(107 A.)

this character are competent in a proper | ures based on the value tables, and used to case, in view of the language of this court illustrate the method of applying them.

Counsel stated the present value of $1,000 a year to be 10 times the present value or $100 a year, or $975, and the present value for a period of 10 years to be 10 times the present value of the same amount for the period of 1 year. As a matter of fact, the

to the table, is $97.50, while the present value for 10 years is $790.95. There is no doubt as to the incorrectness of the illustration used by counsel; it is not apparent, however, that his mistake prejudiced defendant. The jury had the table before them in their deliberations, the trial judge charged upon it with caution, and they could see for themselves, at a glance, the actual present value of $100 for a period of from 1 to 29 years. We find nothing in the record to indicate, and there is no reason to believe, they adopted the method used by counsel in his illustration, and multiplied the present value for 1 year by the number of years of plaintiff's expectation of life, since the table contained the figures already computed for any number of years they might find plaintiff would live. The court stated, on a motion for a new trial, that the evidence justified a find

in Seeherman v. Wilkes-Barre Co., 255 Pa. 11, 17, 99 Atl. 174, and the rulings in Fletcher v. Wilmington Steamboat Co., 261 Pa. 1, 6, 104 Atl. 60. But it is argued that the principles stated in those decisions should be limited to total disability. No adequate reason is given for making the distinction sug-present value of $100 for 1 year, according gested, and on principle none appears to exist. In either case, the question to be answered is merely the present value of such sum of money as the jury may award plaintiff, and the present value tables do not enter into the ascertainment of that sum, but are called into use only after the amount of weekly, monthly, or yearly loss, as the case may be, has been fixed from a consideration of the testimony. Unlike the mortality tables, the present value tables are not intended to establish expectancy of life; they are merely mathematical computations applicable in any case, after their accuracy and relevancy have been established, to aid the jury in making calculations they would otherwise be obliged to make for themselves, and, consequently, involving a tedious process. There is no difference in principle whether the injuries suffered by plaintiff resulted in a total or only partial impair- ing of total loss of earning power, and that ment of his earning capacity. In either case the first question is the extent of loss of earning power resulting from the acciIdent either weekly, monthly, or yearly, as the case may be, the length of time the impairment will probably continue, and the depreciation of earnings by reason of advancing age, and other matters proper to be considered. After this sum has been fixed, the present value tables may be resorted to for the purpose of making a mathematical calculation, based on expectancy of plaintiff's impairment, which may or may not be the full number of years allowed by the mortality tables, depending upon the condition of his health, his occupation, manner of living, etc. In Kerrigan v. Penna. R. R., 194 Pa. 98, 44 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Feb. 24, Atl. 1069, the reason for excluding annuity tables was that they were based on the same theory as mortality tables, and represented the cost of purchasing an annuity of a stipulated amount, payable during the lifetime of a particular person, and in making up the table there necessarily entered into it a calculation of the element of expectancy of life of the annuitant in the same manner as the mortality tables. In the value table, offered in this case, there is no element of insurance or expectation of life; it merely sets out a mathematical calculation of the present values based upon the arbitrary sum of $100

per year.

[3] Objection is also made to the remarks of counsel for plaintiff in his address to the jury, owing to inaccuracies in the use of fig

the amount of the verdict was reasonable
and fair under all the circumstances, and
in view of the nature of plaintiff's injuries.
It does not appear, therefore, that defend-
ant was harmed by the illustration given by
counsel for plaintiff. On this view of the
case we deem it unnecessary to consider
whether the remarks complained of were
properly made a part of the record.
The judgment is affirmed.

(264 Pa. 61)

REILLY v. PRUDENTIAL INS. CO. OF
AMERICA.

1919.)

INSURANCE 84(5) SUIT BY AGENT FOR
COMMISSIONS-RIGHT TO TRANSACT BUSI-
NESS IN THE STATE.

Where a contract between a foreign insurance company and its agent allowed commissions to agent on insurance written by him, he could not recover commissions on insurance written before he had been authorized by insurance commissioner of the state to transact business in the state as the insurer's agent.

Appeal from Court of Common Pleas, Montgomery County.

