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12. "Machinery temporarily used for the purpose of constructing a building."

With reference to the clause of which these words form a portion, it was in one case held that an engine shed and room containing a steam engine connected with a mortar pan for mixing mortar for use on a building near at hand was a "factory" within the meaning of the workmen's compensation act.91

g. - of "engineering work."

2

97

story is being added; 95 to the work of connecting a house drain to the main sewer; 96 to the work of laying pipe for water, gas, or any other purpose; to the work of digging a tunnel under a railroad; 98 and to the work of laying pipes in a trench to be connected with a reservoir.99 It may be that they also embrace work on a steam dredger. But they do not cover pulleys worked by a winch; nor the operation of lifting an air compresser by means of a hydraulic jack, for the purpose of taking These descriptive words have been held it away on a truck after it had been purapplicable to the employment of the driv-chased from the party who had used it er of a water cart used to sprinkle ation of a hydraulic crane without the in building a bridge; 3 nor the construcnewly laid surface before it is rolled by use of any mechanical power; 4 92 to the work of making a steam roller; nor the and removing wooden moulds for cement work of repairing a boiler by hand; 5 where machinery driven by mechanical nor the work of clearing land from natpower was used in connection with the ural growth thereon.6 general work; to the work of constructing streets in which use is made of the steam roller, although at the time of the injury the roller was not being used; 94 to work which includes the hoisting of iron girders by means of a steam winch to the top of a building to which a new to include in the definition, among other things, machinery used in the process of unloading a ship in a navigable river.

93

91 McNicholas v. Dawson [1899] 1 Q. B. (Eng.) 773, 68 L. J. Q. B. N. S. 470, 1 W. C. C. 80.

92 Middlemiss v. Berwickshire (1900) 2 Sc. Sess. Cas. 5th :eries, 392, 37 Scot. L. R. 297, 7 Scot. L. T. 330.

93 McGregor v. Wright (1901; C. C.) W. C. C. (Eng.) 121.

3

94 Lord v. Turner (1902; C. C.) 114 L. T. Jo. (Eng.) 133, 5 W. C. C. 87.

95 Cosgrove v. Partington (1900) 17 Times L. R. (Eng.) 39, 64 J. P. 788. 96 Coles

v. Anderson (1905) 69 J. P. (Eng.) 201, 21 Times L. R. 204.

97 Bennett v. Aird (1899; C. C.) 107 L. T. Jo. (Eng.) 550, 1 W. C. C. 138. It was said in this case that the laying of pipe for water, gas, or for any other purpose is ejusdem generis with the work of constructing, altering, or repairing sewers.

98 Adams v. Shaddock [1905] 2 K. B. (Eng.) 859, 54 Week. Rep. 97, 22 Times L. R. 15, 75 L. J. K. B. N. S. 7, 93 L. T. N. S. 725. In this case, a workman engaged in digging a tunnel under a railroad for the purpose of laying telephone wires was held to be engaged in the alteration of a railroad and consequently was engaged in engineering work within the meaning of the act.

99 Atkinson v. Lumb [1903] 1 K. B. (Eng.) 861, 72 L. J. K. B. N. S. 460, 67 J. P. 414, 51 Week. Rep. 516, 88 L. T. N. S. 789, 19 Times L. R. 412.

1 In Chambers v. Whitehaven Harbour Comrs. [1899] 2 Q. B. (Eng.) 132, 80 L.

A lineman employed by a tramway company to repair its overhead wires is engaged in engineering work while going from one place where he had done some repairing to another place where there was repairing to be done."

A workman engaged in repairing a T. N. S. 586, 47 Week. Rep. 533, 68 L. J. Q. B. N. S. 740, 15 Times L. R. 351, this point was referred to, but not explicitly decided, the action being held not maintainable for another reason.

2 Wrigley v. Bagley [1901] 1 K. B. (Eng.) 780, 70 L. J. K. B. Ñ. S. 538, 65 J. P. 372, 49 Week. Rep. 472, 84 L. T. N. S. 415.

3 Gibson v. Wilson (1899) 1 Sc. Sess. Cas. 5th series, 1017, 36 Scot. L. R. 777, 7 Scot. L. T. 65.

4 Belsey v. Sadler (1899; C. C.) 1 W. C. C. (Eng.) 141.

5 A workman engaged in repairing a boiler, where the work was all done by hand and no mechanical power was being used, was not engaged in engineering work. Cooper & Greig v. Adam (1905) 7 Sc. Sess. Cas. 5th series (Scot.) 681, relying on Wrig ley v. Whittaker [1902] A. C. (Eng.) 299, 71 L. J. K. B. N. S. 600, 66 J. P. 420, 50 Week. Rep. 656, 86 L. T. N. S. 775, 18 Times L. R. 559.

