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things-a judgment and an emotion, or feeling of a peculiar kind.

2. All udgments of the mind, whatever be the subjects of em, appertain to the understanding. This comprehensive faculty includes all intellectual acts, whether relating to external objects, mathematical relations, natural beauty and sublimity, or moral duty. So far, therefore, as conscience is a judgment respecting any moral subject, so far it is an exercise of the understanding. We have not one faculty by which we discern physical truths, another by which we judge of mathematical theorems, and another for matters of taste; but all these are the one and the same understanding, exercised on different objects. Accordingly, when moral qualities are the objects of our contemplation, it is not a different faculty from the reason or understanding which thinks and judges, but the same, exercised on other subjects; and the only difference is in the object. Our conclusion therefore is, that so far as conscience is an intellectual act or judgment of the mind, so far it belongs to the understanding.

3. But as more is included under the name conscience than a mere intellectual act or judgment, and as this judgment is attended with a peculiar feeling, called moral, and easily distinguished from all other emotions; and as mere emotion or feeling can with no propriety be referred to the reason, therefore conscience is, so far as this is concerned, different from the understanding.

4. If the moral judgments of the mind proceeded from a faculty distinct from the understanding, and often differing from it, the harmony of the mental operations would be destroyed. While reason led to one conclusion, conscience might dictate the contrary. And upon this theory, conscience must always be correct, unless the faculty be morbid.

All experience and history show that men may act under the influence of an erroneous conscience. The dictates of conscience are always in conformity with the practical judgments of reason. When these are erroneous, conscience is erroneous. The conclusion therefore is, that conscience is not a distinct faculty from reason, so far as it consists in a judgment of the quality of moral acts. Reason or understanding is the genus; the judgments of conscience are the species. Reason has relation to all intelligible subjects; the moral faculty is conversant about moral qualities alone.

THE MORAL SENSE COMPARED WITH THE TASTE. From what was said in the preceding remarks it appears that conscience, or the moral sense, is not a simple but a compound faculty, including both an intellectual act or judgment, and a peculiar feeling or emotion. The name moral sense was probably adopted to express this feeling, or internal emotion. It will serve perhaps to illustrate this subject, if we bring into view another faculty, between which and the moral sense there is a remarkable analogy. I refer to what is commonly called Taste, or that faculty by which men are in some degree capable of perceiving and relishing the beauties of nature and art. In this there is a judgment respecting that quality denominated Beauty, but there is also a vivid emotion of a peculiar kind accompanying this judgment. The external objects in which beauty is resident might be distinctly seen, and yet no such quality be perceived; as was before mentioned in regard to certain animals, whose sight and hearing are more acute than those of men, and which yet appear to be utterly insensible of the quality called beauty.

If the question should be raised whether Taste is merely an exercise of the understanding, the proper answer would be precisely as in the case of conscience, viz., so far as it consists in judgment, it appertains to the intellectual faculty; but so far as it consists in emotion, it does not. And in this as in matters of conscience, errors of judgment will affect the emotions produced. In cultivating Taste, it is of the utmost importance that correct opinions be adopted in relation to the objects of this faculty.

The question may perhaps be asked, why either of these should be considered a distinct faculty of the mind. In regard to mental faculties or powers, there is a want of agreement among philosophers, as to what is requisite to entitle any mental operation to be referred to a distinct and original faculty. In these two cases, there exists in the mind a capacity

for perceiving peculiar qualities in certain appropriate objects. Though the ideas of beauty and morality are judgments of the understanding, it requires a faculty suited to the objects to enable the understanding to obtain the simple ideas of beauty and morality. We can conceive of a rational mind without such a capacity. There is also in these faculties, the susceptibility of a peculiar emotion, dissimilar from all others; and these two things constitute the faculty of Taste or Conscience. But it is a matter of no importance whether taste and conscience be called distinct and original faculties, if what has been said respecting their nature be admitted.

There is in the human mind a capacity of discerning what is termed beauty, in the works of nature and art. This judgment is accompanied by a pleasurable emotion, and to this capacity or susceptibility we give the name Taste. There is also a power of discerning moral qualities, which perception is also attended with a vivid emotion; and to this power or faculty we give the name Conscience, or the moral faculty. Both these are so far original parts of our constitution, that if there did not exist in every mind a sense of beauty and its contrary, and a sense of right and wrong, such ideas could not be generated or communicated by any process of education.

