way limits or qualifies the interest devised | specific disposal, as to admit of a possible to Marion. Indeed, we are of opinion that lapse thereof. We are of the opinion, ratha careful examination of the language of said paragraph will disclose to the mind considerations which negative rather than sustain the conclusion to which the learned trial judges were persuaded as to the intention of the testator with respect to the devise to Marion. Said second paragraph of the fourth clause of the testament, it will be remembered, reads: "If my son, Marion De Vries, should precede in death his wife, Minnie L. De Vries, and leave him no lawful issue surviving, and should such death of my son, Marion De Vries, occur before the property herein devised and bequeathed to him vests in him, then all the interest herein and hereby devised and bequeathed to said Marion De Vries shall pass to and vest in and become the property of said Minnie L. De Vries, my son, Marion's wife, absolutely and forever." er, that the testator, having intended Marion's remainder should vest upon his (testator's) death, must have further had in mind that, in case Marion leaving lawful issue should precede both his wife and the testator in death, the latter would still have the opportunity and ability to make such disposition of the interest he intended for Marion as would accord with his (testator's) wishes with respect to Minnie L. De Vries and such issue. In any event, considering the fact that the testator displayed an unquestioned and unquestionable wish to provide for Minnie L. De Vries, in the event of the happening of the contingency upon which she was to take, we think it would be the more reasonable view to hold that he did not intend that any circumstances should arise, in the testamentary disposition of his estate, whereby it could happen that the interest which is the subject of the devise to Marion De Vries should go undisposed of by his last will. It seems clear to our minds that the fourth clause of the testament, read together, means this: That the testator intended to and did devise to Marion De Vries a present interest The second proposition plainly deducible in remainder in the property described in from the second paragraph of the fourth said clause; that, counting upon the certain- clause and which, we think, clearly confirms ty of death, but the uncertainty as to the the position that the devise to Marion should time thereof, and therefore the possible con- operate as a vested remainder, arises from tingency of Marion preceding his wife in the language itself of said second paragraph. death, he desired and intended that in the Therein, as we have seen, the testator proevent that that contingency happened before vides that, upon the happening of the condithe remainder to Marion vested in him- tion upon which Minnie L. De Vries shall that is, before the death of the testator- take, "then all the interest herein and hereby then the estate so limited to Marion should devised and bequeathed to said Marion De go to the latter's wife. In other words, the Vries shall pass to and vest in and become testator devised to Marion a vested future the property of said Minnie L. De Vries," interest and to his wife a contingent future etc. Thus it will be noted that the words of interest in the same property. We think, as action-"devise" and "bequeath," as used in previously suggested, that this construction the preceding paragraph of said clause-are is fully sustained by these considerations dé- used in the second paragraph in the past ducible from the second paragraph itself: tense; that is, as denoting action already (1) Assuming, as is the contention, that the taken. In other words, to paraphrase the interest to Marion was not intended to vest fourth clause in its entirety, the testator until the determination of the life estate, if has therein declared: "I devise and bequeath Marion should precede in death his wife, to Marion De Vries the property herein deleaving lawful issue, before the termination scribed, the possession, however, to take efof the life estate, the result in that case fect on the determination of the estate for would not only be that Minnie L. De Vries life in said property to my wife, Mary J. would and could take nothing under the con- De Vries. But should my son, Marion, die, tingent devise to her upon the death of the leaving no lawful issue, before the death of life tenant, but that devise of the testa- his wife, Minnie L. De Vries, and prior to the ment would absolutely fail and the interest vesting in him of the estate or interest so devised necessarily be remitted to administra-devised to him, then the property which I tion, for it will be noted that there is no provision as to whom the property devised to Marion should go in the event Marion died, leaving issue, prior to the death of his wife and before the remainder to him became a vested interest. We cannot persuade ourselves, in view of the evident care with which the whole testament was prepared and ex-ed to said Marion De Vries," etc., the testaecuted, disclosing a clear design to thus tor intended to emphasize his intention as specifically dispose of all interests in his clearly implied from the employment of property, that the testator would have so words of present devise in the first paragraph arranged his disposal of one part of his es- that the right of enjoyment of the interest tate, of which undoubtedly he sought to make | devised to Marion should take effect or vest have already devised and bequeathed to said Marion shall pass to and vest in and become the property of said Minnie L. De Vries," etc. In short, it appears reasonably clear to our minds that by the use of the language in the second paragraph "then all the interest herein and hereby devised and