which you may find he suffered as the result of the publication, and for the detraction from his good name and reputation which the publication of the defamatory article may have occasioned, or may hereafter occasion; and in this connection you may consider the extent of the circulation of the publication.

Defendant excepted to this instruction.

Plaintiff offered instruction number eight, which was given over the objection of the defendant, and exception reserved. It reads as follows:

"You are instructed that the publishers of newspapers are held by the law to the highest accountability for unreliable publications, and that it was the duty of the defendant as the publisher of a widely circulated newspaper to exercise reasonable caution against the false defamation of the innocent, and to take reasonable care to ascertain the truth of the defamatory matter affecting the character, good name, and reputation of the plaintiff; and if you believe from the evidence that the defendant failed to exercise such reasonable care, and that the libel complained of was published without taking reasonable precautions to ascertain the truth of the allegations concerning the plaintiff; and if you further find from the evidence that the libel complained of was published by the defendant with reckless indifference to the injuries which it might occasion to the plaintiff, then such failure to take reasonable precautions and such reckless indifference to the rights of the plaintiff is equivalent to an intentional violation of the plaintiff's rights, or to malice in fact, and sufficient to justify the jury in awarding the plaintiff punitive damages."

Defendant offered the following instruction, which was refused, and exception reserved. It reads as follows:

"The jury are instructed that if they find from the evidence that the defendant's correspondent Essary honestly and in good faith believed the statements in the newspaper article set forth in plaintiff's declaration to be true, and had the grounds for such belief sufficient to satisfy an ordinary prudent and

cautious man that such statements were true, then the plaintiff is not entitled to recover punitive damages in this case."

Defendant then offered the following instruction, which was refused, and exception reserved:

"The jury are instructed that if they find that the defendant's correspondent Essary was prompted by actual malice, or acted with reckless or careless indifference to the rights and feelings of the plaintiff in the publication of the newspaper article set forth in plaintiff's declaration, that such actual malice or reckless or careless indifference cannot be imputed to the defendant on the evidence in this case."

The court in the general charge stated to the jury as follows: "You will consider all the circumstances of the case, and assess those damages at what you believe is a fair and just sum, merely with a view to compensating the plaintiff, so far as he can be compensated by money damages, as is stated in the instruction which has been read to you. Those are all the damages which a plaintiff is entitled to recover in his own right strictly as a matter of law, but in this class of cases, if the jury find certain other elements to be present, the jury has a right to award punitive damages. These damages are to be awarded, if at all, as a punishment to the defendant, and by way of an example to the defendant and to the community in the interest of law and order; and consequently they rest entirely in the discretion of the jury, not only as to the amount, but as to whether any shall be awarded at all. It is my duty to call your attention to the elements which would justify you, if you find them to exist in the case, in awarding such damages."

This was excepted to.

The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, assessing his damages by reason of the premises in the sum of $6,000; $5,000 of which they assess as compensatory damages, and $1,000 as punitive damages.

The court overruled a motion for a new trial and entered judgment upon the verdict for the whole amount, and defendant has appealed.

Mr. Arthur Peter and Mr. Julian W. Whiting, for the appellant, in their brief, cited, Branch v. State, 41 Tex. 622: Brick wood's Sackett Instructions, 197; Bailey v. Holland, 7 App. 184, 189; Bacon, Abr. title "Error," p. 383; Denver & R. G. R. Co. v. Harriss, 122 U. S. 610; Detroit Post v. McArthur, 16 Mich. 447; Eviston v. Cramer, 57 Wis. 571; Phila., etc., Rd. v. Quigley, 21 How. 202, 210; Gambrill v. Schooley, 93 Md. 48; Haines v. Schultz, 50 N. J. L. p. 484; Ilagan v. Rail road, 3 R. I. 88; 1 Joyce, Damages, §§ 122, 135-137; Lake Shore, etc., R. Co. v. Prentice, 147 U. S. 101; North Carolina v. Vanderford, 35 Fed. 282; Northern C. R. Co. v. Newman, 98 Md. 507; Pierce v. United States, 37 App. D. C. 582; Russell v. Washington Post, 31 App. D. C. 277, 281; 1 Sedgw. Damages, 9th ed., $$ 363, 368, 380; Steamboat Co. v. Davis, 12 App. D. C. 323; The Amiable Nancy, 3 Wheat. 546; Wilkes v. Wood, 19 How. St. Tr. p. 1153; Washington Herald Co. v. Berry, 41 App. D. C. 322, 340; Woodward v. Ragland, 5 App. D. C. 220; Washington Times v. Downey, 26 App. D. C. 262.

