mitting Maj. Gill, the draftsman of the will, to testify as to the transactions, circumstances, and instructions given by the testatrix to him in connection with the will and its preparation, as well as what was said by her at such time relative thereto. It is contended, however, by the appellee that, even though the court erred in this respect, such error was harmless, in view of other admitted testimony. In this we cannot agree with her, in view of the relation existing between the witness and the testatrix, and the weight that would naturally be given to the evidence of such witness by the jury. [2] But the court was right in excluding the evidence of others as to what Mr. Gill had told them the testatrix had said to him at such time, as it violated the rule against the admission of hearsay testimony. tacy is not notorious or has not been proved to the satisfaction of the court, and the mere fact that letters are granted within the 20 days does not make them invalid, so as to justify their revocation. 32(1) 4. EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS -REVOCATION OF LETTERS-RIGHT OF CONSULAR OFFICER. The most-favored nation clause in the treaty between the United States and Greece does not give the consul general of Greece or his representative the paramount right to administer estate of a citizen of Greece dying in Maryland, because of privilege conferred by convention of 1911 between the United States and Sweden, and since in the instant case none of the relatives of deceased would be entitled to have letters granted to defendant under Code Pub. Civ. Laws, art. 93, §§ 14, 16, 18-31, revoked, neither the consul general nor his representative have such right. 5. TREATIES 11-CONSTRUCTION-REPEAL OF LAWS. The court granted the defendant her second and third prayers, to which ruling of the court the plaintiff excepted. The third prayer of the defendant, it is true, is not as full as the prayer in Hiss v. Weik, 78 Md. 439, 28 Atl. 400, and in other cases approved by this court; but we do not regard it as defective upon the evidence of undue influence found in this record, although it may become necessary in other cases to insert the omitted parts of the prayer to which we have referred, where the evidence of undue influence in such case differs in character from the one before us; and we find no error in the court's rulings upon the defendant's prayers. The rulings of the court be-struction urged upon them. low, however, will be reversed for the error above mentioned. Rulings reversed, and new trial awarded. It would not be just to assume, in making a treaty with a foreign country, laws of the different states were intended to be repealed or ignored, in the absence of express language or clear implication showing such intent; this being especially true in case of testamentary laws. 6. TREATIES 7-CONSTRUCTION. Though courts are bound by treaties and must not place a construction on them which would alter, add to, or take from, or in any way change them if clear and unambiguous, they can, in ascertaining the meaning of provisions which are not free from doubt, take into consideration the results which would follow con Appeal from Orphans' Court of Baltimore City. Suit by George J. Chryssikos against Vincent J. Demarco, administrator of Nick Valmus. Petition dismissed, and plaintiff appeals. Affirmed. Argued before BOYD, C. J., and BRIS- both of Baltimore, for appellant. John L. Sanford, of Baltimore, for appellee. BOYD, C. J. This is an appeal from an order of the orphans' court of Baltimore city which dismissed a petition of George J. Chryssikos, a representative of the consulate of Greece at New York, which asks the court to revoke, vacate, and set aside letters of administration which had been 32(1) granted Vincent J. Demarco on the estate of Nick Valmus, deceased, and to appoint provid-him in the place of said Demarco. Code Pub. Civ. Laws, art. 93, § 14, ing that no letters of administration shall be granted until 20 days after death of supposed intestate, applies only to cases where the intes The petition alleges that Nick Valmus was a citizen of the kingdom of Greece and died on the 1st day of May, 1918, in the (107 A.) city of Baltimore, where he resided, leaving leges which are denied citizens of this counsurviving him as his only heirs or next of try. Before discussing the treaty relied on, kin certain persons therein set out; that he we will refer to some of the provisions of left $1,800 in the Savings Bank of Baltimore our testamentary laws which relate to and other sums on deposit in the City Sav- granting letters of administration on esings Bank at Savannah, Ga. It is alleged tates of deceased persons and determine that an application for letters of adminis- the right to administer at least where no tration upon the estate of Nick Valmus was such question as that here raised is inmade by Vincent Demarco, attorney at law, volved. of Baltimore, and letters were issued to him on June 1, 1918; that Demarco is not a relative