North: Union State Sovereignty can alone extin $9. To the Congress. Except upon this point, the right of eminent domain, of which and slave re-taxation is a branch, is altogether withheld. But by the sovereign will sponsibility. of a State, can property in slaves, or in any other form, be taken for the public good; and if slavery ever comes to an end in America, it will be guish slavery. accomplished through this Providential division into States, whereby, as each State finds it unprofitable, or sinful, if you please, it can be made to cease. Have we not pursued this course, and made many States free that were slave? Is it not notorious, that efforts were in progress a quarter of a century ago, for gradual emancipation in several more slave States, and which would ere this have been successful in more or less of them, but for Northern interference? It is too great, too ramifying an interest to be suddenly uprooted, even were it the unmixed evil regarded by Abolitionists. By one of these States after another duly exercising its Sovereignty, its Right of Command, slavery may in time be brought to an end, though probably not to be expected, nor in my judgment desired, Anti-slavery but in no other way. Anti-slavery men, of all in the land, should be Federalists. most earnest advocates of pure, unadulterated Federalism. men must be Advantages of Free States must be small: § 10. TO THE NORTH: FEDERALISM DESIRABLE. The more Federalism is understood, the more highly will it be estimated. The extracts from Aristotle will prove his judgment to have been, that diversity of interests, of pursuits, and of character, the greatest possible variety, is requisite to a perfect State, else it partakes too much of the family relation. That homogeneous condition, is desirable for man for certain purposes; but he needs something directly the opposite, for developing other parts of his nature, that he may reach the highest attainments of which he is susceptible. This the STATE supplies. . Montesquieu, too, has shown us, and his wisdom accords with all experience, Rome only excepted and for very peculiar reasons, that a free State must be of moderate extent, so that to have the desirable diversity, -to have di- is not practicable in a simple Republic, and he teaches that the end may versity and strength, unite be attained by a union of small States in a Federal Republic. Aristotle, eral Republic. too, teaches that a woλiтeia Toλiтeшv, a polity of polities, a Republic of them in a Fed Advatages of the Representative princi ple. Defect of Federal Union. Republics, is the highest condition of man. Other writers, however, and some highly and justly esteemed, do not subscribe to this doctrine. Says Lord Brougham: The first and most striking property of the Representative principle is that it enables a free or popular government to be established in an extensive and populous country. This we have already illustrated, by referring to the state of the ancient commonwealths, and the imperfect devices which became necessary for the purpose of enlarging the limits of the State without giving up Republican Government. Beside the other defects of the Federal Union, its manifest tendency to create mutual estrangement, and even hostility, between different parts of the same nation, is an insuperable objection to it. Small communities are exceedingly apt to conceive against their undesirable, as neighbors feelings of rivalry, jealousy, and mistrust; each individual bearing so considerable a proportion to the whole society that the worst personal prejudices and passions are nourished, and, the most ignorant and violent of the people being the Small societies the inhabitants are regarded. North: Feder able. most numerous, the tone of the whole takes the turn which these bad passions tend to § 10. To the give it. If any illustration of this truth were wanted, we have only to remind the alism desirreader of what we found in the history of the Italian republics. The government always is influenced by such feelings, most of all in a democracy, but in a great degree also in an aristocracy, and even in a petty principality. For the rulers themselves in BROUGHAM'S Political Phi such a narrow community partake of the general sentiment, even if the public opinion losophy. should not sway them. Whoever would see further proof of this position may be referred to the Ancient Commonwealths of Greece. As a Florentine hated a Siennese worse than a German or Spaniard, or even an infidel in modern times, so of old did an Athenian hate a Spartan or a Theban worse than a Persian. Now the Federal Federalism made responUnion, by keeping up a line of separation among its members, gives the freest scope gible for these to these pernicious prejudices, feelings which it is the highest duty of all governments evils. to eradicate, because they lead directly to confusion and war. It may further be doubted if the existence of a small community is of itself Evil of smallness upon the desirable for the improvement of society. Undoubtedly great public spirit may be State itself. expected to prevail in such a nation, and the feelings of patriotism to be excited, or rather to be habitual with the people, each individual of whom feels his own weight and importance instead of being merged and lost in the countless multitude of a larger state. But this advantage is more than counterbalanced by the attendant evils of petty, contracted ideas, which such a narrow community engenders, and especially by the restlessness which arises among all the people, when each takes as much interest in the state's concerns as if they were his own. There is thus produced both an over zeal, a turbulent demeanor, a fierce and grasping disposition, hardly consistent with the peace of the community; and also a proportionate inattention to men's private affairs inconsistent with the dictates of prudence, as well as a disregard of the domestic ties, equally inconsistent with amiable character and with the charities of private life. It would further appear that limits may be much more easily set to the bounds Representa tion better emwithin which a Federal Union can be established, than to those within which a repre- ployed in a sentative system may conveniently exist. For the central government in a Federacy large State than large is of necessity feeble. It is