these appellations not only point out the individuals to whom they are applied, but also respectively the office or dignity with which these persons are invested.-But when a term merely denotes an object without implying any attribute of that object, it is called non-connotative. Thus, "Louis Philippe," "Sir Robert Peel," denote respectively the same objects as the two former, but they do not connote any attribute of these individuals. A non-connotative term denotes a subject only, or an attribute only. A connotative term denotes a subject, and connotes an attribute. Cæsar," "Paris," "Russia," denote a subject only; "whiteness," "shortness," "happiness," signify an attribute only; none of these, therefore, are connotative. But "white,' "short," "happy," are connotative terms. The term "white" denotes all white objects, as snow, a lily, the foam of the sea, and implies, or connotes the attribute "whiteness." The information which a term conveys is found, not in what it denotes, but in what it connotes. 66 6. Positive, Negative, and Privative Terms.—A positive term expresses a certain view of a subject actually taken of it; as, a man speaking," "a bird flying."-When this view cannot be taken of the object, it is denoted by a negative term; as, "dumb," "motionless."-When a certain view of a subject might be taken of it, but is not, this is expressed by a privative term; as, a man silent," "a person not walking." 66 66 a 7. Definite and Indefinite Terms.-A privative or negative term, since it does not define and mark out an object, is called an indefinite term.—But the positive, because it does define and limit our view of an object, is called definite. Thus, living creature," "a lion," "a lion roaring," are definite terms, because they mark out a particular class of beings, or a particular individual, or a single individual in a particular mode. -But, "not a living creature," "not a lion," are indefinite, because they do not restrict our view to any class or individual. They merely exclude one, and leave all the rest undetermined. 8. Contradictory and Contrary Terms.-When two terms are opposed to each other, the one having, and the other wanting, the negative particle not, either expressed or understood, these are called contradictory terms. Thus, "a living creature," and "not a living creature," "a lion," and "not a lion." It is impossible that anything can be both these at the same time, and it is impossible also but that everything must either be one of them or the other. Nothing can, at the same time, be both "a living creature," and "not a living creature;" but everything that is conceivable must be one of them. In this way a perfect division of any subject may be made. But contrary terms are merely those that are the most opposite of that class to which they belong. Thus, "rich" and "poor" are contrary terms. They cannot be applied to the same object at the same time; but there are many persons to whom neither is applicable. CHAPTER II. OF CLASSIFICATION. UNDER this head the ancient Logic treated of the ten Categories and the five Predicables. The categories were given as a complete enumeration of everything that can be expressed without composition and structure. They were intended to include all the possible objects of thought, knowledge, or discourse, and were supposed to be of special use in assisting the disputant to find middle terms. A regular distribution of things under proper heads, is a great help both to the memory and the judgment; and the invention of a classification of this kind, which the speculative part of mankind acquiesced in for two thousand years, is a proof, no doubt, of superiority of genius which is seldom to be found. But that which was here attempted exceeded the reach of human power. The ten categories have, therefore, long been abandoned as of no practical utility. It will be sufficient, then, merely to mention them. They were: Substantia, Quantitas, Qualitas, Relatio, Actio, and Passio;-these were considered of special use: the other four, Ubi, Quando, Situs, and Habitus, were reckoned of less importance. We may remark, however, that no general classification of the objects of thought, that has been substituted in the place of the ten categories, has, to the present day, been found perfect. The Predicables, however, have maintained their authority to the present time. Of these, therefore, a more extended account is necessary. A term which can be affirmed of several others has been called a Predicable. It must be evident that whatever is affirmatively predicted of another must express some relation that it bears to that object. It must point out either its whole essence, which is called its species; or the material part of it, which is called its genus; or its distinguishing characteristic, which is called its differentia; or something joined to its essence, either separable or inseparable, which is called its property or accident. This has given rise to the doctrine of the five Universals, or Predicables: to wit, Genus, Species, Differentia, Proprium, and Accidens. The Genus is the highest or most universal class, which includes two or more species. Thus, "animal" is a genus including "man," "beast," and all classes of living creatures. The Species is a class comprehended under a higher class, and is composed of individuals. Thus, "Peter," "John," "Thomas," and all the individuals of the human race, are included in the species "man." distinguishes one species attribute which belongs to Thus, "reason" is the dif The Differentia is that which from another; or it is an essential the species, but not to the genus. ferentia of man, because it distinguishes the species “man from the species "brute;" or because it is a characteristic that belongs to the species "man," but not to the genus "animal." The Proprium is some property peculiar to a species, belonging to the whole of it, to it alone, and to it always, yet not constituting its distinguishing property. Thus "risibility" is the proprium of man; it belongs to the whole species, to this species only, and to it at all times; yet it does not constitute its distinguishing property, for it is less essential to man than rationality. Some of these properties belong to the whole of a species, but are not peculiar to it; as, "to breathe air," belongs to every man, but not to man only other properties are peculiar to a species, but do not belong to the whole of it; thus, man only can be a poet, but it is not every man that is so. These properties, however, are more properly reckoned accidents. 66 99 66 The Accidens is an attribute not essential to the species, which may or may not be absent without destroying its nature. Thus, “hot” or “cold," "rich" or poor," a native of India," 66 a native of London," are all accidents; because, whether absent or present, the essence of the species remains the same. Those accidents that can be separated from the individual are called separable accidents; those which cannot be separated are called inseparable. A man that is poor may become rich; "poverty," therefore, is a separable accident. He that is a native of England can never be otherwise in that respect; "a native of England," then, is an inseparable accident. The above may be illustrated by the following Table :- The genus and difference make up the Species; thus, “rational" and "animal" constitute "man." When, therefore, the genus is spoken of as a whole, and said to contain the species, this is only a metaphorical expression, signifying that it has a more extensive signification; thus, man is a more 66 full expression than animal: but "animal" is more extensive than man, because it can be predicated of several other species. In the same way the name of a species is more extensive, but less full, than that of an individual. A genus may be either a summum or a subaltern genus. It is the former when it has no genus above it, or when it cannot be considered a species of any higher class. Thus, "substance" is a summum genus, because it is not a species of any higher genus. A subaltern genus is both a species of a higher genus, and a genus in reference to the species into which it may be divided. Thus, "animal" is a subaltern genus, because it is included under the higher genus "substance; " and at the same time it is the genus of "man," "bird," and every species of living creatures. That genus which is the nearest that can be predicated of a species is called its proximum genus; thus, "juice" is the proximum genus of wine; "liquid" is its more remote genus. A species which has under it only individuals, and which cannot be considered a genus, because including no species, is called an infima species. Of these predicables some are more universal than others; and this gave rise to what is taught in Logic respecting the extension and the comprehension of a term. By the former is meant the number of individuals of which the term may be predicated. The latter signifies all the simple ideas which united constitute what the term denotes. Thus, the term "bird" is applicable to every individual of all the various species of the feathered tribe. This, then, is the extension of the term. On the other hand, the same term "bird" may be considered as including the idea of life, sensation, spontaneous motion, the possession of wings, a covering of feathers, and all the properties belonging to this class of living creatures. These ideas united give us the comprehension of the term. By attending to this distinction the logical rule will appear evident, that the greater the extension, the less the comprehension of a term; and the greater the comprehension, the less the extension. The term "animal" has a greater extension than "man," because it can be predicated of "man," beast," “bird,” and all living creatures. But "man" is more comprehensive than "animal," because it includes not only all |