« ΠροηγούμενηΣυνέχεια »
OF PURCHASE MONEY ON PRIOR SALE.
3. Whether the subsequent purchaser liable therefor. The assignee of a
bond for the conveyance of land, incurs no personal liability for the pay.
ment of the unpaid purchase money due upon the sale to his vendor, un-
less he expressly assumes the payment of the outstanding lien, or its
amount is allowed in the purchase money. Hammer v. Johnson et al. 192.
PURCHASERS WITHOUT NOTICE.
4. When protected. Where a party purchases without notice of an
outstanding equity in another, he is not affected by such equity. Pitts et
al. v. Cable et al. 103.
WHO MAY BECOME A PURCHASER.
Of a mortgagee or trustee, under power of sale in the deed. See MORT-
PURCHASER PENDENTE LITE.
From a plaintif in ejectment - of his rights. See EJECTMENT, 2, 3.
PURCHASER UNDER A JUNIOR MORTGAGE.
Extent of his rights. See MORTGAGES, 20.
PURCHASER FROM JUNIOR INCUMBRANCER,
Of his right to redeem from the assignee of a prior mortgage. See MORT-
PURCHASER FROM MORTGAGOR.
When estopped from setting up the homestead right of his grantor against
the mortgagee. See MORTGAGES, 19.
OF INSURANCE MONEY.
To whom it belongs where the insurance was obtained by a subsequent pur-
chaser of premises. See INSURANCE, 1.
BONA FIDE PURCHASER.
At judicial sale — who is not a bona fide purchaser. See SALES, 15.
WHO LIABLE THEREFOR.
Whether the assignee of a title bond for land is liable for unpaid purchase
money due the first vendor. See PURCHASERS, 3.
To support a contract. See CONSIDERATION, 1.
JURISDICTION OF THE PERSON OF RESPONDENT.
1. How acquired. Leave was granted a party to file an information in
the nature of a quo warranto, notice of which was given the defendant,
but without further process. A rule was entered requiring the defendant
to plead, which he failed to do; and, proof of the service of the copy of
the same upon him being made, his default was taken, and the court pro
JURISDICTION OF THE PERSON OF RESPONDENT. Continued.
nounced judgment of ouster against him. Held, that the court acquired
no jurisdiction to enter the rule and render the judgment. Hambleton v.
The People ex rel. Young, 458.
2. After leave given to a party to file an information in the nature of a
quo warranto, the court can only acquire jurisdiction by service of a writ,
under seal of the court, and running in the name of the people of the
State of Illinois, or by voluntary appearance of the defendant. This was
the practice under the statute of Anne, from which ours does not substan.
tially differ. Ibid. 458.
Liability for injury to stock. Where cattle are injured upon a rail-
road at a place where the company are required by law to fence the road,
and it had been in operation several years without that being done, the
company are liable for the damages resulting from such neglect of duty.
Toledo, Peoria and Warsaw Railway Co. v. Wickery, 76.
NEGLIGENCE-GENERALLY. See NEGLIGENCE.
OF ACT OF AN AGENT.
Ratification by the principal — what constitutes. See AGENCY, 9.
REAL AND PERSONAL ESTATE.
OF WHICH CHARACTER PROPERTY PARTAKES.
Of a pre-emption right. See PRE-EMPTION, 1, 2.
ROADWAY OF A RAILROAD.
Of improvements thereon — whether real estate, for purposes of taxation.
See TAXES, 12.
Evidence should be clear. See EVIDENCE, 2.
In a suit by one partner for a dissolution of the partnership, for miscon-
duct on the part of the other partners and to enjoin them from collecting
debts, a receiver will be appointed to collect the debts, and be directed to
make proper distribution of the sums, received by him. Maher v. Bull,
AB DETWEEN MORTGAGOR AND MORTGAGEE.
When the right of redemption erists. See MORTGAGES, 1 to 5.
BY A JUNIOR INCUMBRANCER.
Or his assignee. See MORTGAGES, 23.
FROM ASSIGNEE OF PRIOR MORTGAGE. See MORTGAGES, 24.
STATEMENT OF ACCOUNT.
On bill to redeem. Same title, 26 to 29.
IN THE SUPREME COURT. See PRACTICE IN THE SUPREME COURT, 3.
RELEASE OF ONE OF SEVERAL OBLIGORS.
1 Its effect on the liability of the others. Where a release is given to
one of several obligors, which is to operate as an absolute discharge of
such obligor, it will also operate to release his co-obligors, notwithstand.
ing the instrument contains an express provision that such co-obligors
shall not thereby be released. Parmelee et al. v. Laurence, 405.
2. The mere fact that when a release is executed the parties are ignor-
ant that its legal effect will be to discharge the co-obligors, will not pre-
vent its so operating, if executed and delivered unconditionally and
without reference to its bearing upon other parties. Ibid. 405.
3. But it seems, if such an instrument provides, in terms, that the
obligor seeking to obtain the release shall remain subject to the right of
contribution in favor of his co-obligors in case they are compelled to pay
more than their share of the claim, then the provision in the release that
it shall not operate to discharge such co-obligors may be given effect
according to its terms. Ibid. 405.
4. But a release, like every other written instrument, must be so con-
strued as to carry out the intention of the parties, as songht in the
language of the instrument itself, when read in the light of the circum-
stances which surrounded the transaction. Ibid. 405.
5. So where A receives a contract from B, knowing that it was designed
by B to receive a certain interpretation and only to be used for a specific
purpose, A has no right to give it a different interpretation, or to use it
for a different purpose, although the purpose to which it may be diverted
should be consistent with the language of the instrument itself, Ibid. 405.
