revised by the judiciary, but citizens whose property is taken are not entitled to have notice and be heard as to the expediency of the appropriation. The legislative discretion comprehends the amount of property required for the public use; 2 the duration of the power; the extent of the estate to be taken, whether an easement or the fee; the choice of methods and proceedings in taking the property, in determining the necessity of the taking, and in preventing a perversion of the property taken from its legitimate use.5 The legislature may itself declare specifically the property to be taken for a public use, or it may confer the power on some impartial public body or tribunal, or even on the person or corporation in which the title is to be vested by the proceedings. In the case of railroads, it may, by a special act creating a corporation, describe fully the location, or appoint only the termini and principal points, leaving the selection of the precise location to the choice of the corporation. It may by general law confer such powers on corporations to be created as well as on those already existing; and even authorize corporations, thereafter to be created by individuals after certain proceedings, to build rail 1 People v. Smith, 21 N. Y. 595; New York Elevated R. Co., In re, 70 N. Y. 327; Johnson v. Joliet & C. R. Co., 23 III. 202. 2 Hingham & Q. Bridge & T. Co. v. Norfolk County, 6 Allen, 353. 3 Toledo & W. R. Co. v. Daniels, 16 Ohio St. 390; Phil., W., & B. R. Co. v. Williams, 54 Pa. St. 103. 4 Water Works Co. v. Burkhart, 41 Ind. 364; De Varaigne v. Fox, 2 Blatch. 95; Heyward v. New York, 7 N. Y. 314; Rexford v. Knight, 11 N. Y. 308; Brooklyn Park Com'rs v. Armstrong, 45 N. Y. 234, 3 Lansing, 429; Heard v. Brooklyn, 60 N. Y. 242; Chase v. Sutton Man. Co., 4 Cush. 152; Dingley v. Boston, 100 Mass. 544; Malone v. Toledo, 34 Ohio St. 541, 28 Ohio St. 643; Raleigh & G. R. Co. v. Davis, 2 Dev. & B. 451, 467. This discretion may be vested in the corporation. Charlestown & S. R. Co. v. Blake, 12 Rich. 634. 5 Townsend's Case, 39 N. Y. 171, 24 Barb. 658; Secombe v. Mil. & St. P. R. Co., 23 Wall. 108; Kramer v. Cleveland & P. R. Co., 5 Ohio St. 140; Wilkin v. St. Paul & P. R. Co., 16 Minn. 271; Weir v. St. Paul, S., & T. F. R. Co., 18 Minn. 155; Lehmicke v. St. Paul, S., & T. F. R. Co., 19 Minn. 464. See North Mo. R. Co. v. Lackland, 25 Mo. 515. 6 Boston Water Power Co. v. Boston & W. R. Co., 23 Pick. 360; Haverhill Bridge Proprietors v. County Com'rs, 103 Mass. 120; White River Turnp. Co. v. Vt. Cent. R. Co., 21 Vt. 590; Buffalo & N. Y. R. Co. v. Brainard, 9 N. Y. 100; People v. Smith, 21 N. Y. 595; Rensselaer & S. R. Co. v. Davis, 43 N. Y. 137; New York Elevated R. Co., In re, 70 N. Y. 327; Gilbert Elevated R. Co., In re, 70 N. Y. 361, 9 Hun, 303; Iron R. Co. v. Ironton, 19 Ohio St. 299; Ford v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 14 Wis. 609; Weir v. St. Paul, S., & T. F. R. Co., 18 Minn. 155; Warren v. St. Paul & P. R. Co., 18 Minn. 384; Chicago, R. I., & P. R. Co. v. Lake, 71 Ill. 333; Commonwealth v. Franklin Canal Co, 21 Pa. St. 117; New York & E. R. Co. v. Young, 33 Pa. St. 175; Cleveland & P. R. Co. v. Speer, 56 Pa. St. 325; Parke's Appeal, 64 Pa. St. 137; Stockton & D. R. Co. v. Brown, 9 H. L. C. 246. roads on any routes selected by them, and to take private property therefor. It is assumed, where such large discretion in constructing and maintaining a railroad is confided to the corporation, that the pecuniary interest of parties who invest their capital will be identical with the public interest. It is customary, however, to control that discretion both as to the route, and even the enterprise