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infinite number of parts, even when of the same kind, and no otherwise related to each other than that they are situated near to each other; whether they are at all in contact we do not know. If thought belonged to matter, each of these infinitesimal particles of matter would be a conscious boing, and his consciousness be independent of every other particle. By what medium of communication could these particles of matter agree on forming an organised body? But the pantheist does not believe that matter is endued with thought. His theory is, that in the world there exists not only external substance, but thought or intelligence in the same substance. But as this intelligence must have a subject in which it resides, and of which it is a quality, and as it cannot be an attribute of brute matter, there must exist a substance distinct from matter, of which it is a property. Matter being divisible, inert and extended, cannot have intelligence as an attribute, which is active, indivisible, and unextended. Extension and thought, therefore, cannot be properties of the same substance. If, then, the cause of the phenomena of nature which indicate design is in the world itself, the world must, besides the gross matter which we see and feel, be possessed of a soul, or spiritual substance, in which this intelligence resides. This would bring us to the old Pagan theory of the Soul of the World. Under the material part, but under this only, there is a spiritual substance, a soul; just as in a man, we can see and feel the body, but we know that within this case there exists a spiritual substance or soul. This theory, then, admits the existence of a great spirit, possessing the attributes necessary to account for all the appearances of wisdom in the world. It differs from the common theistical doctrine only in this, that it would confine this being to the world; but for this there could be assigned no valid reason. A being possessing such power over matter as to mould it into every organised form found in animals, vegetables and minerals, must have a complete control over matter, and be perfectly acquainted with all its most hidden properties and capabilities, and must be independent of matter, and must exist every where, to carry on the processes of nature. And as we do not know the extent of the material universe, we can set no limits to the presence of this spiritual, intelligent and omnipotent_being. The object of pantheism is to get clear of the idea of a personal God, who gives laws to creatures, and superintends and governs them according to their natures. But the hypothesis, if it could be established, does not answer the purpose for which it was devised. Still, even according to the hypothesis, we must have a personal God, who knows all things and rules over all. The only other atheistical method of accounting for the phenomena of the world, as indicating the most consummate wisdom, as well as the most omnipotent power, is the hypothesis, that the universe in its present form has existed from eternity, and that all the various species of animals and vegetables now observed have always existed, and have communicated existence to one another in an endless series. And as an eternal series has no beginning, it can have no cause. There is therefore no need of supposing any first cause, from whom every thing has proceeded. As we must suppose some being to exist from eternity, we may as well suppose that the world which we see is that eternal being.

This has always been the stronghold of atheism, and therefore deserves a more special attention. The only círcumstance, however, which gives an advantage to this theory is, that it carries us back into the unfathomable depths of eternity, where our minds are confounded by the incomprehensibility of the subject. It is also to be regretted that some truly great men, in attempting to refute this theory, have adopted a mode of reasoning which is not satisfactory. This, we think, is true with respect to Bentley, who possessed a gigantic intellect; and, as might have been expected, many are his followers. Dr. Samuel Clarke has also pursued a course in his reasoning on this point which, to say the least, is not entirely free from objection. The same may be said of many others, and especially of some, including the celebrated Stapfer, who have attempted a mathematical demonstration of the falsehood of an infinite series of living organised beings.

It will be an object, therefore, to free the subject as much as possible from intricacy and obscurity, and to present arguments which shall be level to any common capacity accustomed to attend to a train of reasoning. We may certainly assume it

as an admitted principle, that every effect must have not only a cause, but an adequate cause. If wise contrivance and evident adaptation of means to an end be found in the effect, to ascribe it to an unintelligent cause is as unsatisfactory as to assign no cause.