bequeath upon and coincidently with the beginning of | to postpone or suspend the vesting until the the life estate, or in other words, at the determination of the life estate in those indeath of the testator. stances where words of present devise are used but where he did not intend the creation of vested interests. It is, therefore, very plain to our minds that the testator employed words of present gift in the devise to Marion advisedly and with the express purpose of creating the nature of the interest, as to the time of the vesting of the right thereto, which those words naturally import; that, had he intended that the interest so devised should constitute a contingent remainder or vest only at the conclusion of the life estate by the death of the life tenant, he would then, as in the case of the devise to Lee, have so declared in express language or by words so clear and apposite as to have left no room for doubt upon that proposition. That the testator had a clear conception of the legal significance of words of present devise, unqualified by other language or expressions, is indubitably shown, it appears to us, by the language of the devise to his son, Lee De Vries. Therein he likewise uses words of present devise, but qualifies the same with, "To have and to hold the same (the property) for and during all his natural life only, and thereafter to vest as hereinafter stated, or to be taken by him absolutely, dependent upon the following events and conditions." Then follows a provision that should Lee De Vries "die before I die, and leave him lawful issue surviving, then and upon the termination of the life estate herein created in my wife, if such lawful issue shall survive my said wife, then the said described real property hereby devised to my said son, Lee De Vries, shall vest absolutely in fee simple in such lawful issue of my said son, Lee De Vries." It is then provided that if the wife of Lee De Vries die before him, and Lee De Vries should "survive me and my wife, then and in that event, and upon the termination of the life estate hereby created in my wife, all of the said real property hereby devised to my son, said Lee De Vries, shall absolutely vest in my son, said Lee De Vries, unaffected by any life estate therein." It will be noticed that the initial language of the devise to Lee De Vries, like the devise to Marion, contains words of present devise; but the testator later qualifies or limits the effect of those words by annexing to said devise certain conditions upon which the interest therein created is to vest. Indeed, by express language the testator suspends the vesting of the fee in the interest devised to Lee De Vries, for he specifically provides as a condition upon which such interest to Lee shall vest that the latter must survive, not only the testator, but the life tenant. It will likewise be noticed that in providing for an interest in the issue of Lee De Vries, the testator postpones, by express words, the vesting of said interest in such issue until the termination of the life estate; that is, the provision is that the issue of Lee must survive the life tenant before the interest so devised shall vest in them. It will further be observed that in all the instances of the postponement of the vesting of the interest devised to Lee De Vries apt words of suspension, such as "then," "then and thereupon," "then and in that event," immediately vest," and "absolutely vest" are used as indicative of an intention to suspend the vesting. From the foregoing considerations, it is very manifest, we think, that the testator, in preparing and executing the testament before us, fully appreciated the necessity for the use of express language by which to [7] It may be remarked that it is extrajudicially declared in the brief of appellant that it was held by the court below that the provision of the testator's will for his son, William G. De Vries, vests his remainder in him on the death of the testator. In other words, the court below, as we understand counsel for appellant, has construed the devise to William G. to create a vested future interest. The devise to said son reads: "Unto my son, William Garland De Vries, upon the termination of said life estate, I give, devise and bequeath all those certain lots," etc. There is no other provision, conditional or otherwise, contained in the testament with respect to the interest thus devised to William G. De Vries, and clearly the court was right in holding that the interest so devised was a vested remainder. And, with the exception of the contingent provision for Marion's wife, there is, in practical effect, no ground of distinction between the devise to Marion and the devise to William G. The only difference, as will readily be observed, consists in the transposition of the words with which the two interests are devised. Manifestly, therefore, if the devise to William G. creates a vested interest, it must be true that the devise to Marion creates a like interest, unless it may be held that the contingent provision for Marion's wife exercises some such influence on or control of the language in which the devise to Marion is expressed as to make the interest so devised a contingent remainder, and this we have shown cannot reasonably be held to be the effect of that provision. While this part of the discussion is merely argumentum ad hominem, we notice the proposition that calls it forth because we have, after a careful examination of the principal question presented here, been curious yet unable to perceive the method of reasoning by which the learned court below has discerned the slightest distinction between the devise to Marion and that to William G. De Vries. But we have pursued the discussion suffi whatever that we have been able to find in | at certain