itself, through the intervention of a judicial tribunal or some administrative board; but the extent of such control, where just compensation is made, is purely a matter of legislative choice.1 In New York, the power to determine the necessity and extent of the appropriation is vested by statute in the court, and the land-owner may contest the question upon an application of the company for the taking of land. The burden of proof is on the company to show the necessity.2 If the legislature itself declares specifically the property required for a conceded public use, such declaration of the public necessity is conclusive on the judicial department, at least unless the property so declared cannot in any way serve the use in question, and the legislative act appears to be a mere attempt, under color of law, to transfer the property of one citizen to another. But more often the legislature refrains from a description of the property, and delegates a power of selection to the corporation, subject in some cases to the approval of a tribunal of some sort; and when this course is taken, questions are likely to arise as to what property is required for the railroad or public use. Occasions for Use of the Power; the Necessity or Exigency requiring its Exercise. The necessity or exigency, which justifies the exercise of the power of eminent domain, relates rather to the nature of the property and the uses to which it is to be applied, than to the circumstances of the particular case. Thus, where the corporation, in the exercise of discretion conferred. by statute, has selected land adapted to its purposes, it is not a valid objection to its appropriation, where no wanton motive 1 Buffalo & N. Y. R. Co. v. Brainard, 9 N. Y. 100; Weir v. St. Paul, S., & T. F. R. Co, 18 Minn. 155; Warren v. St. Paul & P. R. Co., 18 Minn. 384; National Docks R. Co. v. Central R. Co., 5 Stewart (N. J.), 755, 4 Stewart (N. J.), 475. 66 2 Rensselaer & S. R. Co. v. Davis, 43 N. Y. 137; New York Cent. R. Co., In N. Y. 407. re, 8 Talbot v. Hudson, 16 Gray, 417, 424; Giesy v. Cincinnati, W., & Z. R. Co., 4 Ohio St. 308, 325. appears, or great mischief is likely to ensue, that other land in the vicinity, which could have been obtained by purchase, would serve its purposes as well, or that it is already holding under a lease the estate which it seeks to take.2 The discretion of the corporation in the choice of land to be taken, when conferred by statute, is not subject to judicial revision, where the purpose for which it is taken is lawful, and no bad faith on the part of the corporation appears.3 Equity has interposed, at the suit of land-owners, to prevent an abuse of the power, where the corporation was authorized to take property without resort to a judicial or other public authority; but the extent of the power has been defined mostly in cases where the corporation has filed, under statutes, a petition for the condemnation of property. The power has been limited to a reasonable necessity, to the exclusion of subsidiary and extraordinary purposes. Thus, it has been held to be properly used to acquire land for a right of way, station grounds, station-houses for passengers, and approaches thereto, engine-houses, and warehouses for receiving, storing, and delivering goods,5 cattle-yards 1 New York & H. R. Co. v. Kip, 46 N. Y. 546; Giesy v. Cincinnati, W., & Z. R. Co., 4 Ohio St. 308; Ford v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 14 Wis. 609. See Prather v. Jeffersonville, M., & I. R. Co., 52 Ind. 16, 37. 