This, then, being assumed, we would take this position as incontrovertible, that if design manifest in one effect requires an intelligent cause, the same necessity requires the same kind of a cause for any number of similar effects; and the conclusion must be the same, whether the number is finite or infinite. This evident truth has been often and happily illustrated, by supposing a chain suspended before our eyes, but reaching beyond the sphere of our vision. The lowest link requires a support, and so does the second, and there is no less need of support for every successive link as you ascend the chain; and if you suppose as many links beyond your sight as there are atoms in the universe, still the same necessity of a support is presumed to exist. There must ultimately be a support for all these suspended links. But suppose some one to allege that the chain is of infinite length, and has no beginning, we immediately begin to experience some confusion of ideas. We attempt to grasp infinity, and finding ourselves baffled in the attempt, we are apt to lose sight of the proper logical conclusion in this case. The necessity of a supporting power has no dependence on the number to be sustained. If one, if one hundred, if one thousand require support, so do any number of links. The conclusion is not in the smallest degree affected by the number, except that the more links, the stronger must be the supporting power; but this has nothing to do with our present argument. The conclusion will be of the same kind, and will as necessarily follow, in the case of effects which have in them the marks of design. The number cannot affect the conclusion. If one such effect cannot exist without an intelligent contriver, an infinite number of great effects cannot. If multiplying one cipher, or zero, by any number in arithmetic, produces nothing, and the same is the result of multiplying a thousand ciphers, the conclusion is inevitable, that an infinite number of ciphers multiplied by any number cannot result in any positive quantity. Indeed, if all the individuals in the supposed infinite series are of the same kind, all are effects, and it is absurd to conceive of an effect without a cause. Cause and effect are correlative and imply each other; and if an effect cannot exist without a cause, much less can an infinite number of effects exist without an adequate cause.

Our next argument will leave out of view altogether the idea of infinity, which is so apt to confound the mind. It is this. Every effect must not only have a cause, but that cause must be in existence and operation; for it would be absurd to think of a cause operating, when it no longer had an active existence. Let us, then, take that individual of a series of organised beings which came last into existence. Let it be an animal-a dog or horse. This individual we know came recently into being; when produced there must have been an adequate cause in existence and in operation. What was that cause? The hypothesis confines us to the preceding series of animals of the same species, supposed to have come down in uninterrupted succession from eternity. But whether the series be long or short, finite or infinite, is of no consequence as it relates to our present argument. What we are inquiring after is a cause in existence at the time this curiously organised and animated being came into existence. Now at that time the individuals of the series had all ceased to exist, except the immediate progenitors. Whatever cause existed, cannot therefore be looked for in them; and if the effect is such as manifestly to be beyond any power and skill which they possessed, the contriving and efficient cause cannot be found in the series. There must be a higher cause.

But lest some persons should have a vague notion that some hidden power might be communicated through the series, although not found in the progenitors of the animal under consideration, we will lay down a principle which is admitted in mechanical powers, and is equally applicable to all causes. It is this. In all cases where any power is communicated through a series of individuals, the whole power necessary to produce the effect, must not only be communicated to the first, but to every single thing in the series, until it reach the last, which is intended to be affected by the original power.

effected by similar means; and as the adaptation of means to an end is as evident in the works of nature as in the works of man, the argument is as conclusive in one case as in the other.

TABLE,

Showing the amount of £1 at 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 per cent. compound interest, for any number of years from 1 to 40.

Yrs.

Thus, suppose it to be required to communicate motion to a ball on a plane, by sending an impulse through a hundred balls, the principle known to all mechanicians is, that the force necessary to give the desired motion must be communicated to the first, and from the first to the second, and so on, until it reaches the ball intended to be moved. And this principle is equally applicable to all causes which operate through a suc- LESSONS IN ARITHMETIC.-No. XXXV. cession of particulars. If at the commencement of a series, an intelligent cause operated, and then ceased, or stopped short of the last effect, no sign of intelligence could exist in this, which brings us back to the same obvious principle with which we commenced, viz. that when any effect is produced, an adequate cause must exist, and be in operation at the time of its production. The simple inquiry, then, is, had the progenitors of this dog, or horse, when the animal came into existence and became animated, the skill necessary to continue the animal frame, with all its curiously contrived parts, and power and skill to give to this individual that constitution of instincts, appetites and passions suited to its condition in the world, which it possesses? I leave the atheist to answer this question. The same course of reasoning will be equally forcible as applied to fruits and vegetables, Every one of these organised beings furnishes an irrefragable argument for the being of a God; for in any one of these is evidence of the existence of a wisdom and a power which certainly do not exist in the several particulars of which the series consists.

