admissible in evidence in behalf of the plaintiff; and he may also prove
the fact that while in possession of the property he claimed it as his own
Whitaker v. Wheeler, 440.

STATEMENTS OF AGENT.

15. When not binding on the principal. Statements made by a person
in the employment of another as to the amount his employer owes another,
are not binding upon his principal, but are proper evidence to contradict
the witness and to show whether he is disposed to testify fairly. Davis
v. Hoeppner, 306.

PROOF OF AGENCY.

What is sufficient. See AGENCY, 7, 8.

AUTHENTICATION OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS.

What is sufficient. See AUTHENTICATION, 1, 2.

DEDICATION--EVIDENCE OF.

Admissibility of a plat or a map of a town. See this title, 6.

EVIDENCE UPON JUDGMENT ON DEMURRER.

In the assessment of damages. See PLEADING AND EVIDENCE, 3.
SWORN ANSWERS IN CHANCERY.

Degree of proof required to overcome them. See CHANCERY, 13.

EVIDENCE AFFECTING CREDIT OF A WITNESS.

What is admissible. See WITNESS, 3, 4.

PROOF OF MARRIAGE.

Of its sufficiency. See MARRIAGE, 1, 2, 3.

WHEN EVIDENCE SHOULD BE PRESERVED IN THE RECORD. See EXCEP.
TIONS AND BILLS OF EXCEPTIONS.

EXCEPTIONS AND BILLS OF EXCEPTIONS.

EXCEPTIONS.

1. When necessary. Where instructions asked by a party have been
refused, unless excepted to, this court will not review them. McPherson
v. Hall, 265.

BILLS OF EXCEPTIONS.

2. When necessary. The finding of a court upon the issue of nul tiel
record will be presumed correct in the absence of a bill of exceptions.
Dean v. Geeman, 286.

3. It was assigned as error on foreclosure by scire facias, that the judg
ment greatly exceeded the principal and interest of the note. The note
bore ten per cent interest, and was payable with exchange on New York.
The record contained no evidence as to what the exchange amounted to
Held, that in the absence of such evidence the court would presume proof
was made of the amount due for exchange. Camp et ux. v. Small, 37.

4. Absence of the seal in the transcript—presumption. Where there
appears to be no seal to the bill of exceptions as transcribed into the
record, and no suggestion of a diminution of the record is made by the

EXCEPTIONS AND BILLS OF EXCEPTIONS.

BILLS OF EXCEPTIONS. Continued.

appellant, it will be presumed that there was none to the original bill.
Miller v. Jenkins, 443.

5. Must be sealed. The statute 13 Edward I, chapter 31, required that
a seal should be attached to the bill of exceptions, and since that time the
British courts have regarded it essential. And the 21st section of our
practice act requires a bill of exceptions to be signed and sealed by the judge
trying the case, and thereupon the exception becomes a part of the record.
If it is wanting in either of these requirements it fails to become a part
of the record. Where there is no seal to a bill of exceptions this court
will not look into it to see if there is error. Ibid. 443.

6. Their requisites. Where the bill of exceptions fails to state that it
contains all of the evidence, the court will not examine to see whether
that which appears in the record does sustain the verdict. In such a case
it will be presumed that the finding is correct until it is rebutted by evi-
dence in the record, as the presumption must be indulged that there was
other evidence sufficient to warrant the verdict. McPherson v. Nelson et
al. 124.

EXCESSIVE DAMAGES.

New trial therefor. See NEW TRIALS, 12, 13.

EXECUTION.

WHAT IS SUBJECT TO LEVY AND SALE.

Of a pre-emption right. See PRE-EMPTION, 2.

EXPRESS COMPANY.

LOSS OF NOTE TAKEN FOR COLLECTION.

1. Liability of the company. If a bailee is robbed of goods, is is no
defense to an action against him, that the owner may still pursue the
thief and recover the property by replevin. An express company, under-
taking to collect a note, must employ the usual means therefor, or be
liable for damages resulting from their negligence. American Express Co.
v. Parsons, 312.

2. In case of the loss of a note, as in this case, if the debt may yet be
collected, the trouble, expense and inconvenience should fall on the com-
pany and not the creditor. By paying the damages occasioned by the
loss of the note, the company became invested with the right to look to
the maker for the amount due on the note to indemnify them for the
money thus paid. Ibid. 312.

FEDERAL POWERS AND STATE RIGHTS.

POWER OF CONGRESS.

Over rights and remedies in the State courts. See CONFLICT OF
LAWS, 1, 2.

FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER.
AGAINST WHOM THE ACTION WILL LIE.

1. And herein, of forcible detainer. In case of a tenant holding over
against his landlord, either the tenant, or any person claiming under
him, is, by the express provision of the statute, liable to this action.
Clark v. Barker, 349.

2. But, in the case of a forcible entry, it is the person who makes it
who is liable to the action. Ibid. 349.

3. Probably, also, the action might lie against any person going in
under the person who had made the forcible entry, collusively, with
knowledge of such force, and for the purpose of availing himself of it,
because such person might be well considered as himself committing the
forcible entry. Ibid. 349.

4. But, where a person has entered into the possession of premises,
peaceably and in good faith, as the tenant of a purchaser from one who
had previously made a forcible entry, the tenant, or even his landlord,
not being a privy to the wrongful act of the grantor, or having any
knowledge of it, such occupant is not liable to be turned out by this
summary remedy. Ibid. 349.

FORECLOSURE. See MORTGAGES, 21, 22.

FOREIGN JUDGMENTS. See JUDGMENTS, 1; ADMINISTRATION OF
ESTATES, 6, 7.

FORFEITURE.

AS BETWEEN LANDLORD AND TENANT.

For non-payment of rent. See LANDLORD AND TENANT, 1 to 9.
FORMER ADJUDICATION.

