ries caused by the negligence of his fellow-servants,1 or by defective machinery.2

Some authorities treat the statute as merely keeping alive a right of action, while others treat it as giving a new cause of action. But whether the statute gives a new cause of action or not, it should be interpreted as intended to give one only when the company would be liable at common law in the event of an injury not fatal in its results.

The statute usually applies not only to corporations which work their railroads, but also to other parties who are lawfully working them by lease or otherwise; but it does not apply to individual stockholders.6

5

An action cannot be maintained under the statute for an injury for which the deceased received satisfaction in his lifetime. It is not to be presumed that the statute contemplated a double payment and satisfaction.7

Averments in Pleading.

The existence of persons entitled to the amount recovered is essential to a recovery, and must be proved and alleged in the declaration or indictment.8 Some

1 Proctor v. Hannibal & St. J. R. Co., 64 Mo. 112 (overruling Schultz v. Pacific R. Co., 36 Mo. 13); State v. Maine Cent. R. Co., 60 Me. 490; Madison & I. R. Co. v. Bacon, 6 Ind. 205; Sherman v. Rochester & S. R. Co., 15 Barb. 574; Hutchinson v. York, N., & B. R. Co., 5 Exch. 343; Wigmore v. Jay, 5 Exch. 354; Paterson v. Wallace, 1 Macq. 748. See Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. State, 33 Md. 542.

2 Elliott v. St. Louis & I. M. R. Co., 67 Mo. 272; McMillan v. Saratoga & W. R. Co., 20 Barb. 449; Brydon v. Stewart, 2 Macq. 30.

3 Proctor v. Hannibal & St. J. R. Co., 64 Mo. 112, 120, 124; Fowlkes v. Nashville & D. R. Co., 9 Heisk. 829; Earhart v. New Orleans & C. R. Co., 17 La. An. 243; Sherman v. Western Stage Co., 24 Iowa, 515, 543; Read v. Great Eastern R. Co., L. R. 3 Q. B. 555.

4 Whitford v. Panama R. Co., 23 N.Y. 465, 470; Crowley v. Panama R. Co., 30 Barb. 99; Chicago v. Major, 18 Ill. 349; Richardson v. New York Cent. R. Co., 98 Mass. 85.

5 Lamphear v. Buckingham, 33 Conn.

237; Meara v. Holbrook, 20 Ohio St. 137. See Commonwealth v. Boston & W. R. Co., 11 Cush. 512.

6 State v. Gilmore, 24 N. H. 461.

7 Dibble v. New York & E. R. Co., 25 Barb. 183; Read v. Great Eastern R. Co., L. R. 3 Q. B. 555; Fowlkes v. Nashville & D. R. Co., 5 Baxter (Tenn.), 663. See Commonwealth v. Metropolitan R. Co., 107 Mass. 236, 237, 238.

8 Safford v. Drew, 3 Duer, 627; Lucas v. New York Cent. R. Co, 21 Barb. 245; Chicago & R. I. R. Co. v. Morris, 26 Ill. 400; Woodward v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 23 Wis. 400; State v. Gilmore, 24 N. H. 461; Commonwealth v. Eastern R. Co., 5 Gray, 473; Commonwealth v. Boston & A. R. Co., 121 Mass. 36; State v. Consolidated European & N. A. R. Co., 67 Me. 479, 482; Johnston v. Cleveland & T. R. Co., 7 Ohio St. 336, 339. Contra, Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Wightman, 29 Gratt. 431; Matthews v. Warner, 29 Gratt. 570; Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Sherman, 30 Gratt. 602. See Lamphear v. Buckingham, 33 Conn. 237.

authorities require it to state the names of such persons,' but others dispense with them."

The indictment or declaration must aver the negligence or default of the company; but it need not describe the kind of negligence or particular acts which constitute the default, or the names or positions of the servants by whose fault the injury was inflicted. It need not allege the exercise of due care by the injured party, or that his negligence did not contribute to the injury. It should allege that an administrator has been duly qualified, where one is required as the recipient of the fund.5

6

Damages. The measure of damages in an action under the statute is the pecuniary injury suffered by the person or persons entitled to the amount recovered. "The theory of the statute is that the next of kin have a pecuniary interest in the life of the person killed, and the value of this interest is the amount for which the jury are to give a verdict." The cause of action is distinct from the one which the injured person, if surviving, would have had, and is based on a different principle; to wit, the reasonable probability of a pecuniary benefit, from the continuance of the life of the deceased to the persons described in the act.7 The express reference to "the pecuniary injury" contained in the statute of New York, and in those of other States which have followed its terms, assumes such injury to the survivors to be the basis of the action. Compensation for a pecuniary injury being

1 Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Gettle, 3 tice where a demurrer is overruled, see W. Va. 376. Daily v. New York & N. H. R. Co., 32 Conn. 356; Carey v. Day, 36 Conn. 152.

