of England. The office is unique. Its holder is a direct participant in the legislative, the executive, and the judicial functions of the government. He is the presiding officer of the House of Lords, and takes part in legislation; he is an important member of the Cabinet, and takes part in administration; he is at the head of the administration of equity, and he is first among the Law Lords in the highest branch of the Supreme Court of Judicature, the House of Lords sitting as a court. To fill the office a man must be something more than a mere legislator, than an administrator, than a great lawyer or a good judge. To fill it as it should be filled, he must combine the essential qualities of all. This should be borne in mind as one reads Mr. Atlay's book. In volume one the author writes of the lives of but three of the Victorian chancellors, Lyndhurst, Cottenham, and Truro. He includes in the volume Lord Brougham, who was not a Victorian Chancellor, but whose career was so closely allied with the fortunes of his immediate successors that it was necessary for completeness. The lives of Lyndhurst and of Brougham occupy more than four-fifths of the volume; only eighty pages are devoted to Cottenham and to Truro together. We might be disposed to find fault with the disproportion if we did not bear in mind the threefold nature of the Chancellor's office, and the type of man necessary to fill it. Lyndhurst and Brougham were leaders in Parliament, and leaders of their parties in the stirring days of Catholic Emancipation, and the First Reform of Parliament. Cottenham and Truro were of a later time, and were far less prominent in party councils. In the life of Brougham is an interesting, careful, and apparently unbiased story of the famous trial of Queen Caroline in which Brougham did his most noted service as an advocate, and in which were opposed to him, among others, his friend Sir John Singleton Copley, afterwards Lord Lyndhurst, and the famous James Parke, afterwards Lord Wensleydale. The book shows painstaking and careful investigation, and throughout the quotations from original sources are useful and apt. The author has handled his material judicially, and has avoided the position either of an enthusiastic partisan in the one case or unreasoning detractor in the other. The lawyer will perhaps be a little disappointed that Mr. Atlay has not given more space and consideration to an estimate of the legal ability and services of the chancellors; but no question can be made that he has shown with great clearness their position as great public servants in the world of affairs. The book is very readable. S. H. E. F. THE PUBLICATIONS OF THE SELDEN SOCIETY. Volume XXI. For the year 1906. BOROUGH CUSTOMS. Volume II. Edited for the Selden Society by Mary Bateson. London: Bernard Quaritch. 1906. pp. clix, 224. 4to. This volume deserves much praise for the value of the material which the editor has collected and for the high standard of scholarship which she has displayed in editing her texts. The work as a whole ranks among the best publications of the Selden Society, and is the most valuable contribution to our knowledge of English municipal history produced in recent times. An elaborate introduction explains "how the borough customs differed from the law of the land, why they differed, and in what way they were brought ultimately into such harmony that borough custom has ceased to be a matter of much practical interest." The editor calls attention to the fact that the boroughs long retained many interesting archaic practices derived from Anglo-Saxon and Danish folklaw. She also shows that the borough customs contributed something to the making of the common law. We have little to offer in the way of criticism. Perhaps the editor is inclined to see "suggestions of high antiquity" in too many borough customs. It is misleading to couple "lot," or right to share in bargains, with "scot," or duty of payment to common charges (p. xlix). An earlier reference to the term of forty weeks in the action of fresh force" at Oxford than the one mentioned on page cxx will be found in Year Book, 15 Edward III. 478, edited by L. O. Pike. C. G. ROMAN WATER LAW. Translated from the Pandects of Justinian by Eugene F. Ware. St. Paul: West Publishing Company. 1905. pp. 160. Svo. This is an interesting monograph on the subject of the Roman law concerning fresh water. It is composed of excerpts from the Corpus Juris Civilis (particularly the Digest), which bear in any way upon this subject. Primarily it is a literal translation of these excerpts. This material from the Roman law has been arranged by the author in the following topics: Rivers, Rain Water, Springs, Drip, Waterworks, Sewers, Reservoirs, Irrigation, Water-Rights, Right of Way, and the appropriate remedies and procedure of the civil law as to them. It is an advantageous contribution to the literature on Roman law. It is supplemented by the Spanish law on the same subject as found in the Siete Partidas, which was the law of Spain when America was discovered, and which underlies the modern Mexican law upon this subject. Students of legal history in Louisiana and certain of the southwestern states should welcome this addition of the author to the proper scope of his work. The author's introduction of fifteen pages is an ambitious effort. It notices the point of contact between certain American states and the civil law, discusses the codification of the Roman law by the Emperor Justinian, and gives some interesting data as to the possible influence of Assyrian, Persian, and Egyptian law on Roman water law. Furthermore, it contains what is found in the works of the French civilian, Domat, and in the French Civil Code, relative to the same subject, a feature which would have come more logically in the supplemental posterior portion of the book. C. P. S. FOIBLES OF THE BENCH. By Henry S. Wilcox. Chicago: Legal Literature Company. pp. 144. 8vo. There is small attraction to be found in this book, which is filled with chapters devoted to the delinquencies of our judiciary. The choice of the means used to point out these defects is not happy, and perhaps has resulted in the loss of what might have been an amusing satire. But attempts at wit, bitter and venomous, are not productive of any of the results the author could wish, nor does the ridicule of personal features of the fictitious judges held up for judgment aid in scoring the point he desires. The absence of personalities in the latter chapters leaves a pleasanter taste, and especially makes the general remarks on judicial needs more convincing, but where the needs are admittedly the greatest the author's lack of power of expression is the most noticeable. The press work is not a recommendation for the book. M. F. AN UNABRIDGED TABLE OF CITATIONS OF CASES IN THE WISCONSIN REPORTS. Compiled by B. K. Miller. Privately Printed. pp. 804. 