Action by Edward A. Reilly, to the use of John Scott, Jr., and Samuel S. Hartranft, administrator d. b. n. of Linn Hartranft, deceased, against the Prudential Insurance

For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes

Company of America. From a judgment for defendant n. o. v., plaintiff appeals. firmed.

Af

(264 Pa. 25)

FISHMAN v. BROWN.

Feb. 17,

1919.)

Assumpsit for commissions by an insurance (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. agent against a foreign insurance company. At the trial it appeared that on May 17, 1900, plaintiff obtained an application from Charles T. Schoen to defendant company for a large policy of insurance on the latter's life. On June 1, 1900, plaintiff was duly appointed agent of defendant under a contract which provided compensation to the agent both during the existence of the agency and after its termination. On June 14, 1900, a state license was procured by the plaintiff to act as defendant's agent. The contract was terminated by mutual consent on July 21, 1901. Suit was brought to recover commissions on the Schoen policies. Verdict for plaintiff for $7,309.73.

APPEAL AND ERROR 748 (1)—DISSOLUTION

OF PARTNERSHIP-EXCEPTIONS TO ACCOUNT. Where plaintiff's exceptions to a partnership account filed by defendant in a suit to dissolve the partnership were vague and indefinite, and nothing appears in the assignments on appeal from dismissal of the exceptions directing attention to specific error, the appeal will be dismissed.

The court in an opinion by Miller, J., entered judgment for defendant n. o. V. The last paragraph of the opinion was as follows: We, therefore, in conclusion and in order that the single reason that compels our action may be briefly set down at the end of this opinion, repeat that the plaintiffs cannot recover and the defendant is entitled to judgment only because when Mr. Reilly obtained the Schoen risk he had not been authorized by the insurance commissioner to transact business in this state as an agent of the defendant foreign insurance company.

Argued before BROWN, C. J., and STEWᎪᎡᎢ, MOSCHZISKER, WALLING, and SIMPSON, JJ.

Aaron S. Swartz, Jr., John M. Dettra, Samuel H. High, and Montgomery Evans, all of Norristown, for appellant.

Appeal from Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia County.

Bill in equity for dissolution of partnership, appointment of receiver, and for an accounting by David Fishman against Morris Brown. Decree dissolving partnership and directing defendant to file account, and from approval of account and dismissal of exceptions to account, plaintiff appeals. Appeal dismissed.

Argued before BROWN, C. J., and STEWART, FRAZER, WALLING, and SIMPSON, JJ.

Edward Tolen, of Philadelphia, for appellant.

Bertram D. Rearick, of Philadelphia, for appellee.

PER CURIAM. This appeal by the plaintiff below is from the dismissal of his exceptions to the partnership account filed by the defendant. They were vague and indefinite, failing to specify any particular er

Frederick J. Shoyer and Henry Arronson, ror or errors in the account, and nothing both of Philadelphia, for appellee.

PER CURIAM. This judgment is affirmed for the single reason given by the learned court below for entering it.

appears in either of the two assignments before us directing our attention to any specific error that ought to be corrected.

The appeal is therefore dismissed, at appellant's costs.

For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes

(42 R. I. 260)

(107 A.)

1916, and to continue for a period not to ex

DUFFNEY v. A. F. MORSE LUMBER CO. ceed 300 weeks from December 11, 1916."

Under Workmen's Compensation Act, art. 2, §§ 6, 7, 8, 9, 23, compensation awarded a partially dependent mother for her son's death in employment is not a right vested in her,

and does not pass over to her husband, as her administrator, though he also was awarded compensation as a partial dependent, but ceased with her death.

Under this agreement, payments of $2 a week were made to each of these partial dependents from December 11, 1916, to January 9, 1918, on which date Emma Duffney died. During that period of time the respondent took from each of the said dependents separate receipts for the weekly payments of compensation of $2.

