SALES. Continued.

SALE FOR DELIVERY AT A SPECIFIED TIME.

7. Acceptance of part after the time. On a sale of chattels to be deliv-
ered by a certain time, if the vendor fails to make delivery within the
time, an acceptance of a part afterward will operate as a release of dam-
ages for non-delivery only as to the portion accepted, there being no express
waiver. Bradley et al. v. King et al. 339.

PAYMENT ON DELIVERY.

8. Effect of refusal to pay. And where the contract provides for pay-
ment on delivery, and the vendor fails to deliver within the time stipu-
lated, but the purchaser accepts part afterward, such acceptance places
the purchaser under the same obligation, as to payment, that he would
have been under had the property been delivered and accepted within
the time stipulated in the contract, and if the purchaser refuses to perform
this obligation on his part, the vendor is excused from further delivery.
Ibid. 339.

9. Whether the sum due for the part thus accepted may be set off against
damages for non-delivery of the residue—and how the purchaser may avail
thereof. In an action by the purchaser against the vendor for non-deliv.
ery within the stipulated time, a plea that a part was delivered and accepted
afterward, but that the purchaser refused to pay for the part thus accepted,
on its delivery, as required in the contract, is a good plea. If the pur-
chaser sought at the time of the delivery of such part to pay for it by set-
ting off the damages for non-delivery of the residue, it was incumbent on
him to have made a distinct offer so to do to the vendor. Ibid. 339.

10. In order to defeat the effect of such a plea, the purchaser should
either traverse the averment of refusal to pay, and prove on the trial of
the issue that damages were due him equal to the value of the property
delivered, and that he offered the vendor to release the damages to that
amount, or he may reply these facts specially to the plea. Ibid. 339.

11. Vendee must be ready and able to pay. In an action for the non-
delivery of goods or personal property, which were to have been paid for
upon delivery, the plaintiff must not only aver, but he must also prove,
not only a willingness to pay, but a readiness and ability so to do. Cum-
mings v. Tilton, 172.

12. What coill excuse a party from offering to deliver. And in such case,
if the purchaser informs the vendor that he cannot pay the money agreed
to be paid upon the delivery of the article, the vendor is excused from
offering to deliver it. Ibid. 172.

DELIVERY TO ONE OF A FIRM.

13. Whether a delivery to the firm. Where a firm composed of two
members entered into an agreement to purchase a steamboat, and a third
party guaranteed the payment of the notes given therefor, and the boat
was afterwards transferred by bill of sale and delivered to only one mem-
ber of the firm, and on the trial the evidence tended to show that the
transfer and delivery were in accordance with, and in fulfillment of, the

SALES. DELIVERY TO ONE OF A FIRM.

Continued.

original contract of purchase, it was held, that this was a transfer and
delivery to the firm and not to the individual, and the guarantor was
liable. Byington v. Gaff, Cochran & Co. 510.

15. Who is bona fide purchaser. When a purchaser at a judicial sale
combines and confederates with the officer and others to conduct the sale
as secretly as possible to prevent competition, and represents to the party
interested in such sale that it had been postponed, with the intention to
deceive such party, to the end that he shall not be present to compete for
the purchase of such property at such sale, such party is not a bona fide
purchaser, and will not be protected against errors in the proceeding.
Dutcher et al. v. Leake et al. 398.

16. Inadequacy of the amount paid. Although mere inadequacy of
consideration, standing by itself, is not a sufficient reason for setting
aside a judicial sale, yet if it exist in connection with other circumstances
tending to impeach the fairness of the transaction and the good faith of
the purchaser, it is entitled to great weight as determining the bona fide
character of the purchaser and to his protection as such. Ibid. 398.

17. Sale under a void judgment. Where a judgment is void, as when
it is confessed by an attorney without authority, a sale of land under such
judgment is also void, and will pass no title. Chase v. Dana, 262.

18. Of sale of land en masse. A sale of property by a judicial officer
ought not to be set aside, except for such irregularities as manifestly
produce injustice and wrong. If, however, a sale of property in gross
produces such inadequacy of price as to amount to a great wrong and
oppression, a court of equity might entertain jurisdiction, even two or
three years after the sale, and afford relief against the purchaser if he
had not parted with the title, upon reasonable excuse being shown for the
delay. Fergus et al. v. Woodworth et al. 374.