2 New York & H. R. Co. v. Kip, 46 N. Y. 546, 67 N. Y. 227. It was held in New Central Coal Co. v. George's Creek Coal & I. Co., 37 Md. 537, 563, that a corporation could not take land for a right of way where it is already the owner of land equally useful for its purposes. Eldridge v. Smith, 34 Vt. 484; Lodge v. Phil., W., & B. R. Co., 8 Phil. 345. Eversfield v. Mid-Sussex R. Co., 1 Giffard Ch. 153, 3 De Gex & J. 286; Dodd v. Salisbury & Y. R. Co., 1 Giffard Ch. 158, 5 Jur. N. s. 782, 33 L. T. 311; Webb v. Manchester & L. R. Co., 4 Mylne & C. 116; Flower v. London, B., & S. C. R. Co., 2 Drewry & S. 330. Whether the saving of expense justifies the taking of a particular piece of land, see Dodd v. Salisbury & Y. R. Co., supra. As to the recovery of "superfluous land" by the owner under English Statutes, 1845, 8 & 9 Vict. c. 18, §§ 127, 128, see Great Western R. Co. v. May, L. R. 7 H. L. 283, L. R. 8 Q. B. 26, 5 Rensselaer & S. R. Co. v. Davis, 43 N. Y. 137; New York & H. R. Co. v. Kip, 46 N. Y. 546, 67 N. Y. 227, 6 Hun, 24; New York Cent. & H. R. R. Co., In re, 77 N. Y. 248; Mansfield, C., & L. M. R. Co. v. Clark, 23 Mich. 519; Reed v. Louisville Bridge Co., 8 Bush, 69; Hamilton v. Annapolis & E. R. R. Co., 1 Md. 553; Giesy v. Cincinnati, W., & Z. R. Co., 4 Ohio St. 308; Weir v. St. Paul, S., & T. F. R. Co., 18 Minn. 155, 167; Nashville & C. R. Co. v. Cowardin, 11 Humph. 348; Protzman v. Indianapolis & C. R. Co., 9 Ind. 467; South Carolina R. Co. v. Blake, 9 Rich. 228; Hannibal & St. J. R. Co. v. Muder, 49 Mo. 165. See Cumberland Valley R. Co. v. McLanahan, 59 Pa. St. 23; post, Chap. XVIII., TAXATION. for stock transported on the railroad,1 shops for the repair of cars and locomotives,2 turnouts and side-tracks,3 springs to supply its tanks, land for the deposit of waste earth,5 additional tracks on the entire route, and a location wide enough to admit a telegraph line for its use. 7 8 The power cannot be used to acquire property for the purpose of speculation or sale, preventing competition, aiding collateral enterprises remotely connected with the management of the railroad, or facilitating prospective business which cannot reasonably be expected; and it has been deemed essential that the land to be condemned should be such as ought, from necessity and usage, to be contiguous to the railroad. Thus, it has been held that the corporation cannot take land for the dwellings of operatives, or the manufacture of railway carriages,10 or for procuring gravel for the construction of the road,11 or for a wharf, 12 or for a temporary right of way during the construction of its main track.18 In determining the amount to be taken, reference may be had, to a reasonable extent, to the prospective wants of the company, and its necessity and convenience in the forwarding and transshipment of merchandise.14 The power to take property may be limited to the original construction of the road, or it may, where such appears to be the 2 Chicago, B., & Q. R. Co. v. Wilson, 17 Ill. 123; Low v. Galena & C. U. R. Co., 18 Ill. 324; Hannibal & St. J. R. Co. v. Muder, 49 Mo. 165; Virginia & T. R. Co. v. Elliott, 5 Nev. 358; State v. Mansfield, 3 Zab. 510. See Southern Pacific R. Co. v. Raymond, 53 Cal. 223. 3 Toledo & W. R. Co. v. Daniels, 16 Ohio St. 390; Philadelphia, W., & B. R. Co. v. Williams, 54 Pa. St. 103; Cleveland & P. R. Co. v. Speer, 56 Pa. St. 325. 4 Strohecker v. Alabama & C. R. Co., 42 Ga. 509. 5 Lodge v. Phil., W., & B. R. Co., 8 Phil. 345. 8 Rensselaer & S. R. Co. v. Davis, 43 N. Y. 137. 9 Rensselaer & S R. Co., v. Davis, 43 N. Y. 137; State v. Mansfield, 3 Zab. 510; Nashville & C. R. Co. v. Cowardin, 11 Humph. 348; Eldridge v. Smith, 34 Vt. 484. 10 Eldridge v. Smith, 34 Vt. 484; New York & E. H. R. Co. v. Kip, 46 N. Y. 546, 6 Hun, 24. 11 New York & C. R. Co v. Gunnison. 