Mr. James S. Easby-Smith and Mr. Ralph B. Fleharty, for the appellee, in their brief, cited Billings v. Field, 36 App. D. C. 16; Chaloner v. Washington Post Co. 36 App. D. C. 231; Denver etc., R. Co. v. Harris, 122 U. S. 610; Gambrill v. Schooley, 93 Md. 48; Re Gompers, 40 App. D. C. 293; Lake Shore, etc., R. Co. v. Prentice, 147 U. S. 101; Northern C. R. Co. v. Newman, 98 Md. 507; Pierce v. United States, 37 App. D. C. 582; Ross v. Fickling, 11 App. D. C. 442; Russell v. Wash. Post Co. 31 App. D. C. 278; Wash. Herald Co. v. Berry, 41 App. D. C. 322; Wash. Time Co. v. Downey, 26 App. D. C. 258; D. C. Code § 226.

Mr. Chief Justice SHEPARD delivered the opinion of the Court:

It is not seriously contended that the charge of the court permitting the jury to find compensatory damages was error. The

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facts alleged in the were libelous per se. disgrace. Norfolk & 306, 332.

article as regards the removal of plaintiff It tended to bring him into contempt and W. S. B. Co. v. Davis, 12 App. D. C.

In that case it was said: "Where, in an action for libel or slander, the cause of action is proved against the defendant, the jury are not limited to nominal damages merely, though no evidence is given on behalf of the plaintiff, and where the libel is actionable without the averment of special damages, the jury may take into consideration not only the injury that has arisen, but that which may thereafter arise, from the publication of the libel." See also Washington Herald Co. v. Berry, 41 App. D. C. 322, 339.

The serious contention is as to the instruction permitting the jury to find punitive damages also. Essary was a correspondent of the Baltimore Sun. His duties were to collect and forward news items. It does not appear that the corporation or its manager knew of the character of the article or of anything to refute the act of publication. On the contrary, the paper published the refutation of the story and sent a representative to the plaintiff with an offer to publish a correction, and this correction was also published. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. v. Prentice, 147 U. S. 101, 107, 37 L. ed. 97, 101, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 261, where the court said: "Exemplary or punitive damages, being awarded, not by way of compensation to the sufferer, but by way of punishment of the offender, and as a warning to others, can only be awarded against one who has participated in the offense. A principal, therefore, though, of course, liable to make compensation for injuries done by his agent within the scope of his employment, cannot be held liable for exemplary or punitive damages, merely by reason of wanton, oppressive, or malicious intent on the part of the agent." See also Haines v. Schultz, 50 N. J. L. 481, 14 Atl. 488; Detroit Daily Post Co. v. McArthur, 16 Mich. 447; Eviston v. Cramer, 57 Wis. 570, 15 N. W. 760; Norfolk & W. S. B. Co. v. Davis, 12 App. D. C. 306, 329; Washington Gaslight Co. v. Lansden, 172 U. S. 534, 43 L. ed. 543, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 296.

It was therefore error to submit the question of punitive damages to the jury.

The verdict for punitive damages being separate and distinct from that for compensatory damages, if the plaintiff shall, within ten days from this date, remit the amount of that verdict, $1,000, the judgment will be modified to that extent and affirmed, each party paying his own costs in this court.

If the amount be not remitted as above provided, the judgment will be reversed with costs, and the cause remanded for a new trial.

A remittitur was filed, and the judgment was modified and affirmed. Modified and affirmed.

VINCENT v. HOPKINS.

APPEAL AND ERROR; PATENTS; INTERFERENCE; REDUCTION TO PRACTICE.

1. Unanimity of decision by the Patent Office tribunals in favor of the senior party to an interference increases the burden of the junior party.

2. Where, in an interference involving the invention of an attachment to an adding machine designed to perform multiplication, it was claimed by the junior party that a plate model constructed by him was a reduction to practice, but it appeared, among other things, that the numbers on the dial wheel of the model were upside down and could not be conveniently read; that there was no mechanism for bringing the registry wheel back to zero after a computation had been made; that the most the model could do was to multiply digit by digit; that the various hand operations which this operation necessitated did not constitute the automatic operation contemplated by the issue, and that the only way in which the accumulating wheels could be cleared was by adding the necessary complementary numbers to them; it was held that the device did not come within the class of crude devices capable of use sufficient to demonstrate their practical efficacy and utility, and did not constitute a reduction to