points as may be ordered by the Cor the fourth clause of the testament relates solely to the provision for Minnie L. De Vries. As to the devise to Marion, we find here "the existence in an ascertained person of a present fixed right" of future enjoy-quire, is a valid exercise of legislative power. ment. In other words, we can here "point to a person who, if the life estate should cease, would eo instante et ipso facto have an immediate right of possession," and this, as the Court of Appeals of New York says, in Moore v. Littel, 41 N. Y. 80, "is a vested remainder, and, by necessary consequence, all the contingencies which may operate to defeat the right of possession are to operate, and only to operate, as conditions subsequent." We are satisfied for the reasons herein given that the testator intended a vested interest in his son, Marion De Vries, and the order or decree appealed from is, therefore, reversed. poration Commission, and empowering said commission, on complaint or on its own motion. to require such companies to make such physical connections and establish and maintain union depots, etc., as the public interest may reAnd where it appears that appellant was incorporated and under the laws of this state, and thus acquired its right of way and station grounds at D., that the effect of the order would tions attached to a bonus of $10,000 to be used be to compel it to fail to comply with the condiin the construction of a depot upon said grounds and abandon its right of way, and, in order to extend its tracks to the union depot ordered and run through two elevators, grade an adoperated at D., to deflect its main line of road ditional roadbed, and curve its track so acutely as to cause delay in handling its trains, all at a cost of about $50,000, held, notwithstanding, that the act and the proceedings thereunder are valid either as a proper exercise of the police power of the state or as a reasonable exercise of the right reserved to the Legislature to amend, alter, or repeal the charter of appellant. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Railroads, Cent. Dig. § 130-136; Dec. Dig. § 58.*] We concur: CHIPMAN, P. J.; BUR-4. STATUTES (8 185*)-IMPLIED POWERS. NETT, J. The act of May 20, 1908 (Laws 1908, c. 18), does not extend the jurisdiction of the Corporation Commission beyond the metes and bounds fixed by article 9, § 18, of the Constitution, nor alter, amend, revise, or repeal sections of the Constitution from 18 to 34, inclusive, but is auxiliary and supplemental to said section 18, and provides a remedy for the enforcement and protection of certain rights thereby secured, and by legislative construction defines those rights so that their exact limits may be known. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Railroads, Dec. Dig. 6.*] 2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (§ 20*)-CONSTRUCTION- — LEGISLATIVE CONSTRUCTION-"PUBLIC FACILITIES"-"PUBLIC CONVENIENCES.' A clause in the Constitution and act passed by the first Legislature after the adoption of the Constitution, relating to the same subject, like statutes in pari materia, are to be construed together. And where such act impliedly construes "public facilities" or "public conveniences," as used in article 9, § 18, to include a union passenger depot, such contemporary interpretation is entitled to great weight, and in this instance, being correct, will not be disturbed. Where a power is given by statute, there is carried with it power to do everything reasonably necessary to make it effective. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Statutes, Cent. Dig. § 264; Dec. Dig. § 185.*] Appeal from the Corporation Commission. Proceedings by the State against the Missouri, Oklahoma & Gulf Railway Company and others to compel operation of a joint depot. From an order of the Corporation Commission, requiring such a depot, the mentioned defendant appeals. Affirmed. Alexander New, E. R. Jones, and Arthur Miller, for appellant. Chas. West, Atty. Gen.. and E. G. Spilman, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State. TURNER, C. J. At the conclusion of the testimony taken on the hearing of the petition of several residents of Durant, a city of 5,300 inhabitants, theretofore filed before it, wherein they complain of the St. Louis & San Francisco Railroad Company, the Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railway Company, and the Missouri, Oklahoma & Gulf Railway Company, defendants, the Corporation Commission on August 10, 1910, found: "It is shown from the evidence that the Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railway and the Arkansas & Choctaw branch of the Frisco intersect at the town of Durant, and that said railway companies maintain a joint depot; that the Missouri, Oklahoma & Gulf has secured right of way through the town of Durant; that said right of way crosses the Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railway in the north part of the town and parallels the said railway from said crossing to the Arkansas & Choctaw branch of the Frisco, 470 feet east of The act of May 20, 1908 (Laws 1908, c. the Missouri, Kansas & Texas and Frisco 18), requiring every railroad company operating a railroad in this state to make such physical crossing; that the proposed site of the Misconnections, transfer, and switching facilities souri, Oklahoma & Gulf depot is south and •For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key No. Series & Rep'r Indexes [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Constitutional Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 14, 15: Dec. Dig. § 20.* For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, Vol. 6. p. 5780; vol. 2, pp. 1556-1558; vol. 3, p. 2637.] 