Since January 9, 1918, the employer has paid to the said petitioner under this agreement the sum of $2 weekly, but has refused to pay to him the weekly payments of $2 formerly made to Emma Duffney. In June, 1918, the petitioner as "a dependent" brought a petition against the respondent, claiming that he was entitled to the compensation Appeal from Superior Court, Providence formerly paid to his wife under the agreeand Bristol Counties; John Doran, Judge. ment on the ground that he was the sole surviving dependent of his son, Dave DuffPetition by George Duffney, as adminis- ney, and also on the ground that the right trator of Emma Duffney, his wife, to compel of Emma Duffney to compensation under the the A. F. Morse Lumber Company, the em- agreement was a vested one and passed to ployer, to pay to him weekly compensation him as her "surviving husband"; and, acawarded the wife under the Workmen's cordingly, he prayed for the enforcement of Compensation Act for the death of their the agreement so that this weekly sum of son, on whom they were partially depend- $2 formerly paid to Emma Duffney should ent. From decree ordering such payments, be paid to him for the balance of the comthe employer claims appeal. Appeal allow-pensation period. This petition was heard ed, decree reversed, and cause remanded, before Mr. Presiding Justice Tanner, who with direction to dismiss the petition.

Gardner, Pirce & Thornley, of Providence (Charles R. Haslam, of Providence, of counsel), for appellant.

filed a rescript denying the petition on the ground: First, that even if the right of Emma Duffney to compensation under the agreement was a vested one, yet it did not pass to the petitioner because he had not been

James F. Murphy, of Pawtucket, and James M. Gillrain, of Providence, for appel-appointed administrator; and, secondly, be

lee.

PARKHURST, C. J. This case comes before this court upon the respondent's appeal from a decree of the superior court. By this decree the respondent was ordered to pay to the petitioner, as administrator of the estate of Emma Duffney, his wife, weekly compensation at the rate of $2 a week, beginning January 16, 1918, until the expiration of the period of 300 weeks from December 11, 1916, the date of the injury of the deceased employé, Dave Duffney, which payments would have been payable to Emma Duffney, if she had lived, under the Workmen's Compensation Agreement No. 6510, filed in superior court February 1, 1917, and approved by the superior court on February 8, 1917.

cause the mere survivorship of the petitioner did not entitle him to all the compensation payable under the agreement to himself and wife.

Later, on January 4, 1919, the petitioner filed an amended petition substantially to the same effect as the former one, except that it was alleged that George Duffney had been appointed administrator of the personal estate of Emma Duffney, his wife, and had given a bond to pay the debts of his wife, and was therefore "entitled to demand and recover as his own property, the remaining weekly sums of $2 each accruing after the death of said Emma Duffney under said memorandum of agreement." This amended petition was heard before Mr. Justice Doran, who rendered a decision in which he held that the right of Emma Duffney as partial dependent under the compensation agreeBy the terms of this agreement, it appears ment was a vested one and upon her death that George Duffney and Emma Duffney, passed to the petitioner as administrator of his wife, were the parents of Dave Duffney, her estate. Thereafter a decree was enterthe deceased employé, were partially de-ed by Mr. Justice Doran in which it was pendent upon his earnings for support at the decreed as follows: time of his death, and payments of $2 a week were agreed to be paid by the said respondent as employer to each of the said partial dependents, "to begin as of December 11,

"(1) That the said petitioner is not entitled to said compensation formerly paid to his wife, Emma Duffney, under said agreement as surviving dependent.

For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes
107 A.-15

(107 A.)

"To hold that the dependent's right to pensation is a vested right, which passes to a legatee by will, and in case of intestacy goes to the dependent's next of kin, would be to put upon the insurer a burden not called for by the object which the act was passed to attain. In addition, the compensation awarded the dependent would go in that case to persons altogether outside the class contemplated by the act. So construed, the act would or might enrich strangers in place of doing justice to the family and next of kin of an employé killed in the course of, and so as an incident to, the business in which he was employed.

