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Argument of Counsel.

[43 App.

fendants did not dispute the bills or liability therefor until suit brought, namely, on the 24th day of June, 1912." On submission of the case to the court below, judgment was entered for defendants, from which this appeal was taken.

Mr. John B. Daish and Mr. J. Raymond Hoover, for the appellant:

1. It was appellees' duty to clearly and definitely disclose the fact that they, when ordering the printing, were acting as agents, and not as principals. Wilder v. Cowles, 100 Mass. 487; Worthington v. Cowles, 112 Mass. 30.

2. There was lack of sufficient notice to appellant that appellees were acting as agents of disclosed principals. District of Columbia v. Roth, 18 App. D. C. 551.

Courts do not take judicial notice of rules of other courts, in the absence of statute. Cherry v. Baker, 17 Md. 75; Comelison v. Foushee, 101 Ky. 257; Gudgeon v. Casey, 62 Ill. App. 599; Van Sandan v. Turner, 6 Q. B. 773, and it would not be fair to impose that requirement upon a printer who may be called upon to print briefs of causes that are being tried in many courts.

But admitting, for sake of the argument, that a printer must have or is chargeable with knowledge of the varying rules of court, the facts of this case are not such as to charge appellant with notice that appellees were acting as agents. Weisse & Co. v. New Orleans, 10 La. Ann. 46; Williamson Paper Co. v. Bosbyshell, 14 Mo. App. 534.

In view of the circumstances of this case, the fact that appellant charged appellees is of great importance. It shows who appellant understood was to pay. It shows that appellant considered the credit was extended to appellees, and it is submitted that appellant acted reasonably in looking to appellees to pay. Livingston v. New York College of Dentistry, 64 N. Y. Supp. 140; Ford v. Williams, 21 How. 287.

3. The facts and circumstances of the case are such as to legally bind the defendants as principals. Heath v. Bates, 49 Conn. 342; Wilder v. Cowles, 100 Mass. 487.

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D. C.]

Argument of Counsel.

4. The cases involving the liability of an attorney to pay for printing briefs are few, but see Trimmer v. Thompson, 41 S. C. 125; Cameron Sun v. McAnaw, 72 Mo. App. 196; Bonynge v. Field, 44 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 581 (for stenographic services); Williamson Paper Co. v. Bosbyshell, 14 Mo. App. 534 (costs for printing a brief); Wires v. Briggs, 5 Vt. 101; Preston v. Preston, 1 Doug. (Mich.) 294.

5. The account is an account stated. Van Etten, 107 U. S. 1, 27 L. ed. 319, 332.

Standard Oil Co. v.

Mr. John C. Gittings and Mr. J. Morrill Chamberlin, the appellees, appeared in proper person:

1. The statement of facts discloses that "on receipt of the manuscript plaintiff knew that defendants were attorneys for their respective clients." A contract made with an authorized agent of a known principal binds the principal, but not the agent, and the legal presumption invariably is that the agent always intends to bind his principal, and not himself. The credit is given to the principal, and not to the agent, and the latter is not liable unless the credit has been given to him expressly and exclusively, and it was clearly his intention to assume a personal responsibility. Evans v. Marsh, 38 App. D. C. 341, citing Whitney v. Wyman, 101 U. S. 392.

2. Attention is called to the statement in the record, viz.: "It is further agreed that the rules of the courts made the printing of briefs necessary in both cases." In Weisse & Co. v. New Orleans, 10 La. Ann. 46, the court held it to be conceded that counsel had the right, as implied power, to have briefs printed at the expense of clients, but that the clients should not be taxed with the printing of more copies than are usually required. In Williamson Paper Co. v. Bosbyshell, 14 Mo. App. 534, the suit was brought by the printers against the client, and not the attorneys. The report there discloses that the attorneys had particularly told a member of the printing firm that it was to be distinctly understood that the payment was not to come out of the pockets of the lawyers.

Argument of Counsel.

[43 App.

Appellant cites Livingston v. N. Y. College of Dentistry, 64 N. Y. Supp. 140, in support of its contention that the court erred in considering it unimportant that the plaintiffs at bar had charged the items against the defendants, in view of the consideration that the defendants did not know it. The record in the case just mentioned shows that the plaintiff, a printer, brought suit against the client for the balance due for printing done at its request through its attorney. We concede that the cases where the attorney has been held liable for printing the briefs of his client are scant and few, but submit that cases involving the liability of the client to pay for briefs ordered by the attorney are numerous indeed, and practically unanimous. Trimmer v. Thompson, 41 S. C. 125, which appellant avers to be "the leading case on the subject," is the leading case in a solitary class of one.

The only other case found in which the attorney has been held personally liable is that of Cameron Sun v. McAnaw, 72 Mo. App. 196.