3. RAILROADS (§ 58*) — REGULATION - UNION STATIONS. Assailing the order, appellant contends: That the commission was without jurisdiction to make it, because the same was based on the act of May 20, 1908, which, it is urged, extends that jurisdiction beyond the metes and bounds fixed by article 9, § 18, Const., which reads: "The commission shall have the power and authority and be charged with the duty of supervising, regulating, and controlling all transportation and transmission companies doing business in this state, in all matters relating to the performance of their public duties and their charges therefor, and of correcting abuses and preventing unjust discrimination and extortion by such companies; and to that end the commission shall, from time to time, prescribe and enforce against such companies, in the manner hereinafter authorized, such rates, charges, classifications of traffic, and rules and regulations, and shall require them to establish and maintain all such public service, facuities, and conveniences as may be reasonable and just. And which east of the main street in the town of Du- Kansas & Texas Railway Companies in said rant and 400 feet east of the north end of town, suitable for the accommodation of the the joint depot used by the Missouri, Kansas passenger traffic into and out of said town, & Texas and Frisco ; that the Missouri, and that said depot shall be used jointly by Kansas & Texas Railway has a double track | said companies on and after the 1st day of through the town of Durant; that east of December, 1909, and maintained for such said track it has a switch track and also a joint use until further orders of this commerchandise track east of the main line, mission." From which said order the Misleading to grain elevators; that there is a souri, Oklahoma & Gulf Railway Company, great deal of switching done on those tracks alone appeals. by the Missouri, Kansas & Texas; that passengers arriving over the Missouri, Kansas & Texas and Frisco, desiring to take a Missouri, Oklahoma & Gulf train, would have to cross these two tracks in order to get to the proposed site of the Missouri, Oklahoma & Gulf depot, thereby incurring additional expense in transferring baggage, and making it very inconvenient and dangerous for the traveling public in crossing from one depot to another. It is further shown that the present depot of the Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railway and Frisco Railroad is very convenient to the business part of the town, being located one block off the main street; that this depot is equipped with ample facilities to take care of the business of the three roads in the town of Durant at the present time; that a union depot can be maintained at much less expense to the railroads than separate depots. It appears from the testimony of the engineer of the Missouri, Oklahoma & Gulf Railway that it would be very expensive for said railway to secure right of way and run a track to connect with the joint depot of the Missouri, Kansas & Texas and Frisco; that the Missouri, Kansas & Texas and Missouri, Oklahoma & Gulf are competitive roads, and that the passenger traffic would be greatly decreased over the Missouri, Oklahoma & Gulf owing to the fact that the agent would be employed by the Missouri, Kansas & Texas and would invariably send passengers over the Missouri, Kansas & Texas, instead of sending them over the Missouri, Oklahoma & Gulf. After a thorough investigation and careful consideration of the evidence, the commission is of the opinion that the greater number of citizens of Durant and the traveling public would be better accommodated by the maintenance of a union passenger depot than by separate depots in the town of Durant; that it would be dangerous for passengers transferring from one depot to another; and that the proper safety and accommodations of the traveling public and the people of the town of Durant require a passenger depot used jointly by the Frisco, Missouri, Kansas & Texas, and Missouri, Oklahoma & Gulf Railways in the said town." And ordered: * That the St. Louis & San Francisco Railroad Company, the Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railway Company, and the Missouri, Oklahoma & Gulf Railway operate a joint passenger depot in the town of Durant at the present site of the depot used by the * said act having been passed prior to the time fixed in section 35 of the same article, which reads, "After the second Monday in January, nineteen hundred and nine, the Legislature may, by law, from time to time, alter, amend, revise, or repeal sections from eighteen to thirty-four inclusive, of this article, or any of them, or any amendments thereof: Provided, that no amendment made under authority of this section shall contravene the provisions of any part of this Constitution other than the said sections last above referred to or any such amendments thereof," is unconstitutional and void, and for that reason the order must fall. On the other hand, it is contended, in effect, that said act neither altered, amended, revised, nor repealed sections from 18 to 34, inclusive, but is ancillary and supplementary to said section 18 and provides a remedy for the enforcement and protection of certain rights thereby secured, and by legislative construction in a measure defines those rights so that their exact limits might be known. This latter contention is correct. Whether that part of said section authorizing the commission to require all transportation companies doing business in the state to establish and maintain all such public service facilities, and conveniences as may be reasonable and just is self-executing or not, it was proper for the Legislature acting subordinate to said provision, and in furtherance thereof, as it did. tional provision rot self-executing is said to transfers, depots, and switching