6 The work of clearing land from the natural growth thereon is not a work of construction, alteration, or repair, which is intended by the act to be termed an engineering work. Basanta v. Canadian P. R. Co. (1911) 16 B. C. 304.

7 Rogers v. Cardiff [1905] 2 K. B. (Eng.) 832, 54 Week. Rep. 35, 22 Times L. R. 9, 75 L. J. K. B. N. S. 22, 4 L. G. R. 1, 70 J. P. 9, 93 L. T. N. S. 683. The court took the view that the obligation of the corporation extended over the entire tramway, and it would not be proper to sever the two acts of repairing and try them as separate engineering works.

exist.12

hydraulic lift, who was injured while although no mine in actual operation may availing himself of the hydraulic power of the lift, partly to put himself in a position to carry out the repairs, and partly for testing purposes, is engaged in engineering.8

A workman injured while engaged in the erection of a machine of which no mechanical power is needed is not within the protection of the statute, although mechanical power was necessary to carry the parts of the machine to the floor of the building upon which the machinery was erected."

Employment on a chaff-cutting machine which was run by a steam engine

and let out to farmers is not within the act, since such a machine is not a factory nor is the operation of it an engineering work.10

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The provision in the coal mines regulation act 1887, § 75, to the effect that "in this act, unless the context otherwise requires, 'mine' includes .

all the shafts, levels, planes, works, tramways, and sidings, both below ground and above ground, in and adjacent to and belonging to the mine," cannot be construed in such a sense as to enable an engine driver to recover for an injury received while he was operating his engine on his employers' private railway about of a mile from the pit mouth. The words "adjacent to and belonging to the mine" mean "physically adjacent to and belonging to the mine itself," and not merely belonging to the owner.11

Road work done as a necessary preliminary to the operation of a mine has been held to be a "mine" within the act,

8 Tullock v. Waygood [1906] 2 K. B. (Eng.) 261, 75 L. J. K. B. N. S. 557, 95 L. T. N. S. 223.

9 Murphy v. O'Donnell (1906) 54 Week. Rep. (Eng.) 149, 8 W. C. C. 70.

10 Watkinson v. Crouch (1899; C. C.) 107 L. T. Jo. (Eng.) 328, 1 W. C. C. 137.

11 Turnbull V. Lambton Collieries Co. (1900) 82 1. T. N. S. (Eng.) 589.

i.

of "undertakers."

1. In the case of a factory.

Under 7 of the act of 1897, the "undertaker" in the case of a factory is the "occupier" of a factory within the meaning of the factory acts of 1878 to 1895; as the two terms are synonymous so far as the construction of this act is concerned, the terms are used interchangeably, some cases making use of one term and some of the other.

factory is a person who occupies, and conducts his business upon, the premises where those processes are conducted which constitute the place of work or "factory" within the meaning of the act.13

An "undertaker" with relation to a

Accordingly a person who, for the time being, has the actual use of a "dock, wharf, or quay," as those terms are construed is liable as an "undertaker" for an injury received by one of his operations with a view to which the use workmen, while engaged in any of the of the premises has been obtained. Thus, shipowners, who, while acting as their of a part of a quay for the purpose of own stevedores, have the temporary use unloading a ship, are "occupiers" of a factory and consequently "undertakers" within the meaning of the act.14 So, a person using machinery, the property of another, in the process of loading a ship from a quay, is an undertaker.15

As a ship in a dock may be a factory, the employer who is doing work on such a ship may also be an undertaker within the meaning of the act.16 But a shipof, his employment on the quay, the ship owners are liable as "undertakers." Merrill v. Wilson [1901] 1 K. B. (Eng.) 35, 70 L. J. K. B. N. S. 97, 65 J. P. 53, 49 Week. Rep. 161, 83 L. T. N. S. 490, 17 Times L. R. 49.

In Hainsborough v. Ralli Bros. (1902) 18 Times L. R. (Eng.) 21, it was held that the consignees of a cargo of wheat, who

12 Ellison v. Longden (1901) 18 Times were also the owners of the vessel in which L. R. (Eng.) 48.

13 See the judgment of Smith, L. J., in Francis v. Turner Bros. [1900] 1 Q. B. (Eng.) 480, 69 L. J. Q. B. N. S. 182, 64 J. P. 53, 48 Week. Rep. 228, 81 L. T. N. S. 770, 16 Times L. R. 105.

