DEATH OF ONE OF SEVERAL PLAINTIFFS.
1. Whether the suit abates thereby. The statute relative to the abate-
ment of suits by the death of parties, was designed to prevent abatement
in any case where the cause of action would survive, on the suggestion
of the death, which suggestion is a matter of form, and may be made by
either party. Stoetzell et al. v. Fullerton, 108.
2. In a joint action of assumpsit, on account, by two plaintiffs, where
one of them, pending the suit, died, and judgment was afterward rendered
therein, and without suggestion of such death having been made,—held,
that the suit did not abate; the survivor, on the death of his co-plaintiff,
being entitled to prosecute the action to final judgment. Ibid. 108.
3. Defendant should avail himself of the death of plaintiff by plea in
abatement failure to do so—effect of. In such case, the defendant, to have
availed himself of the fact of the death of one of the plaintiffs, should
have pleaded it in abatement; but, having failed to do so, and allowed the
cause to be tried upon the merits, under the plea of non-assumpsit, under
which plea such death could not have been proved, he is bound by the
judgment rendered therein, and cannot afterward question it in a collat-
eral proceeding. Ibid. 108.
EX TURPI CAUSA NON ORITUR ACTIO.
1. Where a person sends money to another with the object of inducing
the latter to use his influence to get the former nominated for an office,
without reference to the fitness of the applicant for the position he seeks,
or the public good, and the party receiving the money does not use his
influence for such applicant, but against him, the transaction on the part
of him who sends the money, is of such improper character that the law
will afford him no remedy to recover it back. Liness v. Hesing, 113.
2. During the late civil war, one B., engaged in illicit trade with the
enemy, was detected by A., and to prevent his exposure to the authorities,
he paid A. $1.000. Held, that B. could not recover it back. The law
affords no relief to joint actors in an unlawful scheme. Arter v. Bying-
ton, 468.
LACHES OF AN ADMINISTRATOR.
In not defending suit-remedy of the heirs. See ADMINISTRATION OF
Voluntarily paid-action will not lie. See USURY, 1.
MONEY VOLUNTARILY PAID.
Whether it may be recovered back, when the promise under which it was
paid was within the statute of frauds. See STATUTE OF
FRAUDS, 4.
REFUSING A VOTE AT AN ELECTION.
Who has a right of action therefor. See ELECTIONS, 1.
When it will lie and when not. See DEBT, 1, 2, 3.
FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER.
Against whom the action will lie. See FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DE-
TAINER, 1, 2, 3, 4.
ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATES.
PERSONAL ESTATE-ADMINISTRATOR.
1. Administrator sole representative of personal estate. An administra-
tor or an executor, so long as he retains his office, is the sole repre-
sentative of the personal estate of the deceased. Gold, Admr., et al. v.
Bailey, 492.
JUDGMENT AGAINST ADMINISTRATOR.
2. Binds the personal estate. In such case, in the absence of fraud, the
judgment binds the personal estate. Ibid. 492.
3. Remedy of the heir. And, if the administrator has been guilty of
laches in not defending the suit at law, the remedy is on his bond. It will
not be required of persons holding claims against an estate, to litigate
them first with the representative of the deceased, and afterward with the
heirs in like manner, without alleging fraud or collusion on the part of
the administrator. Ibid. 492.
RIGHTS OF THE HUSBAND AS ADMINISTRATOR.
4. May administer, but must distribute. Under our statute, a husband
has the right to become administrator of his wife's estate, but, like all other
administrators, he must distribute the estate according to the statute of
distribution. The statute of the 29th Car. 2d was never in force in this
State. Townsend et al. v. Radcliffe, 446.
5. Effect of act of 1861. Nor does the act of 1861, securing to married
women their separate property" during coverture," operate to change the
rule in that regard, but on the death of the wife, intestate, her property
becomes subject to the provisions of the statute concerning the distribu-
tion of intestate estates. Ibid. 446.
6. Against an administrator of the same estate. A judgment rendered in
the State of Ohio against the executor of an estate was allowed as a claim
against the estate of the deceased in the County Court of Cook county.
ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATES.
OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS. Continued.
Held, that such allowance was only prima facie evidence of the justice of
the demand against the estate. Rosenthal, Admr., v. Renick et al. 203.
7. And in such case, the claim having been founded upon a judgment
to be paid in the State of Ohio, in due course of administration, its allow-
ance by the County Court of Cook county was improper. A judgment
against an administrator in one State, is no evidence of indebtedness
against a different administrator of the same decedent in another State,
for the purpose of affecting assets received by the latter under his trust.
Ibid. 203.
RIGHTS OF CITIZENS OF OTHER STATES.
8. Where administration has been granted in another State. A citizen
of another State, in which administration has been granted upon an
estate, may come to this State and cause administration to be taken out
here, a claim allowed, and real estate sold for its payment; and, in such
case, it is not necessary to show that the personal estate in the other State
has been exhausted. Ibid. 203.
REVOCATION OF LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION.
9. Who may apply therefor. Where letters of administration had been
granted to one as the widow of the intestate, on an application to revoke the
letters on the ground that the administratrix had another husband living
at the time of her marriage with the decedent, it was held, if the. marriage
with deceased were void, the issue are illegitimate, and do not stand in a
position to apply for a revocation of the letters of administration, they
having no right to administer upon the estate. Myatt v. Myatt, Admx.,
et al. 473.