The only modern attempt to invalidate the argument for the being of God founded on the appearance of design in the universe, is that of Mr. Hume, which is substantially this: that this argument supposes that we have seen similar works performed, from which, by analogy, we conclude that an intelligent cause is necessary to account for them; as if we find a watch we believe it to have been made by an artist, because we have before observed such works made by skilful men; but in relation to the world, it is a singular work, entirely unique. We have never seen any world produced, and, therefore, the reasoning which would hold in regard to the conclusion that the watch was made by an artist does not apply.

3 per cent.

4 per cent. 3 per cent.

6 per cent.

7

per cent.

2

3

1.030,000 1.040,000 1050,000
1.060,900 1.081,600 1-102,500
1.092,727 1.124,864 1.157,625

1.060,000

1.07,000

1.123,600 1.14,490

1.191,016 1.22,504

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1.40,255

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5 1-159,274 1.216,653 1·276,282 | 1·338,226 1.194,052 1.265,319 1.340,096 1-418,519 1.50,073 1-229,874 1.315,932 1-407,100 1-503,630 | 1.60,578 1.266,770 1.368,569 1-477,455 1.593,848 1-71,818 1-304,773 1-423,312 1.551,328 1-343,916 1.480,244 1.628,895 1.710,339 1.384,234 1.539,451 1.425,761 1-601,032 1.795,856 | 2.012,196 | 2-25,219 1-468,534 1.665,074 1.885,649 2-132,928 2.40,984 14 1.512,590 1-731,676 1.979,932 2.260,904 | 2.57,853 15 1.557,967 1.800,944 2.078,928 2.396,558 2-75,903 16 1.604,706 1-872,981 2.182,875 2.540,352 2.95,216 17 1-652,848 1.947,900 2-292,018 2.692,773 3.15,881 18 1-702,433 2.025,817 2-406,619 2-854,339 3.37,293 1.753,506 2-106,849 2-526,950 3.025,600 3.61,652 1.806,111 2.191,1232-653,298 3.207,135 3.86,968 1.860,295 2.278,768 2.785,963 3.399,564 4.14,056 1.916,103 2-369,919 2.925,261 3.603,537 4.43,040 1.973,587 2:464,716 3-071,524 3.819,750 4.74,052 2.032,794 2.563,304 3.225,100 4.048,935 5.07,236 2.093,778 2.665,836 3.386,355 4.291,871 5.42,743 2.156,592 2.772,470 3.555,673 4.549,383 5.80,735 2-221,289 2.883,369 3.733,456 | 4-822,346 6.21,386 2-287,928 2.998,703 3.920,129 5-111,687 6.64,883 2.356,566 3.118,651 4.116,136 5-418,388 7.11,425 2-427,262 3.243,398 4:321,942 5743,491 7.61,225 2.500,080 3.373,133 4.538,039 6.088,101 8-14,571 2.575,083 3.508,059

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More importance has been given to this objection, especially 25 by Dr. Chalmers, than it deserves. The objection of Hume is a mere sophism, and can unsettle no mind which understands the nature of the argument in question. According to Mr. Hume's argument we could not infer from any work of art that it had an intelligent author, unless we had seen a work of the very same kind by an artist. Suppose a boy who has never been away from his father's farm, where he has seen nothing superior to ploughs, carts, and harrows, to be conducted to a seaport, and to see a steam-frigate. As he has never seen on the farm any thing formed like this, according to Mr. Hume, he could not infer that this stupendous work was produced by an intelligent cause. To the boy it would be a singular effect, the like of which he had never witnessed, and, therefore, he could infer nothing respecting it. Now every child knows better than this. Any boy of common sense will conclude in a moment that this steam-vessel must have been the work of a skilful artificer.

In order to apply the argument from design to any effect, it is not at all necessary that we should have seen an artist engaged in producing its like. All that is necessary is, that there should immediately appear an adaptation of means to produce a certain end; and it matters not as to the argument whether we ever conceived of a similar work, or knew any thing of the artist; the certain appearance of design, or a skilful adaptation of means to an end, is always sufficient to produce the certain conclusion, that there has been a designing cause at work. The works of nature are not a singular effect, as far as the argument a posteriori is concerned. The adaptation of means to an end in these is similar to the works of design among men. The difference between a telescope and the eye of an animal is not so great as between a plough and a steam-engine. If there was any difference between the inference from seeing a steamfrigate or complicated spinning-machine, which has never been seen before, and another plough or cart, it would be in favour of the contrivance not before witnessed. The argument seems to be a fortiori in this case. And as the whole argument in regard to the works of man is founded simply on observing an adaptation of means to accomplish an end, and not the adaptation to produce some particular end which we had before seen