14 Where the owners of a ship moored alongside of a quay, who acted as their own stevedores, had the use of the portion of the quay alongside of which their ship lay, for the purpose of unloading the ship's cargo onto the quay, and a workman employed by them was killed through an accident arising out of, and in the course

the wheat was carried, are the occupiers of the quay alongside of which the vessel is lying while being unloaded.

15 Carrington v. Bannister [1901] 1 K. B. (Eng.) 20, 70 L. J. K. B. N. S. 31, 83 L. T. N. S. 457, holding that, in § 23 of the factory act of 1895, the expression "such machinery," as last used in the latter part of the section, refers to the "machinery and plant" mentioned previously in clause (a), and not to the "machinery" mentioned in clause (b).

16 Persons who are in the actual use or occupation of a dock (or, semble, of a

owner is not the occupier of a dock merely because his vessel is in the dock.17

The mere fact that repairing or other work is being done on a vessel in a dock

does not make the shipowner or employers making the repairs the occupier of the dock.18 So, generally, persons engaged in repairing a factory or the ma

berth in a dock), and employ workmen | Harrison v. Oceanic Steam Nav. Co. [1907] in cleaning or repairing a ship in the 2 K. B. (Eng.) 420, note, 97 L. T. N. S. 466, dock, are "undertakers" within the mean- note. ing of the act, and liable to pay compensation to a workman injured in the course of his employment. Raine v. Jobson [1901] A. C. (Eng.) 404, 70 L. J. K. B. N. S. 771, 49 Week. Rep. 705, 85 L. T. N. S. 141, 17 Times L. R. 627.

Stevedores were loading a vessel in a dock by means of machinery The cargo had been put into the hold, and the men employed by the stevedores were "finishing off" by slinging iron beams across the hatchway. The machinery having become entangled, one of the workmen went to disentangle it, was caught by it, and injured so that he died. Under these circumstances it was held by the House of Lords (Lord Lindley dissenting) that the stevedores were occupying a "factory," namely, the machinery, within the meaning of the act, and that the deceased was injured in the course of his employment in loading from the wharf, the process of loading not being complete till the hatchway was secured, within the meaning of those acts. Stuart v. Nixon [1901] A. C. (Eng.) 79, 70 L. J. Q. B. N. S. 170, 65 J. P. 388, 49 Week. Rep. 636, 84 L. T. N. S. 65, 17 Times L. R. 156.

A shipbuilding firm which has sent a newly-launched ship to a public dock to have the engines for which it had contracted with another firm erected and fitted are "undertakers." Jackson v. Rodger (1899) 1 Sc. Sess. Cas. 5th series, 1053, 36 Scot. L. R. 851, 7 Scot. L. T. 76, (1900) 37 Scot. L. R. 390, 2 Sc. Sess. Cas. 5th series, 533, 7 Scot. L. T. 363.

17 Houlder Line v. Griffin [1905] A. C. (Eng.) 220, 7 W. C. C. 87, 74 L. J. K. B. N. S. 466, 92 L. T. N. S. 580, 21 Times L. R. 436, 53 Week. Rep. 609.

And in another case the same court held that millwrights who sent an employee onto a vessel in a dry dock to make some repairs in connection with the insulating of the refrigerators of the vessel are not the occupiers of a factory, and therefore not undertakers within the meaning of the act. Burdon v. Gregson [1906] 2 K. B. (Eng.) 283, 75 L. J. K. B. N. S. 644, 95 L. T. N. S. 45, 8 W. C. C. 76 Romer, L. J., said that the employers were not using the dock in any true sense as a dock. Houlder Line v. Griffin (Eng.) was followed by all of the judges delivering judgment.

Ship repairers, while at work on a vessel in a wet dock, are not the “occupiers" of the dock. Morgan v. Tydvil Engineering & Ship Repairing Co. (1908) 98 L. T. N. S. (Eng.) 762, 24 Times L. R. 403, 1 B. W. C. C. 78.

