duty to another in precisely the same external circumstances or erroneous views. Surely, moral depravity cannot be an and relations; which would be to confound all moral distinc-excuse for erroneous opinions. All actions proceed from tions. This theory would go to sanction every form of religion, certain principles; if, therefore, the action is wrong, because however corrupt and superstitious; and to make the vilest of the corrupt principle, the burden of culpability must be immoralities virtuous; for there can be no doubt that the rolled back upon the principle, or state of the soul, which votaries of idolatry, in their most cruel and abominable rites, sends forth evil acts, as a poisoned fountain sends forth delefollow the dictates of an erring conscience. When the heathen terious streams. sacrifice to demons, and when the victim is a human being, or even a first-born son, there is nothing wrong, for all these acts of worship are performed in obedience to conscience. Every species of persecution and the Inquisition itself may be justified on this principle. Instead, therefore, of putting an end to all animosity, it would bring back, in all their horrors, the days of persecution for conscience' sake. On this subject, again, our appeal must be to the unbiassed judgment of mankind; and we think the verdict will be, that error which might have been avoided, and ignorance, which is not invincible, do not excuse. The knowledge necessary to duty is within the reach of every man, were he disposed sincerely to seek after it. But it is a truth which is of importance on this subject, that one false step leads to another; and though a man who has adopted fundamental error, labours under a kind of necessity to do wrong, yet this does not excuse him, because he ought to have exercised more diligence and impartiality in seeking for the truth, and is justly liable to all the evil consequences resulting from this neglect. Suppose a man to have been educated in a wrong system of religion and morals; he is responsible, because, when arrived at the years of maturity, he should have brought the opinions received by education under an honest examination. The more difficult it is divest ourselves of prejudices thus imbibed, as it were, with the mother's milk, the more necessary is it that, under the influence of a sincere love of truth, we should, with impartiality, diligence, and resolution, endeavour to do .80. It is no proof that such a course is not the solemn duty of man, that few ever perform it. The prevalence of error in the world, is very much owing to the neglect of this duty. This neglect arises from culpable indolence, from a desire to remain in agreement with the multitude or with our parents and teachers, from aversion to the truth and an unwillingness to deny ourselves, and incur the inconvenience and persecution which an avowal of the truth would bring upon us. But none of these reasons will justify us in adhering to opinions which are detrimental to ourselves and others, or contrary to our moral obligations. It is true, if a man's conscience dictates a certain action, he is morally bound to obey; but if that action is in itself wrong, he commits sin in performing it, nevertheless. He who is under fundamental error, is in a sad dilemma. Do what he will, he sins. If he disobey conscience, he knowingly sins, doing what he believes to be wrong; and a man never can be justified for doing what he believes to be wrong, even though it should turn out to be right. And if he obey conscience, performing an act which is in itself wrong, he sins; because he complies not with the law under which he is placed. It may be asked, "How can a man be responsible in such circumstances, when he is under a necessity of doing wrong?" We are responsible for suffering ourselves to be brought into such a state; we are responsible for our ignorance of the truth. Hence we see how important the duty of seeking after truth with untiring diligence, and honest impartiality. The same necessity is found to arise from forming bad habits, and cherishing evil passions. The heart in which envy to another has been indulged until it has become habitual, cannot exercise kind and brotherly affections to that person; but this is no excuse. The fault may be traced far back, but guilt is attached to every act of envy, however inveterate the habit. If this were not so, the greater the sinner, the less his responsibility. The objection to making a man responsible for his opinions, is, that his belief does not depend upon his will, but results necessarily from the evidence existing before the mind, at any moment. This is true; but we may turn our minds away from the evidence which would have produced a conviction of the truth. And this is not all; there may be such a state of mind, that evidence of a certain kind cannot be perceived. Depravity produces blindness of mind, in regard to the beauty and excellency of moral objects. But every man ought to be free from such a state or temper of mind as produces distorted Metaphysical reasoning, however, rather perplexes and obscures than elucidates such points. Let us hold fast by the plain principles of common sense, and appeal to the common judgment of mankind; and the decision will be, that ignorance or error which might have been avoided, never excuses from blame. The same is true of all evil habits and inveterate passions, which have been voluntarily or heedlessly contracted. The whole course of a moral agent must be taken together; his moral acts are complicated, and intimately connected. They form a web, in which one thread is connected with another, and one serves to give strength to another. If we honestly consult our conscience, we feel guilty when we have done wrong, even though we did it ignorantly; because we ought not to have been in ignorance. Two things, therefore, are necessary, in order to determine that an action is right: first, that the state of mind of the agent be such as