of the deceased and his surviving brother living in this country has not reached the age of 21 years; that deceased was not a citizen of the United States but a citizen of Greece, and left surviving him parents, sisters, and a brother in Greece. It is further alleged that the consul general, representing the kingdom of Greece, and in pursuance of the treaty existing between the United States and Greece, is entitled to letters of administration and is by said treaty given the right prior to relatives of the deceased. With the petition there was filed a paper writing in which Constantine Panagopoulos, consul general of the kingdom of Greece at New York, certified that George J. Chryssikos is the duly appointed and acting representative of the consulate of Greece at New York, and he nominated and directed him to make application to the orphans' court of Baltimore city for letters of administration upon the estate of Nick Valmus and to qualify as administrator. That is dated the 29th of July, 1918. An answer was filed September 3, 1918, which denied the right of the petitioner and of the consul general to relief under the petition, and alleged that it was bad in substance and not sufficient in form, etc. [1, 2] There can, of course, be no question about the obligation of state courts to obey and respect treaties made under the authority of the United States, as the Constitution and the laws of the United States made in pursuance thereof and all treaties made under the authority of the United States are the supreme law of the land, "and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding." Article 6, Const. of U. S. Article 2 of the Declaration of Rights of this state is to the same effect, and for the most part in the same language. When, then, the rights of a party under a treaty are alleged to be involved, it behooves a court to give such a case its most thorough investigation and consideration, so that such rights as he has will be fully protected, and possible international controversies be avoided. We are not required, however, to give a strained construction to the language of a treaty, or place an unreasonable interpretation upon it, for the purpose of securing to foreigners privi [3] Our testamentary laws contemplate prompt administration. "Whenever any person shall die intestate, leaving in this state personal estate, letters of administration may forthwith be granted by the orphans' court of the county wherein was the party's mansion house, or 'residence," etc. Section 14 of article 93. The provision in section 16 that "no such administration shall be granted until at least twenty days after the death of the supposed intestate, and at least seven days after application therefor," only applies "to cases where the intestacy is not notorious or has not been proved to the satisfaction of the orphans' court." Williams v. Addison, 93 Md. 41, 48 Atl. 458. If letters are granted within the 20 days, the mere fact that they were does not make them invalid, as the presumption would be that such dying intestate was notorious or was proven as required. Jones v. Harbaugh, 93 Md. 269, 48 Atl. 827. Sections 18-29 of article 93 prescribe the order in which relations of an intestate are entitled to administer, and section 30 provides that, if there be no relations, administration shall be granted to the largest creditor applying for the same. Section 31 is: "If there shall be neither husband, nor wife, nor child, nor grandchild, nor father, nor brother, nor sister, nor mother, or if these be incapable, or decline, or refuse to appear on proper summons or notice, or if other relations and creditors shall neglect to apply, administration may be granted at the discretion of the court." Section 32 provides that "It shall not be necessary to give notice to a party entitled to administration if he be out of the state, nor shall it be necessary to summon or notify collateral relations more remote than brothers and sisters of the intestate, in order to exclude them from the administration; and no relations, except a widow, child, grandchild, father, brother, sister or mother shall be considered as entitled unless they shall apply for the same." In Jones v. Harbaugh, supra, Harbaugh was the only brother and nearest relative of the deceased, who had no other relations who were entitled to letters unless they applied for them, and no creditor applied. Harbaugh was a nonresident of the state, and we heid that— He "was not entitled to notice as he was out of the state, and therefore if letters had been granted, before he applied, to the person next entitled, he could not have had them revoked. Ehlen v. Ehlen, 64 Md. 360 [1 Atl. 880]. There being no one who was entitled to letters unless he applied, 'administration may be granted at the discretion of the court.' Article 93, § 31. So, in the absence of fraud or mistake, the appellee could not have had the letters revoked, if he had applied on the ground that he was first entitled." Dr. Jones was a coroner of