Opinion of the Court.

and in my name, and to my use, to ask, demand, sue for, levy, recover and receive all such sum and sums of money, debts, rents, goods, wares, dues, accounts and other demands whatsoever, which are or shall be due, owing, payable and belonging to me, or detained from me in any manner of ways whatsoever, by any person or persons whatsoever, their heirs, executors and administrators, or any of them, giving and granting unto my said attorney, by these presents, my free and whole power, and strength, and authority to prosecute and do all business belonging to me in the State of Illinois, in my name and for my benefit and behoof, and in and about such premises, to have, to sue and take all lawful means and ways in my name for the prosecution of my business, and for the receiving of any and all sums now due and owing, or which may hereafter be due and owing, to me in said State of Illinois, and upon the receipt of any such debts, dues or sums of money, aforesaid, acquittances, or other sufficient discharges, for me, and in my name, to make, seal and deliver, and, generally, all, every other act and acts, thing and things, device and devices, in the law whatsoever, needful and necessary to be done in and about the premises, that is, in and about my said business generally, in the State of Illinois, for me and in my name, to do, execute and perform as largely and amply to all intents and purposes, as I might or could do if personally present, and attorneys, one or more, under him, for the purpose aforesaid, to make and constitute, and again, at pleasure, to revoke, ratifying, allowing and holding for, firm and effectual, all and whatsoever, my said attorney shall lawfully do in and about the said premises heretofore named, by virtue hereof.

"In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and seal, this 7th day of March, 1864.

"In presence of

"JOHN A. MERRICK. [SEAL.]

"WM. B. SNOWHOOK."

We see that this instrument confers upon the attorney large powers in reference to the settlement of the business of appellant, and the collection of his claims. Appellant Merrick

Syllabus.

authorized his attorney to generally do all and every other act and acts, thing and things, device and devices, not already specified, in the law whatsoever, "needful and necessary to be done, in and about the business generally in the State of Illinois," for him and in his name. When it is remembered that the business referred to was to sue for and collect money in Illinois, there can be no doubt that this general power was amply sufficient to authorize the execution of this bond. It is as full and complete as if it had specified the execution of this bond. That act was deemed necessary to the collection of money, or the recovery of Merrick's property. If Merrick held a mortgage on this property, or had a prior lien to secure any sum of money due or owing to him, the execution of the power of attorney related to its collection, and its execution was within the scope of the authority. It seems to have been. within the scope of his authority, and was therefore binding on his principal. The judgment of the court below must be affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

J. YOUNG SCAMMON et al.

v.

THE CITY OF CHICAGO.

1. TAXES―of the power of the board of assessors of the city of Chicago to fix the valuation of property. Under the second section of the revised charter of 1863, of the city of Chicago, the board of assessors at the joint meeting therein provided for, raised the valuation of the property in the south division of the city, forty per cent above the value which had been fixed by the assessor for that division; the board considering the property en masse, and without determining the value of separate parcels. Held, that this action of the board was authorized; it being clearly within its power to adopt the valuation of property in any one of the divisions as a standard, and either raise or fall, on the valuation fixed by the respective assessors in the other divisions, in order to equalize the several assessments.

2. SAME-notice not required to be given to property owners of such action. And in such case, it is no objection, that notice was not given to the property

Opinion of the Court.

owners of such addition of forty per cent, as the law requires no notice of such subsequent action to be given.

3. PENALTIES-for a delay in payment of taxes — void. The provision contained in section 11, of this charter, providing for a penalty of five per cent, to be imposed for delay in the payment of taxes after a certain day, is void, being in conflict with that provision of the Constitution requiring uniformity of taxation.

APPEAL from the Superior Court of Chicago.

The facts in this case are fully stated in the opinion.

Messrs. HOYNE, FORSYTH & HORTON, and Messrs. BARKER & TULEY and Mr. D. L. SHOREY, for the appellants.

Mr. S. A. IRVIN, for the appellee.