it ought to be; and secondly, that the action be in contormity with the law under which we are placed; for the very idea of morality supposes us to be under a moral law. While, then, we cannot do better than obey conscience; yet if conscience is erroneous, we do not fulfil our duty by such obedience, but may commit grievous sin. For following the dictates of conscience, is only one circumstance essential to a good action. When we do wrong while obeying the dictates of conscience, the error does not consist in that obedience, but in not following the right rule, with which rule the accountable moral agent should be acquainted. WHETHER THERE IS IN THE MIND A LAW OR RULE, BY WHICH MAN JUDGES OF THE MORALITY OF If such a rule existed in the mind prior to the observation of particular acts of a moral nature, we should be conscious of it: nothing of the nature of a law or rule can have existence in the mind, without the knowledge of the mind itself. There seems to be a common mistake as to the process of the mind in regard to general principles. It seems to be thought that in order to judge whether an action be right or wrong, there must be something like a general rule or law, which the mind applies, as the workman does his rule, to ascertain whether the quality of the action be good or bad. But as we are conscious of no such process as the application of a general rule, there seems to be no evidence whatever of its existence. The real process of the mind is very simple. When a moral action is viewed, if its nature is simple and palpable, the mind intuitively perceives its quality, and is conscious of no other mental process. Suppose a man, created as Adam was, in the full possession of his rational faculties: until some occasion offered to elicit its exercise, he would not be conscious of any moral faculty or feeling. But suppose an act of flagrant injustice to be perpetrated before him, he would at once have his moral faculty brought into exercise. He would see that the action had in it a moral turpitude, that it ought not to have been done, and that the agent deserved to be punished. So long as this was the only moral act observed or thought of, there would be in the mind nothing but the judgment, with the accompanying feeling that such an act, and of course every other act of the same kind, was evil. As such an observer would, however, soon observe a multitude of acts, of different kinds, which were judged to be good or bad, a general rule or law would be obtained, by degrees, out of these particulars. The process of the mind, in all cases, is from particulars to generals, and the tendency in the mind to put into classes those things which resemble each other, exists also in regard to moral actions. After observing a great number of acts of different kinds, all of which are morally good or evil, these particulars are classified, and form a general rule or law; and when a new act is observed, it is referred to its proper class. But how can we know an action to be good or bad, without a rule with which to compare it, in the first 446 instance? The answer is, that it is as easy to conceive of a faculty by which we can at once perceive the moral character of an act, as of the power of judging of the rectitude of a general rule. There is a sense in which it may be said, that reason, or the moral faculty having the power of discerning the moral quality of actions, has the rule in itself. If this is all that is intended by a general rule of right and wrong in the mind, there can be no objection to it. This is saying no more than that the mind has a faculty by which it judges intuitively of many moral acts, as soon as they are observed. The idea may be thus illustrated: here is a straight line, as soon as we see it, we perceive it to be straight; there is a crooked line, which at once we perceive to be crooked. There is no need of a rule in the mind, by the application of which we know that the one is straight, and the other crooked. The quality of So of many moral actions, the the lines is seen at once. moment the mind apprehends them, their moral character is perceived. Here are so many boys going to school. We observe one, who is large and strong, forcibly taking from another, who is small and weak, some fruit which the latter has with much We need no general rule to pains gathered for a sick mother. guide our judgment. We need only to know the real circumstances of the action. That a large and strong boy should by force take away from one weaker than himself, property to which he has no right, and to which the other has a right, is so evidently immoral, that every mind sees the evil at The general law or rule of morals is therefore made up by the observation and classification of particular acts; just as the general law of gravity is formed by observation of particular facts. once. All our knowledge relates originally to particular cases; and general ideas and general rules and laws, are formed by a process of the mind, which may be called generalisation or classification. THE MORAL FEELING WHICH ACCOMPANIES EVERY Whether our judgments and feelings are distinct and separate mental exercises, or whether what we call feeling or emotion is only an idea of a more vivid kind, is a question which we need not discuss, as the decision of it is not necessary to our purpose. All men make a distinction between acts which are purely intellectual, and those exercises of mind called emotions; and no practical error can arise from observing this distinction-whether philosophically correct or not. In every case where a moral object or relation comes before the mind, there is a feeling of approbation or disapprobation, according to the moral character of the object, of which we are immediately conscious. This approbation or disapprobation will not be equal in all cases, but exceedingly different in degree. While some moral actions elicit, when perceived, a very slight degree of approbation or disapprobation, others