Baltimore city, where the decedent was found dead, and he applied for letters and obtained them two days after Harbaugh's body was found; the circumstances required prompt action. "In the event of any citizens of either of the two contracting parties dying without will or testament, in the territory of the other contracting party, the consul general, consul, vice consul general, or vice consul of the nation to which the deceased may belong, or, in his absence, the representative of such consul general, consul, vice consul general, or vice consul, shall, so far as the laws of each country will permit and pending the appointment of an administrator and until letters of administration have been granted, take charge of the property left by the deceased for the benefit of his lawful heirs and creditors, and moreover, have the right to be appointed as administrator of such estate. "It is understood that when, under the proviIt is then clear from the statutes and sions of this article, any consul general, consul, our decisions that none of the relatives of vice consul general, or vice consul, or the repreValmus who lived in Greece, or in this coun- sentative of each or either, is acting as executor or administrator of the estate of one of his detry outside of this state, would be entitled ceased nationals, said officer or his representato have the letters revoked which were grant- tive shall, in all matters connected with, related to the appellee, and it is equally clearing to or growing out of the settlement of such that they were not entitled to notice. If the estates, be in such capacities as fully subject to treaty relied on by the appellant required the jurisdiction of the courts of the country notice to be given to the consul general be- wherein the estate is situated as if said officer fore the orphans' court could grant letters or representative were a citizen of that country to the appellee, or if he is by reason of it and possessed of no representative capacity whatsoever." in a position to demand that the letters be revoked, then it vests in him powers which are not only not granted to him by the testamentary laws of this state, but are denied to relatives and all others not claiming under the consul general. [4] Without now referring to other grounds relied on by the appellee as defenses to the petition, we will examine the treaty with Greece in order that we can determine what the rights of the appellant are under it in this matter. In the consular convention of 1903 between Greece and the United States, the following article (33 Stat. 2122) appeared: "Article XI. In the case of the death of any citizen of the United States in Greece, or of a Greek subject in the United States, without having any known heirs or testamentary executors by him appointed, the competent local authorities shall give information of the circumstances to the consular officers of the nation to which the deceased belongs, in order that the necessary information may be immediately forwarded to the parties interested. "In all that relates to the administration and settlement of estates, the consular officers of the high contracting parties shall have the same rights and privileges as those accorded in the United States of America and Greece, respectively, to the consular officers of the most favored nation." The appellant, by reason of "the mostfavored nation" clause, relies on the convention of 1911 between the United States and Sweden (37 Stat. 1479). The first paragraph of article 14 of that convention is sufficiently like that in article 11 with Greece to make it unnecessary to repeat it. That is immediately followed by these two para [5, 6] In view of the testamentary laws of this state, which we have referred to above, there would seem to be but little room for discussion, were it not for the concluding sentence in the first paragraph of the treaty with Sweden quoted above, "and moreover, have the right to be appointed as administrator of such estate." It would not be just to assume that in making a treaty with a foreign country laws of the different states were intended to be repealed or ignored, in the absence of express language or clear implication showing such intent, especially such as testamentary laws, which are necessary and exist in every state, although they differ in some particulars. To permit a representative of a foreign government to set aside the provisions of testamentary laws, and take from the probate courts, orphans' courts, or by whatever name they be known, the power to determine who shall administer upon estate, when otherwise it would be in the discretion of the courts, would be conferring broad powers on him, and yet, if the contention of the appellant is sustained, that is what it amounts to; for if a consul general has paramount right to administer, and can require our courts to remove administrators appointed according to the laws of the state, and let some one he designates qualify, the consul general, or his representative, virtually makes the appointment, and not only that, but may do so when it suits his convenience, and not before. So, although courts are bound by treaties and must not place a construction on them which would alter, add to, take from, or in any way change them, or be controlled (107 A.) if clear and unambiguous, they can, in seek- [55 South. 