Reversal of judgment or decree—its effect upon the rights of purchasers
under it. See PURCHASERS, 1, 2.

SALES UNDER DEED OF TRUST.

Whether the trustees must first enter upon the premises. See DEED OF
TRUST, 1.

SCIRE FACIAS.

OF FORECLOSURE BY SCIRE FACIAS.

What defenses are allowable. See MORTGAGES, 22.

Where the note secured by the mortgage has been assigned. Same title, 21.

SEALS.

ESSENTIAL TO A BILL OF EXCEPTIONS. See EXCEPTIONS AND BILLS OF
EXCEPTIONS, 5.

SET-OFF.

OF THE SUBJECT MATTER OF SET-OFF.

1. Of a sum due for a part of goods delivered, as against damages for
non-delivery of balance. In an action by a purchaser of chattels, against
his vendor, for non-delivery within the stipulated time, a plea that a part
was delivered and accepted afterward, but that the purchaser refused to
pay for the part thus accepted, on its delivery, is a good plea. If the pur-
shaser seeks at the time of the delivery of such part to pay for it by
setting off the damages for non-delivery of the residue, he should make a
distinct offer so to do, to the vendor. Bradley et al. v. King et al. 339.

2. In order to defeat the effect of such a plea, the purchaser should
either traverse the averment of refusal to pay, and prove, on the trial of
the issue, that damages were due him equal to the value of the property
delivered, and that he offered the vendor to release the damages to that
amount, or he may reply these facts specially to the plea. Ibid. 339.

3. Of a judgment after an appeal therefrom. It has been held in Eng-
land that a judgment may be pleaded as a set-off, notwithstanding an
appeal therefrom and supersedeas; but this court is of a different opinion,
though upon the facts in this case it was not necessary to decide the
question. King et al. v. Bradley et al. 342.

4. Whether the damages recovered in such judgment may be set off pend-
ing the appeal. In an action by the vendor against his purchaser for the
price of a part of the chattels sold, which had been delivered and
accepted, the purchaser may set off his damages for the non-delivery of the
residue of the property, although he has recovered a judgment for those
same damages, there being an appeal from such judgment pending, and
a consequent suspension thereof. Ibid. 342.

LIMIT OF AMOUNT OF SET-OFF.

5. How far such set-off may be limited by the judgment recovered. But
the vendor may meet the evidence of such damages by proof of the
former judgment, and insist that the amount of the judgment shall be
the limit of the set-off. Ibid. 342.

SATISFACTION OF THE JUDGMENT.

By having set-off the damages for which it was rendered. See JUDG-
MENTS, 7.

SLANDER.

ALLEGATIONS AND PROOFS.

1. Of the proof of the words laid. In actions for slander, the plaintiff,
to recover, must prove the language laid in the declaration, or as much at
least as fully proves the charge; equivalent words in meaning will not
suffice. All of the words need not be proved, if those which are proved
fully establish the slander, but words proved which limit or qualify the
meaning of those counted on, will defeat a recovery. If all of the words
laid are necessary to constitute the slander, then all must be proved as
laid. Baker et ux. v. Young, 42.

SLANDER. ALLEGATIONS AND PROOFS.

Continued.

2. Of the charge of fornication. Where the words charged were that
plaintiff" was in the family way, and Rink and his wife took her to
a Chicago doctor to have the child worked off,”-held, that proof that
defendants said that plaintiff" was in the family way by Tom Beal” sus-
tained the averment. The declaration proceeds for a slander in charging
the plaintiff with fornication, and the language proved proves enough of
the words to make out the slander. Held, that the additional words laid
in the declaration, or those proved, did not alter or modify the charge of
fornication. Also held that there was no variance. Baker et ux. v. Young, 42.
WORDS SPOKEN BY THE WIFE.

3. Liability of the husband. Where a married woman speaks the slan-
derous words, the action should be against the husband and wife jointly,
and the recovery must be against both. Ibid. 43.

OF THE VERDICT.