com- [ments under the act was not vested, and ceased upon the death of the dependent. But that decision does not reach to the point here raised. Its reasoning, in brief, was that there was no provision in the act for payment to be made to anybody save to the dependents therein named, and nothing to indicate a purpose that the payments be made to the personal representative of dependents in case of their death, and that to treat the right to such payments as passing to their executors or administrators often would or might result in payments to persons in no way connected with the deceased employé, or his family or kindred, and this might de"The opposite result has been reached in prive some of his kindred in truth dependent England and in Ohio. But both those decisions upon his wages for support of any payment unwere founded on provisions of the acts there der the act. The practical justice of that dein question which were not like the provisions cision is illustrated by Bartoni's Case, 225 of our Workmen's Compensation Act. The Mass. 349, 354 [114 N. E. 663, L. R. A. 1917E, decision in United Collieries, Ltd., v. Simp-765]. The word 'dependents' as matter of conson (1909) A. C. 383, was based upon the pro- struction did not seem rationally susceptible vision of the English act that in case the em- of including their personal representatives in ployé was killed a lump sum should be paid to case of their death, in view of the context of those dependent upon him. * The de- the act and its general purpose. That reasoncision in Ohio (State v. Industrial Commission ing does not apply to the case at bar." of Ohio, 92 Ohio St. 434, 436, 437 [111 N. E. 299, L. R. A. 1916D, 944, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 1162]) was founded on a provision of the act that in the case of persons wholly dependent 'the payment shall be sixty-six and two-thirds per cent. of the average weekly wages, and to continue for the remainder of the period between the date of the death, and six years after the date of injury.' This provision, construed in the light of the report of the commissioners, was held by the court to mean what by a literal interpretation of its words it provided. "For these reasons, we are of opinion that, although there is no express provision to that effect in the act, the weekly payment to be made to the dependent comes to an end when the dependent dies."

In Bartoni's Case, 225 Mass. 349, 353, 114 N. E. 663, L. R. A. 1917E, 765, the Massachusetts court, following Murphy's Case, supra, held that under the Workmen's Compensation Act the right to a weekly award for the death of a deceased employé is not vested absolutely in his widow, but continues only during her life and ceases with her death. In the Massachusetts act, there is no provision, as in ours, that, in the case of the death of a dependent widow, the compensation shall thereafter be paid to the children of the deceased employé, dependent upon her for support at the time of her death. The two cases above cited were referred to and approved by the Massachusetts court in Bott's Case, 230 Mass. 152, 119 N. E. 755, where it was held that a widow awarded compensation for the death of her husband is not barred from receiving further payments as a dependent upon her remarriage, although the remarriage renders her no longer dependent for her support upon the payments received under the act. On page 154 of 230 Mass., on page 755 of 119 N. E., the court said:

"It was held in Murphy's Case, 224 Mass. 592 [113 N. E. 283], that the right to pay

Bott's Case, supra, was cited with approval by this court in Newton v. Rhode Island Co., 42 R. I. 58, 63, 105 Atl. 363, 365. This Massachusetts case clearly shows that the question decided by this court in Newton v. Rhode Island Company, supra, is quite different from the one involved here, and consequently that case is not an authority in point here, as contended by the petitioner.

Ray

To the same effect, that the right to compensation awarded to an injured employé or to dependents is not a vested right and does not pass to a personal representative under Workmen's Compensation Acts of a nature substantially similar to our own, see, also, Erie Railroad Co. v. Callaway, 102 Atl. 6 (right of employé himself); Adm'r v. Ind. Ins. Com., 99 Wash. 176, 178, 168 Pac. 1121, L. R. A. 1918F, 561 (right of employé himself); Lahoma Oil Co. v. State Ind. Com. of Okl., 175 Pac. 836, 837 (right of employé himself); Wozneak v. Buffalo Gas Co., 175 App. Div. 268, 161 N. Y. Supp. 675, 679 (right of employé himself); Matecny v. Vierling Steel Works, 187 Ill. App. 448, 458 (dependent mother); Corcoran v. Farrel Foundry & Machine Co., 1 Conn. Comp. Dec. 42, 44, pars. 24, 25 (dependent mother); Ledford v. Casper Lumber Co., 2 Cal. Ind. Acc. Com. 679 (dependent mother).

Counsel for petitioner in their brief cite only a few cases under compensation acts in support of their position that the award of compensation to the dependent mother in this case was vested in her and at her death passed to her administrator. Most of them are not in point. Thus, Wangler, etc., Co. v. Ind. Com., 287 Ill. 118, 122 N. E. 366, and Hansen v. Brann & Stewart Co., 90 N. J. Law, 444, 103 Atl. 696, support the doctrine laid down by this court in Newton v. Rhode Island Co., 42 R. I. 58, 105 Atl. 363 (supra), that a widow receiving compensation as a