facilities at exist by Mr. Cooley in his work on Con. Lim., all such points, and thereupon, or upon its p. 221, "where it merely indicates principles own motion, to require such companies to without laying down rules by means of make such physical connection or to establish which those principles may be given the and maintain union depots, transfer and force of law." Speaking of when the pow-switching facilities as the public interest may er thus given is self-executing, on the next require, provided, etc. Section 3 provides: page, he says: "Perhaps even in such cas- "The expense incurred in the construction es legislation may be desirable by way of and maintenance of the physical connections, providing convenient remedies for the pro- union depots, transfer and switching facilitection of the right secured, or of regulating ties mentioned in the preceding sections of the claim of the right so that its exact lim- this act shall be borne by the companies opits may be known and understood; but all erating the different lines of railroad as such legislation must be subordinate to the such companies may agree and in case of constitutional provision, and in furtherance disagreement the Corporation Commission of its purpose, and must not in any particu- shall determine the expense to be borne by lar attempt to narrow or embarrass it." each, from which order the railroad comQuoting approvingly from Reeves v. Ander-pany or companies may appeal, as in other son et al., 13 Wash. 17, 42 Pac. 625, Mr. Jus- cases provided." With the legislative contice Williams, speaking for the court in struction contained in the act that a union State ex rel. Reardon, etc., v. Scales, Mayor, depot is a "public facility" or a "public conet al., 21 Okl. 683, 97 Pac. 584, said: "Invenience" within the purview of that part our opinion it was competent for the Legis- of said section of the Constitution we have lature to supplement the constitutional pro- no quarrel. 32 Cyc. 748, says: "The word vision by pointing out the manner in which 'public' has two proper meanings. A thing the right conferred by the Constitution might may be said to be public when owned by the be exercised, and by prescribing rules for the public, and also when its uses are public. guidance of the city council in relation there- 27 Minn. 460." As to "facilities," 19 Cyc. to." 109, says: "Applied to railroads it means Such was all that was done or intended by everything necessary for the convenience of the act of May 20, 1908 (Laws 1908, p. 226, c. passengers and the safety and prompt trans18). Indicating what was meant in said sec-portation of freight." Or, as stated by this tion 18 by "public facilities" and "public con- court in the syllabus in C., R. I. & P. Ry. veniences," the Legislature passed said act Co. v. State, 23 Okl. 94, 99 Pac. 901: "The entitled, "An act to extend the jurisdiction phrase, 'such public service facilities and of the Corporation Commission over all mat- conveniences as may be reasonable and just,' ters of physical connection, union depots, as used in section 18, art. 9, of the Constituand sufficient transfer and switching facili- tion (Bunn's Ed. § 222) means everything inties of the different railroads in the state of cident to the general, prompt, safe, and imOklahoma, and requiring all railroad com- partial performance of the duties to the pubpanies to make and maintain physical con- lic at large imposed by the state, in the propnections, transfers, switching facilities, and er exercise of its police power, upon transunion depots in the state of Oklahoma," | portation or transmission companies." And thereby impliedly declaring that it was the legislative construction of that part of section 18 that physical connections, transfers, switching facilities, and union depots were included in the terms "public facilities" and "public conveniences," and then proceeded in the act to provide a remedy for the enforcement and protection of those rights secured by that part of section 18 of the Constitution under consideration. Section 1 of said act provides, in effect, that every railroad company operating a railroad in this state shall make such physical connections, transfers, and switching facilities at all junction points and all incorporated towns where more than one railroad enters as may be ordered by the Corporation Commission, and that, when the interests of the public can be promoted, said commission is authorized to require physical connections between two or more lines of railway where practicable, regardless of whether the roads cross one another or not. Section 2 makes it the duty of said commission to nvestigate all complaints in reference to physical connections, 1 Paine, 90 [Fed. Cas. No. 66]." so, said act eliminated, we would have probably so held, and that a depot of that kind is such a "public facility" or "convenience," as the commission was authorized by said section alone to require appellant to establish and maintain jointly with the other two railroads in interest. Speaking to a similar situation, the court in Cooper Mfg. Co., etc., v. Ferguson et al., 113 U. S. 727, 5 Sup. Ct. 739, 28 L. Ed. 1137, said: "As the clause in the Constitution and the act of the Legislature relate to the same subject, like statutes in pari materia, they are to be construed together. Eskridge v. State, 25 Ala. 30. The act was passed by the first Legislature that assembled after the adoption of the Constitution, and has been allowed to remain upon the statute book to the present time. It must therefore be considered as a contemporary interpretation, entitled to much weight. Stuart v. Laird, 1 Cranch, 299 [2 L. Ed. 115]; Martin v. Hunter, 1 Wheat. 304 [4 L. Ed. 97]; Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264 [5 L. Ed. 257]; Adams v. Storey, We are |