MORAL OBLIGATION.

Much has been written to explain the true ground of moral obligation. But the subject has been rather darkened and perplexed than elucidated by these comments. It is always so when men undertake to explain that which is so clear that it needs no explanation.

Every idea of morality includes in it that of moral obligation. A moral act is one which ought to be performed; an immoral act is one which ought not to be performed. As soon as we get the conception of a moral act, we receive with it the idea of moral obligation. It would be a contradiction to say that any act was moral, and yet that there was no obligation to perform it. One of the best definitions which can be given of a moral act is, that it is an act which we are bound to perform, and of an immoral act, that it is one which ought not to be done. The more clearly we see anything to be moral, the more sensibly we feel ourselves under a moral obligation to perform it. This being a matter of common intuition and universal experience, all that is necessary to convince us of its truth, is to bring it distinctly before our minds. There is therefore no need to look any further for the grounds and reasons of moral obligation, than to the morality of the act itself, as this idea is involved in every conception of morality. The following citation from Dr. Price's work on Morals is in accordance with the view just given: "From the account given of obligation, it appears how absurd it is to inquire, what obliges us to practise virtue? as if obligation were no part of the idea of virtue, but something adventitious and foreign to it: that is, as if what was our duty might not be our duty; as if it might not be true, that what is fit to do, we ought to do, and that what we ought to do, we are obliged to do. To ask why we are obliged to practise virtue, to abstain from what is wicked, or perform what is just, is the very same as to ask why we are obliged to do what we are obliged to do. It is not possible to avoid wondering at those who have so unaccountably embarrassed themselves a subject that one would think was attended with so little difficulty: and who, because they cannot find any thing in virtue and duty themselves, which can induce and oblige us to pay a regard to them-fly to self-love, and maintain that from hence alone are derived all inducement and obligation." Dr. Paley commences his second book on Moral Philosophy by an inquiry into the nature of moral obligation. He asks, "Why am I obliged to keep my word?" and mentions several answers which would be given by different persons, and which he says all coincide. But he goes on to say that all the answers leave the matter short; for the inquirer may turn round upon his teacher with a second question, "Why am I obliged to do what is right, to act agreeably to the fitness of things, to conform to reason, nature or truth, to promote the public good, or to do the will of God?"

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All this, it appears to us, is fitted to mystify as plain a subject as ever engaged the thoughts of a rational mind, and is designed to remove the true ground of moral obligation, and

which is in itself right. The conflict is not between a greater and a less happiness, but between the prospect of happiness and moral obligation.

reduce all such obligation to the single principle of self-love, or the tendency of an act to promote individual happiness. Suppose that, after Dr. Paley had made all obligation to rest on the ground that the performance of a good act promotes On this subject, the appeal must be to the common judg our eternal happiness, the inquirer should again ask, " Why ment of men. And we are persuaded that this confounding of am I bound to perform that which will promote my happiness?" moral obligation with motives of another kind, is a radical The question, indeed, would be unreasonable, because all men defect in Dr. Paley's system, which-lying at the foundation are agreed that happiness is a good; but is it not equally-vitiates the whole, and has already been the cause of great unreasonable, when an action is seen to be virtuous, or morally evil to society. right, to ask "Why am I obliged to do it?" The moment we see a thing to be morally right, the sense of obligation is complete, and all further inquiring for reasons why am I obliged to do right is as absurd as would be inquiring for reasons why I should pursue happiness.

Where we have intuitive certainty of any thing it is foolish to seek for other reasons. If there is anything clear in the view of a rational mind, it is this: that virtue should be practised, that what is right should be done. But still further to perplex this plain subject, Dr. Paley has undertaken to inform us what is meant by obligation. "A man," says he, "is said to be obliged when he is urged by a violent motive resulting from the will of another."