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Discount is the abatement or deduction made for the payment of money before it is due. For example, if I owe a man £100, payable in one year without interest, the present worth of the sum is less than £100; for, if £100 were put out to interest for 1 year at 6 per cent., it would amount to £106; at 7 per cent., to £107, etc. In consideration, therefore, of the present payment of the sum, justice requires that my creditors should make some abatement from it. This abatement is called Discount.

The present worth of a debt payable at some future time without interest, is that sum which, being put out to legal interest, will amount to the debt, at the time it becomes due.

Ex. 1. What is the present worth of £756, payable in 1 year and 4 months, without interest, when money is worth 6 per cent. per annum?

Analysis. The amount, we have seen, is the sum of the principal and interest. Now the amount of £1 for 1 year and 4 months, at 6 per cent., is £1.08; that is, the amount is 188 of the principal £1. The question then resolves itself into this: £756 is 188 of what principal? If £756 is 188 of a certain sum, Too is Tos of £756; now £756 108 = £7, and 188 £7 x 100, which is £700.

00

Or we may reason thus: Since £1.98 (amount) requires £1 principal for the given time, £756 (amount) will require as many pounds as £1.08 is contained times in £756; and £756 £1.08 £700, the same as before.

PROOF.-£700 X 08= £56, interest for 1 year and 4 months; and £700+56= £756, the sum whose present worth is required. Hence,

To find the present worth of any sum, payable at a future time without interest.

First find the amount of £1 for the time, at the given rate, as in simple interest; then divide the given sum by this amount, and the quotient will be the present worth.

The present worth subtracted from the debt will give the true discount.

This process is often classed among the problems of interest, in which the amount (which answers to the given sum or debt), the rate per cent., and the time are given, to find the principal, which answers to the present worth.

2. What is the present worth of £424-83, payable in 4 months, when money is worth 6 per cent.? What is the true discount? Solution.-£424.83 £1.02= £416·50= £416 10s., present worth; and £424·83 — £416-50 = £8.33 £8 6s. 74d., the true discount.

3. What is the present worth of £1,000, payable in 1 year, when the rate of interest is 5 per cent.?

4. What is the present worth of £1,645, payable in 1 year and 6 months, when the rate of interest is 5 per cent.?

5. What is the true discount on a bill for £2,300, payable in 6 months, when the rate of interest is 5 per cent.?

6. What is the true discount, at 6 per cent, on £4,260, payable in 4 months?

7. What is the present worth of a bill for £4,800, due in 3 months, when the rate of interest is 6 per cent. ?

8. What is the present worth of a bill for £6240, payable in 1 month, when the rate of interest is 4 per cent.?

9. A man sold his farm for £3,915, payable in 24 years: what is the present worth of the debt, at 6 per cent. discount? 10. What is the present worth of a bill for £10,000, payable at 30 days' sight, when interest is 5 per cent. per annum? 11. What is the difference between the true discount of £8,000 for 1 year, and the interest of £8,000 for 1 year, at 5 per cent.?

BANK DISCOUNT. CASE I.

[on the given sum from the time it is discounted to the time it becomes due. Hence, in ordinary business transactions, discount is the same as simple interest paid in advance. Thus, the usual discount on a bill for £105, payable in 1 year, at 5 per cent., is £5 5s., while the true discount is only £5.

The difference between ordinary discount and true discount, is the interest of the true discount for the given time. On small sums for a short period this difference is trifling, but when the sum is large, and the time for which it is discounted is long, the difference is worthy of notice. Ordinary discount is always supposed to be meant, unless the word "true" is prefixed. It is usual to charge interest for the 3 days' grace.

To find the discount on a bill or promissory note. Calculate the interest of the bill or promissory note for three days more than the specified time, and the result will be the discount. The discount subtracted from the sum named in the bill or note will give the present worth required.

Note.-Interest should be computed for the three days' grace in each of the following examples.