8vo. In this work all citations of Wisconsin cases (up to and including the 126th volume of Wisconsin reports) have been culled from the American and English official reports, including most of the nisi prius reports. It also includes many citations from leading periodicals, and references to cases which, though they do not cite Wisconsin cases, are similar in principle. All who deal with Wisconsin law will find this book of great value. It gives the means of ascertaining the standing of any particular case, and points the way to fresh authority. It is to be hoped that a similar work will be brought out in other states. THE REMINISCENCES OF SIR HENRY HAWKINS, BARON BRAMPTON. Edited by Richard Harris. London: Edward Arnold. 1905. pp. xi, 358. 8vo. This volume is a welcome relaxation from more serious legal contemplations, and makes a most cheering companion to the blazing logs of a winter's fire. We are soon friends with the author, and as we laugh at his predicaments and his escapes from them and enjoy his anecdotes, we see England, its life and its manners, in the early part of the last century. Nor do we grow weary, for the Baron's experiences throughout his career seem to have been as many and as diversified as his progress at the bar was successful. With many well-known trials do we become more familiar, and the author can well be pardoned evidence of occasional self-satisfaction in the happy issue to which he almost always brought them. But the accounts of examinations and cross-examinations are not limited to his own; the brilliance of contemporaries is shown. The history of the Tichborne case and the part Sir Henry took in the dénouement of that astounding deception are especially interesting. M. F. A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. By Howard S. Abbott. Vol. III. St. Paul: Keefe-Davidson Company. 1906. pp. xvi, 1981-3045. 8vo. NEW ENGLAND TOWN LAW: a Digest of Statutes and Decisions concerning Foibles of THE BENCH. By Henry S. Wilcox. Chicago: Legal Literature STUDIES IN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE. By Theodore F. C. Demarest. New 8vo. 1906. HARVARD LAW REVIEW. VOL. XX. FEBRUARY, 1907. No. 4. CRUCIAL ISSUES IN LABOR LITIGATION. Dedicated to Professor Langdell. I. "We have said here more than once that these points will never be cleared up till we leave off talking about conspiracy and malice.”. -20 Law Quarterly Review 3. WHEN WHEN, if at all, does the law impose liability for preventing the formation, or causing the termination, of business relations, in cases where no breach of contract is involved, and where the methods used do not include defamation, fraud, or force, or reasonable apprehension of force? What constitutes actionable interference with the right to form or maintain business relations? (1) A attempts to enter into a contract relation with C. B induces C not to form such a relation with A; but does not use defamation, fraud, or force, or threat of force as a method of inducement. (2) A and C sustain to each other a contract relation terminable at the will of either party. B induces C to terminate the existing relation. Ex hypothesi there is no breach of contract on the part of C. Defamation, fraud, or force, or threat of force is not among the methods of inducement used by B. When, if at all, has A an action against B?1 It is proposed to consider some of the points which arise under the above general question, giving especial attention to certain topics arising in so-called "labor litigation." The purpose is to 1 It is assumed, for the present, that the right or interest of A in (2) is not entitled to any higher degree of legal protection than his interest in (1). But this has been doubted, and the question is not yet settled by authority. See 37 Am. L. Reg. (N. S.) 374; North, J., in Allen v. Flood, [1898] A. C. 1, 43, 44. discuss the question on principle rather than to present a collection and analysis of authorities. But it should be said that the number of decisions necessarily inconsistent with some of our conclusions is much smaller than might be supposed upon a superficial examination of the cases. If we look "to what has been actually decided" in many cases rather than "to what has been said," it will be found that the present reasoning would not necessarily have led to a different result. For some decisions "better reasons may now be given than were thought of when the decisions were announced." The primary question is as to the liability of a single man acting independently (i. e., not in concert with others). After this has been settled, and not till then, comes in legal order the question. whether members of a combination incur greater liability than a single man. Unfortunately, however, the discussion of the first question has been overshadowed by the discussion of the second. Defendants have, in many cases, been members of a combination, and there has been a tendency to hold them principally on that ground; the court ignoring the question whether a single man accomplishing the same result with the same purpose would have been liable, or perhaps tacitly assuming his non-liability. But in many of these cases it was unnecessary to rest the decision on the element of combination. The damage in question would have been tortious if done by a single individual acting independently.2 Of course an ordinary individual, in many instances, could not succeed in accomplishing the same damage which has been caused 1 For a critical examination of authorities bearing on various phases of the general question, see the following articles in legal periodicals: Prof. Lewis, 42 Am. L. Reg. (N. S.) 125; 18 HARV. L. REV. 444; Prof. Huffcut, 37 Am. L. Reg. (N. S.) 273; 18 HARV. L. REV. 423; Prof. Ames, 18 HARV. L. REV. 411; Prof. Wyman, 17 Green Bag 21 and 210; 15 Green Bag 208. 2 "But I should be sorry to leave this case without observing that, in my opinion, it was not essential, in order for the plaintiff to succeed, that he should establish a combination of two or more persons to do the acts complained of." Romer, L. J., in Giblan v. National, etc., Union, [1903] 2 K. B. 600, 619. "The judges may consider, with a care not yet given to the subject, what acts may be crimes when done by an individual acting alone with a view to interfere with the liberty of his neighbor; May not much conduct even now, which is masked under the euphemism of peaceful picketing, be criminal though pursued only by a single individual?" Prof. A. V. Dicey, National Review, October, 1906, p. 220. See also Prof. Dicey, in 18 L. Quar. Rev. 4; Lord Lindley, in Quinn v. Leathem, [1901] A. C. 495, 537; Fitzgibbon, L. J., in Sweeney v. Coote, Ireland [1906] 1 Ch. 51, 109, 110. |