Mr. JUSTICE BREESE delivered the opinion of the Court:

This record is brought here by appeal from the Superior Court of Chicago. It shows a proceeding before that court, at its February Term, 1867, by the collector of the city of Chicago, to obtain judgment against the several lots and parcels of land owned by appellants, on which the municipal taxes remained due and unpaid for the previous year, as appeared upon the general tax warrant in the hands of that officer.

Notwithstanding the multitude of objections, diverse in their character, urged upon that court, a judgment was rendered against the appellants, severally, for the amount of delinquent taxes due from them respectively, the court, through its chief justice, delivering an elaborate opinion in favor thereof, which the counsel for the city has adopted as the basis of his argument, and which is now before us.

That court entered into a close and critical examination of the local law deemed to be applicable to the case, and we have gained much valuable information from an examination of that opinion, and with which, in the main, we fully concur.

Opinion of the Court.

Without particularizing the several objections raised, it will be sufficient if we direct our attention to that one which is considered by all the parties as the principal objection, and gives character to the case, and to understand it in its full extent it will be necessary to examine with some particularity—for it is a question of chartered power-some of the provisions of the charter, which the appellee contends affords full warrant for all that has been done.

The objection is, that raising the valuation of the property in the south division of the city, by the board of assessors, when in joint meeting, after the valuation had been fixed and return made thereof by the assessor specially appointed for that division, was ultra vires, and consequently void.

It will not be denied by this court, having so often considered and decided the point, that municipal, and other authorities, claiming powers under legislative grant, can exercise such powers only as have been expressly granted, or such as are necessary to carry into effect the granted powers, and this by no strained or forced construction. The point of the objection is, that the assessors of the three divisions, when assembled in counsel, took into their consideration the whole of the real estate in the south division en masse, and without determining the value of the separate parcels, undertook by a majority vote to direct, and did direct, the city clerk, to add forty per cent to the value of this real estate, and to extend the tax at that rate on his books, against the same, all which was done.

Premising that the taxing power is one of the most necessary powers that can be conferred on the legislature, and by that body on subordinate organizations, it must at the same time be remembered it must be executed with reasonable strictness. Taxes, in some form, must be levied in every State, county and city, and their levy must be enforced upon property if not paid in money.

The power to assess the property of the city of Chicago for purposes of taxation, has been conferred by its charter on certain persons denominated a board of assessors. Rev. Charter of 1863. They are municipal officers, and are required to take

Opinion of the Court.

and subscribe the oath of office prescribed by the Constitution of the State. This board consists of three persons, who must be freeholders in the city, and one of them taken from each of the three divisions of the city. The appointment is made annually, by nomination of the mayor of the city, with the advice and consent of the common council. This board of assessors are required to perform all the duties in regard to the assessment of property for taxation, for the purpose of levying such taxes as may be imposed by the common council, and in the performance of their duties they have the same powers as are bestowed upon county or town assessors, and are subject to the same liabilities. Private Acts of 1865.

In the charter concerning assessments, it is provided by the first section, that the assessors, immediately after their appointment, shall examine and determine the valuation of the taxable real and personal estate in their respective divisions.

By the term "divisions," as here used, and elsewhere in the charter, we understand those natural divisions produced by the Chicago river and its north and south branches, so called; the territory south of the main stream, and east of the south branch, being known as the south division; that north of the same, and east of the north branch, as the north division; and the remaining territory, lying, as it does, west, both of the north and south branch, as the west division.

To aid these assessors, the city clerk is required to furnish each of them with schedules or lists of all the taxable real estate in the several divisions, on which they are required to enter, opposite the land or lot, their valuation. These are made, in each division, by the division assessor, he examining and determining for himself, in the first instance, the value of the taxable property in his division. When these assessments are completed, which must be by the first Monday of August in each year, unless further time is granted by the common council, they are to be filed in the office of the city clerk, and a day is fixed by the assessors on which they will meet and hear objections to the assessments, of which notice is to be given by the city clerk, by six days' publication in the corpora