such attorney or attorneys in such form as may be prescribed by the Secretary of the Interior."

*

* *

In pursuance of this act, the Secretary of the Interior promulgated certain rules and regulations, among which was the following: "Before any compensation and expenses are allowed any attorney or attorneys, said attorney or "attorneys must, within thirty days from the date of the approval of these regulations, file with the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Washington, District of Columbia, the contract or agreement entered into with such enrolled person or persons, or someone lawfully authorized to act for him or her, setting forth what compensation was to be paid thereunder to such attorney or attorneys, for services rendered in his or her behalf, or other written evidence sufficient to establish an implied contract to pay for such services, together with a verified itemized statement of services rendered and expenses incurred, giving the character and extent of such services and expenditures, and the dates when, and the places where, same were rendered.”

The material allegations of the bill, however, upon which plaintiff must stand or fall, read as follows:

"Fifteenth. That, although no formal claim has yet been filed by the defendant under and pursuant to the terms of said regulations of the Interior Department, defendant has advised the plaintiff that it is his purpose, in the presentation of the claim, to ignore the copartnership claims and the rights of the plaintiff and the subcontractors of the firm of the plaintiff and the defendant thereunder, and to stand as an individual for such compensation as he may be enabled to secure by way of award to defendant as such individual; and that the defendant has further advised the plaintiff that he would contend, in filing and prosecuting said claim, that he individually had secured the passage of the remedial legislation, and that he, and he alone, was entitled to any and all compensation which might be awarded in consideration for the professional services performed in the interest of the Indian claimants.

"Sixteenth. That there is in the possession of the defendant the books, papers, and documents of the firm, including the con

tracts with the Indian claimants, required by the regulations to be filed with the application for compensation of counsel; that without said documents, it would be impossible for the plaintiff to properly comply with the regulations in making the application on behalf of the firm for compensation; that the defendant denies to plaintiff access to said firm records and contracts; that even if the plaintiff were in position to present such claim without the aid of said records, it would be greatly to the detriment to all concerned for the matter to be presented to the Department by contending factions of the same legal entity, alone entitled to the ultimate result of such award as the Secretary of the Interior may make, it being manifestly to the interest of all concerned that, without schismatic spirit or division, the claim of said firm, including all elements thereof, should be presented in a manner in consonance with the basic equities and rights on which the claim can properly be presented."

The plaintiff prayed for the appointment of a receiver who should be directed to represent the partnership before the Secretary of the Interior in reference to allowance for services rendered, and to receive the sums allowed therefor; and that defendant be enjoined from interfering in any way with the receiver in relation to said claims, and from setting up or presenting any claim in hostility to said firm.

A temporary receiver was appointed, and defendant was directed to show cause why the prayer of the bill should not be granted. The defendant answered the rule, and also moved to dismiss the bill. A hearing was had upon the rule and motion to dismiss, and the court entered a decree in accordance with the prayer of the bill. From this decree the case comes here on appeal.

Mr. Weldon M. Bailey and Mr. Joseph W. Bailey for the appellant.

Mr. George H. Lamar for the appellee.

Opinion of the Court.

[43 App. Mr. Justice VAN ORSDEL delivered the opinion of the Court:

It is urged by counsel for defendant that the act of Congress declaring the contracts which formed the basis of the copartnership void operated to so taint the partnership contract as to nullify it. We are unable to agree with this contention. It is agreed that the partnership contract, when made, was valid. Indeed, the fee contracts were then legal. The statute striking down the fee agreements did not totally destroy the relation of attorney and client thereby established. The rights of the partners were reserved to the extent of establishing a claim to compensation for services rendered in quantum meruit before the Secretary of the Interior. When the copartnership agree、 ment was made, it was familiar law in this country that the United States, as custodian of Indian funds, in the exercise of its inherent powers of sovereignty, could limit the amount of compensation to be paid counsel for representing even a citizen of the United States who made a claim against such a fund, although it might involve the destruction of an existing contract for fees. Ball v. Halsell, 161 U. S. 72, 40 L. ed. 622, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 554; Marchie Tiger v. Western Invest. Co. 221 U. S. 286, 55 L. ed. 738, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 578. Plaintiff and defendant were advised of this ruling when the copartnership was formed, but it still remained for Congress to apply the rule to their agreements. Under these circumstances, it is doubtful if the validity of the partnership agreement would have been nullified had the partners' right to recover anything against the Indian fund been denied. A legal infirmity which will enable a party to a contract to avoid it must be inherent at the time of its inception. The act not only does not declare the services of attorneys an unlawful consideration upon which to base a charge against the fund of the Indians, but it specifically preserves this right.