In Handford v. Clark [1907] 2 K. B. (Eng.) 409, 76 L. J. K. B. N. S. 958, 97 L. T. N. S. 124, 9 W. C. C. 87, compensation was denied when an employee of engine makers was injured while doing some work on the engine. Cozens-Hardy, M. R., said: "I also feel it impossible to say in any true and real sense of the word that there was any actual use or occupation of any portion of the quay by the employers in respect of the transactions which we have had before us." After referring to Smith v. Standard Steam Fishing Co. and Harrison v. Oceanic Steam Nav. Co. (Eng.) supra, the master of the rolls continued: "I do not think that it can fairly be asserted or assumed that those cases were decided simply on the ground that the ship itself did not occupy part of the factory. It was manifest to everybody-and the whole argument proceeded upon it-that 18 In Smith v. Standard Steam Fishing the vessel in those cases was alongside the Co. [1906] 2 K. B. (Eng.) 275, 75 L. J. K. wharf or quay, or connected with the B. N. S. 640, 54 Week. Rep. 582, 95 L. T. wharf or quay by a gangway or by ropes or N. S. 42, 22 Times L. R. 578, 8 W. C. C. something of that kind. And those deci76, following Houlder Line v. Griffin (Eng.) sions do, it seems to me, amount to this, the actual decision was that a carpenter that the mere fact that a vessel is berthed engaged in repairing a trawl board of a alongside a quay, and that in some sense, steam trawl moored to a jetty was not of course, the quay is being used for obentitled to compensation for injuries re-taining access to or from the land to the ceived while engaged in that duty. It appears from the judgments given that one of the judges based the decision upon the ground that the carpenter was not injured while on the stone structure adjacent to the water, but in the ship, which was entirely water borne, while another judge apparently based his judgment upon the ground that since the trawl was floating in the water, the owners of it could not be said to be persons having the actual use or occupation of a dock.

Compensation was denied a workman injured while replacing a shaft in a ship, in

ship, is not enough to bring either the vessel itself or the portion of the quay which it so uses within the definition of factory' under the act."

In Low v. Abernathy (1900) 2 Sc. Sess. Cas. 5th series, 722, 37 Scot. L. R. 506, 7 Scot. L. T. 423, it was held that the mere fact that a steamship was lying in a dock while a workman employed by a firm of engineers was engaged in repairing the boilers did not make the firm "occupiers" of the dock.

A steamship company is not an "occupier" of a quay within the sense of § 7,

chinery in it are not "occupiers" of a factory so as to be undertakers within the meaning of the compensation act; 19 and it has been held that an employer is not liable, as an "undertaker," for injuries received by one of his servants in the factory of another person, while he was engaged in removing a portion of the plant which was to be transferred to the defendant's own factory.20

Persons under contract to furnish coal to vessels in a dock are not, merely because of that, occupiers of the dock.21 And the agents of a ship owned by a foreign country doing business abroad are not undertakers.22

To render the employer an "undertaker" it is not necessary that his possession of the premises should be exclusive. All that is requisite is that he subsec. 2, of the act, so as to be liable for compensation to the servant of a contractor engaged in trimming coal on the wharf, preparatory to putting it on board one of the company's vessels, which had not yet arrived, although a particular berth in the harbor was allowed the company for loading and unloading its vessels, and it had an office and a staff of servants constantly employed in the receipt and discharge of cargo, where the same berth was also used by another steamship company, which also had an office there, and when the berth was not required by either of these companies the harbor master allowed other vessels to load or discharge at the berth. Stewart v. Dublin & G. Steam Packet Co. (1902) 5 Sc. Sess. Cas. 5th series, 57, 40 Scot. L. R. 41, 10 Scot. L. T. 343.

So, in Bruce v. Henry (1900) 2 Sc. Sess. Cas. 5th series, 717, 37 Scot. L. R. 511, 7 Scot. L. T. 421, it was held that shipping agents who had contracted with the owners of a vessel lying at a dock to load her were not the "occupiers" of the dock.

19 A firm of engineers making a preliminary run for the purpose of testing machinery in a building belonging to a cold storcompany were denied to be "occupiers in." Purves v. Sterne (1900) 2 Sc. Sess. Cas. 5th series, 887, 37 Scot. L. R. 696.

In Malcom v. M'Millan (1900) 2 Sc. Sess. Cas. 5th series, 525, 37 Scot. L. R. 383, 7 Scot. L. T. 364, it was held that an iron founder was not liable to the widow of a workman who was killed by falling from a scaffold while he was doing some work in a soap factory to which he had been sent for that purpose.

