fur trade; and which detention Great Britain had justified by the legal obstacles experienced by British creditors.Justice required that where the injury was mutual, compensation should be so; instead of which, a new condition, in behalf of British settlers, was annexed to their surrender.— 3. The right to navigate the Mississippi, which had been conceded to Great Britain by the treaty of 1783, under the mistaken idea that it extended to her territory, was now renewed, and greatly enlarged, when the mistake was discovered; though the same principle of national law was not extended to the United States, as to the navigation of the St. Lawrence; so that an unfounded claim of a small tract of unsettled country to an outlet to the ocean, was allowed to Great Britain, while the unquestioned claim of the United States to a like outlet for a settled country, of great extent, was denied. 4. In extending the list of contraband articles farther than the United States had done by other treaties, they gave an advantage to Great Britain, at the expense of France, and surrendered the protection of the neutral flag to an important branch of their staple products; naval stores, masts, and spars. 5. In the article admitting provisions to be contraband, the United States gave their sanction to an innovation in national law that was peculiarly injurious to them, and against which they had so loudly complained after the British order of the 8th of June. 6. British vessels had free admission into all the ports of the United States, while American vessels were excluded from the British ports in America, and are admitted into the West Indies only on conditions which preclude its acceptance, for besides the restriction as to cotton, the article would deprive the United States of a gainful branch of their commerce in carrying colonial produce to Europe, and moreover, limits the conceded trade to vessels of too small a burthen to engage in the lumber trade, or to compete with larger vessels. 7. The trade from America to the East Indies, by which

dollars were exchanged for India manufactures, had been permitted before the treaty, as being very convenient to the East India Company, but was now subjected to the new restriction of being direct to the United States. 8. Whilst Great Britain thus rigidly insisted on her colonial monopoly, and relaxed it only on the hardest conditions, the United States, by the article concerning discriminating and countervailing duties, deprived themselves of their only means of protecting their commerce and navigation. 9. Though the United States acknowledged every claim advanced by Great Britain, and made compensation for every injury, the greatest of the wrongs sustained by them, the impressment of their seamen, was left unredressed and unnoticed.

In addition to these objections, which so strikingly exhibit the disadvantages under which a weak power negotiates with a strong one, it may be remarked that in those parts of the treaty which have the appearance of reciprocity, the benefit is, by the different circumstances of the parties principally on the part of Great Britain. Thus, the provisions in favour of aliens holding lands, and of resident foreign merchants; against the sequestration of debts and private property; and against reprisals, operate in favour of twenty, or perhaps fifty British subjects for one American citizen. Even in the article which permitted each party to carry on the fur trade within the territories of the other, by which the United States appeared to gain more than they gave, the advantage, by reason of the reserved rights of the Hudson's Bay Company, and the established course of trade, was greatly on the side of Great Britain. The United States having made so many concessions to liberal principles for the advantage of Great Britain, might surely have expected some extension of the same principles for their benefit, by abolishing privateering, or, at least, the right of search for enemy's goods.

The defenders of the treaty, on the other hand, insisted

on the solid advantages of obtaining possession of the western posts, by which a profitable fur trade would be opened to the United States, and the danger of Indian hostility avoided; on the large amount the merchants would receive for their property illegally condemned by the British courts of vice-admiralty; and lastly, that the treaty was the only alternative of war, which, besides its direct burdens and evils, would deprive the country of the golden harvest it was then reaping from its neutrality. These arguments

which appealed so forcibly to the self-interest of individuals, finally and with difficulty prevailed, and thus Great Britain obtained for her mercantile community indemnity for the past and security for the future; important concessions to her belligerent interests; and unresisting submission to her colonial monopoly, at no other expense than a surrender of seven military posts within the limits of the United States which she was bound by treaty to surrender twelve years before; and an agreement to pay for such property as her subjects had illegally taken, after a failure to recover of the captors in the due course of law. Great as was the disparity of the parties, in point of power, a treaty so grossly unequal and defective could not have been ratified, if the immense amount of property captured had not interested so many in its ratification. Nor could this power of bribing American merchants with their own money find any counteraction among individuals from the money to be received by British creditors, as that was to be paid out of the treasury of the United States.

On the main question, whether more good or evil resulted to the United States from the ratification, there is still room for a difference of opinion. To trace out the chain of causes and effects in a series of events which have actually occurred, though not always an easy task, may yet be within the scope of human wisdom, but to perceive the concatenation, on a

different state of facts, is beyond the reach of any degree of sagacity; and no one can conclusively show that had the treaty been rejected, war would have been the certain consequence; or, though it had, that the spirit it indicated would not have prevented the subsequent spoliations on American commerce, and the war of 1813; or whether, on the whole, the substantial interest of the nation would have been thereby promoted or impeded. In such questions the most we should look to is, whether we have defended our own rights, without infringing the rights of others, and to approve or condemn our course, according as it has conformed to that rule. If tried by this test, it would not be easy to defend the treaty of 1794.

In this unqualified condemnation of the treaty it is not meant to cast any imputation on the zeal, talents, or patriotism of its distinguished negotiator. They are unquestionable, and were never more faithfully exerted. But the misfortune was, that Mr. Jay left the United States under the firm belief generally entertained by his party, that peace with England, the prevention of a closer fraternity with the French, and the continued ascendency of the federalists, all depended on his making a treaty. Every thing then, which could interest either his patriotic or party feelings, (and neither were lukewarm,) was hazarded on this single step. The moral necessity under which he acted was as well known to the British ministry as it was felt by himself, and they naturally profited by it to insist on every thing which he could venture to give, and to concede nothing which they could decently refuse.

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CHAPTER XXI.

The British Treaty ratified by the President and Senate. Proceedings in Congress. The right of Congress to refuse appropriations for executing a treaty discussed. Considerations on this subject drawn from the character of the Federal Government. Letter to Mr. Giles. The duty to take sides between conflicting parties considered. Construction of the Constitution as to the power in Congress to establish Post Roads. Letter to Mazzei. Mr. Jefferson's defence of that letter-the objections to it considered. General Washington's Farewell Address. Mr. Adams and Mr. Jefferson rival candidates for the Presidency. Mr. Jefferson chosen Vice-President-the considerations which reconciled him to that result.

1796.

THE ferment of the public mind went on increasing until the meeting of Congress, when all eyes were turned on that body to see the course it would take. In the President's opening speech to both Houses of Congress, he had mentioned the British treaty and stated that it had been ratified by the United States, with the exception of a part of the 12th article, since which the course of the British government was not known. The answer by the House of Representatives, though not explicit, plainly intimated disapprobation of the treaty. In February, the treaty being returned with the ratification of the British government, it was announced to the nation by proclamation, a copy of which was sent to each House of Congress on the 1st of March, 1796.

This course was censured as disrespectful to the House of Representatives, and as implying that the concurrence of the legislature was not necessary to give validity to the