excite strong emotion, the disapproval arising to_indignation, and the approval to admiration. act. In every instance where a good act is observed, there is a feeling of esteem for the agent, as well as approbation of the A disposition, too, is felt to bestow some reward on the person who performs a good action. If we see a man, at the imminent risk of his own life, plunge into the sea to save a stranger who has fallen overboard, we approve the action, and feel that he deserves a reward. We therefore call it a meritorious action; for the simple idea of merit is that which deserves a reward. On the other hand, when we are witnesses of a wicked act of an enormous kind, as, for example, a man murdering a good parent or a kind benefactor, without any provocation, but instigated by avarice or resentment-we feel instantaneously a degree of disapprobation which may properly be called indignation. This feeling would be accompanied by a strong desire that condign punishment should be inflicted on the wicked perpetrator of such a deed. If there were no other means of executing justice, we should feel disposed to aid in punishing the culprit; and the idea of snch a person escaping without punishment, is painful to the impartial mind, and revolting to the moral feelings. These moral emotions are, however, of very different degrees of intensity in different persons, and in the same persons at different periods of his life. Persons who have been long accustomed to see atrocious crimes committed, lose in time their moral sensibility, and become accustomed to scenes of blood and robbery. In proportion as the minds of men are enlightened by the truth, and their hearts upright, will be the sensibility of the moral faculty. But by committing sin, as well as by observing it, the moral sensibilities are blunted. This want of right feeling in the conscience is what is called a "seared conscience," which expression is borrowed from the effect produced on any part of the living body, by the repeated application of a heated iron. The result is, that, by degrees, the skin thickens, and the sensibility of the seared part is lost, or rendered obtuse. Besides this feeling of approbation or disapprobation of BELIEF IN GOD, AS CONNECTED WITH THE OPERA- The question is, whether an atheist is completely divested of the feeling of moral obligation. To those who suppose that speculative atheism is impossible, this question will appear irrelevant; for it would be useless to inquire what would be the effect of a state of mind which never can exist. As, however, the evidences of the actual existence of atheism. are as strong as those of most other fundamental errors; and as the doctrine of certain ideas being impressed on the mind in its creation (on which the opinion that men could not become atheists was founded), is now generally exploded, it may be here taken as admitted that there are atheists in the world. The question proposed is therefore a proper subject for consideration. Bishop Warburton in his "Divine Legation of Moses," seems to adopt the opinion, that a belief in the being of God is requisite to the exercise of conscience, or the sense of moral obligation. But his reasonings on the subject are by no means satisfactory. If we may refer to the experience of the atheist himself, he will assure us, that he perceives the difference between right and wrong, as plainly as others, and that he is conscious of being under a moral obligation to pursue a virtuous course. This, however, they consider an instinctive or constitutional principle, which should be obeyed, just as our appetites and other natural propensities should be obeyed. English. Wax. EXAMPLES. French. Pronunciation. Cire Seer Dire Dit Dee Said. Il Lime Liquide Lire Leer If there are intuitive perceptions of moral relations, when actions of a certain kind are presented to the view of the rational mind, then it is certain that conscience may and will operate, whatever may be the opinions of the person on other subjects. No one, when he contemplates an act of flagrant injustice, is conscious of a reference to the existence of a moral Governor, prior to his moral judgment of the quality of the action. The perception of its moral evil is as immediate as that of the colour of the sky, or the grass. But how can a man feel a moral obligation, unless he admits that there is a superior to whom he is bound? how can he feel himself under a law, unless there is a law-giver? The answer is, that this part of the human constitution furnishes a conclusive argument in favour of the being of God. We have a law written within us, and from the sense of obligation to obey his law we cannot escape. The great Creator has not left himself without a witness in the breast of every man. It is possible that a man my be so abandoned as to believe in lies, and that he may come to desbelieve in the God that made and supports him. But he cannot obliterate the law written on his heart; EE ee. he cannot divest himself of the conviction that certain actions sound prolonged. are morally wrong; nor can he prevent the stings of remorse, when he commits sins of an enormous kind. Men may, indeed, spin out refined metaphysical theories, and come to the conclusion thas there is no difference between virtue and vice, and that these distinctions are the result of education. But let some one commit a flagrant act of injustice towards themselves, and their practical judgment will give the lie to their theoretical cpinion. As those speculatists who argue that there is no external world, will avoid running against a post, or into the fire, as carefully as other men; so they who endeavour to reason themselves into the belief that virtue and vice are mere notions, generated by education, cannot, nevertheless, avoid perceiving that some actions are base, unjust, or ungrateful, and consequently to be disapproved of, whether committed by themselves or others. The inferences from what has been said