valorem principle was for several years pursued. Each was in turn attacked as unjust, and abandoned. Under the first charter of San Francisco, (act of 1850) one-third of the expense was paid out of the city treasury, and two-thirds 'paid in equal proportions by the land on both sides of the street,' etc., but the principle of apportionment is not indicated. Under the characters of 1851 and 1855 the apportionment was according to benefits. The great reform charter, the consolidation act of 1856-adopted the frontfoot principle, and this continued in force till 1859, when it was amended, and an ad valorem apportionment adopted. After trying this system two years, and after having given each principle a fair trial, in 1861 the legislature again returned to the front-foot principle, which had been in force from 1856 to 1859 the only instance of a return to a principle once tried and abandoned. And finally in 1862, after twelve years experience-the present principle of assessing upon the front-foot was continued."

By the amendatory acts of 1866 [statutes of 1865-6, page 549], 1868 [statutes of 1867-8, page 358 and 1870, [statutes of 1869-70, page 890], article four of the "consolidation act" and the intermediate amendatory acts were amended in various particulars. These amendments made many changes in the mode of procedure, but the principle of assessment remained unchanged, that is, the expenses were apportioned and assessed according to the front-foot principle.

In 1872, by an act approved April 1, 1872, [statutes of 1871-2, page 804] the legislature passed an act repealing article four of the "consolidation act," and all acts amendatory thereof, and "substituting this act [act of 1872] for said article four." This act of 1872 amplified many of the provisions contained in the original article four of the consolidation act and in the acts amendatory thereof, but continued in force the front-foot principle of assessment.

The general street improvement act now in force-the Vrooman act of March 18, 1885,-is so similar to the said act of April 1, 1872, amending the charter of the city and county of San Francisco, that it seems but reasonable to conclude that this act of April 1, 1872, furnished the model upon which the said general act now in force was patterned.

In addition to these charters of the city of San Francisco, and the acts above mentioned which are amendatory of said charters, there were many special acts passed, prior to the present constitution, which related to or provided for work upon certain particular streets or localities of the city. Thus, for example, the legislature of 1875-6 passed an act

entitled "An act to provide for the opening and extending of Leidesdorff street, in the city and county of San Francisco." [Statutes of 1875-6, page 563.] Similar special acts were passed by almost, if not every legislature, prior to the new constitution, relative to particular streets and localities in other cities of the state. The charters of each city and the acts amendatory thereof were general in their operation within the boundaries of each particular city, but these last mentioned special acts applied specially to some particular street or locality within the city.

History of the Street Improvement Acts passed since the Adoption af the New Constitution. Under the old constitution it was permissible to pass special and local laws, such as those described supra, relative to street work in the city and county of San Francisco. Such special and local laws might consist of acts providing charters for municipalities. of the state, or acts amendatory of such charters, or might consist of acts making provision for the opening of, or improvement upon, some particular street of some city. But, under the new constitution-the constitution of 1879— the provisions of which are expressly declared to be man datory and prohibitory [section 22, article I], the legislature may not pass local or special laws authorizing the laying out, opening, altering, maintaining or vacating highways, streets, or alleys, or in any case where a general law can be made applicable [section 25, article IV], and all laws of a general nature must have a uniform operation. [Section 11, article I.] Since the adoption of the new constitution general laws have been passed by our legislature, which, in so far as public improvements upon streets, etc., are concerned, have superseded those provisions of the charters of the several cities of the state which relate to street work, as well as all acts of special or local legislation. theretofore made applicable to these public municipal improvements. The history of these general laws passed since the adoption of the new constitution relative to improvements upon public streets is as follows:

The first attempt to pass a general law, (after the new constitution went into effect) in relation to municipalities, was what is commonly known as the "McClure Charter." This was an act approved April 24, 1880, and entitled "An act to provide for the organization, incorporation, and government of merged and consolidated cities and counties of more than one hundred thousand population, pursuant to the provisions of section seven, of article eleven, of the constitution of this state." This act came before the Supreme Court in the case of Desmond v. Dunn, 55 Cal. 242. The

act in question attempted or purported to provide a charter or complete organic law for all consolidated cities and counties of more than one hundred thousand populationalthough there was but one municipal corporation in the state at the date of the passage of the act to which it could by its terms apply, that is, the city and county of San Francisco. The court held the act to be unconstitutional. It was held, First: That the act, even if constitutional, could not take effect as to the corporation known as the city and county of San Francisco, because the constitution, impliedly at least, provides that cities incorporated previously to the adoption of the constitution, shall continue to exist under their existing acts of incorporation, until a majority of the electors determine to be organized under general laws, or frame a charter for their own government, as provided by sections 6 and S, article XI of the constitution. Until superseded or supplanted by a charter framed and adopted in accordance with either of these provisions of the constition, all present charters remain in full force and effect, except as to such parts as may come in conflict with the constitution. Second: In the second place it was held that this act known as the "McClure Charter," was unconstitutional because sections 6 and 7 of article XI of the constitution contemplate the enactment of general laws which shall provide for all municipal corporations regardless of population or the character of the municipal government, and not for some only; and such laws must be as general as the subject to which they relate; such general laws may themselves classify municipal corporations according to population, and make provision for each class, but each law must be general enough to cover all municipal corporations, of whatever class. Held, therefore, that this act is unconstitutional because, 1st. It excludes from its operation all municipal corporations, except "consolidated city and county governments;" and 2nd, because it is limited to municipal corporations having more than 100,000 inhabitants, and makes no provision for those having less than that population.