A firm of boiler makers are not "undertakers" within the meaning of the act, so as to be responsible for injuries to a workman in their employ who was injured while repairing a boiler in a spinning mill belonging to another person. Cooper & Greig v. Adam (1905) 7 Sc. Sess. Cas. 5th series (Scot.) 681, relying on Wrigley v. Whittaker [1902] A. C. (Eng.) 299, 71 L. J. K. B. N. S. 600, 66 J. P. 420, 50 Week. Rep.

should be in possession so far as may be necessary for the purpose of doing the work in hand. A firm of employers engaged in painting and plumbing a ship lying in a dock, who sent employees to do the work, are occupiers of the vessel, nothwithstanding some members of the crew are in charge of the ship for the owners.23 And persons who have entered into a contract to make pigeonholes in what is admittedly a warehouse within the act, and who have such use or occupation of the premises as is necessary for the performance of the work, which is essential to the use of the warehouse for the purposes for which it is required by the government, are the occupiers of the warehouse within the meaning of the act.24 And the occupants of a small hut on a dock, engaged in supplying horses | 656, 86 L. T. N. S. 775, 18 Times L. R. 559.

20 In Francis v. Turner Bros. [1900] 1 Q. B. (Eng.) 478, 69 L. J. Q. B. N. S. 182, 64 J. P. 53, 48 Week. Rep. 228, 81 L. T. N. S. 770, 16 Times L. R. 105, 2 W. C. C. 61, it was held that employers who send a workman on their business to the factory of a third party are not, while the workman is engaged therein, the occupiers of said factory.

21 In Stewart v. Darngavil Coal Co. (1902) 4 Sc. Sess. Cas. 5th series, 425, 39 Scot. L. R. 302, 9 Scot. L. T. 378, it was held that a coal dealer who was under contract to deliver coal to the steamers of a packet company at a particular berth, who sends the coal from his own premises to the dock when required, is not the occupier of the dock.

22 Shea v. Drolenvaux (1903) 6 W. C. C. (Eng.) 93.

23 Bartell v. Gray [1902] 1 K. B. (Eng.) 225, 71 L. J. K. B. N. S. 115, 66 J. P. 308, 50 Week. Rep. 310, 85 L. T. N. S. 658, 18 Times L. R. 70.

A similar doctrine was laid down in Jackson v. Rodger (1899) 1 Sc. Sess. Cas. 5th series, 1053, 36 Scot. L. R. 851, 7 Scot. L. T. 76.

The decision in Bartell v. Gray (Eng.) was based upon Raine v. Jobson [1901] A. C. (Eng.) 404, 70 L. J. K. B. N. S. 771, 49 Week. Rep. 705, 85 L. T. N. S. 141, 17 Times L. R. 627, 3 W. C. C. 135, the effect of which was greatly modified by later decisions. The ultimate decision in the Bartel Case is apparently in conflict with other decisions cited supra.

24 Weavings v. Kirk [1904] 1 K. B. (Eng.) 216, 73 L. J. K. B. N. S. 77, 68 J. P. 91, 52 Week. Rep. 209, 89 L. T. N. S. 577, 20 Times L. R. 152, 6 W. C. C. 95. Collins, M. R., said: "It appears to me that this question is really decided by the case of Bartell v. Gray [1902] 1 K. B. (Eng.) 225, 71 L. J. K. B. N. S. 115, 66 J. P. 308, 50 Week. Rep. 310, 85 L. T. N. S. 658, 18 Times L. R. 70. The respondents in this

and men for hauling wagons loaded with coal, are "occupiers" of the dock.25 But a person who has a mere casual interest in a warehouse by being the owner or purchaser of a parcel of goods stored therein is not an "occupier" thereof.26 2. In the case of engineering work. A person may be an undertaker although he supplies labor only.27 So, where it is the usual practice of a firm of builders to enter into contracts for pulling down and rebuilding, but they invariably sublet the work of pulling down, they are "undertakers" as regards the servants of the subcontractors.28 And a building contractor who is erecting a tenement for himself is deemed to be within that description in such a sense as to be liable to a servant of one of the trading firms with whom he had contracted for particular parts of the work which are not being executed by his own workmen.29 But the owner of a building who contracts with someone to execute repairs on the building, and does not engage in the work himself, has been held not an "undertaker." 30

The word "undertaker" is not restricted to persons who contract for the con

case had all such occupation of a considerable space in a warehouse as was necessary to enable them to carry out the work which they had contracted to do. It was argued that they did not occupy any part of the warehouse qua warehouse. I do not know that it is necessary that they should so occupy for the purposes of the act, or that we ought to go beyond the words of the section itself in this respect; but, assuming that it is necessary, it is essential to the existence of a warehouse, and its use as such for the purposes for which it is required, that works or repairs of the kind which the respondents had contracted to do should be performed within it."