13. What is the discount on a bill for £465, payable in 6 months, at 6 per cent.?

14. What is the discount on a bill for £972, payable in 4 months, at 5 per cent.?

15. What is the discount on a bill for £1,492, payable in 3 months, at 7 per cent.?

16. What is the discount on a bill for £628, Į ayable at 60 days' sight, at 5 per cent.?

17. What is the present worth of £2,135, payable in 8 months, at 7 per cent.?

18. What is the present worth of a bill for £2,790, payable in 1 month, discounted at 6 per cent. at a bank?

19. What is the discount, at 5 per cent., on a bill for £1,747, payable at 90 days' sight?

20. What is the discount, at 44 per cent., on a bill for £3,143, payable in 4 months?

21. What is the discount on £5,126, payable in 30 days, at 8 per cent.

22. What is the discount on £3,841, payable in 60 days, at 6 per cent.?

23. What is the present worth of a bill for £6,721, payable in 10 months, discounted at 6 per cent. at a bank?

24. What is the present worth of a bill for £1,500, payable in 12 days, at 7 per cent. discount?

25. What is the discount on £10,000, payable in 45 days, at 6 per cent. ?

26. What is the discount on £25,260, payable in 90 days,

12. What is the discount on a bill for £850 for 6 months, at at 7 per cent.? 6 per cent.? What is the present worth of the bill?

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27. What is the difference between the true discount and ordinary discount on £5,000 for 10 years, at 6 per cent. ?

:

CASE II.

28. A man wishes to make a bill payable in 1 year, at 6 per cent., the present worth of which, if discounted at a bank, shall be just £200 for what sum must the note be made? Analysis. The present worth of £1, payable in 1 year, at 6 per cent. discount, is £1 - £To £; that is, the present worth is of the principal or sum discounted. The question then resolves itself into this: £200 (present worth) is of what sum? Now, if £200 is of a certain sum, is of £200; and £20094 £2·12766, and 188 = £2·12766 × 100, which is £212-766 £212 15s. 3d. Ans.

=

=

Or we may reason thus: Since £ present worth requires £1 principal or sum to be discounted for the given time, £200 present worth will require as many pounds as £ is contained times in £200; and £200 ÷ £·94 = £212·766, or £212 15s. 3d.

PROOF.-£212-766 X 06 = £12.7659, the discount for 1 year; and £212-766 £12.7659 £200, the given sum Hence,

To find what sum, payable in a specified time, will produce a given amount, when discounted at a bank, at a given per

cent.?

Divide the given amount to be raised by the present worth of £1, It is customary for banks and bill-brokers, in discounting a for the time, at the given rate of bank discount, and the quotient bill or promissory note, to deduct in advance the legal interest |will be the sum required to be discounted.

29. How large must I make a bill, payable in 6 months, to raise £400, when discounted at 7 per cent, discount?

30. What sum, payable in 4 months, must be discounted at a bank, at 5 per cent., to produce £950?

31. What sum, payable in 60 days, will produce £1,236, if discounted at a bank, at 8 per cent.?

32. For what sum must a bill be drawn, payable in 34 days, the proceeds of which, at 6 per cent. bank discount, will be £2,500 ?

33. For what sum must a bill be drawn, payable in 90 days, so that the proceeds, at 7 per cent. bank discount, may be £3,755?

34. A man bought a farm for £4,268 cash: how large a bill, payable in 4 months, must he take to a bank to raise the money at 6 per cent. discount?

35. A man wishes to obtain £6,324 from a bank at 6 per cent. discount: how large must he make his note, payable in 1 month and 15 days?

36. What sum, payable in 8 months, if discounted at a bank, at 6 per cent., will produce £1,000?

37. What sum, payable in 4 months, will produce £5,000, if discounted at 7 per cent. at a bank?

38. A man received £4,625 as the proceeds of a bill, payable in 60 days, discounted at a bank at 5 per cent.: what was the

amount of the note?

39. A merchant wished to pay a debt of £8,246 at a bank, by getting a bill payable in 30 days discounted, at 8 per cent.: how large must he make the bill?

INSURANCE.

Insurance is security against loss or damage of property by fire, storms at sea, and other casualties. This security is usually effected by contract with insurance companies, who, for a stipulated sum, agree to restore to the owners the amount insured on their houses, ships, and other property, if destroyed or injured during the specified time of insurance.