LIMITATION OF CREDITOR'S LIEN.
Within what time such a lien should be asserted. See LIMITATIONS, 1,
2, 3, 4.
Of a pre-emption right. See PRE-EMPTION, 2.
ADMISSIONS AS EVIDENCE. See EVIDENCE, 11, 12, 13.
1. He must act within the scope of his authority. The rule is an estab
lished one, that an attorney in fact can only act within the strict letter of
his authority, for the purposes and in the manner prescribed, a departure
from which will not be sanctioned. Chase v. Dana, 262.
2. Application of this rule to the confession of a judgment under a war-
rant of attorney. See JUDGMENTS, 6.
3. Power to execute a replevin bond in the name of his principal. M.
executed to H. a power of attorney under seal, authorizing him to settle
his business and collect all claims due to him in the State of Illinois;
which instrument conferred upon him extensive powers in relation thereto,
giving him authority to generally do all and every act and acts, thing and
things, service and services, in the law whatsoever needful and necessary
to be done, in the settlement of such business, and the collection of the
claims. Held, that a replevin bond, executed by H. as M.'s attorney, under
this instrument, was within the scope of his authority and binding upon
M. Merrick v. Wagner, 266.
CONTINUING AUTHORITY OF AGENT.
4. Presumption. Where a party is shown to have been the agent of
another in a particular business, and continues to so act within the scope
of his former authority, it will be presumed that his authority still con-
tinues, and will bind his principal unless the persons with whom he acts
have notice that his agency has ceased. Diversy v. Kellogg, 114.
RESCISSION OF CONTRACTS.
5. Authority of agent. An agent for a commercial house who travels
and solicits orders for his principal, in the absence of proof will not be
presumed to have authority to rescind his contracts and take back goods
furnished by the house for which he is agent, when they prove unsatis-
factory to the customer. Ibid. 114.
DELIVERY OF GOODS TO AN AGENT.
6. Of notice that his agency had ceased. In an action to recover the price
of goods sold, and delivered to an agent of the vendee, it is not error for
the court to instruct the jury that a party could only recover by showing
that the person receiving goods for his principal was his general agent
and acted within the scope of his authority, or was his special agent to
receive the goods in dispute, unless it was shown that his general agency
was continued after his principal ceased to do business. Such an instruc-
tion excludes the fact that the person may have the general agency of his
principal before he quit business and the seller not notified that he had
ceased to be his agent. Ibid. 115.
7. By the pretended agent. A party claiming that he had authority to
act as the agent of another in a particular transaction, cannot establish
such agency by his own uncorroborated testimony. Maxey et al. v. Hecke-
thorn, 437.
8. By former acts of recognition by principal. Proof of the fact, that a
person had on former occasions recognized another as his agent in making
purchases for him, is not sufficient to charge him for a purchase afterward
made by such person, claiming to act as his agent, without proof that at
the time of such subsequent purchase the vendor was cognizant of such
former acts of recognition. Ibid. 437.
RATIFICATION BY THE PRINCIPAL.
9. Must be complete. Where an attorney compromised a debt of his
principal, who, after a full knowledge of all the facts attending it, retained
the money paid on such compromise, he will be held bound by it, and will
not be permitted to ratify it so far as it is for his interest and repudiate the
residue. Henderson et al. v. Cummings, 325.
CARE AND DILIGENCE REQUIRED.
1. An agistor of stock for hire is bound to exercise reasonable care and diligence, by himself and his servants, for the safety of the property committed to his charge; and whether this has been done, is a question of fact for the jury to determine, in view of all the testimony before them. Halty v. Markel, 225.
2. An agistor of stock is bound to employ careful, skillful and trustworthy servants, and is liable for all injuries done by them, in the course of their employment, through negligence or carelessness; but is not liable for any malicious or willful act committed by them without his knowledge or consent. Ibid. 225.
ALLEGATIONS AND DECREE.
MUST CORRESPOND.
1. Parties can only recover on the case made in their pleadings. Maher v. Bull, Admx. 98.
2. So upon bill filed by one partner against another for a dissolution of the partnership, and for an account, the complainant cannot be allowed damages against the defendant for a failure in duty on the part of the latter, unless there are allegations in the bill upon which such relief can be based. Ibid. 98.
3. Nor can the complainant have specific relief based upon a sale made by the defendant in fraud of the complainant's rights, except the latter furnish the basis for such relief by appropriate allegations in his bill. Ibid. 98.
4. When a complainant in chancery seeks a specific performance, his bill must be framed with that view. Pitts et al. v. Cable et al. 103.
ALLEGATIONS AND PROOF. See PLEADING AND EVIDENCE, 5, 6, 7. AMENDMENTS.
1. When allowable. When in the record of a criminal case, a clerical error is made, the court has the power to permit such mistake to be corrected, upon a proper application by the people. Kennedy v. The People, 283.
2. So where a grand jury returns an indictment into court, and the clerk erroneously enters upon the record the return of an indictment for a different offense from that named in the indictment, the erroneous entry may be corrected by the court. Ibid. 283.
Where the verdict was sealed and the jury separated. See VERDICT, 2.
FROM BOARD OF SUPERVISORS.
1. To the Circuit Court — concerning an assessment for taxation. Under the act of 1861, an appeal will lie from a board of supervisors to the Cir
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