2 Jeffersonville, M., & I. R. Co. v. Hendricks, 41 Ind. 48, 76. See Commonwealth v. Boston & W. R. Co., 11 Cush. 512.

' Commonwealth v. Boston & W. R. Co., 11 Cush. 512; State v. Manchester & L. R. Co., 52 N. H. 528; Indianapolis, P., & C. R. Co. v. Keely, 23 Ind. 133; Louisville, C., & L. R. Co. v. Case, 9 Bush, 728. See Cincinnati, H.. & D. R. Co. v. Chester, 57 Ind. 297; Claxton v. Lexington & B. S. R. Co., 13 Bush, 636.

4 State v. Manchester & L. R. Co., 52 N. H. 528; Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Whittington, 30 Gratt. 805. But see Indianapolis, P., & C. R. Co. v. Keely, 23 Ind. 133; Jeffersonville, M., & I. R. Co. v. Hendricks, 41 Ind. 48. As to the prac

5 Commonwealth v. Sanford, 12 Gray, 174; Commonwealth v. East Boston Ferry Co., 13 Allen, 589. Various points of pleading are considered in State v. Manchester & L. R., 52 N. H. 528; Cominonwealth v. Fitchburg R. Co., 120 Mass. 372, 126 Mass. 472.

6 Quin v. Moore, 15 N. Y. 432, 435; Telfer v. Northern R. Co., 1 Vroom, 188.

7 Pym v. Great Northern R. Co., 4 Best & S. 396; Paulmier v. Erie R. Co, 5 Vroom, 151; Kesler v. Smith, 66 N. C. 154; Burton v. Wil. & W. R. Co., 82 N. C. 504; Needham v. Grand Trunk R. Co., 38 Vt. 294.

The English act also in its terms contemplates an award of damages "pro

the measure of damages, the jury are to exclude from consideration (1) the personal wrong inflicted on the deceased, and his suffering and pain; (2) the wounded feelings of the survivors for whose benefit the action is brought, and their grief and loss of society; (3) exemplary or punitive damages for any matters of aggravation, even in jurisdictions where such damages are allowed in actions at common law for personal injuries. The rule of damages, as here stated, is declared in numerous decisions. Under

the statute of Connecticut, the ground of damages is held to be the injury to the deceased, and not the loss to the relatives.1 This statute does not include terms equivalent to those in which the English and New York statutes refer to the pecuniary injury of the survivors. So, also, the statute of Massachusetts, which provides a prosecution by indictment, is held to allow a greater or less penalty within the prescribed maximum and minimum, according to the degree of blame which attaches to the defendant, but not according to the loss sustained by the widow and heirs of the deceased. Its purpose is considered to be not only to provide compensation to the relatives, but to inflict punishment for the offence.3

Nominal damages may be given without proof of actual pecuniary loss. Proof of such loss has been required to sustain a verdict for more than nominal damages; 5 but the jury may infer such loss from the age, character, and capacity of the deceased and his relation to the survivors to whose benefit the amount recovered is to inure, and give substantial damages without further direct proof of special loss.6

The difficulty of stating a fixed and definite rule for measuring the compensation allowed under the statute has been frequently confessed. The jury is to exercise a sound judgment, while the court retains its corrective function in revising verdicts which award excessive damages. The court should caution the jury

v. Le Gierse, 51 Tex. 189; Southern Cotton Press Co. v. Bradley, 52 Tex. 587. See Sherman v. Western Stage Co., 24 Iowa, 515; Penn. R. Co. v. Zebe, 33 Pa. St. 318, 330; Kansas Pacific R. Co. v. Cutter, 19 Kan. 83. In Tennessee, the damages may include the suffering, loss of time, and expenses of the deceased resulting from the injury. Nashville & C. R. Co. v. Prince, 2 Heisk. 580, 585; Nashville & C. R. Co. v. Smith, 6 Heisk. 174; Nashville & C. R. Co. v. Stevens, 9 Heisk. 12; Collins v. East Tenn., V., & G. R. Co., 9 Heisk. 841; Fowlkes v. Nashville & D. R. Co., 5 Baxter, 663.

1 Goodsell v. Hartford & N. H. R. Co., 33 Conn. 51; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Burke, 6 Col. 45.

475.

4 Oldfield v. New York & H. R. Co., 14 N. Y. 310, 317; Quin v. Moore, 15 N. Y. 432; Keller v. New York Cent. R. Co., 2 Abbott Ct. App. 480, 17 How. Pr. 102.

5 Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Shannon, 43 Ill. 338; Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Weldon, 52 Ill. 290; McIntyre v. New York Cent. R. Co., 37 N. Y. 287; Mitchell v. New York Cent. & H. R. R. Co., 2 Hun, 535.

6 O'Mara v. Hudson River R. Co., 38 N. Y. 445; Ihl v. Forty-Second St. R. Co., 47 N. Y. 317; Dickens v. New York Cent. R. Co., 1 Abbott Ct. App. 505; Cornwall v. Mills, 44 N. Y. Superior Ct. 45; Chicago v. Scholten, 75 Ill. 468; Rockford, R. I., & St. L. R. Co. v. Delaney, 82 Ill. 198; Grotenkemper v. Harris, 25 Ohio St. 510.