This is, indeed, a very extraordinary definition. The motive he says must be violent; but why may not a motive which is not violent create an obligation according to its force? The main error of this definition is, that it confounds moral obligation with other motives of an entirely different kind. The obligation of which he speaks is created by the will or command of another. The law of a tyrant requiring his subjects to do what is evidently wrong cannot create a moral obligation. A rational being may be urged by the threats of a tyrant, on the universal principle of self-love, and this force may, by an abuse of terms, be called an obligation; but according to the common usage of the language, when a man is said to be under obligation to perform an act, we mean that he is morally bound. But whether the operation of any violent motive, resulting from the will of another, may be said to oblige a man or not, the main inquiry is, what is the ground of moral obligation? The difference between a moral obligation and other motives which may oblige should be kept in view. He then returns to the question, "Why am I obliged to keep my word?" and applies the preceding definition of the nature of obligation, and gives the following answer: "Because I am urged to do so by a violent motive (namely, the expectation of being after this life rewarded if I do, or punished if I do not), resulting from the command of another (namely, of God). He goes on to say, "When I first turned my attention to moral speculations, an air of mystery seemed to hang over the whole subject, which arose, I believe, from hence; that I supposed with many authors whom I had consulted that to be obliged to do a thing, was different from being induced to do it; and that the obligation to practise virtue, and to do what is justice, is quite another thing and of another kind from the obligation which a soldier is under to obey his officer, or a servant his master, or any of the ordinary obligations of

human life."

We cannot but be of the opinion that Dr. Paley has here made a radical mistake, which it is exceedingly important to consider, since, unhappily for sound morals, bis system is so much employed in the instruction of youth.

The theory of morals, of which the above principle is a part, is no other than this: that the only difference between virtue and vice consists in their tendency, respectively, to promote or hinder the happiness of the individual; so that if a man could persuade himself that no evil would arise to him from telling a lie, he would be under no obligation to speak the truth. It is a scheme of morals which obliterates all intrinsic difference between virtue and vice, and makes the one preferable to the other on no other account than its tendency to promote individual happiness in the future world.

If a man does not believe in a future world, he can, according to this theory, feel no obligation to keep his word. We believe, on the contrary, that moral obligation is felt by the atheist, and that he cannot divest himself of it. When men are tempted by some strong motive to deviate from the truth, and yet are enabled to resist the temptation, there is in most cases no distinct consideration of any future good to be gained by it, but the man feels himself under an obligation to do that

The true doctrine is, that virtue and vice are distinct and opposite, and that when we know any act to be right, we are bound-apart from all considerations of self-interest-to perform it.

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Dr. Paley maintains that "we can be obliged to do nothing, unless we are to lose or gain something by it, for nothing else can be a violent motive' to us. And as we should not be obliged to obey the laws or the magistrate, unless rewards or punishments, pleasure or pain, somehow or other depended on our obedience; so neither should we, without the same reason, be obliged to do what is right, to practise virtue, or to obey the command of God."

According to this view, unless a man is persuaded that he shall gain something by keeping his word, he is under no obligation to do it. Even if God should clearly make known his will, and lay upon him his command, he is under no obligation to obey, unless certain that he shall receive benefit by so doing. This is, indeed, to make virtue a mercenary thing, and reduce all motives to a level. And as self-love, or the desire of happiness, is the only rational motive, and all men possess this in a sufficient degree of strength, the only conceivable difference between the good and the bad consists in the superior sagacity which the one has above the other to discern what will most contribute to happiness. And if what we call vice or sin could be made to contribute to happiness, then it would change its nature and become virtue.

The definition of obligation, given by Dr. Paley, upon his own principles, is unnecessarily encumbered with what adds nothing to its import. Why should the "violent motive" result from the command of another? The command of another ought to have no influence, except as obedience or disobedience will be attended with loss or gain. It would, therefore, have been more simple and intelligible to say at once, what is certainly implied, that the only motive which can oblige us from such conduct in the future world. to be virtuous, is the expectation of the happiness to be derived

who confounded the honestum with the utile, deserve to be Cicero, in his work "De Finibus," says that those men banished from society. The result of the whole scheme is, that there is no such thing as moral excellence, abstractedly considered; that the only good in the universe is happiness; and that other things, among which virtue is included, are good only as related to this end. If this is true, the moral attributes of God have no intrinsic excellence; they are all merged in his infinite felicity. Surely this view is not suited to increase our reverence for the Supreme Being.