It appears that services were performed by this copartnership which form a legal charge against the Indians, and it follows that whatever is recovered is an asset of the firm. The act only provides for justice between the Indians and counsel who have

performed services for them. It has no concern for existing contracts between attorneys which may govern the distribution of the fees so obtained. If, in the last analysis, no fees should be recovered, it would not affect the validity of the partnership in its adjustment and disposition of expenses, office fixtures, or whatever assets and liabilities it might have.

But is there ground for the interposition of equity by injunction and the appointment of a receiver? Defendant is enjoined from presenting any claim for services to the Secretary of the Interior, either on his own behalf or on behalf of the firm, in any matter growing out of the cases involved in the partnership. A receiver has been appointed to appear in the Department to assert the claims of the partnership, and to receive such compensation as may be allowed by the Secretary of the Interior. We think no reason in equity exists for either an injunction or the appointment of a receiver. The act of Congress, the rules of the Secretary made pursuant thereto, and the terms of the partnership agreement fully and amply protect plaintiff. The act of Congress permits all parties interested to present their claims to the Secretary of the Interior for compensation for services rendered. This opens the door not only to plaintiff and defendant individually, but as partners, to submit proof of services in all cases involved in the partnership. For the proper protection of all parties, the Secretary, by rule, has required all fee agreements to be filed with him, and when it is made to appear to him that outstanding fee agreements exist as an original basis for the claims of the partnership, he will undoubtedly require compliance with his rules and block every avenue of recovery until the contracts and such records of the partnership as appear essential in the case have been produced. The act then provides "that before payment is made to any attorney or attorneys there shall be filed a receipt in full of all claims or demands on the part of such attorney or attorneys in such form as may be prescribed by the Secretary of the Interior." [38 Stat. at L. 600, chap. 222.]

With such a legal tribunal open to plaintiff, what protection can he claim in equity? His course is plain. All he is required

Syllabus.

[43 App. to do is to place before the Secretary of the Interior the partnership agreement, or a true copy thereof; and the Secretary, in the proper performance of his duties, will not order payment in any claim in which it appears the firm is interested until a full receipt and acquittance has been executed by the partners jointly or as a firm. A like duty devolves upon the Secretary to see that the warrant or evidence of indebtedness is delivered to the person authorized to receive it. In this instance, by reference to the partnership agreement, it appears that plaintiff is alone authorized to receive payment from the Government on behalf of the firm. It thus appears that the Secretary, in the due performance of his duty, must, of necessity, pursue a course which will amply protect plaintiff.

The decree is reversed with costs, and the cause is remanded with directions to dismiss the bill. Reversed and remanded,

CAPITAL TRACTION COMPANY v. BRINLEY.*

STREET RAILROADS; TRANSFERS; PASSENGERS; TRESPASSERS; EVIDENCE.

1. A street railway passenger holding a transfer, and the conductor to whom it is presented, are bound by what appears on the face of the transfer; and if a mistake has been made by the conductor issuing the transfer, the passenger has his right of action therefor against the company. (Following Shortsleeves v. Capital Traction Co. 28 App. D. C. 365.)

2. Where a passenger of a street railway company, holding an overdue transfer, which the conductor to whom he presents it refuses to ac

* Carriers-Defective Transfer Ticket.--For cases passing upon the rights and duties of passenger receiving defective street car transfer, see notes to Little Rock R. & Electric Co. v. Goerner, 7 L.R.A. (N.S.) 97, and Montgomery Traction Co. v. Fitzpatrick, 9 L.R.A. (N.S.) 851

Ejection of Passenger-Tender of Fare to Prevent.-For cases passing upon the sufficiency of tender of fare to prevent ejection, see note to Kirk v. Seattle Electric Co. 31 L.R.A. (N.S.) 991.