248. Ann. Cas. 1913D, 651, as exing to ascertain the meaning of provisions, pressing a different view from that reached which are not free from doubt, take into consideration the results which would follow a construction urged upon them. The decisions have not been uniform in considering the right to administer upon estates, in cases before the courts in connection with different treaties between the United States and other countries. The general rule is thus stated in 9 R. C. L. 158, par. 5: "The duty, and by comity the authority, of a consul to receive and care for the personal estate of a citizen of his own country who may die within his consulate, and to protect the estate from spoliation, is prescribed and recognized by all civilized nations; but this power of intervention does not carry with it the right of administration of such estates, for it is fairly well settled that he has no right, as a consular officer, apart from treaty provisions, local law, or usage, to administer on such estates, or, in the absence of judicial authorization, to aid, in his character as consul, any other person in so administering them." As we pointed out, "the most-favored nation" clause in the treaty with Sweden is relied on, and the important question is whether the clause in the first paragraph in the part of that treaty quoted above, viz. "shall so far as the laws of each country will permit," applies to the last sentence of that paragraph, i. e., "and, moreover, have the right to be appointed as administrator of such estate," or is only applicable to proceedings prior to administration. Since the decision in Rocca v. Thompson, 223 U. S. 317, 32 Sup. Ct. 207, 56 L. Ed. 453, the differences between the authorities seem to turn entirely on the construction of that clause. That case went to the Supreme Court of the United States upon a writ of error from the Supreme Court of California; the case below being reported as In re Estate of Ghio, 157 Cal. 552, 108 Pac. 516, 37 L. R. A. (N. S.) 549, 137 Am. St. Rep. 145. Ghio, an Italian subject, died intestate in California, leaving a personal estate. His wife and children lived in Italy. Rocca, the consul general of Italy for California and some other states, and Thompson, the public administrator, each made application for letters of administration. The Supreme Court of California decided in favor of Thompson, and that was affirmed by the Supreme Court of the United States. The consul general based his claim on the treaty between the United States and Italy, and contended that under "the most-favored nation" clause he was entitled to administer by reason of the privileges conferred upon consuls of the Argentine Republic. Mr. Justice Day referred to a number of cases reported in the New York Supplement, to In re Wyman, 191 Mass. 276, 77 N. E. 379, 114 Am. St. Rep. 601, and to Carpigiani v. Hall, 172 Ala. 287, by the United States Supreme Court, and said that they have followed the doctrine of the Lobrasciano Case, 38 Misc. Rep. 415, 77 N. Y. Supp. 1040, "without independent reasoning upon the part of the courts adopting it." What the Supreme Court decided may be seen by reference to the syllabus of that case, as reported in the Lawyers' Edition, where it is said: "The most-favored nation clause in the Italian treaty of May 8, 1878 (20 Stat. at L. 732), does not give an Italian consul general the right to administer the estate of an Italian citizen dying intestate in one of the United States, to the exclusion of the one authorized by the local law to administer the estate, because of the privilege conferred by the Argentine treaty of July 27, 1853 (10 Stat. at L. 1009, art. 9), upon the consular officers of the respective countries as to citizens dying intestate, 'to intervene in the possession, administration, and judicial liquidation of the estate of the deceased, conformably with the laws of the country, for the benefit of the creditors and legal heirs,' since this provision, if applicable, cannot be construed as intended to supersede the local law as to the administration of such estates." After referring to statutes of the United States in reference to consuls, a section of the Consular Regulations and a letter of Mr. Hay, Secretary of State, under date of February 3, 1900, quoted in Moore's International Law Digest, vol. 5, p. 123, Mr. Justice Day said: "In this country the right to administer property left by a foreigner within the jurisdiction of a state is primarily permitted to state law. It seems to be so regulated in the state of California, by giving the administration of such property to the public administrator. There is, of course, no federal law of probate or of the ad