But every man who carefully examines into his own primary ideas of morality, will find that he has a sense of right happiness, or its loss. This distinction is too deeply engraven and wrong, independent of all considerations of personal on the mind to be erased by any process of reasoning.

THE SUPREMACY OF CONSCIENCE.

That the dictates of conscience should be obeyed, is one of the most evident convictions of the human mind. No matter how much might be gained by going contrary to conscience, every honest mind has the same judgment, that duty should be done. If it is plain that a certain act-such as confessing the truth of the gospel-is a duty, and we are convinced that nothing but suffering will ensue from performing it; yet the judgment of the impartial mind is, that no prospect of pain or loss can ever justify us in denying the truth, or in doing any thing else that we know to be wrong. On this point there is no room for reasoning, The judgment that conscience should be obeyed is intuitive: all men must acknowledge it, unless they belie the clear convictions of their own reason.

That conscience should be obeyed, that duty should be performed at every risk, are maxims which must receive the assent of all who are capable of understanding them. On

the subject of the supremacy of conscience, the following quotation from Dr. Chalmers is very much to our purpose: "In every human heart there is a faculty-not, it may be, having the actual power, but having the just and rightful pretension to act as judge and master over the whole of human conduct. Other propensities may have too much sway, but the moral propensity-if I may so term it-never can; for, to have the presiding sway in all our concerns, is just that which properly and legitimately belongs to it. A man under anger may be too strongly prompted to deeds of retaliation, or under sensuality may be too strongly prompted to indulgence, or under avarice, be too closely addicted to the pursuit of wealth, or even under friendship be too strongly inclined to partiality; but he never can, under conscience, be too strongly inclined to be as he ought, and to do as he ought. We may say of a watch, that its main-spring is too powerful, but we would never say that a regulator was too powerful."

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"And neither do we urge the proposition that conscience has in every instance the actual direction of human affairs, for this were in the face of all experience. It is not that every man obeys her dictates, but that every man feels that he ought to obey them. These dictates are often, in life and practice, disregarded; so that conscience is not the sovereign de facto. Still there is a voice within the hearts of all which asserts that conscience is the sovereign de jure: that to her belongs the command rightfully, even though she do not possess it actually." "All that we affirm is, that if conscience prevail over the other principles, then every man is led, by the very make and mechanism of his eternal economy, to feel, that it is as it ought to be; or if these others prevail over conscience, that it is not as it ought to be." "When stating the supremacy of conscience, in the sense that we have explained it, we but state what all men feel; and our only argument in proof of the assertion is-our only argument can be, an appeal to the experience of all men."

These sentiments will find a response in every honest mind. However often we disobey the voice of this monitor, we always have the feeling of self-condemnation accompanying our disobedience.

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AH. Like the letter A in the English word MARK.

Pronounce this English word-MARK, aloud several times, with strict reference to the sound of the French letter A, until you are sure of having its correct sound.

The sound thus obtained, always belongs to the French letter A in the alphabet, that is, whenever the French alphabet is repeated, always give the first letter the sound of A in the English word MARK, that is, AH.

But the French A does not always and invariably have this sound whenever and wherever it is used in a French word.

Its sound depends upon its position in a word and upon the accent under which it is placed, either by itself, as constituting a single word, or within a word of one or more syllables.

The letter A has, then, another sound which we illustrate by the sound of the letter A in the English word FAT. Pronounce this English word-FAT, aloud several times with strict reference to the sound of the French letter A, until you are sure of having its correct sound.

The French letter A has, therefore, two distinct sounds, viz. :-Short sound in the English word FAT. Long sound in the English word MARK.

In these lessons, the English letter A will be used to illustrate the short sound of the French vowel A; and AH will be used to illustrate the long sound of the French vowel A.

A, has the short sound repesented by A in the English word FAT, when it is a word by itself, and generally when it begins or ends a French word. There are exceptions to this rule; but they will be readily noticed by the reader in the spelling by means of English letters, designed to illustrate the pronunciation of a given French word.

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The above examples are introduced to illustrate the short sound of the French vowel A. In the first word (Abaca), be careful not to pronounce it Ay-bay-kay; but give each A in each syllable, the sound of A in the English word FAT. In the next word, do not say Ay-lahrm; remember to give the sound of A in the English word FAT. Trill the R in the last syllable of the word A-larm. It will be perceived the final E of this word (A-larme) is not sounded.