25 Pacific Steam Nav. Co. v. Pugh (1907) 23 Times L. R. (Eng.) 622, 9 W. C. C. 39. 26 Ramsay v. Mackie (1904) 7 Sc. Sess. Cas. 5th series (Scot.) 106.

27 Wagstaff v. Perks (1902) 87 L. T. N. S. (Eng.) 558, 51 Week. Rep. 210, 5 W. C. C. 110, 19 Times L. R. 112.

28 Knight v. Cubitt [1902] 1 K. B. (Eng.) 31, 71 L. J. K. B. N. S. 65, 66 J. P. 52, 85 L. T. N. S. 526, 50 Week. Rep. 113, 18 Times L. R. 26.

29 Stalker v. Wallace (1900) 2 Sc. Sess. Cas. 5th series, 1162, 37 Scot. L. R. 898, 8 Scot. L. T. 134.

30 M'Gregor v. Dansken (1899) 1 Sc. Sess. Cas. 5th series, 536, 36 Scot. L. R. 393 (Lord Young dissenting).

31 Mason v. Dean [1900] 1 Q. B. (Eng.) 770, 69 L. J. Q. B. N. S. 358, 64 J. P. 244, 48 Week. Rep. 353, 82 L. T. N. S. 139, 16 Times L. R. 212.

struction of a building as a whole. Hence, where a building over 30 feet high is being constructed by means of a scaffolding, and the work of construction is carried on by several persons, not acting jointly, but each of them contracting tion of a separate substantial part of with the building owner for the constructhe building, each of them is an "undertaker," and is liable to compensate the workmen employed by him for personal injury sustained by them in the course of their employment. Every workman employed by the undertaker upon the building is within the act, whatever may be the nature of his own particular work.31 But where the work of decorating a church is distinct from that of restoring it, the undertaker for repairs is not liable to pay compensation for injury to the workman engaged in the decoration, although the scaffolding used is put up by the undertaker.32

It was at first held that a subcontractor for engineering work is not an “undertaker" within the meaning of the compensation act.33 But this view has now been pronounced erroneous by the House of Lords.34

An employee who, under a contract And see Weavings v. Kirk [1904] 1 K. B. (Eng.) 213, 73 L. J. K. B. N. S. 77, 68 J. P. 91, 52 Week. Rep. 209, 89 L. T. N. S. 577, 20 Times L. R. 152 (employer who contracted to cut pigeonholes in building others were constructing, held to be "undertaker.") 32 Hardy v. Moss (1904; C. C.) 116 L. T. Jo. (Eng.) 201, 6 W. C. C. 68.

33 Cass v. Butler [1900] 1 Q. B. (Eng.) 777, 69 L. J. Q. B. N. S. 362, 64 J. P. 261, 48 Week. Rep. 309, 82 L. T. N. S. 182, 16 Times L. R. 227; Cooper v. Davenport (1900) 16 Times L. R. (Eng.) 266.

34 Cooper v. Wright [1902] A. C. (Eng.) 302, 71 L. J. K. B. N. S. 642, 51 Week. Rep. 12, 86 L. T. N. S. 776, 18 Times L. R. 622, holding that a person contracting to erect a building is entitled to be indemnified by a subcontractor for the amount for which he is liable to a workman employed by the latter. See § 1, subsec. 4 of the act.

Cooper v. Wright (Eng.) was followed by Topping v. Rhind (1904) 6 Sc. Sess. Cas. 5th series, 666, 41 Scot. L. R. 573, 12 Scot. L. T. 88, holding that a subcontractor for ornamental carving work which was part of the design of a building was an "undertaker," and was consequently liable to indemnify the principal contractor for compensation paid by him to an injured workman. To the same effect, Evans v. Cook, L. & Y. Ins. Co. [1905] K. B. (Eng.) 53, 74 L. J. K. B. N. S. 95, 53 Week. Rep. 81, 92 L. T. N. S. 43, 21 Times L. R. 42; McCabe v. Jopling [1904] 1 K. B. (Eng.) 222, 73 L. J. K. B. N. S. 129, 68 J. P. 121, 52 Week. Rep. 358, 89 L. T. N. S. 624, 20 Times L. T. 119;

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