Clearly demonstrating the line of authorities unbroken except by Trimmer v. Thompson, supra, the case preferred by us to be designated as the leading case is Judson v. Gray, 11 N. Y. 408, cited with Harry v. Hilton, 64 How. Pr. 199, in Bonynge v. Field, 81 N. Y. 159. See also Covell v. Hart & McGuire, 14 Hun, 252; 26 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 2d ed. 778; Whitton v. Sullivan, 96 Cal. 480; Miller v. Palmer, 25 Ind. App. 357; Boynge v. Waterbury, 12 Hun, 534; Sheridan v. Genet, 12 Hun, 660; Tyrrel v. Milliken, 135 Mo. App. 293; Sanders v. Riddick (1913) 156 S. W. 464; Hornstein Co. v. Crandall, 156 Ill. App. 520; Tyrrel v. Hammerstein, 67 N. Y. Supp. 717; Argus Co. v. Hotchkiss (1907) 121 App. Div. 378, 107 N. Y. Supp. 138.

3. The rule that an account which has been rendered, and to which no objection has been made within a reasonable time, is to be regarded as admitted by the debtor as prima facie correct, assumes that there was some indebtedness between the parties, for there can be no liability on an account stated if no liability in fact exists, and the mere presentation of a claim,

D. C.]

Opinion of the Court.

although not objected to, cannot create liability. 1 R. C. L. ¶ 14; 27 L.R.A. (N.S.) 821, note; 29 L.R.A. (N.S.) 346, note; Allen v. Somerset Hotel Co. 88 N. Y. Supp. 944; Anding v. Lery, 57 Miss. 51; Freeland v. Heron, 7 Cranch, 147.

4. The previous dealings between the parties are not the issue tried here. See Dougherty v. Paige, 48 Iowa, 483; Bonynge v. Field, 81 N. Y. 159.

Mr. Justice VAN ORSDEL delivered the opinion of the Court:

The court below in its opinion attached no importance to the fact that these parties for a long period of time had been conducting transactions similar to the one sued upon, and that it had in all instances been the custom for plaintiff to send its bill to defendants, made out in their name, and for which in each instance it received in payment thereof defendants' cheek. We think the question of defendants' liability turns largely upon this conceded fact. One set of the briefs was for use in the supreme court of South Carolina. It is inconceivable that plaintiff would have printed and delivered the briefs, if dependent upon the client for payment, without either the money in advance or an assurance that the attorneys would pay the bill. While it is stipulated that no such guaranty was expressly given by defendants, we think there was an implied assurance to that effect arising out of the custom which had been established between the parties in past transactions. In Wires v. Briggs, 5 Vt. 101, 26 Am. Dec. 284, a case in which it was held that an attorney was not liable for the costs of the service of a writ, the rule of implied liability was stated as follows: "It is true that in some cases the law may imply a promise on the part of a lawyer to pay fees for the services of client's writs; as where the officer had been in the constant practice of charging his fees for such services to the lawyer, who from time to time had settled such charges without questioning their legality; from such practice the law may imply a promise to pay for subsequent services."

Unquestionably, it is a settled rule of the common law that

Opinion of the Court.

[43 App.

where one contracts with the agent of another, and the contracting party is apprised of the agency, the principal, and not the agent, is responsible. In other words, an agent is not generally liable when transacting business for a disclosed principal. It must be conceded in this case that plaintiff had notice on the face of the briefs printed of defendants' agency and the names of their principals. While it is true that an attorney is the agent of his client, the relation between them, we think, is such that it calls for some modification of the general rule which the law recognizes as existing between principal and agent. In ordinary transactions, the agent is subordinate to the principal, the principal standing out as the real actor, and the agent merely as a subordinate representative. But the relation between attorney and client is different. The attorney has complete charge of the litigation, is so recognized by the court, and, as such, dominates in all matters pertaining to the conduct of the litigation. "While in one sense the client is the principal and the attorney the agent, and while the attorney is professionally and constantly acting for clients, whose names from the records of the courts and other meaus of publicity are almost always known or may be so, yet there are peculiarities in his case which make it necessary to apply to it with some qualification the general principles of agency. In most cases of agency the principal is what the name imports, -the leading person in the transaction. The agent is, as the term implies, a mere subordinate, important only as the representative of the principal; often representing only one principal. An attorney at law, on the other hand, occupies a position of recognized importance in itself, not infrequently of great prominence before the public, in which he often has a large number of clients, his relations to whom are full of detail, and who are little noticed by the public." Heath v. Bates, 49 Conn. 342, 44 Am. Rep. 234. The attorney usually determines what steps are to be taken in his client's interest, and the acts of the attorney in the conduct of litigation are binding upon the client. We therefore deem the just and equitable rule of law thus established to be that, in the absence

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