This vowel is sometimes under a Grave accent; thus, à, là, voilà; but its sound is not materially affected thereby.

31. â.

Under the Circumflex accent, this vowel has the long sound represented by A in the English word MARK, and is named AH. It has, besides, a little more than the sound just spoken of, for the sound must be prolonged, and in order to do this conveniently, the mouth must be opened a little wider than in uttering its short sound, represented by A in the English word FAT. Be careful, however, not to pronounce  â, like the sound of the English word AWE, but give it the sound of AH prolonged, in the following examples, viz. :

French.

Âge
Âme

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Bâche

Bah-sh

Bâfre

Bah-fr'

Bât

Bah

Câpre

Kah-pr'

Grâce

Grah-s

Mâle

Mah-1

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Male Stake (in betting). Pale. Repetition.

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If it can be illustrated by analogous English sounds, it seems quite reasonable to suppose that through this process, many more students would understand and acquire it, than if they were left merely to the doubtful policy of imitation. Let us try.

Before the pupil attempts to pronounce the French words used for examples, let him observe most carefully the sound of the last syllable of the following words, when uttered as they usually are, in common conversation, viz. :

Moth-er! Broth-er! Nev-er! Sis-ter! Wa-ter! Take any one of the above English words, viz. :-the first -Moth-er! Pronounce it naturally and aloud with a full voice several times, until the common sound of the last syllable in particular, is familiar to the ear. Take each of those words and thus practice, by pronouncing aloud carefully, but naturally; observing at the same time THE SOUND OF THE LAST SYLLABLE.

Now, by what combination of letters would you represent that sound? By UR, as in the first syllable of the English word Mur-mur? Or, by UH!? Manifestly the latter. Below are a few French words, which you will now proceed to pronounce aloud, giving to the vowel E in each example, the last syllable of the word NEV-ER! Pronounce each of the following French words quickly and abruptly, as if an exclamation mark were placed over each one of them, viz. :

Before proceeding to the illustration of the sound and use
of E mute or unaccented, let us commend the following Ce like suh!
extract to the careful perusal of the pupil. Speaking of
the unaccented E, it is said,-"Several of our best orthoepists
express themselves thus on that subject:-The proper De like duh!
utterance of the unaccented E characterises, in part, the
pronunciation of the gentleman, as a vicious one marks
the low-bred and ignorant. The unaccented E is some-
times pronounced and sometimes not; and in that consists

a great difficulty for foreigners, who, always pronouncing it Je like zhuh!
full, are long before they are able to follow a French conversa-
tion, and thence are inclined to believe that the French speak
much faster than any other people. The truth is, that the
French, taking them in general, do not speak faster than
other people; but, in conversation and in familiar reading,
they drop the unaccented E as often as they can do it, and Le like luh!
thus go quicker through a sentence than does a foreigner, who
gives the full sound of U in TUB to every unaccented E he
meets with. Thus the word Contenance, and the phrase je n'ai

pas reçu tout le vêtement, will be pronounced by a foreigner and Me like muh;
a Frenchman native of Gascony,—Con-te-nan-ce-je né pa re-çu
tou le vê-te-men; whereas a well-bred Frenchman will pro-
nounce-cont-nans,-jné pa rsu toul vêt-men, sounding in the
first word two syilables only, where the others would sound
four; and in the sentence, sounding six syllables, where the Ne like nuh!
others would sound ten.'

The French custom of clipping or shortening words as much as possible, in ordinary reading and common conversation, is well illustrated in the following sentence, viz. :

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"Quand vous serez le même, vous me trouverez le même." This sentence contains thirteen syllables in prose, viz. :Quand-vous-se-rez le-même-vous-me-trou-ve-rez-le-même. In poetry, meme would have two syllables. However, in familiar reading and conversation, it is pronounced in eight syllables only, viž. :— Quand-vou-srel-même-voum-trouv-rel-même. The suppression of this E is precisely the reason why foreigners imagine that the French speak so very quickly.

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UH! Like the sound of the letter U in the English word
NUT; or, like the sound of the last syllable ER in the words
OVER and WATER, when spoken quickly.