are, that by no arts or course of conduct can men so eradicate the moral faculty, that there shall no longer be any sense of right and wrong. And again, it is evident that, although the belief of the exist ence of God is not necessary to the operations of conscience, yet from the existence of this faculty the existence of God may be inferred. And finally, that although the atheist cannot destroy the moral faculty, yet the firmer the belief of God's existence, and the clearer the knowledge of his attributes, the more distinct and forcible will be the dictates of conscience. Moreover, while the blindness of atheism continues, there will of course be no perception of the moral duties which arise out of our relation to the great Creator; and thus the largest and most important class of moral actions will be out of view. And this is true, to a great degree, in regard to the practical atheist, who forgets God habitually; he feels very little sense of obligation to worship and serve him. LESSONS IN FRENCH PRONUNCIATION. No. III. Rite To read. Bed. Thousand. Who, Like the letters EE, in the English word SEE EXAMPLES. Pronunciation. English. Abyss. Might assist. NAME AND SOUND OF THE VOWELS-Continued. Name. Sound. O o. Like the letter O, in the English word ROBE. 41. I i. Name. EE ee. Like the letters EE in the English word SEE. This vowel receives but one kind of accent, and that is, the Circumflex, viz. :-i î; though it is comparatively seldom found thus accented. This vowel has two sounds, viz.,―long and short-long, as EE, in the English word SEE; and short, like I in the English word PIN, or nearly like it. It becomes nasal, in combination with the letters M and N; in which case, the character of its own sound is completely changed, which is indeed true of all the vowels. In these lessons, the vowel I i, will be represented by the two letters EE, when long or under the Circumflex accent, and by E, when it has the short sound. The sound of this vowel is peculiar, and very difficult for foreigners to obtain. We have no sound in the English language exactly like it. The nearest approch to it, is the sound of U in the last syllable in the English word PICAYUNE, when pronounced with the lips drawn forward, as if to whistle. For instance; pronounce the word PICAYUNE in the most natural manner you can; now pronounce the last syllable of this word with the lips drawn forward and nearly closed. Do you not perceive a difference in the sound, when produced in this latter manner, from that produced in speaking the last syllable naturally? The sound produced with the lips drawn forward and nearly together, embraces the correct sound of the most difficult of all sounds-to the Englishman at least-the sound of the French U u. Let us now take away from the sound of the syllable YUNE, the sounds of all the letters except that of U u, viz.: pronounce first, YUNE, then pronounce UNE: and, finally, pronounce U with the lips nearly closed and drawn forward. This last is the sound of the vowel we want to acquire. It must be acknowledged, however, that the English letter U, does not represent the correct sound of the French U, which is a combination of sounds not recognised in our language. Still, we must use it as the representative of the sound of the French U, for the want of a better one. The following rule has also been given and found useful. The sound of the French U, is based upon that of English E. Pronounce the English letter E as naturally as possible, observing at the same time the position of the internal organs of the mouth. Now keep these organs in the same position as nearly as possible; protrude the lips as if to whistle, drawing them nearly together at the same time, and then try to pronounce the English E again, which will give you the correct sound of the French U. Practise often ALOUD, according to the directions of this Rule, and success will crown your efforts. The rule has never yet failed to impart the correct sound of the French U in this manner, when seconded by the patient, PERSEVERING, and DETERMINED efforts of the pupil. Name. Sound. EE ee. Like the the letters EE, in the English word BEE. This latter is also a word; that is, it is one of the parts of speech in the French language. It is usually an adverb, meaning there. It is also used as a Noun, and a Pronoun. When Y stands alone, and thus becomes a word, its pronunciation is invariably like that of the letters EE in the English word BEE, viz. :-Il y a-pronounced Eel ee a: this last A must be sounded like A, in the English word FAT. Y, is also pronounced like the letters EE in the English word BEE, when it BEGINS or ENDS a word; and also when it occurs in the body of a word, AFTER A CONSONANT, viz.:— MOYEN, JOYEUX, should be pronounced as if printed thus, viz.: MOHEN; divided thus, viz.: MOI-I-EN, but pronounced in two syllables, viz.: MOI-IEN. should be pronounced as if printed thus, viz.: JOIEUX; divided thus, viz.: Jor-I-KUX, but pronounced in two syllables, viz.: JOI-IEUX. ROYAUME, should be pronounced as if printed thus, viz. : ROIIAUME; divided thus, viz.: ROI-I-AUME, but pronounced in two syllables, viz.: ROI-IAUME. The pupil need not attempt to pronounce these three French I words used as examples, because the combination of vowels and other letters occurring in them, has not yet been illustrated. The pronunciation of Y with these and other combinations of letters will be explained in future lessons. In the two following words, the Y, though not placed between two vowels, is under the same Rule, viz. : PAYS, meaning, A COUNTRY, should be pronounced as if printed PAILS; divided thus, viz. : PAI-IS, and pronounced PA-EE. PAYSAGE, meaning, A LANDSCAPE, should be pronounced as if printed PAIISAGE; divided thus, viz.: PAI-ISAGE, and pronounced PA-EE-ZAZH. Name. 46. a CIRCUMPLEX Sound. U u. Like the letter U in the English word PICAYUNE,— sound prolonged. LESSONS IN ITALIAN GRAMMAR.-No. XXXV. IX. Piacere, to please. INFINITIVE MOOD. |