6. So where an obligee executes to one of the several obligors an instru-
ment which, in form, is a release of such obligor, with a provision that it
is not to operate as a discharge of his co-obligors, while the legal effect of
the words used in the contract would be to release all, yet, if when read
in the light of the circumstances attending its execution, it appear that
the party making the contract did not intend it to have that effect, and
the party receiving the contract, knowing such intent, protends that it
will not operate to discharge the co-obligors, who were, in terms, expressly
excluded from the operation of the release, — then the instrument will be
construed merely as a covenant not to sue, not operating as a technical
release, but leaving the co-obligors still liable, and entitled to contribu-
tion from the party seeking the release. Ibid. 405.
SALE FOR DELIVERY AT A SPECIFIED TIME.
Acceptance of part after the time — how far a release of damages for non-
delivery. See SALES, 7.
RELEASE OF ERRORS. See PRACTICE IN THE SUPREME COURT, 2.
OF THE CHOICE OF REMEDIES.
Where an action brought, is found unavailing — whether a bar to another
remedy. Where a party has brought an action at law upon a written
instrument, and that remedy proves unavailing because of a mistake in
the instruinent, he may abandon his action at law and resort to a court of
chancery to have the mistake corrected. McCloskey v. McCormick et al. 338.
AS TO CONTINGENT RIGHT OF DOWER.
Remedy of a purchaser of land subject thereto, from the husband. See
CHANCERY, 8, 9.
LACHES OF AN ADMINISTRATOR.
In not defending a suit — remedy of the heirs. See ADMINISTRATION
OF ESTATES, 3.
TO PREVENT OR ABATE A NUISANCE. See NUISANCES, 2, 3, 4.
Ex TURPI CAUSA NON ORITUR ACTIO. See ACTIONS, 1, 2.
NON-PAYMENT OF RENT.
Termination of tenancy therefor. See LANDLORD AND TENANT, 1 to 9.
RENTS AND PROFITS.
WHETHER RECOVERABLE. See MEASURE OF DAMAGES, 12.
AS BETWEEX MORTGAGOR AND MORTGAGEE. See MORTGAGES, 11, 27.
RESCISSION OF CONTRACTS. See CONTRACTS, 8 to 12.
Loss OF RESIDENCE.
Eligi'rlity to office — effect of a conditional removal from the State and
return. See OFFICE, 1.
ATTACHMENT OF NON-RESIDENTS.
What constitutes residence, within the meaning of the attachment act. See
RESULTING TRUSTS. See TRUSTS, 1, 2, 3.
REVERSAL OF JUDGMENT OR DECREE.
EFFECT THEREOF ON RIGHTS OF PURCHASER. See PURCHASERS, 1, 2.
· RIPARIAN RIGHTS.
REMEDY IN RESPECT THERETO.
Whether at law or in chancery. See CHANCERY, 1, 2.
OF THE RIGHTS OF RIPARIAN OWNERS. See GRANT, 1, 2, 3.
SALE OF GOODS ON AN ORDER.
1. Delivery to the carrier - effect in passing the property in the goods.
If the party of whom goods have been ordered shall ship within a reason-
able time, the amount and quality ordered, and in the manner directed,
the property thereupon vests in the purchaser and is thenceforth at his
risk. If after such shipment a portion of the goods are abstracted and
others of an inferior quality substituted so as to render the whole of an
inferior quality, in that case the loss must be borne by the purchaser. As
soon as such goods are delivered to the carrier the title vests in the buyer
subject only to stoppage in transitu. Diversy v. Kellogg, 114.
2. Notice of shipment not necessary. A party on shipping goods on an
order is not bound to give notice thereof to vest the title in the purchaser,
or a failure to do so does not relieve the purchaser from the acts of his
former agent, or from giving notice that the agency had ceased. Ibid. 114.
3. Of acceptance by the purchaser. Even if a different kind from that
ordered, should be shipped, and is received by the purchaser and he appro
priates it, the title thereby vests in him, and he must pay what it is reason-
ably worth. He would not in that case be bound to receive it, but, on
learning its quality, he should in a reasonable time give notice that he
declined to receive it, and thereby avoid liability. In such a case the title
would vest in him until he accepted it. In such a case it is for the jury
to say from all the circumstances whether he did accept it. Ibid. 114.
TENDER ON SALE OF CHATTELS.
4. Of a tender of warehouse receipts therefor — whether sufficient. In an
action to recover damages for failure to receive and pay for a quantity of
oats, sold by the plaintiff to defendant, proof of the attendance of the
plaintiff at the time and place agreed upon for their delivery, but in the
absence of the purchaser, for the purpose of tendering warehouse receipts
for the oats, is not a sufficient tender, without the further proof, that such
receipts were genuine, and that the grain was not subject to charges.
McPherson v. Hall, 264.
5. But a tender of the receipts to the defendant in person would have
been good, if without objection, as the failure to object would impliedly
admit, that the receipts honestly represented the property. But this
inference cannot be drawn, in the absence of the purchaser. Ibid. 264.
6. What is a sufficient tender thereof — and of a plea of tender. A con.
tract of sale of a quantity of lumber provided that the lumber should be
inspected by a particular person, and should “inspect at least twenty-five
to thirty per cent better than common.” In an action by the purchaser
against the vendor for failing to deliver the lumber, the defendant pleaded
a tender of performance, averring that the lumber tendered was inspected
by the person named, but not that it was inspected “twenty-five to thirty
per cent better than common.” The plea was defective in failing to show
that the lumber tendered was of the quality required by the contract.
Bradley et al. v. King et al. 339.