7 Penn. R. Co. v. Zebe, 33 Pa. St. 318;

2 Carey v. Berkshire R. Co., 1 Cush. Penn. R. Co. v. Ogier, 35 Pa. St. 60;

3 Commonwealth v. Metropolitan R. Co., 107 Mass. 236.

Catawissa R. Co. v. Armstrong, 52 Pa. St. 282; Penn. R. Co. v. Keller, 67 Pa. St. 300; Paulmier v. Erie R. Co., 5 Vroom,

not to assume an unlimited discretion, and instruct it to limit the verdict to a just compensation for the pecuniary injury. The court will set aside a verdict which gives excessive damages, or damages which are beyond just compensation for the pecuniary injury and are awarded by way of example or punishment.2

The amount received by the relatives, for whose benefit the action is brought, upon policies of insurance on the life of the deceased is not to be admitted in reduction of damages.3

The circumstances of the deceased; his occupation, age, health, habits of industry, sobriety, and economy; his skill and capacity for business; the amount of his property, and even his annual earnings and the probable duration of his life, have been admitted to show the pecuniary injury which the survivors have suffered ; and ordinarily such proof is required to entitle them to substantial damages. Proof has been admitted of a father's occupation

151; Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Barron, 5 Wall. 90, 1 Biss. 412, 453; Barley v. Chicago & A. R. Co., 4 Biss. 430; South Western R. Co. v. Paulk, 24 Ga. 356; Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Shannon, 43 Ill. 338; Kansas Pacific R. Co. v. Cutter, 19 Kan. 83; Hermann v. New Orleans & C. R Co., 11 La. An. 5; Frank v. New Orleans & C. R. Co., 20 La. An. 25; Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. Bayfield, 37 Mich. 205; Tilley v. Hudson River R. Co., 29 N. Y. 252, 286; McIntyre v. New York Cent. R. Co, 37 N. Y. 287, 47 Barb. 515; Ewen v. Chicago & N. R. Co., 38 Wis. 613; Burton v. Wil. & W. R. Co., 82 N. C. 504; Kansas Pacific R. Co. v. Miller, 2 Col. 442.

1 Green v. Hudson River R. Co., 32 Barb. 25, 2 Abbott Ct. App. 277; State v. Balt. & O. R. Co., 24 Md. 84; Penn. R. Co. v. Zebe, 33 Pa. St. 318; Penn. R. Co. v. Ogier, 35 Pa. St. 60; Catawissa R. Co. v. Armstrong, 52 Pa. St.. 282; Penn. R. Co. v. Butler, 57 Pa. St. 335; Penn. R. Co. v. Keller, 67 Pa. St. 300; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Burke, 6 Cold. 45; Chicago v. Scholten, 75 Ill. 468; Burton v. Wil. & W. R. Co., 82 N. C. 504.

2 Sherman v. Western Stage Co., 24 Iowa, 515; Rose v. Des Moines Valley R. Co., 39 Iowa, 246; Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Weldon, 52 Ill. 290; Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Garvey, 58 Ill. 83; Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Austin, 69 Ill. 426; Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. v. Sunderland, 2

-

Brad. (Ill.) 307; Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. Bayfield, 37 Mich. 205; Potter v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 22 Wis. 615; McIntyre v. New York Cent. R. Co., 47 Barb. 515, 37 N. Y. 287; Telfer v. Northern R. Co., 1 Vroom, 188; Paulmier v. Erie R. Co., 5 Vroom, 151; Groff v. Cincinnati & I. R. Co., 1 Cincinnati (Superior Ct.), 264; Nashville & C. R. Co. v. Prince, 2 Heisk. 580; Nashville & C. R. Co. v. Stevens, 9 Heisk. 12; Nashville & D. R. Co. v. Jones, 9 Heisk. 27.

3 Althorf v. Wolfe, 22 N. Y. 355; Kellogg v. New York Cent. & H. R. R. Co., 79 N. Y. 72; Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Wightman, 29 Gratt. 431; Harding v. Townsend, 43 Vt. 536; Pittsburg, C., & St. L. R. Co. v. Thompson, 56 Ill. 138; Bradburn v. Great Western R. Co., L. R. 10 Exch. 1. An insurance company, which has paid the amount of a policy on the life of a person killed by the wrongful act of another, cannot recover it of the wrongdoer. Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. New York & N. H. R. Co., 25 Conn. 265.

4 Telfer v. Northern R. Co, 1 Vroom, 188; Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. State, 24 Md. 271; Tilley v. Hudson River R. Co., 24 N. Y. 471, 29 N. Y. 252; McIntyre v. New York Cent. R. Co., 37 N. Y. 287; Catawissa R. Co. v. Armstrong, 52 Pa. St. 282; Penn. R. Co. v. Butler, 57 Pa. St. 335; Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Weldon, 52 Ill. 290; Donaldson v. Miss. & M. R. Co., 18 Iowa, 280; South Western R. Co. v.