Insurance on ships and other property at sea is sometimes effected by contract with individuals.

The insurers, whether an incorporated company or individuals, are often termed underwriters.

The written instrument or contract is called the policy. The sum paid for insurance is called the premium. The premium paid is a certain percentage on the amount of property insured for 1 year, or during a voyage at sea, or other specified time of risk.

Rates of insurance on dwelling-houses and furniture, stores and goods, shops, manufactories, etc., vary from to 2 per cent. per annum on the sum insured, according to the exposure of the property and the difficulty of moving the goods in case of casualty. It is a rule with most insurance companies not to insure more than two-thirds of the value of a building or goods on land.

Coasting vessels are commonly insured by the season or year. In time of peace, the rate varies from 4 to 7 per cent. per annum; in time of war it is much higher. Whale ships are generally insured for the voyage, at a rate varying from to 8 per cent. on the sum insured.

5

When the general average of loss is less than 5 per cent., the underwriters are not liable for its payment.

CASE I.

To compute insurance for 1 year, or a specified time. Multiply the sum insured by the given rate per cent., as in interest. Ex. 1. A man effected an insurance on his house for £1,500, at 1 per cent. per annum: how much premium did he pay? Solution.-£1500 × 0125 (the rate) = £18·75. Ans.

2. What is the premium for insuring a store to the amount of £2,760, at per cent. ?

3. What premium must I pay for insuring a quantity of goods, worth £6,280, from Liverpool to New York, at 1 per cent.?

4. What is the annual premium for insuring a stock of goods, worth £10,200, at per cent.?

5. What is the annual premium for insuring a coasting yessel, worth £1,600, at 6 per cent. ?

6. A bookseller shipped a quantity of books, valued at £4,700, from London to Dublin, at 1 per cent. insurance: what amount of premium did he pay?

7. A merchant shipped a cargo of flour, worth £4,500, from Liverpool to New York, at 2 per cent.: how much premium did he pay?

8. What is the insurance on a cargo of teas, worth £7,500, from Canton to London, at 2 per cent.?

9. What is the annual insurance on a factory, worth £6,500, at per cent.?

10. A powder mill was insured for £1,945, at 124 per cent.: what was the annual premium?

11. A ship embarking on an exploring expedition was insured for £4,536, at 8 per cent. per annum: what did the insurance amount to in 5 years?

12. A policy of insurance for £1,500 was obtained on a whale ship, at 7 per cent. for the voyage: what was the amount paid for insurance? CASE II.

13. If a man pays £16 annually for insuring £800 on his shop, what per cent, does he pay?

per cent.

Analysis. If £800, the amount insured, costs £16 premium, £1 will cost of £16; and £16 £800 = .02, which is 2 PROOF.-£800 X 02 £16, the premium paid. Hence, To find the rate per cent., when the sum insured and the annual premium are given.

will be the rate per cent. required. Divide the given premium by the sum insured, and the quotient

Note. This case is similar in principle to Problem II. in Interest.

14. If a man pays £60 annnally for insuring £2,400 on his house and shop, what per cent. does it cost him?

15. A merchant pays £200 per annum for insuring £8,000 on his goods: what per cent. does he pay?

16. A merchant paid £122 10s. premium on a cargo of flour, worth £12,250, from Charleston to Portland: how much per cent. did he pay?

17. An importer paid £35 insurance on a quantity of cloth, worth £2,800, from London to New York: what per cent. did he pay?

CASE III.

18. A man pays £45 annually for insuring his library, which is 3 per cent. on the amount of his policy: what is the sum insured?

Analysis. Since £18 will insure £1 at the given rate for a year, £45 will insure as many pounds as 18 are contained times in £45; and £4503 £1,500. Ans.

PROOF.-£1500 X 03 £45, the given premium. Hence, To find the sum insured, when the premium and the rate per cent. are given.

Divide the given premium by the rate per cent., expressed in decimals, and the quotient will be the sum insured.

Note.-This case is similar in principle to Problem III. in Interest.

19. An importer paid £650 premium on goods from London to New York, which was 1 per cent. on the amount insured: how much did he insure?