more like a congress of ambassadors from many nations Union.. than the council of one nation. Each person is only animated with zeal for his own state, while none feel for the general welfare. But a representative government may extend over the largest dominions, and they who comprise it may exercise an authority at once vigorous and considerate, thinking for the advantage of each portion of the whole community, as well as consulting for the welfare of the whole. tion saves De Does not this learned and excellent Whig writer overthrow his argu. Is not too much proved. ment against Federalism, by proving too much? Earnest patron as he has ever been of popular rights, zealous defender against governmental tyranny, he at the same time perceives, as shown in the above extract, and in other parts of his able work, the tendency of Democracies to Representaanarchy and misrule. This he sees the principle of Representation aids mocracy from anarchy. effectively to counteract; yet not equally well in a Federal Union, he conceives, as in a single State. The same reason that would cause Aris Brougham dif totle to desire a large polity of polities, in order to have the greatest totle as to va variety of character, interests, and influences, would lead Lord Brougham State. to reject it, in order to attain more homogeneity; for he says, "the Federal Union, by keeping up a line of separation among its members, gives the freest scope to these pernicious prejudices," &c. fers with Aris riety in a ral to man. No doubt at all, man's selfishness makes him antagonistic to his fel. Rivalry natu low, and the same trait predominates in every society of men. Adjacent school districts are rivals, adjacent towns are rivals, and so are adjacent This trait counties and States. Rivalry has its evils, but not without countervail- Government. available in North: Federalism desir able. The smaller to the larger. Difficult in a large State to all characters. 10. To the ing benefits; and it is the height of wisdom in governmental science, to make most available a trait immutable and incident to associated as well as individualized humanity. While school districts are jealous of each bodies devoted other, they have, nevertheless, a common interest and pride in the advancement of their town, as have the towns in their county, the counties in their State, the States in their Federal Union. Did men all think alike on moral and religious subjects, the fundamental organization into. States, might embrace continents, or even unite all mankind in a single State. But having all sorts of opinion in the world, and it being of the first moment that the laws and institutions of a people accord with its conscientious convictions, it becomes exceedingly difficult for adapt laws to a Sovereignty to frame a system of Government that shall be just and give equal satisfaction to all classes and conditions of the subjects, in In a monarchy a widely extended empire. This is the chief inconvenience of a monarchy; that is, if Aristotle was right in considering the greatest variety the highest perfection of a State. Nor is it practicable nor expedient to have authority in a kingdom much divided. No doubt the incorporaAn example in tion of England and Scotland, and subsequently of Ireland, making a single State out of the three, was for the general good. But it renders much more difficult the enacting of suitable laws to govern, by one and the same, English, Scotch, and Irish, than if they had their separate par liaments. Yet with unity in the Right of Command, a division of the legis. lative power into separate parliaments, is perhaps impracticable, or at least has inconveniences. As Montesquieu says of single Republics, "the evil is in the very thing itself; and no form can redress it." inconveni ences. Britain, Kings disinelined to part The Sover eignty in a free State obliged to delegate. Another disadvantage of Monarchy is, the natural disinclination of with power. the possessor of power to part with its exercise. When the Right of Command comes into the possession of one, or even of the few, as in an Aristocracy, the possessor wants undividedly to exercise the whole power; and the contest in Britain has been for hundreds of years chiefly on this point. But a free People, even in a simple Democracy like the ancient States of Greece, cannot, in most concerns, themselves exercise the Right of Command, but have to delegate it to subordinate agents; and in States like ours, simple Democracy is altogether out of the question, it being impracticable, even in the smallest, for the Citizens to meet en masse. Representa The Republican feature, that of Representation, the worth of which is so tageous. well appreciated by Lord Brougham, must be altogether employed in the exercise of Sovereignty. As the sovereign People cannot themselves General good exercise their Right of Command, as can a King, but must delegate it, the object in a free State. proper considerations for the general good have a better chance to operate; and the best possible distribution of authority to control the way. ward and rebellious, to protect the good and virtuous, becomes the high. est aim, the strongest desire of every patriotic Citizen. In such a State, truly the good of one is the good of all. tion advan Small societies a nuisance. Lord Brougham also remarks, "It may further be doubted if the existence of a small community is of itself desirable for the improvement North: Feder able. of society." In my humble judgment it is not to "be doubted." A $10. To the small school district, or a small town, is very undesirable, for the excel- alism desirlent reasons given in his preceding paragraph; and equally undesirable is a small county, or an insignificant State. Free States must be small; yet, in the language of Montesquieu, If a Republic is small, it is destroyed by a foreign force; if it be large, it is ruined Small States made strong in by an internal imperfection. To this twofold inconvenience both democracies and a Federal Rearistocracies are equally liable, and that whether they be good or bad. The evil is in public. the very thing itself; and no form can redress it. It is therefore very probable that MONTESQUIEU. mankind would have been at length obliged to live constantly under the government Spirit of of a single person, had they not contrived