in the case of any offender under the age of seventeen years, and to parole such child under the care of the chief probation officer of the court for a probation period, and it is provided that "such paroled child" shall be under the jurisdiction of the court during the probation period. The fact that Congress deemed it necessary to make the specific grant of special power to the juvenile court as to this particular class of children negatives the idea of a previous grant to that court of general power in this connection, for had such general power been granted its subsequent mention would have been necessary only by way of limitation or exception in specific instances. Section 8 centers in the juvenile court the powers over juvenile offenders theretofore granted to other courts. In addition, it clothes the court with power to commit truants from school "to the Board of Children's Guardians, who are hereby given the care and supervision thereof when so committed." The section further provides that certain delinquent, neglected, or dependent children "shall hereafter be committed" by the juvenile court "to the care of the Board of Children's Guardians, either for a limited period on probation or during minority, as circumstances may require." The prohibition against the discharge, parole, or transfer of any child committed "to any public institution" obviously does not refer to the board, for throughout the acts quoted a careful distinction has been made by Congress between the board and an institution.

We find, therefore, that Congress has clothed the court with continuing jurisdiction over children under deferred sentences, and who are out on parole for a probation period, but that no such power has been given the court over children committed to the Board of Children's Guardians. To find that the court possessed such power would not only do violence to well-established rules of statutory construction and interpretation, as already intimated, but, on the other hand, the independence of the board in this respect is consistent with the juvenile court act, as well as with all other legislation concerning the board, and the express intent of Congress to place upon the board responsi bility for the care and supervision of children committed to it.

As to the wisdom or unwisdom of the policy of Congress in this regard we have nothing to do. It is our sole duty to determine and give expression to the intent of the lawmaking power. We think it clear that when the court, in the present case, committed the child in question to the Board of Children's Guardians during minority, the court, at the expiration of the term in which the commitment was made, had no power to set aside the commitment.

The judgment must be reversed and the cause remanded for appropriate proceedings. Reversed and remanded.

INDEX.

ABATEMENT OF PURCHASE PRICE. See VENDOR AND PURCHASER,

1-3.

ABUTTING OWNERS. See HIGHWAYS, 1.

ACCIDENT INSURANCE.

See INSURANCE, 1-7.

ACCOUNTING. See BROKERS, 2; TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES, 4, 5.

ADEQUATE REMEDY AT LAW. See TAXATION.

ADMINISTRATORS. See EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS.

ADOPTION. See INDIANS, 2.

ADULTERATION. See FOOD AND DRUGS.

ADULTERY. See DIVORCE, 5, 6.

AFFIDAVITS. See ATTACHMENT, 2.

AFFIDAVITS OF DEFENSE. See BILLS AND NOTES, 2; CONTRACTS, 4;
JUDGMENT, 1.

1. Statements in an affidavit of defense, of affiant's belief, without a ten-
der of proof, are insufficient. Hazen v. Van Senden, 161.

2. If the court on reading an affidavit of defense is convinced that it was
made in good faith, and that a doubt exists as to the right of the
plaintiff to recover, summary judgment should not be entered in
favor of the plaintiff. (Following Codington v. Standard Bank, 40
App. D. C. 409.)

ALIENS.

Id.

1. One born of Chinese parents domiciled in one of the states of the Union,
and not employed in any diplomatic or official capacity, becomes at
Vol. XLIII.—39.
609

ALIENS-continued.

his birth a citizen of the United States by the terms of the 14th
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. Chin Wah
v. United States, 38.

2. A certificate of a United States commissioner, showing that a China-
man had, under a certain name, been adjudged by him to be law
fully in the United States, and a certified copy of the fee bill in
that case, are admissible, in a subsequent proceeding of the same
kind, to corroborate testimony that the defendant, who bore a dif-
ferent name, was the person tried in the proceeding to which the
certificate relates, where, although the certificate is not a certified
copy of a court record, it appears that the Commissioner kept no
judgment records. Id.

3. A report to the Department of Justice of an investigator of charges
against a United States commissioner, reciting that the latter had
tried a Chinaman upon the charge of being unlawfully in this
country, is inadmissible in a subsequent proceeding of the same
kind, in which the defendant claims to have been the person tried
and discharged by the Commissioner, though bearing a different name
than the one in the former proceeding. Id.

4. Unimpeached testimony of birth in this country and consequent citizen-
ship is sufficient to establish, as required by sec. 3 of the act of
Congress of May, 1892, his lawful right to remain here, upon the
arrest of a Chinaman under the provisions of such act. Id.

5. It would seem that the burden of overthrowing defendant's prima facie
case of birth in this country and consequent citizenship rests upon
the government, where a Chinaman has lived here for a long time,
and when arrested for remaining here claims, by reason of birth
here, to be a citizen. Id.

ALIMONY. See CONTEMPT, 1; DIVORCE, 4.

AMENDMENT. See EQUITY, 4.

APPEAL AND ERROR. See CARRIERS, 3, 4, 6; CONTEMPT, 1; COSTS;
CRIMINAL LAW, 1, 6; DAMAGES, 1; DIVORCE, 3; EXCEPTIONS, BILL
OF; EQUITY, 2, 3; EVIDENCE, 3, 10; GARNISHMENT, 4; INSURANCE,
1; LIBEL AND SLANDER, 3, 6; MANDAMUS, 1; NEGLIGENCE, 1; OBJEC
TIONS AND EXCEPTIONS; QUO WARRANTO, 2, 5; TRIAL, 3, 7, 8.
1. A decree will, on appellee's motion be affirmed upon appeal, where
the statement of the evidence in the case has been stricken from the
record by order of the court, since the evidence upon which the
cause appears to have been heard in the court below, not being in
the record, must be presumed to have supported the decree. Rozer
v. May, 103.