20. A merchant paid £1,640 premium on goods from London to Constantinople, which was 2 per cent. on the worth of the goods insured: how much did he insure?

21. A premium of £487 10s. was paid on a cargo of cotton from Liverpool to New Orleans, which was per cent. on its value: what amount was insured on the cargo?

22. When the rate of insurance is 1 per cent., what sum can you get insured for £860 premium?

23. At per cent. per annum, what amount can a man get insured on his house and furniture for £20 10s. per annum? CASE IV.

To find what sum must be insured on any given property, so that, if destroyed, its value and the premium may both be recovered.

24. If a man owns a vessel worth £1,920, what sum must he get insured on it, at 4 per cent., so that, if wrecked, he may recover both the value of the vessel and the premium?

Analysis. It is plain, when the rate of insurance is 4 per cent. on a policy of £1, the owner would receive but £8% towards his loss; for he has paid £1 for insurance. Since, therefore, the recovery of £ requires £1 to be insured, the recovery of £1,920 will require as many pounds to be insured

as £ is contained times in £1,920; and £192096 Ans.

PROOF.-£2000 × 04 £80, the premium paid, and £2000 — £80 = £1920, the value of the vessel.

Hence, to find what sum must be insured on a given amount of property, so that, if destroyed, both the value of the property and the premium may be recovered.

Subtract the rate per cent. from £1, then divide the value of the property insured by the remainder, and the quotient will be the sum to be insured.

609 £2000. If an attribute is of such a kind that it belongs either exclusively or preferably to a single object, or if out of the contents of the proposition there undoubtedly or easily arises the idea of the object to which the attribute is ascribed, in such cases the substantive is often omitted in Greek, and the attribute only is employed to denote the object together with its quality. In this way the Greeks use the genitive of possession in union with the article, to designate persons, things, and circumstances which are severally to be regarded as belonging to the idea or person contained in the genitive. Thus the masculine article with the genitive denotes the son of, and in the plural, the relatives of, the subjects of; in general, him, or those persons or things which belong to the object: e.g. Aλežavoρos ó PATTOν, Alexander the (son) of Philip; oi eμavrou, the of me, that is, my (friends, children, etc.), mine; oi ПIEρIKλEOUS, the (family) of Pericles. The feminine article with the genitive, after a similar manner, signifies the wife or the daughter of: e.g. Maia Arλavros, Maia the (daughter) of Atlas; Zurparovs avoiππη, Xantippe, the (wife) of Socrates. The neuter article with the genitive indicates in the most general manner that which belongs to a person-his possessions, his condition, his circumstances: e.g. TO TOV Beшiσтokλεovs, the (relations, condition) of Themistocles; ra TOV KUVOC, the (nature) of the dog; ra piwv, the (interests) of friends; ra

25. What sum must be insured on property worth £8,240, at 1 per cent., so that the owner may suffer no loss if the property is destroyed?

26. What sum must be insured on £13,460, at 3 per cent., in order to cover both the premium and property insured? 27. If I send a cargo to the Sandwich Islands worth £25,000, what sum must I get insured, at 7 per cent., that I may sustain no loss in case of a total wreck?

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GREEK.-No. LVI.

By JOHN R. BEARD, D.D.

ATTRIBUTIVE WORDS WITH SUBSTANTIVE IMPORT; ENLARGE- THS TOλews, the (affairs) of the city. Sometimes this form of

MENT OF THE PREDICATE.

Attributives employed as Nouns.

An adjective acquires a substantive import when an object, whether a person or a thing, is set forth as the material image of a quality, or when the abstract idea of the quality is designated as a substance in and for itself. Thus, peλav, in the neuter gender, is black; that is, blackness. In the same way we use the concrete black for the abstract blackness. Thus Shakspeare

"If in black my lady's brows be deckt." So σkλnρov, hard; kaλov, beautiful; raxv, swift, are used by the Greeks as nouns. The former member of the statement given above, is illustrated by the fact that some noun of general import is understood with the adjective; as, pov, a living (thing); VEKpov, a dead (body), a corpse; Xonorov, a useful (thing); deov, what is needful, duty. With each of these adjectives, xpnua or payua is said to be understood. The simple fact, however, is, that these adjectives in the neuter gender are used as nouns. The adjective in the neuter gender approaches most nearly to the abstract quality, the denoting of which is the office of the substantive. Thus, when we say, "Do you prefer green or yellow?" we use the adjectives as abstractives, meaning the colour green and the colour yellow. Indeed, the noun and the adjective are intimately connected in sense, so that the one may, in many cases, be used for the other in other languages besides the Greek, especially in the Hebrew and the English.