a kind of constitution that has all the Laws, 1. ix,cl. internal advantages of a republican, together with the external force of a monarchical government: I mean a Confederate Republic. Federalism. Almighty GOD, too, taught this Caucasian race the same truths, ages Gop teaches before Montesquieu. Having chosen Democracy as the best form of Government for His favorite people of old, He divided them up into little tribes or States, and with the infinite love and wisdom of our Heav enly Father, did He teach the principle of Federal Union in the Govern ment of His choice. Earnestly did He, by Samuel, remonstrate against the folly of His rebellious children, in deserting the free Government He had instituted, in order that they might "be like all the nations." am. 1 Sam. viii, 20. Not believing that Montesquieu was a fool; that our own experience Reasons for the query to of seventy years is valueless; that JEHOVAH is incapable of judging of Lord Brough what is a desirable form of Government for His creatures; or that the only example He ever instituted should be radically defective, is the rea son why the query was made, whether Lord Brougham did not prove too much for a sound argument. tion in Feder siders a Feder ville also, Part ence not cor Nor is Lord Brougham's reason why "limits may be much more Lord Brougham misjudges easily set to the bounds within which a Federal Union can be estab. of Representalished, than to those within which a representative system may conve- alism-he conniently exist," at all satisfactory. He adds the reason, "For the cen- acy weak. tral government in a Federacy is of necessity feeble." This was also De Tocqueville's judgment. But our experience proves the incorrectness De Tocque of the opinions of these eminent philosophers, and perhaps this examina. I, c. 8 and 18. tion may show wherein they were mistaken, Notwithstanding the Our experi North has been divided up into factions, yet witness the power of the roborative. Government, despite the wrongs of Administration and the abhorrence of many of its leading acts, by at least two-thirds of our citizens. It is this Representa grand principle of Representation, so justly estimated by this wise and of strength. excellent friend of true and proper Government, which enables these States to have something more than merely "a congress of ambassadors Success in from many nations," by which we have the power here demonstrated, not and Confeder only in the older Government of the United States, but in that of the mente. Confederate Government, which has risen into being, and thoroughly established itself as a power in the earth, in spite of adverse surroundings and internal difficulties. tion the means both Federal ate Govern $10. To the North: Feder able. Federalism not understood. is State Sovereignty. It is not surprising that Federalism should not have been well com alism desir- prehended by Lord Brougham; we have not understood it ourselves. It is a most important, deeply interesting field of exploration, which, when our wise men shall again travel over, their paths illuminated with thelamps of truth of these old writers, will have new beauties; and "the Its foundation stateliness of houses, the goodliness of trees, when we behold them" in this field of Federalism, will still more "delight the eye," when we shall have discovered "in the bosom of the earth concealed," "that foundation which beareth up the one, that root which ministereth unto the other nourishment and life." "That foundation," "that root," will be found to be none other than Sovereignty, the Right of Command, in the possession of free Peoples. No wonder is it our landscape is adorned with such "stateliness of houses," such "goodliness of trees." Madison's error as to Na Hamilton corrects it. Allusion has been made to Madison's misconception, considering our tional- system "nationalized" by bringing the Government to bear upon individuals, which the great Hamilton first corrected in his effective specch in the Constitutional Convention, proving it not to be a "national" feature; as under the then existing Government, which was unquestionably The occasion a Confederacy, Congress had power to punish in certain cases. of error not developed. Sovereignty not under stood, as the But the why and wherefore has never been developed, and when our wise men find "that foundation," "that root," they will enable us to understand the subject better. Quite probably they will teach us, that these free Peoples, in the proper exercise of their Right of Command, ruling their subjects with the most despotic sway, had the right and power to place over their subjects, any sort of Government they pleased. Each of them had of the State: its State Government, and every subject that owed allegiance to the Sov basis of Government Federal ereignty which had instituted it, in consequence owed obedience to that -also Federal. Government. But these Sovereignties, for good and sufficient reasons, chose to join together and create a Government to manage some of their most important concerns. The first attempt was a failure, because they Change in the relied too much upon the machinery of their several States, and in the second attempt they made a further advance in the true application of the Federal principle, than had ever come down to them in history. They drought to wisely and rightly, in the judicious exercise of their Sovereignty, subjected their faithful liege subjects, and their property for certain purposes and with guarded restrictions, directly to the authority of their Federal Government, without any intervention of their State Governments. bear on the subjects. Checks in cise of Sover Unless we altogether misjudge, our wise men will further investiupon the exer- gate this subject of Federalism, and instead of being so abhorrent of eignty. absolute, despotic authority, they will teach us it is the very life and soul of all Government; and that, while Federalism exhibits its gigan tic power, as demonstrated in our wars of the Revolution, of 1812, in Mexico, and now in this most tremendous of all modern wars, it also affords more and better checks upon the exercise of the sov Present errors ereign Right of Command, than any system ever devised. Nor does the disregard of these checks in the present Administration of Government, no criterion. |