4. Its requisites. A verdict in an action for slander which finds the
defendants guilty, is sufficient without stating that they were found
"guilty in manner and form as alleged in the declaration.” Ibid. 43.

SPECIAL ASSESSMENTS.

LEGISLATIVE POWER.

1. To authorize the assessment of benefits. Under section 5, article 9, of
the Constitution, the legislature may confer upon the corporate authori-
ties of a city the power in cases of public improvement, which concern
the whole public, to assess each lot the especial benefit it will derive from
the improvement, charging such benefit on the lots, the residue of the
cost to be paid by equal and uniform taxation. Bedard v. Hall et al. 91.
SUFFICIENCY OF CITY ORDINANCE.

2. In applying the principle of uniformity. In this case a city ordinance
was passed, providing for public improvements, and that the public should
pay the cost of them, on the principle of charging the owners of property
specially benefited with the amount of such benefits, if any there should
be, and that the deficiency should be paid out of moneys in the city
treasury not otherwise appropriated. This was deemed a substantial
compliance with the constitutional rule of uniformity, it being presumed
the moneys in the city treasury out of which the deficiency was to be paid,
were the avails of equal and uniform taxation. Ibid. 91.

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE. See CHANCERY, 8, 9, 10.

STATE RIGHTS AND FEDERAL POWERS.

POWER OF CONGRESS.

Over rights and remedies in the State courts. See CONFLICT OF
LAWS, 1, 2.

STATEMENT OF ACCOUNTS.

AS BETWEEN PARTNERS.

Of the basis thereof — upon bill in chancery for dissolution. See PART-
NERSHIP, 4, 5, 6.

STATUTES.

OF THE PASSAGE OF LAWS.

1. Presumption that a statute was constitutionally passed. Where an
act is found among the public laws, bearing the approval of the governor,
this court will presume that such act was constitutionally passed, the
record disclosing no proof to the contrary. The journals of the legis
lature will not be examined here for the first time, to impeach it. Bedard
v. Hall et al. 91.

REPEAL OF STATUTES.

2. By implication. The repeal of statutes by implication is not favored
in the law. If statutes are seemingly repugnant, they should, if possible,
be so construed that the latest one shall not operate as a repeal, by
implication, of the former ones. The People ex rel. v. Barr, 198.

CONSTITUTIONALITY.

3. What laws are constitutional, and of the rules of construction. See
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1, 2.

STATUTES CONSTRUED.

4. The several acts in relation to the rights of the widow, upon renounc-
ing the will of her husband, construed in Lessley et al. v. Lessley, 527.
See WIDOW, 1.

5. Statute of wills, and the act of 1861, securing to married women
their separate property, construed in reference to the right of the hus-
band, as administrator of the wife, to retain the assets. Townsend et al. v.
Radcliffe, 446. See ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATES, 4, 5.

6. Act of 1861, concerning the separate property of married women,
construed in Cole v. Van Riper, 58. See MARRIED WOMEN, 1, 2, 3.
Also in Manny v. Rixford, 132. See same title, 4.

7. The homestead acts construed, as to the character of judgments
embraced therein. Conroy v. Sullivan et al. 451. See HOMESTEAD, 3.
8. Act of 1863, “to enable counties owing debts to liquidate the same,”
construed in Allen v. Peoria and Bureau Valley R. R. Co. 85. Seo
TAXES, 1.

9. The statute authorizing garnishee process to issuc, construed in
Gilcreest v. Savage, 56. See GARNISHMENT, 1.

10. Act of 1849, concerning a right of action by an elector for a refusal
of his vote, at an election, construed in Mills et al. v. McCabe, 194. Sce
ELECTIONS, 1.

11. Act of 1861 allowing one party to call the other as a witness, construed
in Alexander v. Crosthwaite, 359. See WITNESS, 2.

12. The 25th section of the chapter on ejectment, which provides that
no recovery shall be had if the plaintiff's title expires pending the suit,
construed in Mills v. Graves, 50. See EJECTMENT, 3.

13. Amended charter of 1863, of the city of Chicago, in reference to the
proper specification of the purposes of a tax, construed in Clayton v. City
of Chicago, 280. See TAXES, 13.