The article is prefixed to these adjectives with substantive meaning, as it is prefixed to appellatives. A participle with the article acquires the form of a noun, and may often be best rendered by à relative clause, e.g. ò palwv, the scholar, or he who has learnt; o Bovλouevos, the willing man, he who is willing; o xpnooμevos, he who will use; ò ruxwv, he who chances, any one, a common-place person.

This use of the participle with the article gives rise to some of the nicest shades of meaning, and affords great flexibility to the language; these varieties of meaning may be expressed in Greek by means of this form, and by means of the infinitive with the article already noticed, for which other languages have no equivalent except in circumlocutions. For example, the participle of TUTT, with the article, undergoes many

modifications.

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Perfect, TETUOWS, he who has struck.

expression is employed merely to designate the object itself contained in the genitive, as, тa rns ruxns, fate, fate particularly considered in its workings; ra rns aperns, virtue in its adverbial attributes in connexion with the article, are often most comprehensive form. As intimated in the last lesson, employed to denote the relations of time, place, and things indicated in the adverbs severally; thus, o ew, those (who are) without; oi porepov, those (who were) aforetime. In a similar manner with prepositions may the article be used: e.g. ETI TV, the (person who is) over something, the superintendant; oi vо Tivi, those (who are) under some one, his subjects; το επ' εμοι, so far as I am concerned; τα προς τινα, the relations to some one; oi aro Tivos, his descendants; oi ev To, the indwellers of the city; oi ev ry kig, those who Oi apoi riva, and oi Tepi Tiva, originally meant some great are of age ; οἱ κατα τινα, and οἱ επι τινος, the contemporaries. person and his attendants; but as the eye was always directed chiefly to the great person himself, so in time it fixed exclusively on him, and the phrase came to denote the principal personage alone.

With adjectival attributes, nouns were omitted which suggest themselves from the nature of the attribute itself. Thus, Xeo is omitted with deia, the right (hand), apiorepa, the left (hand); μepic with ǹ dekarn, the tenth (part), EKOσr, the twentieth (part), etc.; poipa, a portion, an allotment, with ειμαρμένη, ἡ πεπρωμένη, fate, fortune; γῆ or χωρα with ἡ pia, and moleua, a friendly (country), a hostile (country); and so with the adjectives denoting names of countries, as, Attıkn (scil. yñ); also, i woλλn (yn), the greatest part, the most part; odos with eveĩa, the straight, direct (way); and upa, with the cardinal numbers, to indicate the days of the month, as, voтepaia, ǹ eжiovoa, naupiov, the next day, the coming day, the morrow; and TроTEрaia, the day before. Texvn is understood with adjectives ending in un, denoting skill in a certain art or profession, e.g. iarpun, the healing (art), pnropun, the speaking (art), whence the word (and the form of the word) rhetoric. Iepa, rites, is to to be supplied with the names of festivals, as, ra eπivikia, the victor's (festival); ra Aovvota, the (feast) of Bacchus, the Bacchanalia. So yvwun goes with vikoa, the conquering (opinion), the prevailing view. In the same way are used several technical terms, as, in the military art, ro detov (scil. Kepas, wing), the right; ro Evwvvpov, the left (wing); also the grammatical word roots. case, e.g. Yevikη, genitive, dorukη, dative, etc. In the same way συλλάβη, syllable, is understood with ληγουσα, the ter minating syllable; apaλnyovaa, the penult, that is the last syllable but one; and προσφδια, accent with βαρεῖα, οξεία, the acute and the grave; βιβλος and βιβλιον, also συγγραμμα, book, writing, with parts and titles of books; finally, the musical term xopon, string, is implied with varŋ, the highest, vηrn, the lowest (on the lyre), and appovia, concord, with

These modifications may be extended through the middle | δια πασῶν, ἡ δια τετταρων, etc. and passive voices.

Other omissions of substantives are permitted only when

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