WHEN NOT A BAR.

After it is set aside. In February, 1857, P. filed her bill for dower,
in which suit a money decree was rendered for $3,455.44, in lieu of dower
in the lands; and in December, 1858, she assigned the decree to S. In
June, 1855, the city of Chicago condemned a portion of the lands in which
dower was claimed, for public improvements, and assessed the damages
thereon, but refused to pay them, whereupon suit was brought by the
heirs against the city, and judgment recovered for $12,162.65, which in
December, 1861, was satisfied by the payment of $11,500, in city bonds,
and the balance in money. In January, 1863, upon a bill of review
brought by the heirs, the decree allowing dower in gross was set aside,
and thereupon P. filed her second petition, and the court decreed dower in
the lands unappropriated by the city, and also in the bonds, at the sum of
$1,277.73, and $426.72 as interest on the same. S., the assignee of the
first decree, was not made a party to the bill of review, nor to this second
petition filed by P. Held, that the decree rendered in the former suit
having been set aside, it constituted no bar to the proceedings under the
second petition filed by P. for the same purpose. Bonner et al. v. Peter-
son, 253.

FORMER DECISIONS.

ALWOOD v. MANSFIELD, 33 Ill., 458, in regard to rendering final judgment
in the Supreme Court, overruled in Storing v. Onley, 123. See
PRACTICE IN THE SUPREME COURT, 5.

FRANKLIN COUNTY.

REMAINS IN TWENTY-SIXTH CIRCUIT.

Under act of 1867. See JUDICIAL CIRCUITS.

FRAUD.

ASSIGNMENT FOR THE BENEFIT OF CREDITORS.

Whether certain matters will render it fraudulent. See ASSIGNMENT
FOR THE BENEFIT OF CREDITORS, 1 to 14.

FRAUDS, STATUTE OF. See STATUTE OF FRAUDS.

GARNISHMENT.

WHEN THE PROCESS MAY ISSUE.

Not under judgments in rem. Under our statute, a judgment in rem
by attachment does not authorize the issuance and return of a general
execution in personam so as to issue garnishee process thereon. Gilcreest
v. Savage, 56.

GIFT.

FROM HUSBAND TO WIFE.

Whether such gift will be supported. See HUSBAND AND WIFE, 1.

GOLD CONTRACTS.

PAYABLE IN LEGAL TENDER NOTES. See CONTRACTS, 5.

GRANT.

RIPARIAN OWNERS.

1. Of the boundaries. Where three persons, in possession respectively
of certain lands, viz., A of those lying upon the east bank of a river, B
of those lying upon the west bank, and C of an island in the center, made
their respective entries for the same at the government land office on the
same day, and which lands had been separately surveyed, and purchased
by them as distinct tracts, held, that the mainland and the island having
been separately surveyed and purchased by these parties respectively as
distinct tracts, the grantees of the mainland cannot claim, that the island
purchased at the same time by C was not reserved but included in the
grant to them. Stolp et al. v. Hoyt, 220.

2. That, the grant to each being separate and distinct, neither can claim
beyond the calls of his entry and patent. That C acquired the same
riparian rights as A and B, two fila aquæ being established, one on each
side of the island. Ibid. 220.

3. In a grant of land lying on a stream not navigable, if there be a clear
reservation of the islands, either expressly or by implication, they do not
pass to the grantee, and the filum aquæ which bounds the grant is the
center thread between the mainland and the island. Ibid. 220.
3644TH ILL.

GUARDIAN.

CANNOT ASSIGN DOWER. See DOWER, 2.

GUARDIAN AND WARD.

EQUITIES OF THE LATTER.

1. As against third persons. A guardian who had money belonging to his ward in his hands, purchased a tract of land and received a title bond therefor, but paid none of the purchase price therefor, and after his death his widow paid the purchase money out of her own funds, and obtained the legal title to the land, which she exchanged for other land. In a suit by the ward to subject this land in the hands of the widow to the satisfaction of the ward's claim thereon, on the alleged ground that the guar dian had used the trust funds in the purchase and improvement of the land bought by him, it was held, that, upon the facts, the ward had no preferable equity, to the exclusion of all others, in the premises in question. McFarland et al. v. Conlee et al. 455.

2. But even if the money of the ward had been invested in the land purchased by the guardian, inasmuch as the money of the widow of the guardian was also invested therein, she had an equal equity, and having also the legal title, she would have the preference, and would have the right to relieve the premises from the ward's claim by paying the amount due; or, if the premises should be sold, the purchaser of the legal title should first be reimbursed the price paid therefor, with interest, then the claim of the ward, with interest, and the overplus, if any, to the owner of the legal title. Ibid. 455.

HEIRS.

LACHES OF ADMINISTRATOR.

In not defending suit - remedy of the heirs. See ADMINISTRATION OF
ESTATES, 3.

OF A PRE-EMPTION RIGHT.

It goes to the heir, not to the executor. See PRE-EMPTION, 2.

HIGHWAYS.

SAFETY OF HIGHWAYS IN CITIES.

1. Of negligence in that regard. In an action brought by G. against the city of Chicago, for the loss of her husband's life, caused by falling into a slip, it appearing by the proof that the slip was crossed by a bridge much narrower than the street, and that there was no protection in the course from the sidewalk to the bridge to prevent persons proceeding in that direction from falling into it, if they continued in a direct line from the walk to the slip,-held, that the omission to erect proper barriers to protect persons from walking or falling into it, was negligence for which the city was liable for all damages resulting therefrom. City of Chicago v. Gallagher, Admx. 295.

2. The city having permitted the excavation to be made, it was its duty to have made it secure, and fully protected persons in passing from walking or falling into it under any circumstances. Ibid. 295.