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Morrow, &c., vs. Slaughter.

It seems to us that this is both the literal and rational construction of the title, which is not simply "to reduce," but to "amend and reduce into one all the laws on the subject of billiard tables."

We therefore adjudge that the act of 1864 is not repealed; and, consequently, the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.

CASE 10-PETITION EQUITY-JUNE 11.

Morrow, &c., vs. Slaughter.

APPEAL FROM WOODFORD CIRCUIT COURT.

S. conveyed a house and lot, in consideration of eight hundred dollars, to M., J., and B., with the reservations-First. That the grantees were to insure the property, and keep it in good condition, and out of the profits reimburse the eight hundred dollars, with interest, and afterwards apply the profits to the use of the New School Presbyterian Church in Versailles; and, second. That if the said church should ever be dissolved, the property should pass to a committee to be appointed by the Synod of the New School Presbyterian Church of Kentucky, and be disposed of as said Synod shall direct for the benefit of the New School Presbyterian Church of Kentucky. Such conveyance passed from the grantor forever all title, as in all other sales, without condition or reservation.

Had the grantor been a donor of a charity, a failure in the object of dedication would, by an implied trust, have resulted in a reversion. But in this case it was a sale for an admitted valuable and a presumptively commensurable consideration, without any reserved reversion.

Morrow, &c., vs. Slaughter.

If the church in Versailles had been dissolved, the court could not assume that there is not now, or will not hereafter be, a New School Presbyterian Church of Kentucky.

PORTER & GREATHOUSE,

CITED

For Appellants,

7 B. Mon., 489-90; Gibson, &c., vs. Armstrong.
Revised Statutes, sec. 5, chap. 14, 1 Stanton, 237.
M. &. B.'s Digest, 1349.

3 B. Mon., 257; Shannon, &c., vs. Frost, &c.

11 B. Mon., 288; Berryman vs. Ruse.

1 Met., 355; Thornton vs. McGrath.

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7 Mon., 544; Pool vs. Young.

3 Dana, 157; Frogg's ex'r vs. Long's adm'r.

13 B. Mon., 197, and cases cited.

T. N. & D. W. LINDSEY,

CITED

2 M. & B.'s Digest, 1349, Act of 1824.
Revised Statutes, 1 Stanton, 237.

Hill on Trustees, top pages 329, 157.

For Appellees,

MS. Opin., 1869; Hodge vs. Berry & Thornton.
9 Smith's N. Y., 69; Phelps vs. Pond.

14 N. Y. (4 Kernan), 380; Owens vs. Missionary So-
ciety.

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JUDGE ROBERTSON DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT.

On the 27th day of August, 1850, the appellee, Mrs. Sarah J. Slaughter, and her husband, John H. Slaughter, since dead, sold and conveyed to Preston B. Morrow, Humphrey Jones, and Henry C. Blackburn, her house and lot in Versailles, Kentucky, for the consideration of eight hundred dollars, then paid with money

Morrow, &c., vs. Slaughter.

borrowed by them, for the benefit of an organized Presbyterian Church of the New School section in said town. The conveyance was made on the following trusts:

First. That the said Trustees should insure the property, keep it in good condition by repairs and otherwise, and out of the profits reimburse the eight hundred dollars, with the accruing interest, and afterwards apply the profits to the use of the said church.

Second. That if the said church should ever be dissolved, the property should pass to a committee, to be appointed by the Synod of the New School Presbyterian Church of Kentucky, and be disposed of as said Synod shall direct, for the benefit of the New School Presbyterian Church of Kentucky.

In December, 1866, the appellee, claiming the reversion, brought this suit in equity, alleging that the said church in Versailles had been dissolved, that the new school had no Synod in Kentucky, and that the rents had, or ought to have, reimbursed the eight hundred dollars and interest, and thereupon praying for a restitution of the trust property.

Morrow's answer denied the alleged reimbursement and dissolution, and controverted the appellee's title to the reversion in any event.

On these issues and several depositions the circuit court decreed restitution to the appellee, and this appeal calls for a reversal of that judgment.

If, in any event, the appellee could be entitled to the reversion, her right could not availably accrue until after the profits shall have paid to the trustees the eight hundred dollars advanced by them and its interest. On that subject there is a direct issue, of which the appellee holds the affirmative; and she has offered no sufficient proof to sustain her traversed allegation. The decree was, there

Morrow, &c., vs. Slaughter.

fore, at least premature, and therefore erroneous. Nor is there sufficient proof of the alleged dissolution, either actual or legal, nor of the non-existence now, or certain non-existence hereafter, of a synod of New School Presbyterianism in Kentucky, however material or immaterial that may be in this case.

But, however all this may be, we can perceive no solid ground for the decree. Had the appellee been the donor of a charity, a failure in the object of dedication would, by an implied trust, have resulted in a reversion to herself. But that is not her case. She did not give, but sold the property for an admitted valuable and a presumptively commensurable consideration, and her contract reserved no reversion to herself, but passed from her forever all her title, as in all other sales, without condition or reservation. She can, therefore, have no reversionary title; nor can the Commonwealth have any such title, by escheat or otherwise.

Eut the deed itself guards against any reversion, on the possible failure of the special trust, by providing, that, in that event, the New School Church of Kentucky shall be the ultimate beneficiaries; and it is neither alleged, nor can be judicially assumed, that there is not now, or will not hereafter be, such a recipient. But in no event will the vendor have any peculiar right of reversion, unless she might possibly derive it from the Commonwealth, through the legislative release lately made to her of its possible title not yet existing.

Wherefore, the judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the cause remanded, with instructions to dismiss the appellee's petition.

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Possession must accompany the title in sales of movable property, or
the sale will be per se fraudulent and void in law as to subsequent
purchasers and creditors of the vendor, even though the contract
contains a stipulation that the seller is to retain possession until a
future day. (Brummel vs. Stockton, &c., 3 Dana, 135; Robbins vs.
Oldham, 1 Duvall, 28.)

But this rule does not extend to property which is not susceptible of
delivery, as a growing crop, which could not, without destroying it,
be removed at the time. (Cummings vs. Griggs, &c., 2 Duvall, 87.)
A sale of movable property, which is exempt from execution, is not
constructively fraudulent, because the seller remained in possession.
As between the purchaser and attaching creditors, the purchaser 19
entitled to such property; but otherwise as to such property as is
not exempt from execution.

OSCAR TURNER and

W. P. D. BUSH,

CITED

For Appellants,

6 Dana, 185; Daniel, &c., vs. Clay, &c.

17 B. Mon., 541; Taylor vs. Smith.

8 Dana, 247, 254, 265; Vernon, &c., vs. Morton, &c. 4 B. Mon., 299; Pearson & Anderson vs. Rockhill &

Co.

4 B. Mon., 429; Bank of U. S. vs. Huth.

3 B. Mon., 557; Ford vs. Williams.

1 Met., 404; Short vs. Tinsley, &c.

1 Duvall, 29; Robbins vs. Oldham.

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