1 Hun, 496, 3 Thomp. & C. 632. 12 Iron R. Co. v. Ironton, 19 Ohio St. 299. 13 Currier v. Marietta & C. R. Co., 11 Ohio St. 228. Lands held for a canal basin, where the railroad has no canal 6 New York Central R. Co., In re, 67 connection, is not protected from levy Barb. 426. 7 Prather v. Jeffersonville, M., & I. R. Co., 52 Ind. 16. The power to take land for lateral roads is not to be implied, Baltimore & H. Turnp. Co. v. Union R. Co., 35 Md. 224. and execution. Plymouth R. Co. v. Colwell, 39 Pa. St. 337. 14 New York Cent. & H. R. R. Co., In re, 77 N. Y. 248; Lodge v. Phil., W., & B. R. Co., 8 Phil. 345. intent of the statute, authorize appropriations from time to time to supply the demands of increased business.1 As a general Property Subject to the Right of Eminent Domain. rule, all property is subject to this right, irrespective of the use to which it has already been applied, or the different estates and interests held in it. The following, like other property, are subject to condemnation: Incorporeal hereditaments, as rights of way; the right to a flow of water; the easement of one corporation within the location of another; leasehold estates; 5 land subject to a lease or mortgage, or to a judgment lien, or owned by parties under disability; land used as the site of wharves,9 or of dwelling-houses; 10 land under water; 11 land already occupied by the corporation under a lease,12 or under a defective title,13 or without color of right; 14 a subterranean right of way; 15 land owned by the State itself; 16 the public lands of the United States not already appropriated to specific national uses.17 1 Chicago, B., & Q. R. Co. v. Wilson, 17 Ill. 123; Toledo & W. R. Co. v. Daniels, 16 Ohio St. 390; South Carolina R. Co. v. Blake, 9 Rich. 228; Philadelphia, W., & B. R. Co. v. Williams, 54 Pa. St. 103; New York Cent. R. Co., In re, 67 Barb. 426; Prather v. Jeffersonville, M., & I. R. Co., 52 Ind. 16; Beck v. United New Jersey R. & C. Co., 10 Vroom, 45. See post, Chap. IX. pp. 255, 256. 2 Philadelphia, W., & B. R. Co. v. Williams, 54 Pa. St. 103; Boston Gas Light Co. v. Old Colony & N. R. Co., 14 Allen, 444; Galena & S. W. R. Co. v. Haslam, 73 Ill. 494; Sixth Avenue R. Co. v. Kerr, 72 N. Y. 330. 3 Arnold v. Hudson River R. Co., 55 N Y. 661, 49 Barb. 108. R. Co., 12 Cush. 605, 3 Allen, 142; Iron 10 Brocket v. Ohio & P. R. Co., 14 Pa. St. 241; Cleveland & P. R. Co. v. Speer, 56 Pa. St. 325; Wells v. Somerset & K. R. Co., 47 Me. 345. 11 New York Cent. & H. R. R. Co., In re, 77 N. Y. 248. 12 Kip v. New York & H. R. Co., 67 N. Y. 227. 13 Prospect Park & C. I. R. Co., In re, 67 N. Y. 371, 8 Hun, 30. 14 Secombe v. Mil. & St. P. R. Co., 23 Wall. 108; McClinton v. Pittsburg, Ft. W., & C. R. Co., 66 Pa. St. 404. 16 Brown v. Corey, 43 Pa. St. 495; 4 Cincinnati & I. R. Co. v. Zinn, 18 Baltimore & P. R. Co. v. Reaney, 42 Md. Ohio St. 417. 5 Cobb v. Boston, 109 Mass. 438. 6 New York Cent. R. Co., In re, 20 Barb. 419; North Penn. R. Co. v. Davis, 26 Pa. St. 238; Alabama & F. R. Co. r. Kenney, 39 Ala. 307; Kip v. New York & H. R. Co., 67 N. Y. 227, 46 N. Y. 546, 6 Hun, 24. 7 Watson v. New York Cent. R. Co., 47 N. Y. 157. 117. 16 Indiana Cent. R. Co. v. State, 3 Ind. 421. The right to take the land of the State, under navigable waters, was held not to be given in Stevens v. Paterson & N. R. Co., 5 C. E. Green, 126; AttorneyGeneral v. Hudson Tunnel Co., 12 C. E. Green, 176. 17 United States v. Railroad Bridge Co., 6 McLean, 517; Grintner v. Kansas 8 East Tenn. & V. R. Co. v. Love, 3 Pacific R. Co., 23 Kan. 642; Illinois Cent. Head. 63. R. Co. v. United States (Court of Claims), Boston & W. R. Co. v. Old Colony 20 Law Reporter, 630; Union Pacific R. |