In 1883 by an act approved March 13, 1883, the legislature passed an act entitled "An act to provide for the organization, incorporation and government of municipal corporations." [Statutes 1883, page 93.] This act of March 13, 1883, commonly called the "Municipal Incorporation Act," "is in harmony with, and passed in obedience to the provisions of section 6, article XI, of the constitution." [Ex parte Campbell, 74 Cal. 26.] By this act, and the municipal classification act of March 2, 1883, [statutes 1883, page 24], the municipalities of the state were divided into six classes according to

population, and a complete charter provided for cities of each class, electing to be incorporated thereunder, that is to say, a charter for cities of the first class (cities having a population of more than 100,000), a charter for cities of the second class (cities having a population of more than 30,000 and not exceeding 100,000), etc.

This municipal incorporation act of March 13, 1883, provides that "any portion of a county containing not less than five hundred inhabitants, and not incorporated as a municipal corporation, may become incorporated under the provisions of this act, and when so incorporated, shall have the powers conferred, or that may hereafter be conferred by law upon municipal corporations of the class to which the same may be'ong." Such territory is incorporated as a municipal corporation of the class to which it belongs when a majority of the votes cast at the election held for that purpose are for incorporation. The same act also provides that "any city and county, city or town, organized or incorporated prior to the first day of January, eighteen hundred and eighty, at twelve oclock meridian" may become re-organized and re-incorporated under the provisions of said act, upon the proper steps being taken therefor. This is in accordance with that provision of the constitution [section 6, article XI] which provides that "cities and towns heretofore organized or incorporated may become organized under such general laws [that is general laws providing for the incorporation, organization and classification of cities and towns] whenever a majority of the electors voting at a general election shall so determine." This is one of the modes pointed out by Justice Myrick in his concurring opinion in the case of Desmond . Dunn, 55 Cal. 253, whereby cities and towns may be incorporated. But, until the people of a city or town, incorporated prior to the 1st day of January, 1880, or the people of any portion of a county, determine to become organized under a general municipal incorporation law, such as the municipal incorporation act of March 13, 1883, and until a majority of the electors vote therefor, the provisions of such general municipal incorporation act do not apply to such city or town, or territorial portion of county. Therefore there are but few cities or towns in this state to which the provisions of the municipal incorporation act, approved March 13, 1883, apply. [See In re Guerrero, 69 Cal. 100.] Consequently the provisions of that act need not be regarded save in those few cities or towns, which being incorporated prior to January 1st, 1880, have elected to re-incorporate under that act, or those cities

and towns, which, coming into existence since the new constitution took effect, have been organized under said act of March 13, 1883; and even as to such cities and towns, the provisions of the general street improvement and street opening acts, passed since the passage of said municipal incorporation act of March 13, 1883, are controlling where inconsistent with the provisions of the said municipal incorporation act, but when not inconsistent the provisions of the latter latter act, the municipal incorporation act, even in respect to street work may be applicable in those cities and towns which have incorporated thereunder. Thus in Capron v. Hitchcock, decided June 3, 1893, 33 Pac. Rep. 431, it was held that no valid assessment can be made for street work done under the general street improvement act-the Vrooman act of March 18, 1885,-if the contract therefore is void under section 628 of the municipal incorporation act of March 13, 1883, providing that no officer of a city of the fourth class, organized under said act, shall be interested in a contract to which the city is a party, and that any contract contrary to the provisions thereof shall be void; held, further, that the said municipal incorporation act of March 13, 1883— section 628-forbidding any officer of a city of the fourth class to be interested in a contract with the city, is not impliedly repealed by section 5 of the general street improvement act-the Vrooman act of March 18, 1885providing that under certain circumstances a street contract shall be awarded to the owners of a majority of the frontage on the street to be improved.

In this case, the action was brought by plaintiff to enforce the lien of an assessment on the lot of defendant in the city of San Diego, for street work alleged to have been done by plaintiff under a contract awarded to him by the city council of San Diego, and executed on the part of the city by the superintendent of streets. At all the times mentioned in plaintiff's complaint the city of San Diego was a municipal corporation of the fourth class organized and existing under said general municipal incorporation act of March 13, 1883, and plaintiff, to whom said contract to do said street work was awarded as aforesaid, was a school trustee of said city of San Diego, duly elected, qualified and acting as such school trustee for the third ward of said city of San Diego, held, that, for the reasons given above,-i. e. because of the letting of the contract to plaintiff, was violative of said provision of section 628 of the municipal corporation act, under