THE MIND.

In every process of argumentation there are three operations of the mind called into exercise,-Simple Apprehension, Judgment, and Reasoning. By Simple Apprehension we gain our notions or ideas; by Judgment we compare our ideas together, and pronounce on their agreement or disagreement; by Reasoning we proceed from certain judgments to another judgment founded upon them, or from which it necessarily

follows.

To analyse these processes, and investigate their phenomena, in so far as they are purely mental exercises, belongs to another department of science. It is only as they are employed in Reasoning that they come within the province of Logic. An act of simple apprehension embodied in language, is called a term; an act of judgment, when expressed, is called a proposition; and an act of reasoning, an argument.

These, however, are all liable to serious defects. Terms may be indistinct; propositions may be false; and arguments may be fallacious. It is proper, therefore, to guard against these defects, as much as possible, by the best means we can devise. This Logic endeavours to do, by a system of rules based on scientific principles.

Logic is, therefore, divided into three parts, sometimes denominated after the three operations of the intellect referred to above. The first treats of Terms; the second of Propositions; the third of Arguments.

PART I.

OF TERM S.

In order to conduct the process of Reasoning properly, it is of importance that we be able clearly to express our own meaning, and fully to understand the statements of others. For this purpose it has been found necessary, in giving accurate explanations of the principles on which Reasoning proceeds, and in laying down rules for our guidance, to employ a technical language" a regularly-formed set of expressions, distinctly defined and agreed on." This is found to be indispensable even in mechanical operations. If a workman had not well-defined names for the several operations he performs, and for the several instruments he employs, he would be involved in endless difficulties and perplexities, both in teaching and exercising his handicraft. So also in various branches of study. If we had not such words as Noun, Adjective, Verb, and other Parts of Speech, clearly defined, and the various rules of Grammar fixed and well understood, how could we, without great inconvenience, acquire or communicate a knowledge of Grammar? And if Addition, Subtraction, and other arithmetical processes were not exactly defined, and fixed rules laid down for conducting these operations, we should find it a tedious and toilsome work to perform even those simple calculations which we now learn to do with certainty and perfect ease. And how could we, without such terms, make others see that our calculations were correctly made? It has, therefore, been found necessary, in what relates to the Reasoning process, to employ technical terms, in explaining principles, and laying down rules. And these terms, and

explanations, and rules, will not be found more difficult to be understood, or remembered, or applied to practice, than those in any other branch of study. "You are to observe, however, that technical language and rules, if you would make them really useful, must be not only distinctly understood, but also learnt and remembered as familiarly as the alphabet, and employed constantly and with scrupulous exactness; otherwise technical language will prove an encumbrance instead of an advantage; just as a suit of clothes would be, if, instead of putting them on and wearing them, you were to carry them about in your hand.” *

The first part of Logic treats of terms. Terms may be confused, indistinct, and inadequate. Logic endeavours, as far as possible, to remove this obscurity, and to give them a clear and determinate meaning, by rules of Distinction, Classification, Division, and Definition. These have been called Logical Instruments; it is only to the last two, however, that this title peculiarly belongs.

A knowledge of the instruments we employ in Reasoning is indispensable to our progress. No art can be of much practical utility unless we know how to construct, and use, and designate the tools which that art renders necessary. Thus only can we perform our work correctly, neatly, with expedition and ease.

CHAPTER I.

OF DISTINCTION.

ERRORS in Reasoning frequently spring from our not properly distinguishing things that are different. Distinctions, then, if founded in truth, may be of great use in keeping us from mistake, and in assisting us to detect error. Some distinctions are verbal, others are real. As an example of the former, the word "cause" may be selected. Properly speakEasy Lessons on Reasoning," p. 12.-An admirable work, by one of the first Logicians of the day.

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ing, there is but one cause-the self-originated fountain of all being. The term, however, is frequently applied to animate and inanimate objects, only adding the word secondary" to qualify the expression. There are also other distinctions in reference to causes. Among these the most important are, the efficient cause, the material cause, the formal cause, and the final cause. The "efficient cause is that from which the effect proceeds. The "material cause is that of which it is produced. The "formal cause is the manner in which it is accomplished. And the "final cause is the object intended to be achieved. Verbal distinctions, however, more properly belong to Grammar than to Logic.

Distinctions that are real are those that retain their signification into whatever language they may be translated. Of these there are many in common use, which, though not exclusively belonging to the science of Reasoning, may here be mentioned. A number of the usual divisions of words given in works on Logic are not so much divisions of the words themselves as of the manner in which they are employed. This is the case with univocal, equivocal, and analogous terms. They are not distinct classes of nouns, but the same term used in either signification, according to the pleasure of the writer. Thus the term "house" may be considered univocal, because it is only applicable, in the same sense, to one kind of object. Bnt it may be used also so as to give it a different meaning every time it is employed, and then it would properly be called equivocal. When two objects have a certain resemblance or analogy to each other, they are often called by the same name. Thus, a "blade of a "blade of grass," and a sword," resemble each other. In this case, then, the term is called analogous. But all these are not distinctions in the terms themselves, but only in the manner of using them.

Terms in which a real distinction obtains have been arranged into the following classes:

1. Singular and Common Terms.—A singular term denotes one object considered as an individual existence; as, "Alexander the Great," the "city of Paris," "this tree," "that river." These terms cannot be said affirmatively of anything but themselves.-A common term stands for several individuals called its significates, and may be affirmed of all comprehended

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in the class to which it belongs. Thus, 66 man," city," tree," "river," may be affirmed of any object included in these classes. As, "Pompey and Cæsar were men." "Paris, London, and Calcutta are cities." "The Euphrates, the Tigris, the Indus, and the Ganges are rivers."

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2. Absolute, Relative, and Correlative Terms.- An object viewed as a whole without any reference to another with which it may be connected, is denoted by an absolute term; as, "a man," a living creature," "a human being."-A relative term expresses an object considered as a part of a whole, viewed in reference to that complex object. Thus, "Teacher," "Scholar," "Master," "Servant," are relative terms, because they are each a part of the complex objects, "Teacher-and-scholar," "Master-and-servant."—When objectsare related to each other, and viewed in reference to that relation, they are expressed by correlative terms. Thus, "Father and Son," "King and Subject," ""Master and Servant," are correlative. But, "King and Servant," "Father and Subject," are not correlative terms, although the servant may be the subject of the king, and the subject may be the son of the father.

3. Opposite and Compatible Terms.-When there are two views of a single object which cannot be taken at the same time, this is expressed by opposite terms.-When both views may be taken of the same object at the same time, this is denoted by compatible or consistent terms. Thus, “hard and soft," ""cold and hot," "black and white," are opposite terms. But, "hard and cold," "white and soft," are compatible terms.

4. Abstract and Concrete Terms.-An abstract term expresses an object without any reference to the subject in which it exists. As, "wisdom," "folly," "poverty," "riches."—When an idea is expressed in conjunction with the object to which it refers, it is expressed by a concrete term. As, "wise," "foolish," "poor," "rich."

5. Connotative and Non-connotative Terms.-When a term applied to any object implies in its signification some attribute belonging to that object, it is called connotative; it "connotes," or notes together with the object something considered as inherent in that object. Thus, "the King of the French," First Lord of the Treasury," are connotative terms, because

"the