ministration of estates." He then, with his usual clearness and force, examined the treaties, and the Supreme Court reached the conclusion announced above. The learned justice, after stating that when the treaty makers intended to commit the administration of estates of citizens of one country, dying in another, exclusively to the consul of the foreign nation, they would do so in unmistakable terms, added, "For instance, when that was the purpose, as in the treaty made with Peru in 1887, it was declared in article 33 as follows"-that article being then set out. But, by reference to it, it will be seen that it was only "until the conclusion of a consular convention, which the high contracting parties agree to form as soon as may be mutually convenient." After the quotation of that part of the treaty with Peru (25 Stat. 1461), the opinion proceeds, in a separate paragraph, "And in the convention between the United States and Sweden, proclaimed March 20, 1911, it is provided"-then follows the quotation from the treaty with Sweden. He did not repeat in terms what he had said of the Peru treaty, but, if that must be inferred from what he did say, he did not suggest or intimate that the treaty with Peru or Sweden had any binding effect on the case then before the court; for indeed we understand that the one with Peru had terminated in November, 1899, and the one with Sweden had not been made when the California case began in the lower courts. The learned justice would not, therefore, have construed the treaty with Sweden in a case in which it was in no wise involved, and, of course, the other members of the court were not called upon to do so, and the court cannot be said to have placed any construction upon it, but what was said was by way of illustration simply. That treaty can, therefore, be properly construed by us without danger of coming in conflict with a decision of that high tribunal, or lessening the force and reasoning of the opinion on the question decided. Who is to have the right to administer? definitions which may be selected shows that the last sentence is directly connected with what precedes it, and as the subject (the consul general and others) is the same for both verbs, with the qualifying expression following the subject, it would be unreasonable, and we might add ungrammatical, to apply it to one clause, and not to the other. If the last sentence in the paragraph of the treaty with Sweden referred to was not qualified by the prior language, it might well be contended that it was the intention to give the consul general, or other persons named, the exclusive right to administer, but we cannot believe that the treaty makers would have inserted the clause "so far as the laws of each country will permit" for the purpose of merely limiting the right to take charge of property left by the deceased, "pending the appointment of the adminis-"furthermore," and "also." Either of those trator, and until letters have been granted," without intending that it was to be applicable to the right to be appointed administrator, especially if that right be exclusive. Such a right would very materially interfere with the laws of some of the states, including Maryland, and would be very inconvenient and sometimes occasion losses to estates of the subjects of the countries affected by such treaties, if a consul general, or other persons named, could demand that letters granted to others be revoked on the ground that he had the exclusive right to administer. If the consul general, or others named, had the exclusive right to administer, it was not necessary, at least in most cases, to give such persons the right to take charge of the estate pending the appointment of an administrator and until letters of administration are granted, for the same persons are mentioned in the one case as in the other, and instead of a consul general, or his representative, taking charge of the property temporarily, he could qualify at once as administrator. But, in our opinion, by the proper construction of the article, the term "so far as the laws of each country will permit" applies to the last sentence as well as to the other, In most of the cases we have found, or have been referred to, since the decision of Rocca v. Thompson, the courts have reached the same conclusion we have, as to the meaning of the treaty with Sweden. In Austro-Hungarian Consul v. Westphal, 120 Minn. 122, 139 N. W. 300, decided in 1912, the court said that, while grammatically it might be contended that the qualifying clause applied only to the first part, yet the presumption, so aptly referred to by Justice Shaw in Re Ghio, 157 Cal. 552, 108 Pac. 516, 37 L. R. A. (N. S.) 549, 137 Am. St. Rep. 145, "against any intention on the part of the federal government to invade, by treaty, the province of state law, in a matter so inherently local," and in consideration of the subject-matter and the provisions of the whole article, convinced the court "that the right to appointment as administrator is |