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The E mute or unaccented," is a mere emission of the voice without any distinct sound. It either succeeds a consonant, by the articulation of which it becomes sensible, or comes after a vowel, of which it may be considered the prolongation.' It is confessedly difficult to illustrate the sound of this vowel by the aid of English letters; yet it is worthy an honest attempt. True, it may be acquired from a teacher, by sheer imitation; but alas, all learners are not good imitators!

That is, a combination of the letter S, with the usual sound of the last syllable of the English word MоTH-ER !

That is, a combination of the letter D, with the usual sound of the last syllable of the same word MотH-ER!

That is, a combination of the letters ZH, with the same sound mentioned in the first example; or, like the sound of the last syllable of the word PLEASURE! as usually pronounced, but without the sound of the Y, which is sometimes heard; i.e., peas-ure! and not pleasLyure!

Se like suh! {

Te like tuh!

Que like kuh!

That is, a combination of the letter L, with the same sound mentioned in the first example.

That is, a combination of the letter M, with the same sound mentioned in the first example; or like the sound of MU in the first syllable of the English word MUTTER.

That is, a combination of the letter N, with the sound mentioned in the first example; or, like the sound of NU in the English word NUT. Pronounce NU in the word NUT, and you have the correct pronunciation of the French word NE. That is, exactly like the pronunciation of CE as given in the first example.

That is, exactly like the sound of the last syllable of the English word WATER!

That is, like the sound of the last syllable of the English word BAKER, pronounced rather carelessly

Take, if you please, another illustration, viz. :-the sound of U in the English word NUT, as explained above, in illustrating the sound of the French word NE. This will give the correct sound of E mute or unaccented.

The sound of E mute or unaccented, resembles the sound of the letter E of the word THE, which is heard in pronouncing quickly these two words, viz. :-THE MAN. Apply the sound of this E thus pronounced, to the E in the following words, viz. :-CE, DE, JE, ME, NE, SE, TE, QUE, etc.

Or lastly, the sound of E mute or unaccented, is based upon the sound of English A pronounced naturally. Let the organs within the mouth maintain as nearly as possible the same position, whilst the lips are protruded as if to pout or whistle. Then, whilst the mouth is in this position, endeavour to pronounce English A again; this, in a majority of cases, will give the correct sound of E mute or unaccented. Practise

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Vérité

Name.

Pray-may-dee-tay

Troo-vay

Vay-ree-tay

39. È GRAVE.

Sound.

Obliged. To proceed Premiditated. Found. Truth.

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AI Like the letters AI in the English word STAIR.

has a longer and broader sound than È. The mouth must be opened wider in pronouncing the former than the latter. In ordinary reading and common conversation, the difference between E and È is hardly perceptible. Still there is a difference; just the difference betwen pronouncing E like the letters AI in the English word STAIR with the mouth half opened, and pronouncing the same letters in the same word with the mouth well opened, and also prolonging the sound. Practice will demonstrate this, viz. :—

LESSONS IN ALGEBRA.-No. XXII.
(Continued from page 419.)

ADDITION OF RADICAL QUANTITIES. Ir may be proper to remark, that the rules for addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division of radical quantities depend on the same principles, and are expressed in nearly the same language, as those for addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division of powers. So also the rules for involution and evolution of radicals, are similar to those for involution and evolution of powers. Hence, if the learner has made himself thoroughly acquainted with the principles and operations relating to powers, he has substantially acquired those pertaining to radical quantities, and will find no difficulty in understanding and applying them.

When radical quantities have the same radical part, and are under the same radical sign or index, they are like quantities. Hence their rational parts or co-efficients may be added in the same manner as rational quantities, and the sum prefixed to the radical part.

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If the radical parts, after reduction, are different, or have different exponents, then the quantities being unlike, can be added only by writing them one after the other with their signs.

11. The sum of 3/6 and 2a, is 3√b + 2√α.

It is manifest that three times the root of b, and twice the root of a, are neither five times the root of b, nor five times the root of a, unless b and a are equal. 12. The sum of 2a and a, is √a+3√a. The square root of a, and the cube root of a, are neither twice the square root, nor twice the cube root of a.

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